Representing Others in a Public Good Game
AbstractIn many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by group representatives. We present the results from a laboratory experiment that compares decisions made by individuals in inter-individual public good games with decisions made by representatives on behalf of their group in inter-group public good games. Our main finding is that contribution behavior differs between individuals and group representatives, but only for women. While men’s choices are equally self-interested as individuals and group representatives, women make less self-interested choices as group representatives. View Full-Text
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Hauge, K.E.; Rogeberg, O. Representing Others in a Public Good Game. Games 2015, 6, 381-393.
Hauge KE, Rogeberg O. Representing Others in a Public Good Game. Games. 2015; 6(3):381-393.Chicago/Turabian Style
Hauge, Karen E.; Rogeberg, Ole. 2015. "Representing Others in a Public Good Game." Games 6, no. 3: 381-393.