Affective Neuroscience, Moral Psychology, and Emotions in 2 Cor 7:5–16
Round 1
Reviewer 1 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsSee attached.
Comments for author File: 
Comments.pdf
Author Response
We are very grateful for the reviewers' comments, which helped to improve the paper. In the short time we had to make amendments, we tried our best to take the reviewers' comments into account and incorporate them into the text.
Reviewer 1
Comment: It might be helpful to mention one area in which the article might be improved. Methodologically, it would be helpful if the authors explain how the application of the modern neuroscience theory to a particular biblical text avoids the problem of anachronism.
Response: Neuroscience is proposed as a partner in dialog for biblical studies (see Schellenberg 2022, p. 83). Renowned authors also refer to it in their studies on emotions in antiquity. The authors added the following text and note to clarify the connection between modern and ancient approaches:
Neuroscience highlights the biological and evolutionary determinants of basic emotional mechanisms and points to their universal and cross-cultural character. In this sense, it seems a viable instrument for studying emotions in ancient texts. [1]
Subsequently, we speak of the necessary connection between the essentialist and constructivist approach to emotions.
[1] On the use of neuroscience in the research on emotions in antiquity, see Sorabji (2000, pp. 144–155); Nussbaum (2001, pp. 114–119); Griffiths (2017, pp. 107–125).
Author Response File: 
Author Response.docx
Reviewer 2 Report
Comments and Suggestions for AuthorsI would recommend that Panksapp material be supplemented by noting both criticism and supplementary work built on the primary research.
The focus on Aristotle concerns me as my own research suggests that Stoicisms and Epicureanism (which does not get a look in, despite the use of Clarence Glad's work) would be more popular and more widely adopted in the period. The writer can get rid of this objection by showing me how prevalent Aristotelian thought is in the first century CE. More concerning is the effective rendering of Stoicism and Middle Platonism as "footnotes to Aristotle". The quickest way around this objection is then for the writer to show the prevalence of Aristtotelian thought in the first century.
because I did NOT write it, I can highly recommend
Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind
Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and his Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries
[Moralische Bildung in der griechisch-römischen Philosophie des Geistes. Eine Kartographie des moralischen Milieus des Apostel Paulus und seiner Zeitgenossen in der jüdischen Diaspora.]
2020. XXXV, 658 Seiten.
Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe (WUNT II) 515
as a book which ought to be there. noting that Lee does not mention Aristotle all that much.....(20 refs in 600 plus pages in Google search. There is a warning there....)
Lastly, and this may be a simply personal point. I am never quite sure what is gained by gutting the entry from LSJ for possible meanings for a word. This approach has been heavily questioned by those (Like James Barr) who deal with semantics in their linguistic theory. I tend to quote an older comment from Camille Paglia in this regard:
It is clear he has never pondered the most basic questions of historicizing about Athens, which requires minute attention to enormously rapid cultural changes occurring over a century. Compare, for example, the anxiety-provoking transformations in Renaissance Italy from 1500 to 1525, in Shakespeare’s England from 1590 to 1610, and in America from 1915 to 1925 or from 1960 to 1967. Halperin jumps around amateurishly from the fifth century (whose many phases he does not see) to the middle or late fourth century, back to the fifth, then to the early sixth, then to the late fourth or early third, and back to the late sixth, all of which is funneled, like gravel pouring off a truck, into conclusions about “classical” Athenian attitudes. 42
from https://www.bu.edu/arion/files/2019/10/Arion-Camille-Paglia-Junkbonds-Corporate-Raiders.pdf
Comments for author File: Comments.pdf
Author Response
We are very grateful for the reviewers' comments, which helped to improve the article. In the short time we had to make amendments, we tried our best to take the reviewers' comments into account and incorporate them into the text.
Reviewer 2
Comment 1: I would recommend that Panksapp material be supplemented by noting both criticism and supplementary work built on the primary research.
Response 1: The authors point out that Panksepp and Haidt are not widely used in research on emotions in ancient texts. See: “The essentialist scholars whose research we will refer to are Jaak Panksepp and Jonathan Haidt, representing neuroscience and evolutionary psychology. They remain significantly underappreciated in the study of emotions in ancient authors and in the Bible.” The novelty of the approach presented by the authors lies in introducing these authors and their research into the field of biblical studies. Following the reviewer's suggestion, note 7 has been expanded:
Note 7: See references to Haidt’s research in Konstan (2006); Kaster (2010). On Panksepp’s and Haidt’s research from the moral theology perspective, see Spezio (2011, pp. 339–356); Messer (2017) 43-49, 58-59; Cameron (2023, pp. 12–13, 39–53). On the critical reception of Pankepp’s and Haidt’s research, see Barrett et al. (2007, pp. 297–312); Suhler and Churchland (2011, pp. 2103–2116); Zachar and Ellis (2012).
