Paradigm Shift in Game Theory: Sociological Re-Conceptualization of Human Agency, Social Structure, and Agents’ Cognitive-Normative Frameworks and Action Determination Modalities
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Classical Game Theory
3. Sociological Theories of Games and Interaction
3.1. Goffman’s Interaction Game Theory (IGT)
3.2. Social Systems Game Theory (SGT)
4. Discussion: Applications and Illustrations
4.1. Social Rules and Rule Systems and Their Influence on Behavior
Multiple Norms and Institutional Factors
4.2. Multiple Values Versus Uni-Dimensional Utility
Empathy and Caring for Others
4.3. Multiple Roles and Shifts in Roles
Asymmetry and Heterogeneity in Roles and Role Relationships
4.4. Variety of Interactions and Games
4.4.1. Ritual and Ceremonial Types of Interactions
4.4.2. Rule and Ritual Based Behavior as Contrasted with Instrumental Rationality
4.5. The Concepts of Open and Closed Games
4.6. Rule-Based Patterns of Interaction and Outcomes
4.7. Cooperation, Trust
5. Key Points and Conclusions
Acknowledgments
Author Contributions
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Elaboration of SGT
Appendix A.1. Foundations
DET-I Rule Following | DET-II Choice Among Given Alternatives | DET-III Construction or Adoption of “New” Action(s) |
---|---|---|
Properties of Action Determination Modalities | ||
Ritual/Routine/Algorithmic Rule-following including the following of cultural scripts.
(see Equation (A4)) | The action alternatives are given within defined action constraints bounded choice—among the given alternatives.
(see Equation (A7)) | Non-routine action determination in “open situations” where actors construct or discover one or more alternatives to be considered for choice and implementation (with greater or lesser constraints on their construction of options). |
Collective Forms of Action Determination Modalities | ||
Collective coordinated rule following. A group, organization, or community perform together prescribed organized activities (or are compelled in the given game situation to do so). | Collective procedure(s) to make choices: (1) authority relations in which the group leader makes the choice; (2) a well-defined voting procedure in a group is followed to determine among established or given alternatives in action or policy; (3) Participants engage in organized negotiation about choice among given alternatives. | Collectives construct and propose options and alternative proposals in an “open” situation. They make a determination or selection among constructed alternatives through negotiation or democratic voting; or a collective authority constructs or adopts their new action, policy, or paradigm, authorizes and imposes it (possibly after consultation, negotiation, or even voting). |
Conditions for Applicability | ||
Clear-cut rule or procedure to follow or enact in a particular “traditional” or institutioinalized action situation. | Actor(s) has (have) choice opportunities and motivation as well as the time to apply one or another DET-II procedure, that is, making a selection among two or more alternatives. | Actor(s) has (have) opportunity to utilize a DET-III process to construct or discovery appropriate action or actions in the situation. |
Or time constraint so actor(s) does (do) not have the opportunity to utilize a DET-II selection procedure or a DET-III action construction procedure. | ||
Or social structural constraints on an actor (or actors) blocking their utilization of DET-II and/or DET-III | ||
Performance Features Including Phase Patterns and Termination | ||
There is basically a direct enactment or performance phase of DET-I. | A selection or choice phase is followed by a DET-I enactment or performance phase. In other words, a two-phase process. | DET-III process is followed by a second phase or possibly two more phases. That is, after the construction phase, there is possibly a DET-II choice phase (whenever two or more alternatives are constructed or discovered). Even when no selection among alternatives is necessary, there will be an enactment/performance phase, that is DET-I. |
Appendix A.2. Game Processes: Interaction Patterns and Outcomes
Appendix A.3. Selected Classical Games: Interaction Patterns and Social Equilibria
Actor 2 | |||
---|---|---|---|
Collaboration/Support (C) | Non-Collaboration/Non-Support (-C) | ||
Actor 1 | Collaboration/Support (C) | R1, R2 (symmetric gains) | S1, T2 (asymmetric outcome, unequal gains or losses) |
Not Collaboration/Non-Support (-C) | T1, S2 (asymmetric outcome, unequal gains & losses) | P1, P2 (symmetric losses) |
- Coordination Game: Ri > Pi > Ti = Si;
- Prisoners’ Dilemma Game: Ti > Ri > Pi > Si; Ti ≠ Si;
- Confrontation (Chicken) Game: Ti > Ri > Si > Pi; Ti ≠ Si;
- Battle of the Sexes Game: Ti > Si > Pi > Ri; Ti ≠ Si.
