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15 November 2025

Disinformation in Crisis Contexts—Perception of Russia Today’s Narratives in Ecuador

Departamento de Ciencias de la Comunicación, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Educación y Humanidades, Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja, Loja 110107, Ecuador
Journal. Media2025, 6(4), 192;https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia6040192 
(registering DOI)
This article belongs to the Special Issue Social Media in Disinformation Studies
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Abstract

Disinformation poses a substantive challenge to democratic governance, particularly in contexts marked by foreign influence. While the broadcasting of Russia Today (RT) in Europe has received significant attention, comparatively little is known about its impact and audience reception in Latin America. This study addresses this gap by analysing Ecuadorians’ perceptions and uptake of RT’s broadcast narratives during a period of acute economic and security crisis. The objectives are (1) to establish the news narratives presented on RT, (2) to identify citizens’ perceptions of the news narratives, and (3) to determine the uptake of the narratives. A mixed methodological approach is undertaken, including narrative analysis of three audiovisual news pieces published by RT in Spanish, a survey, and three online focus groups. The results reveal the deployment of sophisticated narrative strategies that mix information with unsubstantiated claims and emotional appeals, resulting in a discernible bias favouring Russian perspectives. The findings underscore the urgency of strengthening media literacy and public policy responses in Latin America to counter the internalisation of such narratives. In addition, the research contributes to debates on information security, democratic resilience, and the protection of public opinion in vulnerable environments.

