3.1. The Phenomenon of the Present Perfective Paradox
The term ‘present perfective paradox’ was coined by
Malchukov (
2009) and is based on the unusual behavior of the present tense in a number of languages with perfective–imperfective systems. The present tense as a grammatical category is typically considered to be a straightforward concept and appears in an abundant number of descriptive grammars. Yet under closer inspection, it appears that this term is to some extent a misnomer, at least for some languages: depending on the aspectual properties of the verb it combines with, the present tense often turns out to do anything but evoke the time of speaking (see, e.g.,
Langacker 2001). In Russian, for instance, the present tense can combine with imperfective verb forms to refer to the present (1), but with perfective verb forms, it typically yields a future reading (2) (see, among others,
Malchukov 2009)
3:
(1) | On | ø-znaet. |
| he | IPFV-know.PRS:3SG |
| ‘He knows.’ |
(2) | On | u-znaet. |
| he | PFV-know.PRS:3SG |
| ‘He will find out.’ |
A slightly different yet not unrelated pattern is attested in languages that do not have systematic perfective–imperfective marking (
De Wit 2017). In these languages, the determining factor appears to be actionality rather than aspect, at first blush. In Japanese, for instance, dynamic verbs are typically given a future reading in the present tense, whereas present-tense stative verbs are taken to refer to the time of speaking (
Ogihara 1992). Something similar happens in English, in which the so-called ‘simple present’ cannot be used for present-time reference with dynamic verbs:
(3) | *I play tennis right now. |
In order to align a dynamic verb with the time of speaking, speakers of English make use of the progressive, as in example (4):
(4) | I am playing tennis right now. |
Barring some special contexts, such as performatives or narratives, dynamic verbs like
play combined with the simple present can only have a habitual reading. What is being expressed then is a habit or routine which holds for a certain interval of time but need not be going on at the time of speaking:
(5) | I play tennis three times per week. |
It is evident that (5) refers to a habit that holds at the time of speaking, and in this sense, a statement is made about the present. What is crucial here is that (5) cannot refer to an ongoing event that overlaps with the time of speaking—it could be uttered while playing tennis, but this is not part of the denotation of the sentence. It is important to note that we thus use the term ‘present-time reference’ to refer to the narrowly defined temporal interval formed by the time of speaking (‘now’) rather than an unbounded interval which includes the time of speaking but goes beyond it (
Woisetschlaeger 1976, pp. 93–98;
Comrie 1985, pp. 37–39;
Langacker 1991, pp. 250–52;
De Wit 2017, pp. 13–17).
4 It is true that a sentence such as (4) could also be uttered while the speaker is not actually playing tennis, e.g., to refer to a temporary habit. Yet a pivotal, subjective difference with (5) remains, in that (4) is presented as phenomenal (
Goldsmith and Woisetschlaeger 1982) and therefore by definition somehow tied to the ‘now’. While speakers of English cannot use the simple present with dynamic verbs to refer to this ‘now’, there are no such restrictions with stative verbs:
(6) | I have my laptop with me right now. |
Similar observations have been made for many African languages, where so-called ‘factative’ tense–aspect grams typically receive a past interpretation with events and a present interpretation with states (
Welmers 1973, pp. 344–47;
Suggett 2015). Along the same lines, creole languages, such as Sranan, feature zero-marked present-tense forms that trigger a present interpretation of states and a past interpretation of events (cf.
Holm 2000 for an overview;
Prescod 2013, p. 74;
De Wit and Brisard 2014; see also
Dechaine (
1991), and
Bohnemeyer and Swift (
2004) for analogous cases in other languages, and see
Caudal and Bednall (
2022) in this issue for a particularly nuanced perspective taking into consideration more fine-grained actionality classes).
