Abstract
The authors examine the emotions contained in 2 Cor 7:5–16. They refer to the nativist approach, in particular to Jaak Panksepp’s theory of primary emotions and Jonathan Haidt’s five foundations of morality. The emotions of Paul, Titus, and the Corinthians described in 2 Cor 7:5–16 can be classified into Panksepp’s categories of FEAR/anxiety, GRIEF/separation distress, CARE/nurturing, and RAGE/anger. They serve as a response to the pain and threat posed by the community’s separation from Paul and aim to repair and strengthen the family/parental relationship with the apostle. Following Haidt’s typology, most of the emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–16 can be located in the care/harm module, related to Paul’s care about his spiritual children in Corinth. In addition, other modules can be engaged to link various emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–15: fairness/reciprocity, focused on reciprocal altruism, in-group/loyalty, reinforcing mutual loyalty, authority/respect, working for Paul’s authority in Corinth, and purity/sanctity serving the holiness of the community and their belonging to Christ. The nativist approach to Pauline emotions smoothly transitions into a socio-cultural approach, pointing to their complementarity. This combination allows for the appreciation for the role of emotions in making moral judgments and helps understand the similarities and differences between ancient and modern views of emotionality. It also aids in grasping the interconnectedness and adaptive functions of emotions, serving the individual and the community.
1. Introduction
2 Cor 7:5–16, containing an account of Titus’ mission in Corinth, is a veritable treasure trove of emotions. The apostle begins by mentioning his own fear (v. 5), joy (vv. 7, 12), regret (v. 8), boasting without being ashamed (v. 14), joy and trust in the community (v. 16). Paul also describes Titus’ emotions: joy, refreshment of the spirit (v. 13), and stirring of affects (v. 15). Finally, the apostle presents a whole range of the community emotions: longing, mourning, zeal (v. 7); godly and worldly grief (vv. 8–10); eagerness, indignation, fear, longing, again zeal, readiness to mete out justice (v. 11); again eagerness (v. 12); fear and trembling (v. 15). 2 Cor 7:5–16, with its plethora of feelings, has not attracted much scholarly attention. Andrew D. Clark examined the expressions σπλάγχνον and ἀναπαύω in 2 Cor 7:13, 15, their use in Jewish and Greco-Roman contexts, and the meaning that the expression “refresh the heart” takes on in Paul’s letters (Clarke 1996, pp. 277–300). Larry L. Wellborn, in an extensive article from 2001, analyzed the persuasive nature of “pity,” “anger,” and “zeal” in the Pauline letter of reconciliation (2 Cor 1:1–2:13 and 7:5–16) (Welborn 2001, pp. 31–60). The author referred to the works of Quintilian, Cicero, Aristotle, Demosthenes, and Apollonius of Tiana, illustrating the occurrence of mentioned emotions in the context of conflict negotiation and reconciliation in Corinth. In his subsequent article from 2011, Welborn compared 2 Cor 7:5–16 to the ancient psychagogical literature to explain the therapeutic value of the sorrow present there (Welborn 2011, pp. 547–70). According to the author, in his approach to “godly sorrow” (2 Cor 7:10–11), Paul proves to be original as compared to ancient philosophers and moralists, modeling himself on the emotions of Christ and creating a new kind of emotional therapy.
Ivar Vegge also referred to rhetoric and the psychagogical literature, devoting one chapter of his monograph to 2 Cor 7:5–16 (Vegge 2008, pp. 71–140). The author reads the analyzed passage as “idealized praise with a hortative objective,” in which Paul uses amplification and idealizes the image of reconciliation that resulted from Titus’ visit to Corinth. Vegge was not interested in emotions as such, but in their role in the letter of reconciliation that is 2 Corinthians. From a different perspective, John Gavin examined “grief” in 2 Cor 7:10, understood by the ancients as decidedly negative (Stoics), but rehabilitated by Paul (“godly sorrow”) (Gavin 2010, pp. 427–42). The author also cites later patristic interpretations of grief in the analyzed passage. Finally, Te-Li Lau devoted part of his monograph to shame and regret in 2 Corinthians 7, referring to Aristotle and drawing attention to godly sorrow, which serves to shape the mind of Christ in the Corinthians (Lau 2020, pp. 156–57).
Given the multitude and diversity of emotions that surface in 2 Cor 7:5–16, it can be said that interest in this passage is rather modest. Research on it is dominated by rhetoric and the ancient psychagogical approach. The emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–16 are treated selectively, without an attempt to link them together. References to contemporary psychology are also scant, with Lau being the only modest exception. Emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–16 are studied from a historical and constructivist perspective, which generally dominates the humanities. This article attempts to fill the apparent gap by offering a holistic view of emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–16. We will refer to neuroscience, evolutionary, and moral psychology, in particular to Jaak Panksepp’s (1998) theory of primary emotions and Jonathan Haidt’s (Haidt and Graham 2007, pp. 98–116; Haidt 2012) five foundations of morality. They point to the innate nature of emotions interpreted as intuitive moral judgments, oriented toward values and community construction. Their theories will help us to group Pauline emotions, allowing for a better understanding of their character and function. Neuroscience highlights the biological and evolutionary determinants of basic emotional mechanisms and points to their universal and cross-cultural character. In this sense, it seems a viable instrument for studying emotions in ancient texts.1 Since the emotions described in 2 Cor 7:5–16 are also a product of Paul’s times and differ from our understanding, we will refer to ancient and contemporary authors to highlight this difference.
Among the ancient philosophical schools studding emotions, Stoicism was very popular in Paul’s time. However, it was characterized by a negative approach to emotions, which fundamentally distinguishes the Stoics from both Old Testament anthropology and Paul.2 This does not mean that the Stoic therapy of emotions and their descriptions are devoid of value or points in common with Paul (see joy). However, Aristotle seems to be closer to the apostle’s approach, treating emotions as natural motivators of human action, influencing moral reasoning and judgments. In the post-Hellenistic period, one can note a return to Aristotle’s thought, which became increasingly popular, starting with Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BC and culminating in Alexander of Aphrodisias in the second half of the second century and beginning of the third century AD (Falcon 2016). We will refer to Aristotle also because of his study of emotions in the communication process (Rhet. 2.1–11), similar to Paul’s use of them in 2 Cor 7:5–16.3 Necessarily, due to the constraints of this paper, we must also limit ourselves in comparisons between Paul and other philosophical schools.4 Biblical studies postulate combining neuroscience and contemporary psychology with a historical perspective (Schellenberg 2022, p. 83). This paper is an attempt to respond to this call and help us better understand the working of emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–16.
2. Emotions from a Nativist Perspective: Jaak Panksepp and Jonathan Haidt
The dominant way of interpreting emotions in biblical studies and the humanities is constructivism, which treats them as a historically conditioned cultural product.5 Less frequently, biblical scholars and representatives of the humanities refer to essentialist views that emphasize the universal and evolutionarily grounded nature of human emotionality. This approach does not deny that the categories describing emotions and the understanding of the values associated with them are culturally conditioned, but it emphasizes the importance of emotional mechanisms inherent in human nature. The essentialist and constructivist positions should not be treated as contradictory but as complementary.6 The essentialist scholars whose research we will refer to are Jaak Panksepp and Jonathan Haidt, representing neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. They remain significantly underappreciated in the study of emotions in ancient authors and in the Bible.7 Panksepp summarizes the main points of his research on emotions as follows (Panksepp 2010, p. 533):
Cross-species affective neuroscience studies confirm that primary-process emotional feelings are organized within primitive subcortical regions of the brain that are anatomically, neurochemically, and functionally homologous in all mammals that have been studied. Emotional feelings (affects) are intrinsic values that inform animals how they are faring in the quest to survive. The various positive affects indicate that animals are returning to “comfort zones” that support survival, and negative affects reflect “discomfort zones” that indicate that animals are in situations that may impair survival. They are ancestral tools for living—evolutionary memories of such importance that they were coded into the genome in rough form (as primary brain processes), which are refined by basic learning mechanisms (secondary processes) as well as by higher-order cognitions/thoughts (tertiary processes).
In this summary, the author first draws an analogy between the brain of mammals and humans. Second, he distinguishes three levels of emotional control, which are as follows (Panksepp 2010, p. 534):
- (1)
- Primary-process emotions—the experienced aspects of the unconditioned (“instinctual”) emotional brain systems. From a philosophical point of view, they control “intentions-in-action.”
- (2)
- Secondary emotional processes that arise from simple emotional learning, such as classical and operant conditioning well studied in animal models.
- (3)
- Tertiary-process emotions—the intrapsychic ruminations and thoughts about one’s lot in life, higher order affective-cognitions that promote “intentions-to act” and are elaborated by medial-frontal regions.
According to the author, it is among the instinctive tools inherited from our ancestors (primary-process emotions) that the foundations of human emotional life are to be found. Brain research suggests the existence of at least seven subcortical emotional systems common to all mammals: SEEKING/desire, RAGE/anger, FEAR/anxiety, LUST/sexual systems, CARE/maternal nurturance, GRIEF/separation distress, and PLAY/physical social engagement.8 The processes occurring in these systems are rarely, if ever, triggered by higher prefrontal neocortical areas, suggesting that higher brain areas may not have the appropriate circuits to generate affective experiences, although the cerebral cortex can regulate emotional arousal and evoke emotional responses by reflecting on life problems (Panksepp 2010, p. 537; see also Panksepp 1998, pp. 41–58).