1. Introduction

Despite the abundance of studies focusing on Russian media disinformation in Europe and North America, there is still a significant gap of ignorance regarding the way in which the narratives spread by Russian state media, particularly Russia Today (RT), are received, reinterpreted, or internalised in socio-political contexts in the Global South. Previous research has mainly focused on the impact and discursive strategies of disinformation in Western societies, leaving the dynamics of consumption and reception in Latin American countries undergoing institutional, economic, and security crises insufficiently explored. In this sense, Ecuador presents itself as a relevant social laboratory, since its unstable situation constitutes fertile ground for the circulation of disinformation messages and allows us to analyse the mechanisms through which such narratives can influence public opinion, adapt to local cultural codes, and potentially modify citizens’ attitudes towards international actors.
Ecuador presents a particularly relevant environment to study disinformation due to its geopolitical situation, economic dependence, and increasing vulnerability to external influence. In contrast to European contexts, where institutional resistance is more developed, this country offers an opportunity to analyse how Russian narratives are embedded in a fragmented information ecosystem with high levels of distrust towards institutions.
Ecuador is characterized by structural inequality and poor governance (), which worsened after the onset of COVID-19 due to political unrest, the prevalence of misinformation, and polarization regarding the development model (; ). In the last decade, this Andean country has seen an increase in online media consumption, although young people still use open channels. Television stations are exploring new forms of distribution through social media, and although they remain popular, they face growing demand for local content (). In general, traditional media are declining, leaving room for new online offerings. There are also systematic efforts by educational institutions and civil society to develop media and information skills that lead to a participatory society ().
This study offers systematised empirical evidence on the reception and assimilation of RT’s audiovisual narratives. It seeks to understand how international media can adapt their media soft power strategy in Latin American environments and how national audiences re-signify messages according to their specific socio-political context, thus providing original evidence and a regional perspective for the advancement of knowledge.
In terms of theoretical definitions of the study, it should be mentioned that disinformation is “the deliberate creation and dissemination of false or manipulated information intended to mislead and confuse audiences, either for the purpose of causing harm or for political, personal, or economic gain” (Digital, Culture, Media & Sport Committee) (). It is often linked to news that is intentionally and demonstrably false (). The purpose of disinformation is to “undermine public trust, distort facts, convey a certain way of perceiving reality, and exploit vulnerabilities in order to destabilise” () and create distrust so that narratives appear suspect (). At the origin of disinformation is “the will to lie and to have others spread the lie” () to ‘mislead the listener’ ().
A common strategy for spreading disinformation is to use social media, focusing on stories rather than sources (), manipulating emotions, and addressing polarising political issues (). In recent years, particularly after the beginning of COVID-19, there has been a deliberate intention to fabricate information to inflict harm through the manipulation of video, images, or other multimedia formats (). Declining trust in the media increases the risk of people falling for hoaxes () and is one of the major challenges to security worldwide. Furthermore, innovations in the production, distribution, and consumption of news cause lies to spread rapidly, so states are fighting this challenge by implementing policies to prevent disinformation from spreading.
In practice, disinformation is constructed through narratives. A disinformative narrative is made up of messages or stories designed to manipulate public perception, influence opinions, or undermine trust in legitimate sources (, ). Narratives in the media construct meanings of reality that help people “make sense of the world and situate themselves in it” (). A disinformative narrative becomes powerful when it is linked to familiar stories (), and in international politics, they are used to subvert political discourse ().
For the European Union (EU), disinformation is one of the greatest threats to democracies because they are vulnerable “to manipulation more than totalitarian systems and consequently find it more difficult to offer forceful responses” (). In the past, the fear of nations was physical attacks. Today they are “becoming aware of another danger, the use of media and psychological warfare to spread disinformation and propaganda” (). War events around the world carry a significant burden of disinformation strategies (). Disinformation is therefore considered a type of belligerence (). The higher the level of a narrative, the greater its potential to influence the general discourse ().
For a decade the spread of disinformation through social media to distort the official version of events and infect the news environment has been known (), but the meddling practices of Russian intelligence services, which dominate the online manipulation market, stand out (). Russia is described as a producer of propagandistic messages aimed at influencing the policies of other governments, disrupting relations, discrediting opponents, convincing others of its greatness, and demonstrating the degradation of Europe and the West (; ).
In political destabilisation campaigns, “the Russian government has been accused of using clear weapons: the internet and social media, which offer access to the heart of liberal democracies” (). Russian news websites often broadcast the narratives of their authorities (; ). Many indications show that the Kremlin supports aggressive narrative strategies. Even if for the Russian government this is “public diplomacy” (). Although Russia practices communications policies that are close to “governmental manipulation, the rest of the governments also have a determinant manipulative role. In fact, we could affirm that all governments, in one way or another, play that role” (). Russia does not have a monopoly on disinformation campaigns, “but any state—as well as non-state actors—can make use of them to achieve their goals” ().
