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Article

Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys

1
Institut für Angewandte Physik, Technische Universität Darmstadt, D-64289 Darmstadt, Germany
2
Institute of Electronic Structure and Laser, FORTH, P.O. Box 1385, GR-70013 Heraklion, Greece
3
Cryptoplexity, Technische Universität Darmstadt, D-64289 Darmstadt, Germany
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Cryptography 2019, 3(4), 25; https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography3040025
Received: 5 September 2019 / Revised: 21 October 2019 / Accepted: 23 October 2019 / Published: 25 October 2019
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Quantum Cryptography and Cyber Security)
Optical physical unclonable keys are currently considered to be rather promising candidates for the development of entity authentication protocols, which offer security against both classical and quantum adversaries. In this work, we investigate the robustness of a continuous-variable protocol, which relies on the scattering of coherent states of light from the key, against three different types of intercept–resend emulation attacks. The performance of the protocol is analyzed for a broad range of physical parameters, and our results are compared to existing security bounds. View Full-Text
Keywords: physical unclonable keys; physical unclonable functions; continuous-variable quantum authentication; emulation attack; dual homodyne detection; unambiguous state-discrimination; minimum-error discrimination; square-root measurement physical unclonable keys; physical unclonable functions; continuous-variable quantum authentication; emulation attack; dual homodyne detection; unambiguous state-discrimination; minimum-error discrimination; square-root measurement
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MDPI and ACS Style

Fladung, L.; Nikolopoulos, G.M.; Alber, G.; Fischlin, M. Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys. Cryptography 2019, 3, 25. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography3040025

AMA Style

Fladung L, Nikolopoulos GM, Alber G, Fischlin M. Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys. Cryptography. 2019; 3(4):25. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography3040025

Chicago/Turabian Style

Fladung, Lukas; Nikolopoulos, Georgios M.; Alber, Gernot; Fischlin, Marc. 2019. "Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys" Cryptography 3, no. 4: 25. https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography3040025

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