Panksepp points out two extremes in the study of emotions: the Freudian approach, which lacks knowledge about the brain, and the reductionist approach dominant in neuroscience, which lacks reference to the mind. The author suggests combining these perspectives in his BrainMind study, in a discipline he calls the “affective neuroscience (Panksepp 1998, pp. vii–viii, 4–7; 2010, p. 535).” In his Affective Neuroscience, Panksepp focuses on a detailed description of the first-order emotions, treating the processes related to learning and higher-order thinking only in the last chapter of his book. They still require a lot of research and are more difficult to track in the brain (Panksepp 1998, pp. 300–23). Nevertheless, the author leaves us with solid experimental knowledge about emotions as the evolutionary voice of our ancestors, which form a system of adaptive learning and memory.9 They lead to the development of habits and behavior patterns and are subject to reflection.
Jonathan Haidt shares the view of a certain innate set of adaptive emotional responses, focusing on their relationship with the development of the individual and the community. According to the author, emotions are an essential component of the so-called intuitive moral judgments, which occur quickly, outside the cortical centers of the brain that control thinking (Haidt and Kesebir 2010, pp. 797–832). If reasoning follows the initial intuitive judgment, it generally serves to justify the original intuition, rather than to overturn it. Intuitive judgments serve social persuasion and are social in nature, fulfilling various strategic goals related to the community (Haidt 2001, p. 815). To describe the innateness and social character of emotions, Haidt uses the concept of Gary Marcus, who studied the developmental pathways by which genes guide the construction of the brain (Marcus 2004). Marcus argued that genes create the first draft of the brain, which is then edited by life experience. The changes in the brain, as it learns and grows, are governed by genetic processes. Marcus’s view of innateness helped Haidt to explain the ways that human morality may be “organized in advance of experience (Haidt and Craig 2008, pp. 373–74).”
Haidt puts the intuitive moral judgments and accompanying emotions into five categories, illustrated in the following table (Haidt and Craig 2008, p. 382):
Emotions such as compassion, anger, gratitude, guilt, pride, fear, and disgust are, according to Haidt, linked to five groups of concerns connected with an adaptive challenge: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity (see Table 1). Haidt attaches more weight to primary emotional responses than Jean Piaget, Paul Churchland, Alan Fiske, and others who accept certain evolutionary roots of morality (Haidt and Craig 2008, pp. 374–81). Emotions serve not only to respond to harm or defend justice, but also to promote loyalty, authority, and holiness (Haidt and Craig 2008, pp. 371–73). The author describes them as an evolutionary preparedness to link certain patterns of social appraisal to specific emotional and motivational reactions. The moral mind is somehow structured in advance of experience so the mentioned classes of social concerns are likely to become moralized during development (Haidt and Craig 2008, p. 381).
Table 1.
The Five Foundations of Intuitive Ethics.
These innate emotional responses serve to meet adaptive challenges such as protecting and caring for offspring, fostering cooperation outside kinship ties, forming cohesive coalitions within a group, establishing beneficial relationships in hierarchical groups, and avoiding contamination. Emotional reactions are triggered by primary phenomena, such as the needs of children, the violation of cooperation rules, threat to the group, excessive dominance or demands for submission, and contact with a sick person (Haidt and Craig 2008, pp. 383–84). Primary triggers stimulate action that results in moral attitudes: caring and kindness, honesty and reliability, loyalty and sacrifice, obedience and respect, purity and piety. The original triggers are culturally adaptable, e.g., the need for cooperation can be frustrated by marital infidelity. Experiments prove that both the emotions mentioned by the author and the accompanying activation mechanisms are innate, located outside the thinking centers in the cortical layer of the brain, and are present in us at the earliest stages, preceding reflection and life experience. At the same time, they are culturally conditioned (Haidt 2012, chap. 7).
Haidt’s five foundations of innate morality are characterized by universality. According to the author, the ways in which different cultures deal with the five adaptive challenges show a surprising degree of similarity. Their constituent elements are found in other primates and overlap with other models of innate morality (Haidt and Craig 2008, pp. 384–85). The research of Panksepp and Haidt makes us realize that emotions are not only a cultural construct, but also an important evolutionary instrument for organizing social interaction and promoting values. Panksepp speaks of basic emotions common to all mammals, but treats them as a starting point for higher emotions generated in the higher parts of the brain, where learning and logical reflection processes are evident. Studying them in biblical texts requires a combination of neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and exegesis. This is what we propose in the subsequent reading of 2 Cor 7:5–16.
3. Neuroscience, Moral Psychology, and 2 Cor 7:5–16
Let us begin with Panksepp and his primary emotions. In 2 Cor 2:13 and 7:5, Paul, eagerly awaiting the return of Titus, mentions that his spirit could not find peace. In 2 Cor 7:5, he also reports an experience of distress (θλίβω) and inner fear (ἔσωθεν φόβοι), which may signal the activation of the FEAR system. This system serves to protect against pain and danger. Paul fears for the success of Titus’ mission and the potential loss of his relationship with the Corinthians. Weaker stimulation of the FEAR system causes a freeze response, which the apostle seems to experience in 2 Cor 2:12–13. Paul mentions that although he had open doors for preaching the gospel in Troas, he left the city anxious about Titus. Concerned about the success of the messenger’s mission and the future of the community, the apostle is unable to work. People stimulated in the corresponding areas of the brain report being consumed by intense, free-floating anxiety that seems to have no environmental cause (Panksepp 1998, pp. 206–22; 2010, p. 538). It is close to what Paul says of the tension in his body and inner fear (2 Cor 7:5). They paralyzed his actions, and he was freed from this inertia only by the arrival of Titus.
Titus, who brings good news, comforts the apostle (vv. 6, 7, 13). Paul rejoices (χαίρω/χαρά) (vv. 7, 9, 13, 16), experiencing the emotion of achieved goal and restored relationship between himself and the community. The happiness hormones associated with joy (dopamine, serotonin, endorphins, and oxytocin) are responsible for strengthening social bonds and can be linked to many of Pankseppian systems. In particular, the CARE system, associated with parental nurturance, may come to vogue here (Panksepp 1998, pp. 247–60; 2010, p. 539). In several places of his correspondence with the Corinthians, the apostle calls himself the father of the community (1 Cor 4:15; 2 Cor 11:2; 12:14). The apostle rejoices at the happy return of Titus and the news that the community is safe. Paul’s parental concern for the Corinthians explains his anxiety about their estrangement, his search for closeness, and his happiness at their return to him.
While Paul’s path from fear to joy is also Titus’ path, the community travels in the opposite direction. In the Corinthians, the FEAR/anxiety system, associated with the threat of losing the relationship with Paul (φόβος) (vv. 11, 15), begins to operate. Titus also reports on their longing (ἐπιπόθησις), mourning (ὀδυρμός), and zeal (ζῆλος) for the apostle (2 Cor 7:7), as well as grief (λύπη) (2 Cor 7:8–10), which can be assigned to the GRIEF/separation distress system. It is a system focused on the experience of CARE/nurturing and stimulated by endogenous opioids, oxytocin, and prolactin—the main chemicals of attachment and social bonding in the mammalian brains. These substances are fundamental to secure attachment, which is essential for mental health and happiness (Panksepp 1998, pp. 261–79; 2010, p. 539). The longing and grief of separation experienced by the Corinthians are directed toward re-experiencing Paul’s CARE and love. If he is the father of the community, they manifest themselves here as his children, coping with the psychosomatic discomfort of separation.
Under the influence of the “letter in tears,” RAGE and anger also appear in the community, motivating the Corinthians to take decisive action and repair their relationship with the apostle. This manifests itself in eagerness (σπουδή) and defense (ἀπολογία), indignation towards those who hurt Paul (ἀγανάκτησις), and a readiness to mete out justice (ἐκδίκησις) (v. 11). Feelings associated with the RAGE and anger system are strongly imprinted in the memory and push to violence against those who harm us. In the brain, this system is located close to the FEAR/anxiety system and may be responsible for various types of violent behavior (Panksepp 1998, pp. 187–205; 2010, p. 538). Hence, the apostle’s appeal that the community should not exaggerate with punishing the offender (2 Cor 2:6–8).
The Pankseppian categories make us realize that in 2 Cor 7:5–16 Paul can effectively appeal to the innate emotional systems, which serve to restore balance in the relationship between him and the community. These emotions activate instinctively, outside the areas of the brain responsible for critical thinking and reflection. Of course, a nativist approach is not sufficient to understand Paul’s emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–16, which are also reflective in nature and involve an assessment of the situation. This is demonstrated by Haidt’s model applied to 2 Cor 7:5–16.
3.1. Harm/Care
Most of the emotions described in 2 Cor 7:5–16 could be classified under Haidt’s category of harm/care, which is evolutionarily linked to childcare and characterized by compassion, care, and kindness. Mammals face the need to care for vulnerable offspring, and nothing is more central to evolutionary success than keeping these offspring alive. For humans, suffering by or harm to almost any child-like entity can be part of the actual domain of this module (Haidt and Craig 2008, p. 383). The trigger for the harm/care system in 2 Cor 7:5–16 could have been the threat to Paul’s spiritual children (1 Cor 4:14–15; 2 Cor 6:13; 12:14) if they lost their bond with the apostle (see Table 2). The emotions of Paul and Titus assigned to this module confirm their parental love and concern for the community. In turn, the emotions of the Corinthians express a desire to return to a safe, paternal relationship with Paul.
Table 2.
The Five Foundations of Intuitive Ethics and Pauline Triggers in 2 Cor 7:5–16.
