The Dual Pillars of Progress: Institutional and Cultural Dynamics in Economic Development
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Literature Review on the Interplay between Cultural and Institutional Backgrounds
2.1. Formal and Informal Institutions and Economic Development
2.2. The Co-Evolution of Culture and Institutions and Economic Development
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Empirical Strategy
3.2. Data
3.3. Estimation Strategy and Economic Issues
4. Empirical Results
Robustness Analysis
5. Discussion and Conclusions
5.1. Synergy between Institutional and Cultural Backgrounds
5.2. Policy Implications and Challenges
5.3. Transformative Policy Interventions
5.4. Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Funding
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Cultural Dimension | Question/Definition | |
---|---|---|
Generalized trust | “In general, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you should be very careful in dealing with people?” The level of trust in each country is measured as the percentage of respondents who answered that “most people can be trusted”. | |
Control of life | “How much freedom of choice and control do you feel you have over how you live your life”? The respondents’ response “a great deal of freedom of choice and control” is the one taken into account. | |
Independence | “Which quality do you consider to be particularly important to teach to your children? Obedience or independence»?” The variable is defined as the percentage of respondents reporting “independence” as the most important quality. | |
Honesty | Honesty I | “Is it justified to evade taxes? Honesty I corresponds to the answer “not acceptable”. |
Honesty II | “Is it justified to avoid paying a fare on public transport?” Honesty II is derived from the percentage of respondents who also answer, “not acceptable”. | |
Competition affinity | Competition affinity I | “How would you place your view, on a scale of 1 to 10, from competition being good to competition being harmful?” Competition I corresponds to the answer “competition is good”. |
Competition affinity II | “Can people only get rich at the expense of others?” Competition II is derived from the percentage of respondents answering, “at the expense of others”. | |
Work ethic | Work ethic I | “What quality is considered particularly important to teach your children?” “Work Ethic I” corresponds to the responses “hard work”. |
Work ethic II | “Work is very important to your life?” Work Ethic II is derived from the percentage of respondents answering, “very important”. | |
Respect | “Which quality do you consider to be particularly important to teaching your children?” The variable “respect” is defined as the percentage of respondents in each country reporting the quality “tolerance and respect for others” as important. |
Strong Institutions–Weak Culture | Strong Institutions–Strong Culture | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Country | Culture | Institutions | GDP Per Capita | Country | Culture | Institutions | GDP Per Capita |
Vietnam | 5.89 | 6.05 | 3330.30 | Norway | 9.35 | 7.38 | 55,653.87 |
New Zealand | 5.76 | 8.05 | 28,268.62 | Sweden | 8.74 | 7.34 | 37,068.91 |
Georgia | 4.06 | 7.59 | 5716.39 | Netherlands | 8.71 | 7.61 | 40,332.87 |
Armenia | 3.23 | 7.57 | 5075.77 | Finland | 8.71 | 7.60 | 33,646.95 |
Estonia | 5.57 | 7.52 | 19,887.70 | Hong Kong | 7.87 | 8.86 | 37,889.14 |
Chile | 5.28 | 7.31 | 15,360.80 | Japan | 7.72 | 7.65 | 33,247.75 |
Latvia | 4.99 | 7.25 | 16,185.53 | Germany | 7.60 | 7.69 | 37,573.25 |
Czech republic | 4.15 | 7.21 | 26,175.23 | Switzerland | 7.54 | 8.35 | 49,494.08 |
Lithuania | 5.16 | 7.16 | 19,989.40 | Australia | 7.24 | 7.81 | 36,647.47 |