Russian disinformation is not recent, but it is now multiplying its reach through the Internet (). There are allegations of Russian funding of far-right groups in the EU (). Also, Russian disinformation campaigns have been identified through social media platforms in several states (; ). Russian support for information projection is part of an effort to harm and undermine others (; ). In a direct way, Russia has followed the model of CNN and BBC, as opposed to creating and promoting international media to confront the narrative of Western media companies and break the dominance over global news (; ).
Moscow has media with a great online presence, such as the popular Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik News, which from their origin were instruments of disinformation in Europe and other countries (; ). They were born in 2013 and 2014 “with the mission to deepen the internal division in the European Union” (). The US and EU governments describe RT and Sputnik as elements of the Russian government’s ecosystem of disinformation and open propaganda. They are intended as soft power tools to promote Russia’s image internationally (; ). Their narratives show sophistication, using experts and commentators to lend credibility to disinformation (; ).
In March 2022, the EU imposed sanctions on RT and Sputnik, banning them from broadcasting within its borders () because of the Kremlin’s systematic manipulation of information and because they pose a threat to public order and security. This decision was influenced by the fact that Russia has been “conducting disinformation activities of unprecedented” (). The EU stresses the need to address Russian disinformation (). The European Commission and the EU High Representative indicated that Russia executed disinformation campaigns on COVID-19 to undermine democratic debate and exacerbate social polarisation (). In June 2020, the European Parliament set up a special committee on foreign interference in all democratic processes, including disinformation. This committee produced a report highlighting the ability of social media platforms to reinforce cognitive biases and interfere with civic decision-making ().
From an academic perspective, the study of disinformation narratives derives from the analysis of ’s () ritual model of communication and the meaning of messages over time (). The development of disinformative narrative demands logical structures and alternative ways of interpreting and framing events (); they are offered “representing a past, a present, and a future, an obstacle, and a desired endpoint” (), specifically, in “[a] simple, unifying, and easily expressed story or explanation that organises people’s experience and provides a framework for understanding events” ().
Other relationships of misinformation to communication theories are linked to the democratisation of communication and to communication for development (; ), as it advocates freedom of expression, participation, plurality, and diversity. For citizens to achieve their right to freedom of expression, they need to have access to comprehensive and quality information; therefore, misinformation is contrary to the freedom of expression enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international legal instruments. In the same sense, reference should be made to the recent “Joint statement on freedom of expression and (“fake news”), disinformation and propaganda” issued by international freedom of expression representatives ().
It should also be remembered that Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “everyone has the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers”, as does Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, thus disinformation disqualifies an essential quality of the human being. Other instruments that endorse freedom of expression are the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the American Convention on Human Rights. Underlying risks to democracy arising from disinformation are highlighted as arising from a general trend towards polarisation of public debate, which “reduces the common ground on which reasoned debate, based on objective facts, can take place” ().
On the basis of the above, and because there is little research on the reception of the narratives transmitted by Russian state-supported media platforms in various languages, including Spanish (; ; ), the case of information generated by RT is studied with respect to Ecuador.
Previous research shows RT’s influence on national news agendas. RT employs historical and ideological narratives, such as conspiracy theories about the New World Order and the Golden Billion, to justify Russia’s actions and position the country against Western elites (). The perception of RT’s narratives varies significantly by region and demographic group. In post-communist European countries, local media frequently propagate official Russian narratives to influence public opinion (). In Latin America, RT’s diplomacy has mixed results; some audiences are optimistic about RT’s influence, but prefabricated images of Russia may decrease its acceptance (). In the United States, exposure on RT of human rights violations in Ukraine was shown to reduce their valuation among Americans, regardless of knowing the source (). RT’s narratives influence agendas and align issues with Russian interests, for example, by strategically using social media to normalise its influence ().
This study is justified, in addition to the arguments outlined above and related to other countries and continents, because RT, as Russian state media, has been particularly active in Latin America, which explains its inclusion in the analysis. The objectives of the research are (1) to establish the news narratives broadcast by RT, (2) to identify citizens’ perceptions of the narratives broadcast by RT, and (3) to determine the assimilation of RT’s narratives among Ecuadorians, from which the research questions are derived: (1) What are the narratives of the news broadcast by RT in Ecuador? (2) What is the perception of Ecuadorians about the narratives broadcast by RT? (3) How do Ecuadorians assimilate RT’s narratives?