Although the evolutionary foundations of harm/care system are very old, the emotions and attitudes associated with it are culturally conditioned. Compassion, highlighted by Haidt, in its contemporary understanding essentially means a distressing emotion connected with commitment to share in another’s distress, implying a desire or wish to relieve the other’s suffering.10 Compassion is not discussed in the work of Aristotle, who describes kindness, but does not treat it as an emotion.11 Instead, Aristotle focuses on pity (ἐλεέω), which is marked by solidarity not with everyone who suffers, but with those who suffer unjustly.12 We feel pity for a person who suffers danger, death, wounds, illness, hunger, and mistreatment (Rhet. 2.8.10). We pity those who are similar to us and whose suffering may be ours in the near future (Rhet. 2.8.13–14). According to Martha Nussbaum, Aristotle’s idea of pity is related to three issues: recognition of the importance of the problem, the innocence of the sufferer, and the fact that a similar suffering may befall us (Nussbaum 2001, pp. 304–35). Pity, as harmful and rooted in the excessive attachment to external goods, was condemned by the Stoics (Nussbaum 2001, pp. 354–93).
According to Welborn, 2 Corinthians, as a letter of reconciliation, is driven by an appeal to pity, presenting Paul’s innocent suffering for the gospel (Welborn 2001, pp. 39–47). Indeed, elements of an appeal to pity can be found in 2 Cor 1:1–7:1 and in Paul’s “letter in tears.” However, to what extent does an appeal to pity manifest itself in 2 Cor 7:5–16? Paul’s feelings toward the Corinthians cannot be called pity in the Aristotelian sense, because the community is suffering through its own fault. Instead, love seems to be a good candidate to explain the apostle’s emotional reaction in 2 Cor 7:5–16. Aristotle describes love (φῐλία) as “wishing for anyone the things that we believe to be good, for his sake but not for our own, and procuring them for him as far as lies in our power” (Rhet. 2.4.2) (Aristotle 2020, p. 191). Such love is characteristic of family and friendly relationships (Rhet. 2.4.28–29).13 While pity does not necessarily motivate us to act on behalf of the sufferer, love does (Ben-Ze’ev 2003, p. 114). In 2 Cor 7:5–16, Paul manifests emotions that can be classified as derivatives of love and express concern and anxiety for the welfare of his spiritual children.14
The apostle begins with fear (φόβος) (v. 5), which accompanied his expectation of Titus’ return.15 The way in which the apostle expresses his fear, without shame or embarrassment, places him far from the Stoic ideal of the peaceful mind (Harris 2005, p. 527). Fear (φόβος), according to the Stoics, belongs to the four detrimental emotions, together with desire (ἐπιθυμία), grief (λύπη), and delight (ἡδονή). It is linked to the opinion that something in prospect is an evil of such a sort that we should avoid it (Cicero, Tusc. 4.14–15; Diogenes Laertius, Vit. 7.111–114). According to Aristotle, fear is “a kind of pain and trouble caused by the impression of an imminent evil that causes destruction or pain” (Rhet. 4.5.1) (Aristotle 2020, p. 199). We feel fear in the face of evil that seems to be near at hand and threatening with the loss of something dear to us. Aristotle’s definition is not far from the modern understanding of fear, treated as a basic emotion and a reaction to immediate danger. Paul reacted with fear to Titus’ prolonged return and to the situation in Corinth. He mentions this emotion again in 2 Cor 11:3, where he is concerned about the Corinthians being deceived by his opponents. In 2 Cor 12:20 he fears that his next visit to Corinth will be painful (2 Cor 12:20). Paul is concerned about the community, their response to his “letter in tears,” and the future of their relationship, which he believes is crucial to the spiritual well-being of his children (Martin 1986, p. 390). His concern stems from his love for them. God responded to Paul’s fear and concern by “comforting” him (παρακαλέω/παράκλησις) with the arrival of the eagerly awaited Titus and the good news he brought from Corinth (2 Cor 7:6–7).
Another term, μεταμέλομαι (2 Cor 7:8), which Paul uses to describe the regret accompanying the sending of the “letter in tears,” also fits in with his love and concern for the Corinthians. The term appears in the Old Testament to describe God’s reactions, which have much to do with mercy. God regrets and withholds the plague on Jerusalem (1 Chr 21:15), hears and saves the Israelites who beg him (Ps 105:45). The term μεταμέλομαι expresses faithfulness, as in Psalm 109:4, where the Lord swears to stand by his anointed one and will not regret it. It also describes human regret for reckless and wrong decisions that bear bitter fruit (1 Macc 11:10; Prov 5:11; 25:8; Wis 19:2; Sir 32:19; 33:20; Ezek 14:22; Zech 11:5).
This emotion becomes understandable in light of the close bond between the Corinthians and Paul. To quote Aristotle: “the persons men pity are those whom they know, provided they are not too closely connected with them; for if they are, they feel the same as if they themselves were likely to suffer” (Rhet. 2.8.12) (Aristotle 2020, p. 225). Moved by love, the apostle feels what the Corinthians feel, regretting having sent a difficult “letter in tears” in which he admonished the community (2 Cor 7:8). His regret may also have been related to uncertainty about the fruits his letter would bring.16 The fact that Paul mentions the grief of the Corinthians seven times and rejoices that the letter did not harm them suggests a considerable amount of compassion on his part, and that is how his regret should be interpreted.
With the arrival of Titus and influenced by the description of the community’s emotions, Paul’s anxiety gives way to joy (2 Cor 7:7). There is no discussion of this emotion in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, nor of sadness, probably because pleasure and pain are components of all emotions, not being emotions in themselves, as these require judgment. Joy, on the other hand, appears in the Stoics as one of the four positive emotions, connected with elation of one’s spirit engaged or in the presence of good.17 The apostle often refers to this important emotion in his letters, calling on Christians to practice it (Rom 12:12,15; 2 Cor 13:11; Phil 2:18,29; 3:1; 4:4; 1 Thess 5:16: Col 1:11; 4:18). Paul himself regularly emphasizes that he rejoices in his communities and co-workers (Rom 15:32; 16:19; 1 Cor 16:17; 2 Cor 2:3; 13:9; Phil 1:4; 2:2; 4:1,10; Col 2:5; 1 Thess 2:19.20; 3:9; 2 Tim 1:4), as well as in the progress of the gospel and its proclamation, even at the cost of his own life (Phil 1:18; 2:17; Col 1:24). Paul works to increase joy in Corinth and in Philippi (2 Cor 1:24; Phil 1:25; 2:28).18 Joy (χαίρω/χαρά) (vv. 7, 9, 13, 16) accompanies Paul as he observes the community returning to him. It is a special emotion, classified by contemporary psychology as affectionate and social, responsible for building and strengthening bonds.19 Paul’s joy, which is shared with the community, serves to solidify relationship between them and the apostle.
Moving on to Titus, his comfort (παράκλησις) (v. 7), refreshment of spirit (ἀναπέπαυται τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ), joy (χαρά) (v. 13), and affects (σπλάγχνον) (v. 15) also fit into the love for the community, which is his family, and in which he participates together with Paul. The Corinthians gave Titus’ spirit (πνεῦμα) rest and refreshment after the uncertainties and anxieties of his mission (2 Cor 7:13) (Harris 2005, p. 548).20 Paul also states that Titus’ affects (σπλάγχνον) are all the more directed toward the community, as he recalls their obedience and the welcome they gave him (2 Cor 7:15). The term σπλάγχνον, which the apostle uses to describe Titus’ emotions, literally means “bowels,” the deepest stirring of the inner self. It is sometimes translated by “heart,” other times by “spirit” or simply “affection.”21 In the literal sense of bowels, the term occurs in 2 Macc 9:5,6, describing the illness of Antiochus IV Epiphanes and his death (see also Prov 26:22; Acts 1:18). It is also used to describe parental love and care (Wis 10:5; Sir 30:7; 4 Macc 14:13; 15:23, 29). In the NT, σπλαγχνίζομαι renders Jesus’ compassionate responses to human poverty and abandonment, which motivate him to act (Matt 9:36; 14:14; 15:32; 20:34; Mark 1:41; Luke 7:13). In the sense of God’s mercy, the term also appears in Matthew 18:27 and Luke 1:78; 10:33; 15:20.
Paul uses the term σπλάγχνον to describe his own emotions toward the community in 2 Cor 6:12, Phil 1:8, and 2:1. In 2 Cor 6:12, he says that there is plenty of room in his heart for the Corinthians, but their affections (σπλάγχνον) are restrained. In Phil 1:8, he admits that he longs for the community “in the affections (σπλάγχνον) of Christ” and appeals to them in the name of Christ’s affections and mercy (σπλάγχνον and οἰκτιρμός) (Phil 2:1). In Col 3:12, Paul again combines σπλάγχνον and οἰκτιρμός, calling on Christians to practice heartfelt mercy and forgiveness (Col 3:13) toward one another. Finally, in Philemon, the apostle uses σπλάγχνον to describe the interior/hearts of the saints who have been refreshed, Onesimus as his heart, and his own interior/heart in Christ, which should be refreshed Philemon (Philem 7, 12, 20). Titus’ affects (σπλάγχνον) in 2 Cor 7:15 can be understood as an extension of parental love and care, as in the LXX, and as the compassionate response to the Corinthians changed behavior.
