Side-Channel and Fault Attacks in Post-quantum Cryptography

A special issue of Electronics (ISSN 2079-9292). This special issue belongs to the section "Circuit and Signal Processing".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (20 October 2024) | Viewed by 1507

Special Issue Editors

Department of Electrical and Information Technology, Lund University, 221 00 Lund, Sweden
Interests: information and coding theory; information security; cryptography; cryptographic implementations

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is a research subject investigating public-key cryptographic algorithms that are believed to resist quantum attacks. On July 5, 2022, NIST announced the selected KEM and digital signature candidates to be standardized in their PQC standardization project. The need to securely implement PQC schemes will drastically increase in the coming years as many commercial products or open-source hardware/software have planned the transition to PQC solutions. In this Special Issue, we are particularly interested in discovering new side-channel and fault attacks against known PQC implementations and proposing more efficient and secure countermeasures.

Topics of interest include but are not limited to:

  • Power and EM side-channel attacks on post-quantum implementations
  • Micro-architectural side-channel attacks on post-quantum implementations
  • Masked implementations in post-quantum cryptography
  • Efficient constant-time post-quantum implementations
  • Fault attacks and countermeasures in post-quantum cryptography
  • Attacks and countermeasures on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) implementations

Dr. Qian Guo
Dr. Ali Hassan Sodhro
Guest Editors

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Keywords

  • post-quantum cryptography
  • side-channel attacks
  • fault-injection attacks
  • masking
  • timing attacks
  • cryptographic implementations

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Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

18 pages, 5018 KiB  
Article
Single Trace Analysis of Visible vs. Invisible Leakage for Comparison-Operation-Based CDT Sampling
by Keon-Hee Choi, Jaeseung Han and Dong-Guk Han
Electronics 2024, 13(23), 4681; https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics13234681 - 27 Nov 2024
Viewed by 713
Abstract
The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to the security of conventional public-key cryptosystems, driving the demand for quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted a multi-year competition, ultimately selecting four ciphers. Among these, [...] Read more.
The emergence of quantum computers poses a significant threat to the security of conventional public-key cryptosystems, driving the demand for quantum-resistant cryptographic solutions. In response, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted a multi-year competition, ultimately selecting four ciphers. Among these, Falcon employs cumulative distribution table (CDT) sampling, which produces arrays of random values derived from a discrete Gaussian distribution during the signature generation phase. This array is then used with secret key information, forming the core of Falcon. Enhanced variants of Falcon, such as Mitaka, SOLMAE, and Antrag, implemented CDT sampling using comparison operations. Previous research by Choi et al. proposed a single trace analysis and countermeasure for CDT sampling, which exploited a non-constant-time vulnerability in 8-bit AVR microcontrollers. However, this vulnerability is specific to certain environments, and a potential vulnerability in comparison-operation-based constant-time CDT sampling remains unstudied. This paper is an extension of that study. This paper investigates the constant-time operation of comparison-operation-based CDT sampling on Arm Cortex-M4-based chips and proposes a deep learning-based side-channel analysis to recover the sampling values using a novel vulnerability. The proposed model achieves an F1 score of 1.0 and a recovery success rate of 99.97%. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Side-Channel and Fault Attacks in Post-quantum Cryptography)
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