In other words, states and events may in the present tense have different time-referential properties in different languages. This comes as no surprise, given that these two actional classes contrast in many ways and behave differently in a variety of grammatical contexts. Different semantic properties have been proposed to be responsible for the distinction between states and events (see, e.g.,
Vendler 1967;
Dowty 1979;
Mourelatos 1981;
Croft 2012, pp. 31–69). Many of these properties, however, do not make a clear-cut distinction between the two actional classes, with some states exhibiting event-like properties and vice versa (see, e.g.,
Croft 2012, pp. 33–37), and they critically rely on objective parameters, such as boundedness or heterogeneity, which we believe are in fact derived from a more encompassing subjective property, i.e., identifiability (
Langacker 1987, pp. 258–62;
Michaelis 2004, pp. 10–11;
De Wit et al. 2018; see also
Section 3.2). This term refers to the temporal interval needed to identify a situation as being of a certain kind. In this respect, states are considered to be instantly identifiable, while events are not. This means that any temporal subinterval of a state can be regarded as a valid instance of that state. The temporal interval needed to identify a state as such thus has minimal extension. Events, by contrast, typically consist of several subprocesses that only together make up the process as denoted by the verb. They are, therefore, construed as not fully and instantly identifiable on the basis of only a subinterval of the situation they denote.
The non-instant-identifiability of events is what makes it difficult to align them with the very short time span which is the time of speaking.
Michaelis (
2013) frames this interaction as the manifestation of a ’say and see’ problem: in order to report a situation as ongoing at the time of speaking, one must also be able to instantly identify this situation (see also
Michaelis 2004). Similar reasoning underlies
Smith and Erbaugh’s (
2005) ’Bounded Event Constraint’, which states that situations that are construed as temporally bounded cannot be located in the present (see also the Temporal Schema Principle discussed in
Caudal and Bednall (
2022)). As a resolution to the incompatibility of the present tense with bounded situations, a non-present (i.e., not ‘now’) interpretation is assigned to the clause (
De Wit 2017, pp. 185–86). In the case of English, this interpretation is a habitual or generic one. In Sranan, on the other hand, the alternative, non-present reading is past.
As mentioned above, aspect languages like Russian originally gave rise to the term ‘present
perfective paradox’, yet
De Wit (
2017) has extended the term to also comprise languages like English where the paradox emerges from the actional profile of stative/dynamic verbs rather than from overt marking of perfectivity. At this point, one might wonder to what extent this term is also suited for these languages—especially given the received opinion that it is actionality rather than aspect that is the determining parameter in English (
Taylor 1977;
Dowty 1979;
Giorgi and Pianesi 1997;
Bohnemeyer and Swift 2004). We will come back to this issue in
Section 3.2; for now, it will suffice to mention that there are good reasons to believe that perfectivity is equally relevant for a language like English. As can be seen by comparing the data from Russian, English, Sranan and other languages, the basic pattern of the present tense expressing non-present time in dynamic/perfective contexts is the same, but the alternative non-present interpretation that is chosen is different. On the basis of work by
De Wit (
2017, pp. 192–94), we can identify three cross-linguistic patterns in the way the PPP manifests itself:
(2) The ‘prospective strategy’: the construction that is used as a present tense with stative/imperfective situations is given a future interpretation with dynamic/perfective situations. Apart from Russian, this strategy occurs in other northern Slavic languages (
De Wit 2017, chp. 7), the Dravidian language Kannada (
Bhat 1999), and Japanese (
Ogihara 1992).
(3) The ‘structural strategy’: the construction that is used as a present tense with stative/imperfective situations is given a general-validity (habitual or generic) interpretation with dynamic/perfective situations. Besides English, other languages in which this strategy is used are southern Slavic languages (
De Wit 2017, chp. 7) and the Cushitic language Somali (
Saeed 1999).
3.2. A New Approach to Aspect
Now that the PPP has been described in sufficient detail, we can return to the question of whether the term ‘present perfective paradox’ is appropriate for languages like English which, at first sight, do not appear to have a dedicated perfective construction. This question brings up a more general issue, which is central to this paper: how do we define (im)perfectivity? In the following, we will present a novel, epistemically oriented characterization of aspect, which will lead us to the conclusion that languages like English do express perfectivity grammatically, albeit in a different way compared to languages like Russian. It follows from this discussion that speaking of a ‘present perfective paradox’ is also appropriate in the context of English.