Spain | 5.21 | 7.14 | 28,817.90 | Canada | 7.18 | 8.00 | 36,705.35 |
France | 5.61 | 7.08 | 34,558.47 | Average | 8.07 | 7.83 | 39,825.96 |
Slovakia | 4.00 | 7.07 | 20,558.37 | ||||
Lebanon | 3.36 | 7.05 | 12,649.27 | ||||
Malaysia | 5.57 | 7.01 | 17,286.46 | ||||
Kazakhstan | 4.78 | 7.00 | 15,735.42 | ||||
Average | 4.84 | 7.21 | 17,973.04 | ||||
Weak Institutions–Weak Culture | Weak Institutions–Strong Culture | ||||||
Country | Culture | Institutions | GDP per capita | Country | Culture | Institutions | GDP per capita |
Burkina Faso | 2.91 | 5.99 | 1195.23 | - | - | - | - |
India | 3.33 | 5.99 | 3413.81 | ||||
Dominican Rep. | 4.19 | 5.98 | 9441.76 | ||||
Haiti | 0.00 | 5.96 | 1777.94 | ||||
Russia | 4.58 | 5.94 | 19,549.52 | ||||
Poland | 5.44 | 5.81 | 16,716.41 | ||||
Ghana | 2.17 | 5.75 | 3585.80 | ||||
Ecuador | 3.72 | 5.69 | 8530.45 | ||||
Pakistan | 3.97 | 5.59 | 3639.66 | ||||
Ethiopia | 4.37 | 5.52 | 977.15 | ||||
Mali | 2.57 | 5.43 | 1641.60 | ||||
Zambia | 3.29 | 5.41 | 2782.47 | ||||
Egypt | 4.69 | 5.40 | 8778.71 | ||||
Argentina | 4.60 | 5.38 | 15,807.43 | ||||
Bangladesh | 4.43 | 5.34 | 2180.83 | ||||
Ukraine | 4.74 | 5.32 | 7201.05 | ||||
Brazil | 2.73 | 5.27 | 12,418.27 | ||||
Nigeria | 2.07 | 5.13 | 4075.95 | ||||
Iran | 3.46 | 4.87 | 14,920.61 | ||||
Libya | 3.33 | 4.69 | 26,331.32 | ||||
Zimbabwe | 3.12 | 4.60 | 2540.86 | ||||
Algeria | 3.09 | 4.48 | 11,667.48 | ||||
Venezuela | 1.60 | 4.45 | 15,032.13 | ||||
Average | 3.41 | 5.39 | 8443.76 |
1 | See Kostis et al. (2018) for a discussion on the role of generalized trust in economic development. See Banfield (1958) for the role of control of life in economic outcomes. To see the role of honesty, see Guiso et al. (2010) for a discussion on the extent to which individuals try to increase their benefits regardless of the potentially negative social externalities of their actions. See Inglehart and Baker (2000) and Phelps (2006) for a discussion on the roles of competition affinity and work ethic in economic outcomes. See Tabellini (2010) for a discussion on the role of respect in the economy. |
2 | Given socio-economic research’s dynamic and evolving nature, applying a PCA over time warrants careful consideration. It is essential to address potential concerns regarding introducing bias in constructing composite indicators, as highlighted by Mazziotta and Pareto (2016, 2018). These authors provide valuable insights into adjusting composite indices to reflect changes more accurately over time, emphasizing the importance of methodological rigor in longitudinal analyses. However, it is pertinent to note the distinctive characteristics of cultural values compared to other socio-economic phenomena. Cultural values are inherently stable and evolve over significantly longer horizons than economic indicators or institutional changes. This inherent stability of cultural dimensions provides a methodological advantage when applying a PCA over time in this study. The long-lasting nature of cultural values suggests that potential biases associated with temporal dynamics are considerably mitigated, allowing for the reliable use of a PCA to aggregate cultural indicators across different time periods. |
3 | The variation in the number of observations across different specifications and robustness checks in this study is attributed to data availability for the variables related to institutions and culture. Specifically, the analyses incorporating “institutions” as the sole independent variable include a broader dataset, reflecting the comprehensive availability of institutional data across all countries over the seven analysis waves. In contrast, when “culture” is introduced as a variable, the number of observations is reduced due to the more limited availability of cultural data. This discrepancy is consistent across all tables and is an inherent study limitation influenced by the external constraint of data availability. Despite these variations, the data utilized across all analyses remain consistent, ensuring the integrity of the comparative analysis within the bounds of the available data. |