2. Materials and Methods

The research uses qualitative and quantitative methodology, descriptive in scope, as it measures variables as they are manifested in reality (). A methodological triangulation is sought through three instruments: narrative analysis, a survey, and virtual discussion groups.
Three audiovisual news published by RT in Spanish were identified for narrative analysis, this identification was made on the basis of the publications from the Código Vidrio portal, which have a high impact on social media audiences (). The audiovisual news corresponds to: (1) Soft power, iron fist: How Washington tries to isolate Latin America from other partners, published by RT in Spanish; (2) Dollarisation and drug trafficking: the case of Ecuador; and (3) Correa denounces that the Ecuadorian prosecutor ‘knew that Villavicencio was in danger’ and did not protect him. These audiovisual publications were contrasted with news reports presented by other international media, public and private television stations whose archives are freely available on YouTube. This strategy made it possible to isolate the distinctive features of RT’s discourse compared to conventional approaches. However, it is acknowledged that the corpus, while representative of RT’s agenda, does not cover its overall temporal or thematic diversity.
The search was done through keywords on seven channels: (1) DW Español, German public television; (2) France 24 in Spanish, French public television; (3) Voice of America, US public television; (4) RTVE Noticias, Spanish public television; (5) CNN in Spanish, US private television; (6) NTN24, Latin American private television; (7) Telesur, public television sponsored by Latin American governments. But in the last four channels no related files were found. The search keywords were for the first news item: Laura Richardson, visit, Ecuador; for the second: Ecuador, drug trafficking, violence, dollarisation; for the last news item: Ecuador, Correa, Villavicencio, murder. The pieces analysed are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Description of the audiovisuals analysed.
The research instruments complement each other and contribute to achieving the research objectives. Narrative analysis achieves objective 1; the results of the survey help to shape perceptions of the uninformative narratives identified in objective 2; and the focus groups provide evidence to determine the internalisation of the narratives (objective 3). A triangulation seeks to examine different facets of a phenomenon using relevant instruments in a sequential manner, combining methods, philosophies, and orientations of various methodological designs (; ). Descriptive research produces data in “people’s own words spoken or written” (), and “aims to define, classify, catalogue or characterise the object of study” ().
In general, the methodologies used to study disinformation narratives include content analysis and social network analysis. By combining content analysis and virtual ethnography, disinformation can be linked to its effects on social actors and institutions. Narrative analysis was initially used to deconstruct literary texts (); today it is a basis for identifying and evaluating misinformation. ’s () model of narrative analysis is adopted as a way of organising diverse data into coherent entities, revealing underlying stories. The questions guiding the examination are: Who are the actors involved? What are the events? What are the spaces? How do stories emerge, continue and change over time? What is the problem posed? What are the reasons for the problem? and What are the suggested solutions? This leads to a “grand narrative” that involves identifying What are the stories being told? How are they told? and how do they relate to each other?
The survey is based on non-probabilistic convenience sampling due to the availability of participants and because it optimises time “according to the specific circumstances surrounding both the researcher and the subjects or groups under investigation” (). A Google Form was used to collect the data between 9 and 28 July 2024, which were processed in SPSS statistical software, version 22. The questionnaire was developed based on the studies of (), (), and (), who consider disinformation multidisciplinarily based on the meanings of the news and the theory of appraisal to discern strategies used and the sense of veracity. These works also show that repetition and recycling are part of the Russian disinformation model; for them, RT is a mix of infotainment and disinformation.
The purpose of the survey is to obtain information to identify citizens’ perceptions of the Russian narratives in the same two audio-visual pieces used for the narrative analysis. The sample selection is random because the questionnaire was distributed in a “snowball” dynamic through social networks, for this reason responses were mostly received from young people, although it is also due to the fact that Ecuador has a predominantly young population structure, more than 25% are between 15 and 29 years of age, according to the (). A total of 81 participations were received, corresponding to 33 men and 48 women. The average age is 25 years old, by age group: 18–27 years old: 73%; 28–37 years old: 23%; 38 and over: 4%. The participants live in different cities in Ecuador and have different occupations. The applied questionnaire and the database obtained on which the analysis was applied are publicly accessible, they are in the figshare repository, in the links https://acortar.link/ZJSnAJ https://acortar.link/tRHJG5 (accessed on 20 August 2025).
Finally, three online focus groups were held on 11, 18, and 25 July 2024, one group for each geographical region of the country: highlands, coast, and east, to ascertain the opinions of the videos selected for the narrative analysis and the survey. The division is justified because each group represents people with different media consumption habits and trajectories. Eight people participated in each group, all from different cities through the Zoom tool. Each session lasted 1:30 min. By gender, the participants are 10 men and 14 women. The average age is 40 years old. According to the professional profile, they are seven basic education teachers, four journalists, three professionals in civil engineering and industry, three business administrators, three doctors, one person working in non-governmental organisations, two students, and a housewife.
A focus group is an interactive practice of social research (; ), “consisting of bringing together a group of six to ten people and provoking a discussion among them on the topic of interest, which must be led by a moderator” (); it is “deal for capturing dominant representations, values, affective formations, and imaginaries; it allows us to reconstruct social meanings” (). On the other hand, “conducting online focus groups is logistically feasible. Social researchers currently have a series of technological and communicative resources that we can manage and configure to shape group dynamics” ().
The methodological integration responds to a sequential and complementary logic that reinforces the internal coherence of the research. Firstly, the narrative analysis of the audiovisual pieces broadcast by RT built the empirical basis for the identification of the central discursive patterns and structures, which allowed to design the data collection instruments for the survey and the focus groups, ensuring that the perceptions measured were relevant and aligned with the narratives present in the materials studied. Therefore, the results of the narrative analysis guided both the specific questions in the questionnaire and the discussion dynamics in the focus groups, facilitating the exploration of the reception and re-signification of the messages in diverse audiences.
The mixed strategy and methodological triangulation allow us to approach the phenomenon from different perspectives and strengthen the validity of the findings by contrasting information obtained in different ways. However, it is recognised that the use of convenience sampling in the application of the survey introduces limitations in terms of national representativeness. Although this technique optimised participant recruitment and operational feasibility, it could bias the socio-demographic composition of the sample and limit the transferability of the results.
To mitigate this restriction, heterogeneity criteria were applied in the selection, trying to maximise regional diversity and participant profiles. For this reason, the findings should be interpreted with caution in their generalisability to the population. The convergence of qualitative and quantitative data provides conclusions with a robustness that mitigates, in part, the limitations of sampling, offering an in-depth understanding of how the subgroup studied perceives and assimilates media narratives in a crisis environment.
During the writing of this paper, Qwen3-Max, a generative artificial intelligence tool, was used to conduct bibliographic searches, sort the testimonies of focus group participants, and improve the writing of certain paragraphs. After using the tool, the content was reviewed and edited as needed. The author assumes responsibility for the text.