We will use the seminal Comrian definition of perfectivity as the starting point for our analysis. Recall that
Comrie (
1976, p. 16) defines the difference between perfectivity and imperfectivity as follows: “perfectivity indicates the view of a situation as a single whole, without distinction of the various separate phases that make up that situation, while the imperfective pays essential attention to the internal structure of the situation”. A similar, but more concrete definition is given in
Klein (
1994, p. 108) (see also
Hatav 2019). In the tradition of
Reichenbach (
1947), Klein identifies three concepts relevant to the semantics of tense–aspect grams: utterance time, situation time, and topic time, whereby the latter refers to the time for which a certain claim about a situation is made. Klein then defines the difference between perfective and imperfective aspect as follows: perfective aspect denotes situations whose situation time is included in the topic time, while imperfective aspect denotes situations whose topic time is included in the situation time (see also
Corre (
2022)). In the same vein,
Tournadre (
2004, pp. 29–32) describes perfective situations (
situations accomplies) as those whose starting and end points are included in the topic time (
repère temporel). Comrie, Klein, and Tournadre thus all relate perfectivity to a notion of totality, though their formalizations differ.
Reformulating these totality-based approaches in more epistemic terms, we can posit that perfective constructions entail full and instant identifiability of a situation (based on the knowledge set of the speaker or how s/he conceives of the knowledge set of the hearer), while imperfective constructions indicate a lack of full and instant identifiability (
De Wit et al. 2018). As can be inferred from our characterization of the PPP, where identifiability plays a crucial role, it is this knowledge-based approach that we adopt in this paper.
Apart from the various ‘totality’-oriented approaches mentioned above, there is another line of thought in the definition of (im)perfectivity, which is more concerned with the notion of (un)boundedness.
5 Bybee et al. (
1994, pp. 54, 125), for example, argue that perfective aspect construes situations as temporally bounded, while imperfective aspect construes situations as temporally unbounded (see also
Smith 1997).
Croft (
2012, pp. 169–71) reasons in a similar way, positing that perfective aspect construes situations as bounded on both the temporal and the qualitative dimension in his two-dimensional approach to actionality. We partly agree with these positions but think that they require more nuancing: boundedness is indeed relevant for the semantics of many aspect grams but does not capture (im)perfectivity as such. It rather denotes a semantic value corresponding to a concept we will refer to as ‘transition-sensitivity’ in the following.
Apart from the epistemic characterization of perfectivity, the second ingredient of our analysis is the selectional approach to aspect and actionality presented in
Bickel (
1996, pp. 18–19). Bickel views differences in actionality as differences in the (lexically specified) temporal representation of verbs, which we will refer to as ‘TRs’ from now on. TRs consist of regular alternations of transitions (τ) and phases (φ) and are presented between square brackets. Transitions represent the starting and endpoints of a situation, i.e., its temporal boundaries, while phases represent those parts of a situation in between temporal boundaries. The essential difference between stative and dynamic verbs, on Bickel’s account, is that the TRs of the former correspond to a single phase only—[φ] –, while those of events feature at least one transition, e.g., [τ φ τ]. One might object to this account in terms of temporal boundaries that there are certain states that are objectively bounded in time (e.g.,
Alice is in the bathroom), while certain events involve little to no temporal boundedness (e.g.,
The universe is constantly expanding). Yet these are objective differences, and what matters to our aspectual choices is our subjective perception of states of affairs and their development. This again brings us back to our epistemic approach in terms of full and instant identifiability. As
Michaelis (
2004, pp. 10–11) points out in her analysis of the difference between states and (homogeneous) events:
[…] events are those situations whose existence cannot be verified on the basis of a momentaneous sample […] Verification of a homogeneous activity like holding a broom, standing in a corner, or sleeping, requires access to points of inception and termination, as well as several contiguous frames between those endpoints. Sleeping is distinct both from being comatose and from nodding off for a second, and staying at one’s sister’s house is distinct both from popping in on one’s sister and living with her. While states like being tall endure in the same way that the events of sleeping and standing in a corner do, states do not take time: any subinterval of a state counts as an instance of that same state.