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N | Avg. | St. dev. | Min | Max | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
GDP per capita | 712 | 9.44 | 1.09 | 6.35 | 11.83 |
Institutions | 610 | 6.57 | 1.24 | 2.59 | 9.12 |
Culture | 152 | 0.00 | 1.57 | −4.52 | 4.58 |
Trust | 366 | 28.40 | 15.63 | 2.50 | 77.40 |
Control of life | 352 | 15.36 | 8.52 | 0.00 | 43.90 |
Respect | 359 | 67.87 | 13.24 | 14.20 | 96.30 |
Independence | 364 | 48.10 | 18.79 | 7.90 | 90.00 |
Honesty | 331 | 0.00 | 1.32 | −3.84 | 3.67 |
Honesty I | 354 | 60.04 | 14.73 | 20.30 | 98.10 |
Honesty II | 338 | 55.93 | 15.58 | 12.60 | 96.30 |
Competition | 178 | 0.00 | 1.12 | −1.73 | 6.14 |
Competition I | 327 | 26.10 | 12.32 | 3.70 | 66.30 |
Competition II | 183 | 7.66 | 6.95 | 0.30 | 77.30 |
Work ethic | 335 | 0.00 | 1.03 | −2.73 | 2.43 |
Work ethic I | 362 | 52.85 | 25.43 | 2.10 | 94.60 |
Work ethic II | 338 | 61.82 | 14.95 | 26.10 | 95.10 |
FDI | 687 | 10.31 | 32.47 | −51.77 | 322.05 |
Tertiary education | 579 | 33.42 | 23.43 | 0.27 | 113.77 |
Investments | 672 | 24.04 | 6.72 | 3.35 | 49.31 |
Population density | 742 | 253.66 | 860.10 | 1.99 | 7934.36 |
Cultural Value | Principal Component Score |
---|---|
Trust | 0.466 |
Control of life | −0.226 |
Independence | 0.389 |
Honesty | 0.027 |
Competition | −0.457 |
Work ethic | −0.507 |
Respect | 0.325 |
Eigenvalue | 2.463 |
Var | 35.2% |
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Institutions | 0.05 *** (2.51) | 0.11 *** (5.05) | 0.08 ** (2.24) | 0.09 ** (2.01) | 0.19 *** (5.19) | 0.11 *** (2.40) | 0.23 *** (5.46) | 0.19 ** (2.08) | |
Culture | 0.01 (0.27) | 0.04 ** (2.01) | 0.05 * (1.66) | 0.05 ** (2.35) | 0.07 * (1.59) | ||||
Institutions × Culture | 0.01 * (1.65) | 0.08 *** (2.43) | |||||||
Institutions/Culture | 0.17 ** (2.10) | 0.17 (0.98) | |||||||
Culture/Institutions | −0.48 *** (−2.76) | −0.32 * (1.41) | |||||||
Ν | 607 | 149 | 135 | 135 | 134 | 135 | 134 | 135 | 134 |
R2 | 64.21% | 69.81% | 77.74% | 78.03% | 78.63% | 76.46% | 76.20% | 75.43% | 64.85% |
F-stat | 108.43 *** | 32.19 *** | 27.00 *** | 65.13 *** | 79.71 *** | 181.02 *** | 189.26 *** | 182.08 *** | 33.82 *** |
(10) | (11) | (12) | (13) | (14) | (15) | (16) | (17) | (18) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Institutions | 0.09 *** (9.03) | 0.14 *** (5.25) | 0.11 *** (4.63) | 0.11 *** (4.09) | 0.13 *** (5.30) | 0.14 *** (8.21) | 0.13 *** (7.40) | 0.14 *** (5.90) | |
Culture | 0.02 (1.11) | 0.03 ** (1.95) | 0.03 * (1.78) | 0.03 * (1.69) | 0.04 * (1.63) | ||||
Institutions × Culture | 0.01 * (1.91) | 0.01 * (1.69) | |||||||
Institutions/Culture | 0.13 * (1.67) | 0.01 (0.34) | |||||||
Culture/Institutions | −0.16 *** (−2.54) | −0.11 (1.19) | |||||||
GDP per capita previous year | 0.64 *** (15.36) | 0.86 *** (11.61) | 0.58 *** (7.14) | 0.53 *** (8.90) | 0.54 *** (8.90) | 0.53 *** (8.94) | 0.58 *** (12.32) | 0.58 *** (6.85) | 0.53 *** (8.94) |
Ν | 534 | 143 | 133 | 133 | 131 | 132 | 131 | 133 | 131 |
R2 | 87.04% | 76.05% | 90.80% | 91.10% | 91,17% | 90.92% | 90.80% | 79.17% | 91.33% |
F-stat | 505.15 *** | 73.12 *** | 77.24 *** | 138.14 *** | 109.48 *** | 135.14 *** | 133.27 *** | 184.35 *** | 111.62 *** |
(19) | (20) | (21) | (22) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Institutions | 0.17 *** (5.66) | 0.16 *** (5.86) | 0.12 *** (3.38) | 0.17 *** (5.17) |