Finally, the Corinthians respond to Paul and Titus’ concern and love with their longing (ἐπιπόθησις), mourning (ὀδυρμός) (v. 7), zeal (ζῆλος) (vv. 7, 11), and grief (λύπη) (vv. 8–10), which also fit into the model of loving family and friendship relationships. The “longing” (ἐπιπόθησις), with which the community responded, appears only in 2 Cor 7:7, 11 (it is a hapax legomenon in the OT and NT). In Ezek 23:11 (Aquila) and extra-biblical texts, this term is used to describe strong desires and cravings (Liddell et al. 1996, p. 377; Arndt et al. 2000, p. 652). The Corinthians longed to see Paul again and show him their affection, thus responding to the dramatic circumstances in which he left Corinth without their support. As Vegge rightly points out, this emotion is aimed at rebuilding relationship.22 The love as the motivator of Paul’s emotional responses in this section also motivates the Corinthians. Friendly and family love, according to Aristotle, cannot bear separation (NE, 8.5.6–14; Konstan 2018, pp. 46–47). The prospect of its loss causes the community to lament or mourn. Paul describes it with the rare term ὀδυρμός (2 Cor 7:7), denoting pain like that of losing a child (Jer 31:15, Matt 2:18) and supplication, begging for salvation (2 Macc 11:6). This attitude contains a strong appeal for mercy and compassion, and may be accompanied by crying and bodily gestures, such as shaking the head (Hauck 1964–1976b, p. 116). Here, we may see the Pankseppian separation distress and the Corinthians’ desire to return to a safe, parental relationship with Paul.
The apostle goes on to write about the zeal (ζῆλος) that the community showed towards him (2 Cor 7:7, 11, 12).23 According to Aristotle, zeal is a feeling of pain caused by the visible possession of highly valued goods by people who are similar to us; pain not due to the fact that another possesses them but to the fact that we ourselves do not (Rhet. 2.11.1). This emotion is characteristic of virtuous people and associated with imitating persons whom we admire (Rhet. 2.11.6–7). Aristotle distinguishes it from envy (φθόνος), which is the pain resulting from the fact that others possess desirable goods that we would like to deprave them of (Rhet. 2.11.6) (Konstan 2006, p. 224).24 Aristotle assesses envy as an emotion characteristic of ambitious, self-righteous, and petty people (Rhet. 2.10.2–3). The contemporary view of envy sometimes follows Aristotle’s distinctions (Konstan 2006, pp. 112–28; Taylor 2006). However, more and more often, modern psychology recognizes the positive aspects of this emotion and attempts to distinguish between benign and malicious envy, which manifests itself in ill will (Protasi 2022, pp. 2–3).25
Paul does not speak of φθόνος in the Corinthians, but uses the term ζῆλος, which assumes various meanings in his writings. It can describe rivalry, which, if too aggressive or related to jealousy, leads to divisions (Rom 13:13; 1 Cor 3:3; 2 Cor 12:20; Gal 5:20). It can also denote devotion and zeal, which Israel or Saul the Pharisee showed toward God (Rom 10:2; Phil 3:6). The word also expresses a readiness that stimulates others to compete in good deeds (2 Cor 9:2) and Paul’s anxious love for the community (2 Cor 11:2).
Welborn argues that the Corinthians, by showing ζῆλος, desire the goods that Paul possesses (Welborn 2001, p. 55). However, it is better to assume that the community is entering into a “competition” for the apostle, seeking to return to a close relationship with him. Zeal and positive rivalry have the potential to push us to imitate those who possess the virtues we desire. According to Aristotle, those we admire and want to imitate are benefactors and virtuous men, distinguished by courage, wisdom, and authority (Rhet. 2.11.4–5). This is consistent with the apostle’s self-presentation in 2 Corinthians. Paul praises the Corinthian zeal, reading this emotion like Aristotle, who pointed out its motivational potential and virtuous character.26 Contemporary research also stresses the positive aspect of benign envy, which has educational value and leads to imitating those who are admired (Vaccarezza and Niccoli 2022, pp. 111–28). The Corinthian zeal returns once again in 2 Cor 7:11, where it is paired with their desire to do justice and thus fix the relationship with the apostle.27
Finally, the community emotion that dominates in 2 Cor 7:8–10 is grief. Aristotle does not classify λύπη as an emotion because it signifies pain, which is an essential component of every emotion (Konstan 2006, pp. 244–47). In the modern view, grief is connected with perceiving an object as mattering to oneself in a positive sense, in degrees ranging from the comparatively minor to the centrally important, and as lost, either temporarily or irrevocably (Blustein 2018, p. 124).28 This explains why the Stoics view this emotion as decidedly negative, associating it with disordered attachment to external goods and poor judgment of reality (Epictetus, Diss. 2.22.6–7; Cicero Tusc. 3.13.27; 4.6.14; Dio Chrysostom Or. 16.1.4; Graver 2002, pp. 73–127). The evil of this emotion ultimately consists of the distortion of the rational judgment of mind.29 However, grief also has a moral value, motivating people to change their lives. The Tabula of Cebes depicts λύπη together with mourning (ὀδυρμός) as women dressed in rags, deformed, and naked. Those who commit evil are exposed to such company, and only repentance (μετάνοια) can change that (Tab. Cebes 10–11) (Welborn 2011, pp. 550–51).
The apostle is aware that his “letter in tears” filled the Corinthians with sadness (λύπη) (Gavin 2010, pp. 430–33). He is aware of both the motivating and dangerous potential of this emotion. In 2 Cor 2:1–13, grief is responsible for the apostle’s change of plans and his withdrawal from visiting Corinth (2 Cor 2:1–3), as well as for his dilemma, the anguish of heart, and tears, which resulted in the “letter in tears” (2 Cor 2:4). Grief paralyzed Paul’s work, making him unable to evangelize in Troas (2 Cor 2:12–13). Grief has a way of spreading over the whole community (2 Cor 2:5). It can also consume a person, leading him or her to despair (2 Cor 2:7).
Paul’s approach to grief is ambivalent. The apostle treats this emotion as part of human life (2 Cor 6:10), but more often highlights its negative effects (2 Cor 2:4–13). In 2 Cor 7:9–10, Paul distinguishes between two types of grief, godly and worldly, which, according to Welborn (2011, p. 548), constitutes his original contribution to ancient reflection on this emotion. Interestingly, the apostle seems to speak here in a language that in many ways converges with contemporary psychology. Paul’s “worldly grief” can be considered an equivalent to excessive self-pity and may be described as a sort of depression, an unfitting emotional response to loss. It erodes the capacity for hope, diminishes agency by removing the motivation to act, presents the past as dead and settled, and causes estrangement from other people (Blustein 2018, pp. 125–126; see also Ratcliffe 2015). The grief of this world (ἡ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου λύπη) takes away strength, paralyzes action, and ultimately leads to death (2 Cor 7:10b).
Godly grief, on the other hand, is an emotion that helps us focus and provokes deeper reflection (Bonanno 2009, p. 31). A person experiencing sadness may devote more time to deliberation when making decisions than an angry person, which leads to both a more accurate assessment of what has happened and a more constructive judgment of what should be carried out (Blustein 2018, p. 128). It can be said that Paul himself first experienced the godly grief that he communicates to the Corinthians in 2 Cor 2:1, 3, 5 and in his “letter in tears.” It led to the godly grief of the community, which Paul rejoices in and which caused their μετάνοια.30 Grief is responsible for the transformation of the Corinthians’ thinking and acting, so that they suffered no harm (2 Cor 7:9). It led to their salvation (σωτηρία) and should not be regretted. The godly grief (ἡ κατὰ θεὸν λύπη), experienced by the community, was associated with the realization of the loss in their relationship with Paul, mobilizing them to action that brought good (2 Cor 7:10a).31 It could also be associated with the acknowledgement of guilt and one’s fault, thus working toward reconciliation in Corinth.32 Jeffrey Bluestein argues that sorrow, closely related to mourning, can be a response to wrongdoing (Blustein 2018, p. 124). It can express reproach toward the perpetrator, motivate to take charge of one’s life, and reconfigure it to take account of the loss one has suffered.33 The godly sorrow shown by the Corinthians signals their transformation (μετάνοια), a departure from the self-centered thinking that characterizes worldly sorrow, and an openness to Paul.34 It appeals to the apostle’s love and prompts him to act gently toward the community.
In summary, the care/harm category can comprise a range of emotions experienced by the apostle, Titus, and the community, focused on repairing and strengthening family relationships in Corinth. Pauline compassionate love, different from the Aristotelian pity, results in fear, regret, and joy of the apostle. Titus’ joy and affects are also rooted in the same love. The Corinthians display a whole range of emotions also aimed at repairing their relationship with Paul: longing, mourning, zeal, and godly grief. They express a deep desire to return to a safe and stable parental relationship with the apostle. At the same time, godly grief also triggers a series of actions by the Corinthians described in verses 11–12, aimed at restoring justice in the church, which leads us to the second category discussed below, fairness and reciprocity.
3.2. Fairness/Reciprocity
Haidt’s fairness/reciprocity category comprises a suite of emotions that may have evolved to help social organisms reap the gains of reciprocal altruism with non-kin or distant kin. It is connected with emotional reactivity to signs of cheating and cooperation, virtues and vices related to fairness, religious injunctions about reciprocity, cultural constructs such as rights, and social institutions related to justice (Haidt and Craig 2008, p. 383). It serves group cooperation and it is based on emotions and attitudes such as anger, gratitude, guilt, honesty, justice, and credibility.35 The trigger in 2 Cor 7:5–16 is again the crisis situation in Corinth, which had many consequences. One of them is the harm experienced by the apostle. Offended by one of the members of the community, passively assisted by the Corinthians, he had to leave the city. The “letter in tears” probably reproached the community for their passivity, calling on them to punish the culprit and restore justice (2 Cor 2:4–11; see also 2 Cor 7:2–4). Confronted with Paul’s emotions expressed in the “letter in tears” (distress, anguish of heart, tears, grief), the Corinthians responded with eagerness (σπουδή), apology (ἀπολογία), indignation (ἀγανάκτησις) toward the one who provoked the crisis, and a desire to mete out justice (ἐκδίκησις) (2 Cor 7:11, 12).