3. Results

The news about Laura Richardson’s visit considers the security crisis and the possible agreement to exchange Soviet weapons for American equipment. RT’s narrative centres on geopolitics and violated sovereignty. It presents the visit as Washington’s “soft power, iron fist” strategy to isolate Latin America from other partners, specifically Russia and China. In other words, it excludes the prospect of cooperation. With its narrative, RT generates mistrust and suspicion towards the US. It uses words such as “repudiation” and “backyard” to evoke feelings of humiliation and resistance. The framing works as an implicit question about the legitimacy of US influence and also shows security cooperation as a pretext for broader political objectives. It focuses on the “controversy with Russia” and the exchange of military equipment as a “violation of agreements”. It reiterates the US’s intention to “isolate” the region from its partners. Finally, the “backyard” metaphor defines the US’s relationship with Latin America as domination.
For their part, the news projected by DW, France 24, and Voice of America show bilateral cooperation for security. The visit is a response to the crisis of violence in Ecuador and a show of support. The news transmits hope through international cooperation. In France 24 alludes to the reduction in violent deaths to generate relief. DW asks, “What can the United States do?” before analysing possible forms of support. The US appears as an actor offering solutions. No disinformation techniques are observed: their approach is fact-based and descriptive, focusing on details of meetings and agreements. The Voice of America covers the news “live”. There is reiteration of the concepts of US support, backing, and cooperation in its fight against organised crime.
News about drug trafficking, violence, and dollarisation are presented by RT with a narrative of cause and effect between dollarisation and drug trafficking. A tone of fatalism is evident when mentioning “consequences that are difficult to reverse”. RT presents rhetorical questions to guide conclusions, such as “What links exist between dollarisation and drug trafficking? How does the mechanism work? (…) You see where this is going, right?”. Simplification and false causality are employed. Although it is mentioned that violence began decades after dollarisation, the framing insists that the currency is a magnet for money laundering. The phrase “dollarized countries attract drug trafficking like honey attracts flies” is a misleading generalisation and an analogy of the inescapable attraction of dirty money. There are repetitions of the connection between “dollarisation” and “drug trafficking.”
DW’s narrative on drug trafficking, violence and dollarisation questions direct causality. The headline “Is dollarisation to blame for violence in Ecuador?” opens a debate rather than drawing conclusions, it encourages a critical approach and invites reflection rather than alarmism. The reports act as verification exercises. The expert interviewed says that blaming to dollarisation as the cause of crime is “an excuse used by politicians” and offers other explanations such as institutional weakness and corruption. There are also repetitions of ideas, for example, dollarisation as an “excuse” and that the real causes are the “fragility of institutions” and “corruption”.
News reports on the murder of candidate Fernando Villavicencio focus on accusations made by former Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa. RT’s narrative gives credibility and prominence to Correa’s version of events, presenting it as an authentic denunciation. The headline “Correa denounces that Ecuador’s prosecutor “knew Villavicencio was in danger” and did not protect him” frames the information from the former president’s perspective, generating suspicion towards state institutions (the prosecutor’s office) and suggesting deliberate negligence. The composition of the article reveals the use of a single source and confirmation bias. By focusing almost exclusively on Correa’s accusation, it presents it as the main fact, without providing any context on the official investigations. Specifically, the news focuses on repeating and amplifying Correa’s accusations.
Meanwhile, DW en Español and France 24 frame Correa’s testimonies as accusations related to a political conflict. The headlines attribute the opinion to Correa, without presenting it as a verified fact. The narrative conveys the polarisation of the Ecuadorian political environment. There are no disinformation techniques. There is a balanced approach. France 24 produces a complementary piece entitled “What did Fernando Villavicencio’s investigations reveal about Rafael Correa?” This provides a reference point for the enmity between Correa and Villavicencio, who was a whistle-blower on corruption in Correa’s government.
By linking the three cases, a persistent and concise “grand narrative” emerges from RT News in comparison with other media. RT portrays a multipolar world in which the United States is a declining power that uses manipulative tactics to maintain its hegemony over Latin America and undermine its rivals (Russia and China). In this narrative, the internal problems of Latin American countries, such as violence in Ecuador, are not the result of their conditions, but are directly caused by neoliberal influences imposed from outside, for example, through dollarisation. Those who oppose US influence, such as Rafael Correa, are presented as courageous whistle-blowers of conspiracies. In contrast, DW, France 24, and Voice of America tell stories of international cooperation, institutional challenges, and complex security crises. The problem is posed as a democratic state’s fight against transnational organised crime. The suggested solution is institutional strengthening with the support of international partners, mainly the United States and Europe.
With regard to the second research instrument, the survey, Table 2 shows the respondents’ appraisals of the first video. The data show ambiguity with regard to identifying the authenticity of the broadcaster. According to the respondents, the intention is mostly to report objectively, albeit on the basis of unverifiable data. It would be understood, therefore, that there is a formal construction that cannot support an authentic story.
Table 2. Perceptions of the first video.
The associations between the perceptions of the objective of the video and the information presented, and the type of source that predominates, were also evaluated. The results of the relationship between the data of the variable: What is the objective of the video? with the data of the variable: Is the information presented in the video? They show a Chi-square of significant association, a value of 36.6, p = 0, confirmed by Fisher’s exact test for low frequencies p = 0. The Cramer’s V coefficient showed a moderately strong association V = 0.48. The analysis included 81 participants. The results of the relationship between the data of the variable: What is the purpose of the video? with the data of the variable: What type of source predominates in the video? They show a significant association, Chi-square with a value of 36.8, p = 0, confirmed by Fisher’s exact test for low frequencies p = 0. The Cramer’s V coefficient showed a moderately strong association V = 0.48. The analysis included 81 participants.
In another analysis, perceptions of the second video (Figure 1) indicate that respondents identify characteristics of disinformative narratives, mostly analogies, rhetorical questions and indirect quotations.
Figure 1. Respondents’ perceptions of the narrative elements in the second Russia Today (RT) video: “Dollarisation and drug trafficking: the case of Ecuador.” It illustrates the frequency with which participants recognise discursive devices present in the video, such as comparisons or analogies, rhetorical questions, direct quotations, emotional language, explicit evaluation, balance of perspectives, and expression of opinion by the narrator. Each bar represents the number of affirmative (Yes) and negative (No) responses to the presence of these elements.
As in the first video, the association between variables was evaluated; in this case, between the data of the variable, How is the information mostly presented in the video? with the data of the variable, How are the people involved in the events of the video described? The Chi-square test results show a significant association, with a value of 26.9, p = 0, confirmed by Fisher’s exact test for low frequencies p = 0. The Cramer’s V coefficient showed a moderately strong association V = 0.4. The analysis included 81 participants.
Meanwhile, the contributions from the discussion groups are presented by region. In the highlands, participants point out that the videos “mix verifiable facts with unverifiable statements, appeal to emotions rather than logic, and present information without clear sources. They aim to confuse” (participant 5). “There is no fair presentation, and they use an emotive tone” (participant 2), “arguments lead viewers to a predetermined conclusion. Misinformation was observed; some data are opinions of the presenter” (participant 3). It was indicated that audiovisual reports “present news without verified information” (participant 4). “Although external sources are cited to support the argument, they are in a context that favours the author’s interpretation, showing a bias” (participant 6). In a plot, where “Ecuador is going through a crisis, and you can come up with different analyses depending on how other people see it” (participant 6).