In other words, what matters is whether or not we have sufficient information to identify a situation on the basis of a random sample. With states, this is unproblematic. In order to identify events, however, we need to have some idea of their temporal boundaries, and they can therefore not be identified on the basis of a single sample. Bickel’s TRs thus encode the minimal interval needed to fully and instantly identify a given situation.
In line with Bickel, we further assume that markers of aspect select parts or the entirety of TRs. Similar to the totality-based approaches to perfectivity discussed above, Bickel posits that perfective grams select the entire TR of a given verb, including all transitions and phases. In epistemic terms, this definition implies that the situation as denoted by the verb needs to be identifiable in its entirety at the time of speaking. Imperfective grams, on the other hand, select a phasal subpart of a TR and therefore do not require complete identifiability. These definitions of perfectivity and imperfectivity will be the ones adopted in the remainder of this paper.
In our view, Bybee et al.’s and Croft’s definitions of perfectivity in terms of (temporal) boundaries can be incorporated into the approach sketched above under the notion of transition sensitivity. This concept is an addition to Bickel’s theory but appears to be crucial in the characterization of grammatical aspect markers. Transition sensitivity imposes certain restrictions on the boundedness properties of TRs. Aspect markers sensitive to transitions can only combine with verbs that are construed as featuring transitions in their TR. Such markers are, therefore, either incompatible with states or trigger a dynamic reading of originally stative verbs. (Im)perfectivity and (non-)transition-sensitivity are two independent properties that are both relevant for the description of grammatical aspect markers, entailing that both parameters can be freely combined with each other. In order to illustrate this point, we will go on to present what we consider to be a transition-sensitive perfective and a non-transition-sensitive perfective, respectively.
The Russian perfective is a transition-sensitive perfective gram. This means that it selects the entire TR of a verb, but under the restriction that the selected representation also contains at least one transition. This is why some states are coerced into achievements in the context of the Russian perfective, as in example (4). The TR of the state ‘know’, [φ], is not a proper input for this gram because no transitions are perceived to be present. To resolve this incompatibility, an initial boundary is added to the TR of the verb, coercing it into an achievement verb meaning ‘find out’, [τ φ], which then represents the proper input for the transition-sensitive perfective. The English simple present, on the other hand, can be viewed as a non-transition-sensitive perfective gram. It selects the entire TR of a given verb but is indifferent to the presence of transitions. This is why it can be used on states to express present-time reference. Crucially and despite their differences, both grams can be considered perfectives by virtue of triggering the PPP as a consequence of their semantics of full and instant identifiability: neither gram allows reference to the ‘now’ with dynamic verbs.
We can, therefore, say that both Russian and English feature grams in their verbal paradigm that express perfectivity. It is the interplay between these perfective grams and actionality that triggers the PPP; as soon as a perfective viewpoint is imposed on an event (whether this is in the form of a transition-sensitive or a non-transition-sensitive gram), we end up with the present-time alignment issues outlined in
Section 3.1. We believe this proposal, which recognizes the intrinsically perfective value of constructions such as the English simple present, constitutes an improvement with respect to accounts that focus solely on actionality (see also
Caudal and Bednall 2022) and analyze the English simple present as an aspectually sensitive construction that selects only states (e.g.,
Michaelis 2004;
Michaelis 2011; and
Altshuler and Schwarzschild 2013). Apart from the fact that it brings together analogous patterns across languages with different grammatical systems in a unified model, our approach also has the advantage that it can account for “special” uses of the English simple present, e.g., in performative or narrative contexts, which are hard to explain in terms of stative selection (
De Wit 2017, pp. 48–51).