The primary emotion in the justice/reciprocity category is anger, which Paul does not mention directly in his description. Anger has deep evolutionary roots, being a reaction to threat to food, mates, children, and close kin (Flanagan 2018, pp. viii–ix). It is also a cultured passion, a participant in modern normative orders, governed by complex psychosocial norms and warrants (Flanagan 2018, pp. xii–xxiv). Aristotle defines anger (ὀργή) as a “desire, accompanied by pain, for [an apparent] revenge, due to an apparent slight affecting a man himself or one of his friends, by persons who ought not to slight him” (Rhet. 2.2.1–2) (Aristotle 2020, p. 171). Anger is felt towards an individual who wronged us, not towards a category of people (e.g., thieves) (Rhet. 2.2.2), and it is provoked by disdain, spitefulness, and insult (Rhet. 2.2.3–6). We show anger when the value of something dear to us is questioned (Rhet. 2.2.13–17), and it is especially painful when it comes from our friends: “they are angry with friends, if they neither speak well of nor treat them well, and in an even greater degree, if they do the opposite” (Rhet. 2.2.19–20) (Aristotle 2020, p. 181). Anger is also provoked by situations in which we encounter ingratitude (Rhet. 2.2.23–24) and indifference (Rhet. 2.2.26).
According to Aristotle, anger is associated with the pursuit of justice and it is not manifested to those who admit their guilt and show humility (Rhet. 2.3.5–6). While Paul does not speak of anger toward the community in 2 Cor 7:5–16, it can be said that the Corinthians have many reasons to be angry with the one responsible for the turmoil. Stoics considered the display of anger a sign of immaturity,36 but both Aristotle and ancient society expected anger as a natural reaction to injustice (Konstan 2006, pp. 58, 65–67). Failure to do so could be regarded as weakness and ingratitude. The emotions assigned to the category of fairness/reciprocity can be understood as derivatives of or triggered by anger, and associated with violating the principle of reciprocity that governed Paul’s relationship with the Corinthians. Grief, a reflective emotion that Paul described in 2 Cor 7:8–10, elicited (κατεργάζομαι v.11) many reactions from the Corinthians, paving the way for anger and blame. In fact, grief, as a reaction to wrongdoing, can be a part of emotional complex that involves anger and resentment (Blustein 2018, pp. 129–36).37 There is also a relational difference here: while the Corinthians show grief towards Paul, anger is manifested towards the one responsible for the harm.
The first emotion in the category of fairness/reciprocity is σπουδή, which can be interpreted as the Corinthians’ readiness and willingness to repair the harm inflicted (Thrall 1994, p. 493; Harris 2005, p. 542).38 The term means haste, zeal, effort, sincere and urgent commitment to a cause, but also respect, attention devoted to a person, and consideration for them (Liddell et al. 1996, pp. 1630–31). In the Old Testament, this word is used, for example, to describe the haste with which Israel leaves Egypt (Exod 12:11, 33; Deut 16:3; Wis 19:2), or the swift and sure action of God administering justice (Sir 20:18; 21:5; 27:3; Zech 1:18; Lam 4:6). In Paul, σπουδή, in the sense of resolution and zeal, characterizes superiors (Rom 12:8) but also every Christian in their task of brotherly love and service to the Lord (Rom 12:11). Aristotle uses the verb σπουδάζω when speaking of those who take the anger and insults of others seriously and thus deserve our gentleness: “And men are mild toward those who are serious (τοῖς σπουδάζουσι) with them when they are serious, for they think they are being treated seriously (σπουδάζεσθαι), not with contempt” (Rhet. 2.3.7). Paul recognizes and praises the eagerness and commitment of the community, the seriousness with which they treated his cause in Corinth (2 Cor 7:11,12).
Another attitude of the Corinthians, which falls under the category of fairness/reciprocity, is “apology” (ἀπολογία). In the New Testament, it denotes a defense speech delivered in response to the accusations of opponents (Acts 22:1; 25:16; 1 Cor 9:3; 2 Tim 4:16), but also the defense of the gospel (Phil 1:7,16). In 2 Cor 7:11, most commentators argue for the Corinthians’ effort to clear themselves in Paul’s eyes, through words and actions (Furnish 1984, p. 388; Martin 1986, p. 401; Barnett 1997, p. 378; Harris 2005, p. 541; Thrall 1994, p. 486). However, the noun in 2 Cor 7:11 lacks qualification, and Phil 1:16 indicates that it can take a complement (εἰς ἀπολογίαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου). Therefore, it may just as well refer to the actions of the Corinthians, who defended Paul against his opponents, accusing him of weakness and inability to resolve the crisis in Corinth. This theme dominates 2 Cor 10–13. In the opinion of his adversaries, the apostle was incapable of punishing a sinful member of the community; he proved to be weak and unworthy of the function of the church leader. Paul himself explains his actions as imitating the “gentleness” and “kindness” of Christ and acting for the good of the community (2 Cor 10:1–11; 13:1–10).39 The community’s apology of the apostle fits much better into the picture of their μετάνοια than their justification before him.
Another emotion that fits into the fairness/reciprocity category is indignation (ἀγανάκτησις). The word is a hapax legomenon, denoting the community’s reaction to the evil suffered by Paul and should probably be directed against the culprit (Barrett 1973, p. 211; Furnish 1984, p. 395).40 In the non-biblical literature, ἀγανάκτησις describes pain and irritation, whether physical (Plato, Phaedr. 251c) or resulting from being ruled by someone worthless and inferior in character (Thucydides, Hist. 2.41; Josephus, B.J. 1.449; Liddell et al. 1996, p. 6; Arndt et al. 2000, p. 5). In Josephus, it denotes an outrage at false behavior and injustice (B.J. 1.471, 542, 544; 2.170, 175; 3.439), an emotion so violent that it can lead to bloodshed (B.J. 4.342, 541) or madness (B.J. 4.589). Philo uses this term to describe God’s reaction to Cain’s crime (Pot. 1.69). Indignation is also one of the main emotions discussed by Aristotle, although it differs from Paul in terminology (νεμεσάω).41 In Aristotle it denotes pain at the fact that unworthy people enjoy goods and success that they do not deserve (Rhet. 2.9.1–8). Indignation is an attitude of the virtuous and has much in common with anger and injustice, and this is what Aristotle and Paul have in common. Perhaps the community was outraged at the one who insulted the apostle, seeing how this man still enjoyed a good reputation in the church. More importantly, however, their emotions should be read as a response to the injustice he had committed.
Indignation leads to one more reaction of the community mentioned by Paul, which is the “desire to mete out justice,” expressed by the term ἐκδίκησις. This term can denote a whole range of actions such as revenge, punishment, or retribution (Liddell et al. 1996, p. 504; Schrenk 1964–1976, pp. 445–46). According to Aristotle, an important component of anger is a desire for revenge (Rhet. 2.2.1).” In Romans 12:19, Paul, quoting Deut 32:35, calls on believers not to avenge themselves but to leave room for the wrath of God. In 2 Thess 1:8, Christ coming at the end of time is depicted as the one who takes vengeance. From that context can be inferred that the community is praised not for an act of revenge, because this action ultimately belongs to the Lord.42 The Corinthians are praised for doing justice to the apostle by punishing the guilty party.43
In summary, eagerness, apology, indignation, and desire to reestablish justice can be interpreted as derivatives of the Corinthians’ anger, which, however, differs from Aristotle. According to Paul, vengeance belongs to God. The emotions connected with anger motivate the community to take action that will restore justice in Corinth and make the community credible in Paul’s eyes. This leads us to another category related to group loyalty.
3.3. In-Group/Loyalty
The crisis in Corinth also concerns the community’s loyalty to the apostle, falling under Haidt’s category of in-group/loyalty. This category organizes phenomena related to the well-studied human tendency to aggregate into groups and teams that compete with other groups and teams. Conflicts over territory or attacks from other groups call for virtues such as loyalty, heroism, and self-sacrifice for the common good (Haidt and Craig 2008, p. 383). In-group/loyalty serves to create cohesive coalitions and is accompanied by strong emotions and attitudes such as pride and rage. Loyalty is also an important virtue of friendly and family love (Konstan 2018, pp. 61–93). Adherence to Paul might have been questioned by the behavior of an unknown member of the community connected with the Corinthian crisis (2 Cor 2:4–11). The fact that the apostle did not punish this person only aggravated the problem resulting in a bitter criticism of his opponents (2 Cor 10:1–2). At the time of Paul’s painful visit, the community lost an opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty by not expressing their support for the apostle. However, their negligence was remedied by their response to Paul’s “letter in tears.” In 2 Cor 7:5–16 the apostle is grateful for the demonstration of their loyalty, which he further strengthens by appealing to honor (καυχάομαι/καύχησις) and shame (καταισχύνω). Paul boasted about the Corinthians (see also 2 Cor 1:12–14) and claims that he was not put to shame in his undertaking (see also 2 Cor 10:8). He also confesses that he can trust the community in everything, acting with great boldness (θαρρέω) toward them (2 Cor 7:16).