According to the testimonies offered, the notes “give favouritism to Russia. Therefore, they show particular interests” (participant 1); “they try to alter the perception and opinion of the viewers, despite the fact that the subject matter shows the dominance of the United States over neighbouring countries, without respecting international norms” (participant 3). However, there are contradictions with the previous ideas by stating that “the topic was well specified and communicated to the public. Journalists do present the news according to official sources, and clear and concise language is used to achieve objectivity in informing the viewing public’ (participant 7). “The information is mostly documented by official sources; however, it is necessary to do a personal search to contrast” (participant 4). “The videos were very explanatory, but it depends on the media that give the news because each media has its point of view and its script to provide adequate information with what they think” (participant 6).
In addition, it is mentioned that the news “is clear, concise, and reflects reality with official arguments and statistical data about what is happening in the country; it is a transparent and clear communication” (participant 2). “It gives truthful information, which helps us to be aware of what is really happening in our environment and to make informed decisions in all aspects of life” (participant 8).
The first video “talks about the controversy with Russia over Ecuador’s decision to deliver its military equipment to the United States” (participant 3). “It uses value judgements against the United States” (participant 6). “It does not contain Ecuador’s response when it desists from sending Soviet equipment. I see it as redolent of the issue (closely related to the issue) and less appealing” (participant 7). “It’s fake news that confuses the audience and makes them believe the wrong thing; it affects decision-making” (participant 2). The note “exemplifies Washington’s subtle power politics to isolate Latin America from other partners through a combination of diplomacy, cultural influence, and economic pressure” (participant 4). “Support for Russia and its interests is shown, while the comments and opinion of the expert interviewed are against diplomatic actions between the United States and Latin America” (participant 5). The second video “makes reference to dollarisation being a fundamental key for drug traffickers” (participant 6). “We heard the presenter give his opinion and direct the audience towards his arguments, in order to qualify them in a negative way. In the video we observe a use of critical language and a possible inclination towards a particular perspective” (participant 8).
A focus group discussion with citizens from the coast revealed two positions: for some, the videos “are relevant to learn about the economy and drug trafficking. However, the way they present Ecuador is negative, promoting the image of a high-risk country that should not be visited” (participant 1). “Disinformation can be observed, without reliable bases, creating a perception in the public without verifiable data” (participant 8). “The content, on the one hand, could reflect legitimate concerns about foreign intervention and regional sovereignty. On the other hand, it could be seen as a disinformation tool to discredit the US and strengthen pro-Russian narratives” (participant 4). Other participants indicate that the news is “didactic and invites the viewer to take an interest in the topic” (participant 5). “It informs about what is happening” (participant 2). “It seemed to me that the information is based on verified data, presented on screen. Personally, I really liked the way in which the presenters addressed and narrated” (participant 3).
About RT, they stated that “it is a Russian state propaganda media that tries to disguise serious journalism. It uses emotional language, accusations, and repetitions of information” (participant 3). “It uses common propaganda techniques, lacks verifiable quotes, and presents information mostly from the narrator’s point of view, using adjectives to manipulate the audience” (participant 6).
The second video shows “how drug traffickers bring money into the country without being detected” (participant 1); “it relates the situation in Ecuador. The affectation we have by gangs and how people join these groups” (participant 3). “The narrator expresses his opinion on the subject, compares, and gives an example of the situation” (participant 2). The exception is raised by another person: “I liked the information because I could find out about things that happen in my country” (participant 5). It is necessary to “verify the information before broadcasting” (participant 2) and “to inform by showing both sides of the coin” (participant 8). “In these sensitive issues we must be clear and neutral when giving information, for the sake of the listeners” (participant 4). The expressions converge in specifying that “it is crucial to recognise the responsibility of spreading news and the importance of verification” (participant 5). “We have to get to the talks so that there is no conflict. The previous government let in a lot of criminals” (participant 6). As in the highland focus group, it was emphasised that “the veracity of information must be critically evaluated” (participant 4). “The importance of examining narratives and understanding the underlying interests behind policies and strategies is stressed, ensuring a balanced understanding of the issues” (participant 5).
It is mentioned that “propaganda and misinformation are crucial issues today, given their profound impact on society” (participant 7). “Media that broadcast information can manipulate it, taking the power to persuade each and every listener” (participant 8).
Finally, the focus group conducted with residents of eastern Ecuador gave the following opinions. RT “is a Russian channel that clearly defends its positions and wants to create conflict against its opponents” (participant 7). “It is not reliable due to problems of disinformation; political influences intervene” (participant 2). “It presents subjectivity, induces the audience, and is against Latin American countries close to Washington” (participant 3). “It tries to associate United States political leaders with the illegal use of weapons” (participant 8). “It shows that the Russian system applies the same message in multiple media to persuade” (participant 6).
One person emphasised that “I did not find something disinformative, since the events narrated have occurred in Ecuador and had repercussions in that Russia has a certain enmity towards the country due to Noboa’s decisions” (participant 1). “There is no disinformation; their objective is to keep the audience informed without mixing any emotion” (participant 5). In the first video, “they inform about the situation between Russia and the United States and try to ally Ecuador for the war with exchanges of armaments and equipment” (participant 3). “It shows judgements, although contrasted with governmental information” (participant 4).
Overall, the focus group results reveal distinct patterns based on participants’ educational and occupational profiles and geographic regions. Teachers and journalists, who are present in all three regions of the country, demonstrated greater critical thinking skills in identifying disinformation techniques, such as the use of emotive language, the absence of verifiable sources, and narrative manipulation in RT content. Professionals in technical fields (engineering, administration) and doctors, while recognizing biases and value judgments in the videos, tended to focus their observations on the logical coherence of the content rather than its propagandistic intentions. For their part, students, the person linked to an NGO, and the housewife expressed susceptibility to emotional narratives but added concern about the lack of neutrality.
Depending on the region, as described in the previous paragraphs, participants from the Sierra emphasized the geopolitical exploitation of Ecuador by foreign powers and questioned RT’s pro-Russian bias. On the Coast, concern prevails over the reputational and tourism consequences of the negative narrative about Ecuador, along with a call for journalistic ethics and cross-checking. In the East, in addition to acknowledging the real facts, the confusion generated by the mixing of verifiable information with value judgments was highlighted, and the need for neutrality in international communication was also underscored. There is consensus that RT operates as an instrument of Russian state propaganda, appeals to emotions, omits contracts, and seeks to erode trust in Ecuador’s alliances with the United States.