Culture | 0.05 ** (2.28) | 0.05 *** (2.64) | 0.05 * (1.81) | 0.04 ** (2.01) |
GDP per capita previous year | 0.01 *** (4.28) | 0.01 *** (3.87) | 0.01 * (1.86) | 0.01 * (1.61) |
Investments | 0.02 * (1.83) | 0.01 * (1.63) | 0.02 * (1.80) | −0.01 (−0.06) |
Population density | 0.01 *** (5.02) | 0.01 *** (4.79) | −0.01 * (−1.88) | |
Tertiary Education | 0.01 *** (2.49) | 0.01 (0.87) | ||
FDI | 0.01 *** (2.77) | |||
Ν | 132 | 130 | 114 | 111 |
R2 | 74.16% | 78.47% | 77.62% | 85.76% |
F-stat | 23.93 *** | 30.83 *** | 17.59 *** | 24.54 *** |
(23) | (24) | (25) | (26) | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Institutions × Culture | 0.01 *** (3.05) | 0.01 *** (3.49) | 0.01 *** (2.67) | 0.01 *** (4.11) |
GDP per capita previous year | 0.49 *** (4.28) | 0.48 *** (3.98) | 0.47 *** (3.21) | 0.37 ** (2.34) |
Investments | 0.02 *** (7.03) | 0.02 *** (5.42) | 0.02 *** (5.05) | 0.01 *** (3.25) |
Population density | 0.01 (0.27) | 0.01 (0.16) | −0.01 ** (−2.26) | |
Tertiary Education | 0.01 (0.45) | 0.01 (0.69) | ||
FDI | 0.01 * (1.89) | |||
Ν | 132 | 130 | 114 | 111 |
R2 | 92.48% | 85.37%% | 89.44% | 92.51% |
F-stat | 93.88 *** | 89.35 *** | 69.15 *** | 33.91 *** |
(27) | (28) | (29) | (30) | (31) | (32) | (33) | (34) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Institutions | 0.12 *** (3.06) | 0.13 *** (2.98) | 0.11 *** (2.59) | 0.12 ** (2.91) | 0.09 ** (2.09) | 0.05 * (1.82) | 0.07 ** (2.42) | 0.12 ** (2.91) |
Culture | 0.06 ** (1.95) | 0.05 ** (1.93) | 0.04 ** (1.89) | 0.04 ** (1.79) | 0.05 * (1.79) | 0.04 ** (2.24) | 0.04 * (1.63) | 0.04 * (1.61) |
Institutions × Culture | 0.01 *** (4.21) | 0.01 *** (2.50) | 0.01 *** (2.91) | |||||
Institutions/Culture | −0.02 (−0.29) | |||||||
Culture/Institutions | 0.03 (0.24) | |||||||
GDP per capita previous year | 0.73 *** (12.94) | 0.75 *** (13.21) | 0.87 *** (17.50) | 0.88 *** (24.27) | 0.78 *** (11.36) | 0.92 *** (16.52) | 0.82 *** (13.72) | 0.88 *** (2.18) |
Investments | 0.01 * (1.89) | 0.01 *** (3.51) | 0.01 *** (2.42) | 0.01 ** (2.31) | ||||
Population density | −0.01 (−0.70) | −0.01 (−1.19) | −0.01 (−0.92) | −0.01 (−0.83) | ||||
Tertiary education | −0.01 (−1.34) | 0.01 (0.21) | ||||||
FDI | −0.01 (−0.43) | 0.01 (0.48) | ||||||
Arellano–Bond AR(1) test | 0.307 | 0.632 | 0.367 | 0.399 | 0.395 | 0.942 | 0.721 | 0.879 |
Arellano–Bond AR(2) test | 0.318 | 0.472 | 0.258 | 0.237 | 0.291 | 0.263 | 0.374 | 0.294 |
F-statistic | 246.76 *** | 324.29 *** | 352.67 *** | 512.47 *** | 269.29 *** | 680.02 *** | 411.37 *** | 476.41 *** |
Hansen test | 0.086 | 0.104 | 0.112 | 0.092 | 0.563 | 0.265 | 0.121 | 0.254 |
No. of instruments | 31 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 33 | 18 | 23 | 18 |
No. of groups | 75 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 73 | 68 | 72 | 67 |
No. of observations | 174 | 172 | 172 | 172 | 171 | 136 | 170 | 135 |
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Kafka, K.I. The Dual Pillars of Progress: Institutional and Cultural Dynamics in Economic Development. Economies 2024, 12, 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12040076
Kafka KI. The Dual Pillars of Progress: Institutional and Cultural Dynamics in Economic Development. Economies. 2024; 12(4):76. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12040076
Chicago/Turabian StyleKafka, Kyriaki I. 2024. "The Dual Pillars of Progress: Institutional and Cultural Dynamics in Economic Development" Economies 12, no. 4: 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12040076
APA StyleKafka, K. I. (2024). The Dual Pillars of Progress: Institutional and Cultural Dynamics in Economic Development. Economies, 12(4), 76. https://doi.org/10.3390/economies12040076