Pride connected with boasting (καυχάομαι/καύχησις), which falls under the category of in-group/loyalty, is an ambivalent emotion with a strong social trait.44 For Aristotle, pride is characteristic of the virtuous and accomplished persons who are aware of their merits (NE 4.3.1–34). In De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando, Plutarch warns against boasting about one’s achievements and advises on how to perform it without provoking the envy of audience. At the same time, he points to the benefits of the right praise that inspires others to good deeds and emulation of what is virtuous, defending them from error (Mor. 539A–547F) (Betz 1978, pp. 367–93). Contemporary philosophy and psychology perceives pride as an emotion, character trait, and agential disposition (Carter and Gordon 2017, p. 2). It is most commonly referenced as self-conscious or self-oriented emotion, which promotes continued effort towards future achievement and status striving. It can also take other-oriented forms, functioning as a social emotion alongside gratitude and compassion. Group-level pride arises from appraisals related to in-group actions and shows two basic functions: pursuit of in-group-promoting goals and increased commitment to the in-group.45 Studies on envy suggest yet another adaptive function of pride: the elevation of others. Expressions of pride might inspire other individuals to strive for similar skills and successes, thus increasing the fitness of the group via the increased efforts of individual members (McLatchie and Piazza 2017, p. 154).
In 2 Corinthians, Paul seems to adhere to the Greco-Roman canons of boasting, but both in vocabulary and in the nature of his enterprise, he is closer to the Old Testament praxis (Kowalski 2013, pp. 241–256). The apostle often uses the root καυχ- in his letters, describing boasting in God and in Christ, in the Law, in the hope of God’s glory, and in the cross of the Lord (Rom 2:17, 23; 5:2, 11; 15:17, 31; 1 Cor 1:31; Gal 6:13, 14; Phil 3:3). The root also describes Paul’s boasting of his communities (1 Thess 2:19; 2 Cor 1:12; 5:12; 8:24; 9:2) and the empty human pride (1 Cor 1:29; 3:21; 4:7). In 2 Corinthians, the apostle particularly often boasts about his community and ministry, thus responding to the boasting of his opponents (2 Cor 10:8, 13, 15–17; 11:10, 12, 16, 17, 18, 30; 12:1, 5, 6, 9). Paul’s boasting of the Corinthians proved to be justified by the actions of the community (2 Cor 7:14). The apostle’s acknowledgement of this fact serves to increase their loyalty and commitment to the group.
Paul situates his boasting in the community at the antipodes of shame (καταισχύνω). Shame is another powerful emotion of a social nature, reflected upon by both ancient and contemporary authors.46 Earlier studies maintained that shame, unlike guilt, focuses on the negative evaluation of the agent, not his action (Tangney and Dearing 2002). Today, while emphasizing certain dangers associated with this emotion, its positive, pro-social, and moral effects are highlighted, related to devaluation and the recognition of a person as incoherent by the relevant community to which the person belongs (Olthof 2023, pp. 14–16). As such, anticipated shame helps the individual to refrain from behaving in ways that would compromise his or her standing.
In the vast majority of Old Testament texts, shaming belongs to God, who defeats enemies and saves believers (Ps 6:11; 21:6; 24:2, 3, 20; 30:2, 18; 33:6; 34:4; 39:15; 43:8, 10; 52:6; 69:3; 70:1; 73:21; 118:31, 116; Jl 2:26, 27; Isa 28:16; 54:4; Jer 17:13, 18; Dan 3:44). Paul uses this emotion to highlight the sanctions imposed on those who break social norms (1 Cor. 11:4–5) and to accentuate God’s actions, which reverse the norms of honor and shame (1 Cor 1:27). Lau (2020, pp. 155–57) points to the educational effect of the shame aroused by Paul’s “letter in tears,” which led the Corinthians to repentance and conversion (2 Cor 7:9–10). Paul in 2 Cor 7:14 and elsewhere in the letter (2 Cor 9:4; 10:8), uses the notion of shame to stir the Corinthians’ loyal support for his Jerusalem collection and ministry in Corinth.
The terms καυχάομαι/καύχησις and καταισχύνω, related to pride and shame, clearly serve the apostle to strengthen the loyalty of the community. Boasting is also naturally associated with shame. Among the reasons for shame, Aristotle mentions excessive praise given to somebody while ignoring his faults (Rhet. 2.6.9). Paul risked being called a flatterer or naive by praising the Corinthians before Titus. Indeed, group-level emotions sometimes promote group-oriented actions that carry personal costs (Williams and Davies 2017, p. 48). By their actions, the Corinthians saved the apostle from shame, which should strengthen their mutual loyalty. Emphasizing their agency and moral action also solidifies their ties. Research demonstrates that individuals report higher levels of group-level pride as a function of their in-group having acted morally (Williams and Davies 2017, p. 49; see also Leach et al. 2007, pp. 234–49).
Finally, Paul states that he has complete confidence (θαρρέω) in the Corinthians, thus issuing a positive judgment about their loyalty (v. 16).47 Aristotle, among the categories of people we love, mentions those, in whom we may have confidence (θαρροῦμεν) (Rhet. 2.4.28). The term θαρρέω is found in the Bible only in Paul and in Heb 13:6. The latter speaks of the confidence that comes from the constant presence of the Lord with believers. In a similar way, Paul uses the word θαρρέω to express the confidence and courage that accompany his pilgrimage in the flesh (2 Cor 5:6, 8). The verb also appears in the description of the apostle’s communication with the Corinthians, in which his opponents accuse him of being courageous only at distance, in his letters. The apostle promises that he will demonstrate courage towards his enemies when he arrives next time (2 Cor 10:1–2). In 2 Cor 7:16, Paul refers to the trust he has in the Corinthians, which implies frankness in their mutual communication (Garland 1999, p. 361). According to Aristotle, trust is the opposite of fear, as it is for Paul.48 It is also manifested by those who have not harmed anyone (Aristotle, Rhet. 2.5.20).
In summary, the self-conscious emotions of pride (boasting) and shame in 2 Cor 7:14, strengthen the bonds between the apostle and the community and reinforce their mutual loyalty. The apostle’s boasting motivates the Corinthians to greater commitment to both Paul and the community. The risk associated with shame that the apostle took makes them aware of their moral agency and pushes them to greater effort. The apostle rejoices in the trust and sincerity that prevail in their mutual communication (2 Cor 7:16). The community responded to Paul’s “letter in tears” with obedience, which brings us to the next category in which the emotions of the Corinthians can be located, namely authority/respect.
3.4. Authority/Respect
The category of loyalty is closely related to authority/respect, which in turn serves to create beneficial coalitions within the hierarchy. Many leaders live in hierarchies, and the common patterns of dominance and submission found in different species and cultures suggest that the human mind might have developed a set of emotions and behaviors related to authority and power. Subordinates show respect and submission, but superiors protect them from external threats and maintain order within the group. In societies that value authority, norms and associated virtues regulate the behavior of superiors and subordinates (Haidt and Craig 2008, p. 384).
The trigger for this category in 2 Cor 7:5–16 may be the questioning of Paul’s authority in Corinth by the culprit and opponents, a topic that comes up particularly strongly in 2 Cor 10–13. In 2 Cor 7:5–16, the remedied crisis concerning the apostle’s authority results in his joy and forgiveness. Man’s greatness of soul (μεγαλοψυχία), according to Aristotle, can be recognized in moral nobility, honor, and dishonor, with which one is concerned (EN 4.3.16–17). Gentleness (πραότης) and forgiveness seem to “err on the side of defect” because they do not call for the necessary compensation for evil (EN 4.5.3–4) (Aristotle 1926, p. 231). In this respect, Paul’s construction of authority differs from Aristotle. As the head of the church, Paul gladly accepts the Corinthians’ transformation and forgives them (see also 2 Cor 2:10). He also acknowledges that he is not concerned with his honor, but with the community’s welfare (2 Cor 7:14; see also 13:7–10).
The Corinthians’ obedience (ὑπακοή), fear, and trembling (φόβος καὶ τρόμος) (vv. 11, 15) confirm the authority of Paul and serve well the community. Obedience (ὑπακοή) in Paul appears mainly in the context of preaching the gospel and responding to it (Rom 1:5; 6:6; 14:26; 15:18; 16:19) (Aletti 1986, pp. 231–32, 237–38).49 If the Corinthians show obedience to the apostle, they cling to the gospel he preaches (2 Cor 10:5–6). The fear and trembling (φόβος καὶ τρόμος) with which Paul’s messenger was received in Corinth should be understood in a similar way (2 Cor 7:15). In the fear of the Corinthians (φόβος) in 2 Cor 7:11, interpreters see an alarm, concern, but also “fear of God” before the apostle as God’s messenger (Barrett 1973, p. 211; Furnish 1984, p. 389; Martin 1986, p. 402; Thrall 1994, pp. 494, 500; Vegge 2008, p. 103).50 The latter meaning comes to the fore in 2 Cor 7:15, where φόβος appears in the company of τρόμος. In the Old Testament, these terms describe the fear associated with God’s working, which paralyzes Israel’s enemies (Exod 15:16; Deut 2:25; 11:25; Judith 15:2). The expression also denotes a human reaction to death (Ps 54:6) and the reverence with which the faithful serve God (Ps 2:11). In the New Testament, φόβος καὶ τρόμος are used to describe the women after their encounter with the Risen Lord (Mark 16:8). Finally, Paul preaches the gospel in Corinth amid great fear and trembling (1 Cor 2:3). Christians should strive for their salvation with fear and trembling (Phil 2:12), while slaves should thus serve their masters (Eph 6:5). The fear and trembling of the Corinthians toward Titus has little to do with the paralyzing fear. Rather, the community recognizes the authority of the apostle himself in Titus and shows him respect. The attitude of the Corinthians also reflects Paul’s way of preaching the gospel.51
The emotions and attitude of the Corinthians, who received Paul’s messenger with fear and trembling (2 Cor 7:15), are an actual acknowledgment of the apostle’s authority. It is closely linked to the gospel and the character of Christ, whom Paul preaches (see 2 Cor 10:1–2). Lest the Corinthians think that justice, Pauline authority, and loyalty to him are the most important goals of their communication, the apostle states that his greatest concern is their relationship with God (2 Cor 7:12). Godly grief and the apostle’s actions should lead to their salvation (2 Cor 7:10) (Thrall 1994, p. 496). This brings us to the last category to which the emotions and attitudes n 2 Cor 7:5–16 can be assigned, which is purity and sanctity.