4. Discussion

The research objectives are met based on the results. RT’s videos employ disinformation techniques such as semantically loaded language, generalisations, and lack of transparency of sources. Narrative analysis shows resources and structures that build disinformation, e.g., use of emotions, rhetorical questions, paradoxical descriptions, exaggerations, reiterations, and analogies. These literary constructions contribute to the positioning in favour of the Russian narrative to the detriment of adversaries in the political and economic fields. The results of the study, which prove and contribute to reaffirming previous research findings that RT seeks credibility by posing as a media outlet in another country’s media ecology, but its real purpose is to subvert political systems (; ), continue in its quest to “use the media to increase its relative influence at the expense of liberal democracies” ().
The survey provided data that support a profile of Ecuadorians’ perceptions of the news narratives broadcast by RT. There is still confidence in audiovisual information, but it is not absolute because the majority of people who responded to the survey point out that the information mixes truth with falsehood, with a tendency towards disinformation and unverifiable sources. Likewise, respondents associate the purpose of the videos with the construction of the news (Chi-square tests), while narrative analysis, comparisons, rhetorical questions, emotional language, evaluative position, and the narrator’s opinion are the variables or characteristics that stand out in the audiovisual pieces. While the focus groups showed that people understand that there is an intention to confuse, there is no proportion in the testimonies of the protagonists of the news, and there is an attempt to induce positions. The testimonies indicate that, in the three geographic regions of Ecuador, RT’s influence is recognised as a means of Russian propaganda at the expense of discrediting other positions.
RT in Ecuador’s communication builds a “master narrative” where there is an enemy to confront (the bad guy) that seeks, through subtle ways (cooperation, subsidies, sales of military equipment), to attract weak countries, but which have opportunities to be on the right side (the good guy), for which it is important to distance themselves from what implies risks (dollarisation, delivery of Russian arms). It should be remembered that a master narrative is a dominant storyline that permeates and structures knowledge, including lower-level narratives, on a broad topic (). It seems that the central aim of all the narratives studied is to weaken institutions and their norms (; ), “to create a general fog of uncertainty and doubt about “truth”, thus undermining liberal norms in Western democratic society” (), and initiates by affecting the communication of cultural centres, the media, academia and publishing ().
Today’s information influence, which differs from traditional propaganda, is executed through new media channels and patterns of global coverage (; ). “A new era of global competition in communication” () is taking hold, where it is necessary to understand how authoritarian states pursue their ambitions and what role their international media play in reframing policy in spaces where the lines between public diplomacy, propaganda, and traditional journalism are blurred (; ). Strategies of information manipulation can achieve their purposes and permeate the interests of hegemonic countries in territories facing economic dependence, a need for cooperation, and institutional weakness, even if this means harming their own interests.
These results warn about the importance of media literacy and critical thinking in identifying misinformation. It is crucial to promote the analysis of sources, the verification of information, and the understanding of media biases in order to counteract the influence of disinformative narratives. In the face of this, it remains to train citizens in informational competencies; likewise, “it is transcendental to innovate in the education of future journalists and train them to combat disinformation, and misinformation” (). It is essential that universities conduct media literacy courses “to identify, select, understand, and use reliable information” ().
The findings contextualize the claims about Russian information projection put forward by (), (), and (), who describe RT as a soft-power tool designed to undermine Western cohesion through conspiratorial and anti-hegemonic narratives. While these authors emphasize the Kremlin’s geopolitical logic, this analysis shows that the narratives are not mechanically reproduced in the peripheries; instead, they are adapted to local contexts to maximize their impact.
It also helps validate ’s () observation regarding diplomacy’s role as a “contextualized information war,” in which discourse is tailored to each audience’s vulnerabilities. Thus, in Ecuador, RT replicates the “New World Order” framework and translates it into accusations against local actors (), reinforcing ’s () thesis on RT’s ability to blend into other nations’ media ecosystems.
In line with () and the UK Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee (), disinformation is defined by the deliberate intent to mislead and undermine trust in democratic institutions. From this perspective, RT’s narratives are not opinion journalism but disinformation strategies because they mix facts with unsupported claims, a pattern of “instrumentalized half-truth” according to (); they methodically omit opposing voices to create a deliberate distortion in public debate (); and they appeal to emotions instead of critical analysis, as () points out. Unlike opinion journalism, disinformation operates through deliberate ambiguity. Disinformation is visible in the narrative architecture, a combination of biased information, emotions, and the appearance of objectivity.
There is also room to rethink the concept of “informational vulnerability” in Eastern Europe (; ). There, the uptake of Russian narratives is partly explained by linguistic and historical proximity, whereas in Latin America vulnerability stems from other structural factors such as institutional weakness (), economic dependency () and a media culture in transition, where citizens consume global outlets without established frameworks or media literacy ().
Disinformation, therefore, does not operate solely through ideological or cultural affinities, but because there are knowledge gaps. It could be argued that audiences, in contexts of crisis, lack the foundations that would allow them to recognize the interests of foreign supremacies, opening the door to external reference frames. From this premise, the analytical focus shifts from “propagandistic intent” to “structural conditions of reception,” an approach that complements ’ () “firehose of falsehood” model by incorporating sociopolitical variables from the Global South.

