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Representing Others in a Public Good Game

Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Gaustadalléen 21, Oslo 0349, Norway
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Ananish Chaudhuri
Games 2015, 6(3), 381-393;
Received: 6 July 2015 / Revised: 14 September 2015 / Accepted: 16 September 2015 / Published: 21 September 2015
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Experimental Studies of Social Dilemma Games)
In many important public good situations the decision-making power and authority is delegated to representatives who make binding decisions on behalf of a larger group. The purpose of this study is to compare contribution decisions made by individuals with contribution decisions made by group representatives. We present the results from a laboratory experiment that compares decisions made by individuals in inter-individual public good games with decisions made by representatives on behalf of their group in inter-group public good games. Our main finding is that contribution behavior differs between individuals and group representatives, but only for women. While men’s choices are equally self-interested as individuals and group representatives, women make less self-interested choices as group representatives. View Full-Text
Keywords: public good game; lab experiment; group representative; gender public good game; lab experiment; group representative; gender
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Hauge, K.E.; Rogeberg, O. Representing Others in a Public Good Game. Games 2015, 6, 381-393.

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