Comment 2: The focus on Aristotle concerns me as my own research suggests that Stoicisms and Epicureanism (which does not get a look in, despite the use of Clarence Glad's work) would be more popular and more widely adopted in the period. The writer can get rid of this objection by showing me how prevalent Aristotelian thought is in the first century CE. More concerning is the effective rendering of Stoicism and Middle Platonism as "footnotes to Aristotle". The quickest way around this objection is then for the writer to show the prevalence of Aristotelian thought in the first century.
Response 2: The authors added a note on Aristotle's popularity in the 1st century BC – 2nd/3rd century AD. An additional argument for referring to him is his treatment of emotions in rhetoric and his positive view of them as motivators of moral judgments. See the added text and footnotes:
Among the ancient philosophical schools studding emotions, Stoicism was very popular in Paul’s time. However, it was characterized by a negative approach to emotions, which fundamentally distinguishes the Stoics from both Old Testament anthropology and Paul. [1] This does not mean that the Stoic therapy of emotions and their descriptions are devoid of value or points in common with Paul (see joy). However, Aristotle seems to be closer to the apostle’s approach, treating emotions as natural motivators of human action, influencing moral reasoning and judgments. In the post-Hellenistic period, one can note a return to Aristotle's thought, which became increasingly popular, starting with Andronicus of Rhodes in the first century BC and culminating in Alexander of Aphrodisias in the second half of the second century and beginning of the third century AD (Falcon 2016). We will refer to Aristotle also because of his study of emotions in the communication process (Rhet. 2.1-11), similar to Paul's use of them in 2 Cor 7:5-16.[2] Necessarily, due to the constraints of this paper, we must also limit ourselves in comparisons between Paul and other philosophical schools.[3]
[1] On the Stoics’ negative approach to most of emotions, perceived as irrational movements of the soul, to be removed from human life, see Annas (1992, pp. 104–120); Nussbaum (2018, 9–10, 41, 359–401); Nussbaum (2018, pp. 9–10, 41, 359–401); Sorabji (2000, pp. 169–193). Nussbaum and Sorabji acknowledge the unattractiveness of the Stoic indifference to and eradication of emotions.
[2] On the use of pathos, Aristotle’s influence on Quintilian’s, Institutio oratoria, and the tension it creates with the Stoic ethics, see Leigh (2004, pp. 122–140).
[3] Lee (2020) in his extensive monograph, reconstructing the cultural milieu of Paul, discusses mainly the Stoic and Epicurean systems, by necessity omitting the others. Occasionally, however, he also mentions the Peripatetics, whose ideas permeated other philosophical schools and ancient authors.
Comment 3: because I did NOT write it, I can highly recommend Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and his Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries [Moralische Bildung in der griechisch-römischen Philosophie des Geistes. Eine Kartographie des moralischen Milieus des Apostel Paulus und seiner Zeitgenossen in der jüdischen Diaspora.]2020. XXXV, 658 Seiten. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe (WUNT II) 515 as a book which ought to be there. Noting that Lee does not mention Aristotle all that much.....(20 refs in 600 plus pages in Google search. There is a warning there....)
Response 3: The authors added the suggested bibliographic reference.
Comment 4: Lastly, and this may be a simply personal point. I am never quite sure what is gained by gutting the entry from LSJ for possible meanings for a word. This approach has been heavily questioned by those (Like James Barr) who deal with semantics in their linguistic theory. I tend to quote an older comment from Camille Paglia in this regard: It is clear he has never pondered the most basic questions of historicizing about Athens, which requires minute attention to enormously rapid cultural changes occurring over a century. Compare, for example, the anxiety-provoking transformations in Renaissance Italy from 1500 to 1525, in Shakespeare’s England from 1590 to 1610, and in America from 1915 to 1925 or from 1960 to 1967. Halperin jumps around amateurishly from the fifth century (whose many phases he does not see) to the middle or late fourth century, back to the fifth, then to the early sixth, then to the late fourth or early third, and back to the late sixth, all of which is funneled, like gravel pouring off a truck, into conclusions about “classical” Athenian attitudes. 42from https://www.bu.edu/arion/files/2019/10/Arion-Camille-Paglia-Junkbonds-Corporate-Raiders.pdf
Response 4: The authors agree with the reviewer that dictionaries are not perfect from the methodological point of view. However, they remain the first point of reference for philological research, providing a wide spectrum of meanings of the analyzed Greek terms with their English equivalents. We use them not to indicate the precise meaning of a term in the text under study, but to show interpretative options.