5. Conclusions

Based on the results, the presence of subtle disinformation narratives is evident in the audiovisual content broadcast by RT about Ecuador. The narratives combine verifiable information with unfounded claims and emotional appeals, creating a bias in favor of Russian interests. Ecuadorians partially detect the manipulation, particularly those with a higher level of education.
Participants in discussion groups with greater exposure to journalistic practices, or who have verification habits, such as teachers and journalists, demonstrated stronger abilities to spot narrative bias and resist emotional manipulation. Vulnerability to disinformation is not uniform: it’s shaped by cognitive skills and information practices. Digital literacy, therefore, stands as a cornerstone of civic coexistence.
The three research questions are answered. First, the narratives disseminated by RT were identified, such as the geopolitical framing that presents the United States as a hegemonic power isolating Latin America from other allies like Russia and China, the spurious link between dollarization and drug trafficking, and the legitimation of political voices aligned with the Russian agenda. Second, it was shown that public perception is heterogeneous: some recognize the bias and narrative manipulation, but others reproduce RT’s interpretive frames. Finally, the focus groups revealed that external narratives are selectively internalized, adapting to the local context and reinforcing binary visions of the international order.
The narrative analysis revealed that RT’s disinformation strategies operate through a discursive architecture. Among the most recurrent mechanisms are the construction of spurious causalities, the use of rhetorical questions aimed at guiding the viewer toward predetermined conclusions without empirical evidence, biased source selection, and the activation of binary geopolitical frames that instrumentalize local crises to reinforce an anti-Western vision. These tactics distort Ecuadorian issues and reconfigure their interpretation based on foreign interests. Thus, it is evident how contemporary disinformation operates through the manipulation of context and emotion disguised as analytical journalism.
From the perspective of critical communication theory, the results reflect institutional crisis structures, inequality, and information dependency. Ecuador’s vulnerability stems from a historical asymmetry in the global production and circulation of discourse, where peripheral countries consume interpretive frameworks crafted in hegemonic centers—a thesis posited and documented in the MacBride Report and Communication for Development. The findings reveal how communicative power operates as a form of symbolic colonization. They also reinforce the view that international media act as agents that rearticulate global hierarchies. The central thesis is that contemporary disinformation has a political context that exploits cognitive inequalities between centers and peripheries.
Faced with the structural vulnerability of Latin American information ecosystems, multidimensional responses that integrate regulation, education, and institutional capacity are required. States must promote media and information literacy in national curricula, as a cross-cutting axis that articulates critical competencies and digital citizenship, as proposed by UNESCO (). The same should happen from regulatory authorities, since digital platforms and local media can support the efforts of independent verification networks.
Cooperation in both training and research on disinformation strengthens democratic resilience: it should also begin by bringing together professional profiles capable of achieving qualitative change in a short time, such as journalists, educators, and legislators. Journalists will dismantle geopolitically motivated narrative frames, educators will help citizens identify discursive manipulation, and legislators will work on regulatory frameworks that prevent interference from foreign agendas.
This study has methodological limitations that should be considered when interpreting its results. First, the use of non-probability convenience sampling in the survey restricts the national representativeness of the quantified perceptions and limits the statistical generalization of the findings. In addition, other demographic variables should be integrated into the questionnaire, such as the occupation and educational level of the respondents, to locate behavioural relationships rather than identify disinformation strategies. Second, the corpus analyzed is limited to three audiovisual pieces from RT, which could limit the network’s narrative on other topics. Third, the focus groups include a small number of participants per region (n = 8), which would condition the inter-group depth and the identification of finer sociocultural patterns. However, these limitations do not invalidate the findings, although they do suggest that the identified patterns should be understood as qualitative trends in crisis contexts, rather than as stable population proportions.
While this research focuses on RT, it recognizes the importance of continuing to compare these narratives with those of other international media. The inclusion of U.S. media in future studies will allow for a more comprehensive and balanced assessment of the disinformation strategies employed by different global actors.
Future research could address cross-country comparisons of the reception of disinformation narratives, use probability samples and expand the corpus analyzed, as well as explore the sociocultural and institutional factors that mediate the appropriation of external messages. In addition, it is suggested to examine data verification strategies to strengthen citizens’ critical capacity in the face of the penetration of global disinformation narratives.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

The study was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the Ethics Committee for Research on Human Beings of the Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja (CEISH399 UTPL), dated 16 September 2021.

Data Availability Statement

Data are contained within the article. The applied questionnaire and the database obtained on which the analysis was applied are publicly accessible, they are in the figshare repository, in the links https://acortar.link/ZJSnAJ and https://acortar.link/tRHJG5.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

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