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Stable Sampling Equilibrium in Common Pool Resource Games

Economics Department, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia
Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse 31015, France
Department of Economics, Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, USA
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Ananish Chaudhuri
Games 2015, 6(3), 299-317;
Received: 4 June 2015 / Revised: 19 August 2015 / Accepted: 26 August 2015 / Published: 31 August 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)
PDF [259 KB, uploaded 7 September 2015]


This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a model of payoff sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data, including single-peaked frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actionsand stable heterogeneity in choices. These properties can also be accurately replicated using logit quantal response equilibrium (QRE), but only by tuning the free parameter separately for separate games. When the QRE parameter is constrained to be the same across games, sampling equilibrium provides a superior fit to the data. We argue that these findings are likely to generalize to other complex games with multiple players and strategies. View Full-Text
Keywords: common pool resource games; experiments; sampling equilibrium; quantal response equilibrium common pool resource games; experiments; sampling equilibrium; quantal response equilibrium

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Cárdenas, J.C.; Mantilla, C.; Sethi, R. Stable Sampling Equilibrium in Common Pool Resource Games. Games 2015, 6, 299-317.

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