Additional remarks of the reviewer:
Remark 1: It might be worth looking at more recent reactions, e.g., Tolchinsky, Alexey, George, Michael Levin, Šárka Kaňková, and Jeffrey S Burgdorf. 2024. “Disgust as a Primary Emotional System and Its Clinical Relevance.” Frontiers in Psychology 15 (August). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1454774.
Response 1: The authors added the suggested bibliographic reference (Rozin and Fallon 1987, pp. 23–41; see also (Tolchinsky et al. 2024))
Remark 2: I note the privileging of Aristotle.This needs to be justified. Stoic ideas which appear flittingly below are more liklety to have been in currency at a wider level in Paul's time. Max Lees. wrok on Moral Formation in the Paiuline letters might be usefully added.
Response 2: This remark overlaps with Comment 2, which we hope to have addressed above.
Remark 3 and 4: “The evil of this emotion boils down to opposition to the divine, to the logos 427 inscribed in nature, and to the depravity of the mind”: The order here risks interpreting Stoicism through Aristotelian lenses. I would suggest refinement and consideration of why Stocis viewed emotions as problematic (and here their distinction of the reflex reaction from a resposne needs to be added)
A phraselike deapravity of the mind is problematic. Soemhow , oneeds to delve in Stoic understandings of mind: whether as divided into parts or as a unity . Their opinions varied. Posidonius goes for parts, based on Plato. The main problem for Stoics is thate motions involve the wrong degree of tension in construction of events and responses ( the tuning of a guitar is a useful analogue0 Emotions affect the correct logical tone.
Response to 3 and 4:
The authors do not intend to delve into a detailed reconstruction of the Stoic process of cognition, reflex reaction and response, or the functioning of the mind. This exceeds the scope of this work and does not contribute much to understanding Paul's emotions, who does not seem to follow the complex Stoic theories. Responding to the reviewer's suggestions, we rephrased the sentence as follows:
The evil of this emotion ultimately consists in the distortion of the rational judgment of mind.
Remark 5: Note 26: “In ancient texts, ζῆλος is also associated with the desire for justice. Demosthenes uses the Athenians’ zeal for justice and honor to motivate them to bring about his restoration (Demosthenes, Ep. 2.1–12). Marcus Aurelius seeks to move his old teacher Herodes Atticus beyond a feeling of resentment against him by appealing to his legitimate desire for justice (Philostratus, Vit. Soph. 2.1.562).”: Wow! Athens to Rome over 600 years in one footnote. Precison?
Response 5: This note is intended to illustrate that the concept of ζῆλος is also associated with the pursuit of justice in ancient texts. The time span works in favor of the connection that we find across many centuries. This note is not essential and may be removed.
Remark 6: “The godly sorrow shown by the Corinthians signals their transfor-469 mation (μετá½±νοια), a departure from the self-centered thinking that characterizes worldly sorrow, and an openness to Paul.35 It appeals to the apostle’s love and prompts him to 471 act gently toward the community”: Question_ a process which originates in an emtion, even a supposedly positive one,will not be adequate for Stoic thought. If you say that it originates in the emotion. there is a failure to recognised the division between the immediate reaction and the considered response. Thus a Stoic could not have the process starting in the pre-response reaction- and call it an emotion.
The difference amy be put this way- you will feel pain if I stick a needle in you, that is an instinctive responce not an emotion. but it only becomes an emotional response if you then belt me back.
Response 6: The authors do not describe the cognitive reaction of and response to grief, but rather the effect of God’s sorrow in Paul. It causes a transformation in the Corinthians and provokes a compassionate response from Paul. The term “emotion” embraces both the initial reaction and the subsequent reflective action on the part of both the Corinthians and Paul.
Remark 7: “The emotions assigned 521 to the category of fairness/reciprocity can be understood as derivatives of anger, associ-522 ated with violating the principle of reciprocity that governed Paul’s relationship with the 523 Corinthians”: Really- all anger is a response to injustice? I think not.