3.5. Purity/Sanctity
The specificity of this category consists of the fact that is the only one that did not arise from social challenges, but from nutritional ones. Humans have long been exposed to a high risk from bacteria and parasites that spread through physical contact. Therefore, we have developed a range of cognitive and emotional adaptations related to disgust that make us cautious about what we eat (Rozin and Fallon 1987, pp. 23–41; see also Tolchinsky et al. 2024). The system of evaluating and rejecting food was later adapted for social and moral evaluation. Contagion and purity might have also contributed to ideas about sacredness, generating virtues such as chastity and temperance, innocence and piety (Haidt and Craig 2008, p. 384). While the primary triggers of the system are physical impurity and sickness, in Paul’s case it is the actions of the culprit and his opponents that pose a threat to the sanctity of the community (see 2 Cor 11:3).
Paul refers to the purity/sanctity category in 2 Cor 7:11, stating that the Corinthians proved to be pure (ἁγνός) in everything. This term bears the connotations of ritual cleanness, chastity, and moral blamelessness (Hauck 1964–1976a, p. 122). In Stoics, ἁγνεία (purity, chastity) appears as an equivalent of modesty or self-control and is defined as “a careful knowledge of appropriate blame.” (SVF 432; 439.1–3; 440; Konstan 2006, p. 96). Its equivalent is the Roman pudor with the multitude of scripts and roles it played in social life (Kaster 2010, pp. 28–65). In the LXX, ἁγνός denotes the holiness of cultic objects (2 Macc 13:8), of the word of God (Psa 11:7), human words, deeds, and hearts (Prov 15:26; 19:13; 20:9; 21:8). The “purity” of the Corinthians refers to the actions produced in them by the godly grief (2 Cor 7:11). They were the proof of their transformation (μετάνοια), which leads to salvation (σωτηρία) (2 Cor 7:10) (Thrall 1994, p. 493); (Barnett 1997, p. 375).52 Their godly sorrow brought them life, which is also a fruit of the obedience to Paul’s gospel (2 Cor 2:16) (Martin 1986, p. 399). The opposite of life and godly sorrow is the eschatological death (θάνατος), which results from the worldly grief.53
The category of purity and the accompanying disgust have a power to shape the values, attitudes, and relationships in Corinth. On the one hand, the disgust is instinctive and automatic; it is not learned but natural and common to all. On the other hand, it is subject to reflection and cultural processing, linked to social status and conscious judgments, recognized values, and the symbolic structure of one’s own universe.54 As such, disgust takes on an ethical character and contributes to the formation of social norms and rules of coexistence, as pointed out by Rozin et al. (1999, pp. 429–45), Nussbaum (1999, pp. 19–62; 2001, pp. 200–6), and Kaster (2010, pp. 130–31), the latter analyzing the Roman concept of fastidium. Images of the decaying, poisoned, diseased, and dangerous evoke instinctive aversion and can be associated with individuals and social groups. Paul qualifies the behavior of the Corinthians as pure, morally good, and life giving. What should be repulsive is turning away from the apostle, closing oneself off in grief and resentment, which lead to death.
Paul additionally gives the Corinthians’ “pure” behavior a Christological qualification. Welborn argued that in 2 Cor 1–7, the apostle is shaping his and the community’s emotions after Christ (2 Cor 1:6). According to the author, Pauline and the Corinthians’ anger transitions into love (2:8, 10), while their zeal passes into confidence (7:13–16) (Welborn 2001, pp. 57–59). The apostle also experiences a transformation from grief to joy, resulting in Christ-like compassion (Welborn 2011, pp. 567–70). His statement that God comforts the humble (ταπεινός) (2 Cor 7:6) is an echo of Isa 49:13, a reference to the Servant of the Lord and the humble Christ from Matt 11:29 and Phil 2:8 (Martin 1986, pp. 390–91). Thus Paul, imitating the Messiah (see also 2 Cor 10:1–2), shows the community a model of emotionality that results in their sanctity and salvation. The purity of the Corinthians in 2 Cor 7:11 echoes 2 Cor 11:2, where the apostle expresses a desire to present the Corinthians as a pure, blameless virgin, devoted to Christ. Their purity in the present situation is an equivalent of belonging to Christ.
4. Conclusions
What new light can neuroscience, moral, and evolutionary psychology shed on the issue of emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–16? First, they elevate emotions to the status of an important element of moral judgments. They are not merely an addition to or a result of critical reasoning, but an autonomous system that influences our thinking, intuitive judgments, and moral norms. The point of departure for this approach can be found to some extent in Aristotle, who, unlike the Stoics, does not censor emotions but presents them as motivators of human action.
Second, by talking about the nature of emotions and their evolutionary roots, we gain a universal basis on which we can build our culture-dependent understanding of them. The nativist and constructivist approaches to emotions should not be treated as contradictory but as complementary, as we intended to show. The nativist approach additionally builds a kind of bridge between the ancients and the moderns, allowing us to see both the similarities and differences between Paul’s and our reading of emotions.
Third, Panksepp’s and Haidt’s categories help to link different emotions together, subordinating them to various adaptive goals related to caring for offspring (harm/care), reaping the gains of reciprocal altruism (fairness/reciprocity), creating cohesive groups (in-group/loyalty) and beneficial coalitions within the hierarchy (authority/respect), as well as addressing threats to the community in terms of contagion (purity/sanctity). Each of these adaptive goals has a set of emotions that serve it (compassion, anger, gratitude, guilt, pride, shame, respect, fear, disgust) and attitudes shaped by them (caring, kindness, fairness, justice, honesty, trustworthiness, loyalty, obedience, purity, and piety). The value of Haidt’s categories lies in their diversity, which encompasses the entire spectrum of values important for constructing social bonds, from compassion and caring, through justice, loyalty, respect for hierarchy and authority, to sanctity.
We tried to show how Panksepp’s and Haidt’s categories help us better understand the emotions described in 2 Cor 7:5–16. Most of the emotions experienced by Paul, Titus, and the community can be placed in the category of harm/care, where Paul, as the father of the community, speaks of his fear (7:5), regret (7:8), and joy (7:7, 9, 13, 16), combined with Titus’ joy (7:13) and the stirring of affects (compassion) (7:15), as well as the Corinthians’ longing, mourning (7:7), zeal (7:7, 11), and grief (7:8–10). These emotions are aimed at building the affective, family bonds between Paul, Titus, and the community. The fairness/reciprocity system includes the Corinthians’ emotions derived from anger: eagerness, apology, indignation, and desire to reestablish justice (7:11–12), which serve to bring justice and rebuild harmonious cooperation between the apostle and the Corinthians. The in-group/loyalty system, with Paul’s pride/boasting, shame, and confidence (7:14,16), works to strengthen the loyalty and coherence of the Corinthian church. Furthermore, the authority/respect and related obedience, fear, and trembling of the Corinthians (7:11,15) serve to foster coexistence in a hierarchical community with Paul’s authority. Finally, the category of purity/sanctity qualifies godly sorrow and the community’s return to the apostle as pure, resulting in life and salvation (7:11), while worldly sorrow leads to death and should arouse disgust. Paul uses these powerful emotions as motivators to adhere to him, linking them additionally to Christ (11:3), whose humility he imitates (7:6; 10:1–2).
The proposed analysis of 2 Cor 7:5–16 reveals various emotional systems at work in one text, aimed at fostering bonds and cooperation within the Corinthian church. A comprehensive view of the network of emotions in the analyzed passage is a response to their selective and individual reading in articles and monographs. Paul is interested in more than just love and justice in Corinth. He promotes loyalty, respect for his apostolic authority, purity, and the community’s belonging to Christ. How the individual systems, emotions, and values interact in 2 Cor 7:5–16 and in other Pauline letters is a question that opens the way for further research, calling for a combination of nativist and constructivist approaches to emotions.
Author Contributions
M.K.: Conceptualization, methodology, formal analysis, investigation, writing—original draft preparation, writing—review and editing, supervision, funding acquisition M.G.K.: writing—review and editing, funding acquisition. J.G.: Conceptualization, writing—original draft preparation. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
Jan Kochanowski University research project SUPB.RN.24.002, supervisor Mariusz G. Karbowski.