Response 7: The phrasing “can be understood as derivatives” does not necessarily mean that all emotions described in this category are derivatives of anger. They could have been triggered by the activation of the primary emotional system associated with anger. The following rewording of the phrase may be helpful:
The emotions assigned to the category of fairness/reciprocity can be understood as derivatives of or triggered by anger, and associated with violating the principle of reciprocity that governed Paul’s relationship with the Corinthians.
Remark 8: “There is also a relational dif-527 ference here: while the Corinthians show grief towards Paul, anger is manifested towards 528 the one responsible for the harm”.
Response 8: Comma added, thank you for the careful reading.
Remark 9: “The word is a hapax legomenon in the entire Bible”: is "entire Bible" not an anachronism?
Response 9: We removed the expression “in the entire Bible”.
Remark 10: “Pride connected with boasting (καυχá½±ομαι/καá½»χησις), which falls under the cate-615 gory of in-group/loyalty, is an ambivalent emotion with a strong social trait.44 For Aristo-616 tle, pride is characteristic of the virtuous and accomplished persons who are aware of their 617 merits (NE 4.3.1–34). In De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando, Plutarch warns against boast-618 ing about one’s achievements and advises on how to perform it without provoking the 619 envy of audience”: But the jump from Aristotle to Plutarch is considerable, and care is needed not to give the impression that they are on the same pagr.
Response 10: The authors do not suggest that Aristotle and Plutarch say the same thing about “boasting.” However, they agree on one fundamental point: boasting can be virtuous and even necessary for the defense of virtue.
Remark 11: “Paul situates his boasting in the community at the antipodes of shame (καταισχá½»νω)”: Is there a need to consider that boasting, depending on context in ancient rhetoric , may be legitimate as opposed to illegitimate. This needs to be pointed out as it is different from our modern view that "boasting" is always negative.
Response 11: Agreed, Paul considers boasting about the community to be justified. The authors refer to the justified boasting in 2 Corinthians in the paragraph preceding the highlighted sentence. It also applies to the note 49, which we can modify accordingly, following the reviewer’s suggestion: On the legitimate and illegitimate boasting in Paul, see Judge (1968, pp. 37–50); Forbes (1986, pp. 1–30); Mitchell (2001, pp. 354–371); Watson (2003, pp. 77–100).
Remark 12: “As such, disgust 775 takes on an ethical character and contributes to the formation of social norms and rules of 776 coexistence, as pointed out by Rozin and Haidt”: Note that the article I suggested earleir,on disgust would help support your categorisation here beyou=nf Panksapp....
Response 12: The authors added the proposed article.
Added references:
Annas, Julia. 1992. Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Barrett, Lisa Feldman, Kristen A. Lindquist, Eliza Bliss-Moreau, Seth Duncan, Maria Gendron, Jennifer Mize, and Lauren Brennan. 2007. Of Mice and Men: Natural Kinds of Emotions in the Mammalian Brain? A Response to Panksepp and Izard. Perspectives on Psychological Science 2 (3): 297–312.
Falcon, Andrea. 2016. Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity. Leiden, Boston: Brill.
Griffiths, Paul E. 2017. Current Emotion Research in Philosophy. In Emotions, community, and citizenship: Cross-disciplinary perspectives, ed. Rebecca Kingston, Kiran Banerjee, James McKee, Yi-Chun Chien and Constantine Christos Vassiliou, 107–125. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Lee, Max J. Lee. 2020. Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and his Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Leigh, Matthew. 2004. Quintilian on the Emotions (Institutio Oratoria 6 Preface and 1-2). Journal of Roman Studies 94:122–140.
Messer, Neil. 2017. Theological neuroethics: Christian ethics meets the science of the human brain. London, New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing PIc.
Nussbaum, Martha C. 2018. The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Spezio, Michael L. 2011. The Neuroscience of Emotion and Reasoning in Social Contexts: Implications for Moral Theology. Modern Theology 27 (2): 339–356.
Suhler, Christopher L., and Patricia Churchland. 2011. Can Innate, Modular “Foundations” Explain Morality?: Challenges for Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 23 (9): 2103–2116.
Tolchinsky, Alexey, George F. R. Ellis, Michael Levin, Šárka Kaňková, and Jeffrey S. Burgdorf. 2024. Disgust as a primary emotional system and its clinical relevance. Frontiers in psychology 15:1454774. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1454774.
Zachar, Peter, and Ralph D. Ellis. 2012. Categorical Versus Dimensional Models of Affect: A Seminar on the Theories of Panksepp and Russell. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Author Response File: Author Response.pdf