Institutional Review Board Statement
Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement
Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement
No new data were created or analysed in this study. Data Sharing is not applicable to this article.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Notes
| 1 | On the use of neuroscience in the research on emotions in antiquity, see Sorabji (2000, pp. 5–7, 144–58); Nussbaum (2001, pp. 114–19); Griffiths (2017, pp. 107–25). |
| 2 | On the Stoics’ negative approach to most of emotions, perceived as irrational movements of the soul, to be removed from human life, see Annas (1992, pp. 104–20); Nussbaum (2018, pp. 9–10, 41, 359–401); Sorabji (2000, pp. 169–93). Nussbaum and Sorabji acknowledge the unattractiveness of the Stoic indifference to and eradication of emotions. |
| 3 | On the use of pathos, Aristotle’s influence on Quintilian’s, Institutio oratoria, and the tension it creates with the Stoic ethics, see Leigh (2004, pp. 122–40). |
| 4 | Lee (2020) in his extensive monograph, mapping the moral milieu of Paul, discusses mainly the Stoic and Epicurean systems, by necessity omitting the others. Occasionally, however, he also mentions the Peripatetics, whose ideas permeated other philosophical schools and ancient authors. |
| 5 | In this paper, I will use the term “emotions,” as Richard Sorabji and Ian Jew do. See Sorabji (2000, p. 7); Jew (2021, pp. 14–18). The latter defines it as a “portmanteau word” that can refer to both affects and feelings, indicating the fluid boundary between them and the interpenetration of nature and nurture. |
| 6 | Panksepp (1998, p. 44); Lau (2020, pp. 27–28), with reference to Mallon and Stich (2000, pp. 133–54); Solomon (2008, p. 14). Also Jew (2021, pp. 13–14), with reference to Riis and Woodhead (2010, pp. 5, 24–30). |
| 7 | See references to Haidt’s research in Konstan (2006); Kaster (2010). On Panksepp’s and Haidt’s research from the moral theology perspective, see Spezio (2011, pp. 339–56); Messer (2017, pp. 43–49, 58–59); Cameron (2023, pp. 12–13, 39–53). On the critical reception of Pankepp’s and Haidt’s research, see Barrett et al. (2007, pp. 297–312); Suhler and Churchland (2011, pp. 2103–16); Zachar and Ellis (2012). |
| 8 | The capitalization comes from the author and indicates the need to go beyond the popular understanding of these terms found in the contemporary systematization of emotions. |
| 9 | On Panksepp’s research and theory, see also Davis and Montag (2019, pp. 1–11). |
| 10 | There is no agreement on or a single definition of compassion. On compassion, how it differs from sympathy, pity, empathy, mercy, and care, see Price and Caouette (2018, pp. ix–xiv). |
| 11 | On “kindness/favor”, see Aristotle, Rhet. 2.7.2–3. See also Konstan (2006, pp. 82, 157–68); Ben-Ze’ev (2003, p. 113). For more on the emotions in Aristotle, see Fortenbaugh (1975); Cooper (1999, pp. 406–23); Konstan (2006). |
| 12 | Aristotle, Rhet. 2.8.1: “Let pity then be a kind of pain about an apparent evil, deadly or painful, that befalls one who does not deserve it.” See Aristotle (2020, p. 221). Konstan regards “pity” as different from both the Aristotelian and contemporary notion of “compassion.” See Konstan (2006, pp. 201–2). Nussbaum downplays the differences, labeling ἐλεέω in Aristotle as “compassion”. See Nussbaum (2001, pp. 301–3). |
| 13 | See also EN 8.12. On companionate love which also fits the relationship between Paul and the Corinthians, see Sternberg (1986, pp. 119–35). |
| 14 | On love motivating to loyalty, gratitude, grief, and civic solidarity in the ancient Roman context, see Konstan (2018). |
| 15 | On the anxiety in 2 Cor 7:5, which fits Pauline appeal to pity and reaffirms love, see Welborn (2001, p. 45; 2011, p. 553). |
| 16 | According to Glad, Paul may have feared that his public rebuke would hurt the Corinthians and negatively affect their relationship. By speaking of the godly sorrow that they had experienced, the apostle, according to the author, was attempting to reconcile them to himself. See Glad (1995, p. 318). |
| 17 | On the joy in Stoics, see Graver (2016, pp. 124–42); Gill (2016, pp. 143–60). |
| 18 | On Paul’s joy in Philippians, see Schellenberg (2022, pp. 90–95); Fogg (2024, pp. 3–14). |
| 19 | On joy as an “affectionate emotion” that serves to build bonds, see Solomon and Theiss (2013, p. 185). |
| 20 | On the expression “to refresh the spirit” in 2 Cor 7:13, see Clarke (1996, pp. 290–92). |
| 21 | Clarke (1996, p. 292) suggests translating σπλάγχνον as a parallel to 2 Cor 7:13—πνεῦμα. Harris (2005, p. 551) reads σπλάγχνον with reference to 2 Cor 6:12—καρδία (see also EIN and NRS). For “affection,” see ESV, NAS, NJB. |
| 22 | The author speaks of friendship. See Vegge (2008, p. 101). Similarly Martin (1986, p. 393); Kruse (1987, p. 143); Thrall (1994, p. 489); Garland (1999, p. 357). |
| 23 | Garland (1999, p. 352): “ardent concern.” On this emotion and its value in restoring the relationship between Paul and the community, see Welborn (2001, pp. 54–57): “Paul wishes to move the Corinthians beyond concern for what he has suffered and desire to redress the wrong to an ardent longing for the intimacy and confidence of their old relationship (7.7, 11)” (p. 54). |
| 24 | See Aristotle, Rhet. 2.10.1: “(…) envy is a kind of pain at the sight of good fortune in regard to the goods mentioned; in the case of those like themselves; and not for the sake of a man getting anything, but because of others possessing it.” See Aristotle (2020, p. 235). |
| 25 | For more on envy, see Protasi (2021). |
| 26 | On Aristotle, see Gill (2003, pp. 29–51). |
| 27 | In ancient texts, ζῆλος is also associated with the desire for justice. Demosthenes uses the Athenians’ zeal for justice and honor to motivate them to bring about his restoration (Demosthenes, Ep. 2.1–12). Marcus Aurelius seeks to move his old teacher Herodes Atticus beyond a feeling of resentment against him by appealing to his legitimate desire for justice (Philostratus, Vit. Soph. 2.1.562). |
| 28 | The author, following others, classifies sadness as a basic emotion and an elementary affective response or assessment of one’s own situation, which is constant across cultures, times, and places, and closely related to functions critical for survival. |
| 29 | On grief in Stoicism, see Gavin (2010, pp. 428–29); Welborn (2011, pp. 560–64). |
| 30 | On the ancient authors, who draw attention to the therapeutic role of grief and pain, see Plutarch, Virt. mor. 452C–D; Tranq. an. 476F–477A; Epictetus, Diss. 3.23.30. |
| 31 | On different approaches to sadness associated with love and the loss of loved ones in antiquity, see Konstan (2018, pp. 129–57). |
| 32 | On guilt and its role in repairing damaged and promoting socially valuable relationships, see Cokelet and Maley (2019, pp. 131–70), esp. 150. |
| 33 | On sadness connected with blame and forgiveness, see an excellent text by Blustein (2018, pp. 117–54). |
| 34 | On the Roman concept of repentance (poenitentia), which focuses on oneself, and the Christian repentance, which reaches out to others, see Kaster (2010, pp. 66–83, esp. 81). |
| 35 | On anger in 2 Cor 7, see Welborn (2001, pp. 47–54). |
| 36 | Seneca, De ira, 1.12.5: “To feel anger on behalf of loved ones is the mark of a weak mind, not of a loyal one.” See Seneca (1928, p. 139). For more on anger in Seneca, see Laurand et al. (2021). |
| 37 | On the destructive character of resentment, see Karbowski (2023, pp. 51–79; 2025, pp. 438–44). |
| 38 | On many aspects related to the Corinthians’ σπουδή, see Vegge (2008, p. 102). |
| 39 | On Paul’s argument here, see Kowalski (2013, pp. 161–165). |
| 40 | Martin (1986, p. 402) argues for the Corinthians’ indignation at themselves. |
| 41 | On indignation in Aristotle and the difference between indignation and envy, see Konstan (2006, pp. 111–28). |
| 42 | Barrett (1973, p. 205): “a desire for vengeance”. |
| 43 | See Barnett (1997, p. 378): “readiness to see justice done”. |
| 44 | On the legitimate and illegitimate boasting in Paul, see Judge (1968, pp. 37–50); Forbes (1986, pp. 1–30); Mitchell (2001, pp. 354–71); Watson (2003, pp. 77–100). |
| 45 | On group-level pride, its antecedents and functions, see Williams and Davies (2017, pp. 47–51). |
| 46 | On shame, its meaning in antiquity, and modern evolution, see Konstan (2006, pp. 91–110); Kaster (2010, pp. 13–27); Lau (2020, pp. 13–31). |
| 47 | On the virtue of “confidence,” see Cicero, Tusc. 4.66; Epictetus, Diss. 2.1.1–7. |
| 48 | Aristotle, Rhet. 2.5.17: “for confidence (θάρσος) is the contrary of fear and what gives confidence of what causes fear, so that confidence is the hope of what is salutary, accompanied by an impression that it is quite near at hand, while the things to be feared are either nonexistent or far off.” See Aristotle (2020, p. 205). |
| 49 | On the gospel as the source of Paul’s apostolic identity, see Schütz (1975, pp. 35–78, 183). |
| 50 | In 2 Cor 7:11, apart from recognizing Paul’s authority, it may also mean fear of losing the relationship with him, as indicated by the context. |
| 51 | Barnett (1997, p. 385) argues that this phrase reflects Paul’s idea of eschatological salvation. |
| 52 | Kruse (1987, p. 145): the vocabulary associated with loss in 2 Cor 7:9 brings to mind 1 Cor 3:14–15 and the image of judgment. |
| 53 | Lambrecht (1999, p. 131) (“eschatological ruin”); Matera (2013, p. 175). |
| 54 | On the combination of these characteristics in contemporary research on disgust, see Stevenson et al. (2019, pp. 209–25). For more on disgust, see Strohminger and Kumar (2018). |
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