Type of Social Relationshp | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Type of Game | Status/Domination Relation (Action determination principle (ADP) is A decides, B accedes and payoffs should be asymmetric).44 | Solidarity Relationship (Action determination principle is for A and B to cooperate and share more or less equally).45 | Competitive Relation (Action determination principle is that each chooses separately and selects strategies or constructions options to outdo one another and gain asymmetric payoffs advantageous for self).46 | Adversary Relation (Action determination principle is for each to choose separately and selects or constructs actions to cause harm to the other preferably at the same time limiting harm to self).47 | Indifferent/Egotistical Relation (Action determination principle is for each to select or construct options to gain solely for oneself, with no empathy or concern for the other).48 |
Coordination Game (both gain by coordinating; both lose if one and/or both do not coordinate) | A decides, B accedes. Normative Equilibrium = [T1,S2] Should B oppose the unequal outcome, this would entail questioning and restructuring the relation. | A and B coordinate and share payoffs. Normative Equilibrium = [R1,R2] | A and B choose separately, and try to induce or trick the other into the asymmetrical outcomes. No Normative or non-normative equilibrium. But If CC [R1,R1] payoff large enough, A and B might decide to switch to a cooperative mode with some probability >> 0 | A and B choose separately, trying to induce or trick the other into the disadvantageous asymmetrical outcome. A and B would each prefer [P1,P2] to [R1,R2] Non-normative Equilibrium =[P1,P2] | A and B inclined to coordinate Non-normative Equilibrium = [R1,R2]. |
Confrontation Game or Chicken (both lose if they both try to win. Both avoid disaster if both give in; if one of the actor accedes and the other insists, the latter gains “wins”) | A decides, B accedes. Normative Equilibrium = [T1,S2] | A and B coordinate. and avoid the confrontation interaction. Normative Equilibrium = [R1,R2]. | A and B choose separately. No Normative or non-normative Equilibrium (unless they jointly decide not to play because of risks involved). | A and B choose separately. Non-normative Equilibrium = [P1,P2] (unless punishment so great that refuse to play) | A and B choose individually. Partial non-normative equilibrium in that [R1,R2] likely—but not stable. |
Battle of the Sexes or Distributive Game (both lose if both try to win as in PD or confrontation game; both lose if they both choose non-collaboration. They both win to a certain extent if one accedes) | A decides, B accedes. Normative Equilibrium = [R1,R2] | A and B try to coordinate. [T1,S2] and [S1,T2] are partial Normative equlibria, not intrinsically fully satisfactory. Actors likely to try to transform the game making new action possibilities such as a new option or introduction of a norm such as turn-taking. | A and B choose separately. No Normative or non-normative equilibrium | A and B choose separately. Non-normative Equilibrium = [P1,P2]. | A and B choose individually. No normative or non-normative equilibrium. Actors may transform the game into one offering equilibria. |
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (both lose if each tries to gain ahead of the other. Both win if each agrees to collaborate and accept a second best outcome. One gains, the other looses in the asymmetrical patterns) | A decides, B accedes. Normative Equilibrium = [T1,S2] | A and B coordinate and avoid the mutual loss outcome. Normative Equilibrium = [R1,R2] | A and B choose separately, aiming for [T1,S2] and [S1,T2], respectively, No equilibrium | A and B choose separately, aiming for [T1,S2] and [S1,T2], respectively. Likely Non-normative outcome equilibrium = [P1,P2] | A and B choose individually. No normative equilibrium. Actors are likely to try to negotiate cooperation for mutual gain or to change the game, for instance, agreeing to choose together, [R1,R2], which would be a partial equilibrium. |
Appendix A.4. Concluding Remarks
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1 | Some like Peterson (1994), but also Swedberg (2001), claim that Game Theory has proved only sporadically useful to sociologists, while Abell (2000) argues it ought to have a greater influence in sociology, and Edling (2002) claims that it has mostly affected mathematical sociology, but that its core—yet most basic principle “…that social actors interact, and are affected by game outcomes, albeit in different ways, by that interaction” is basic sociology. While Swedberg (2001) long ago pondered the possibility of developing a distinctively sociological game theory approach without acknowledging earlier initiatives such as IGT and SGT, he mostly saw and partially articulated the idea of game theory in order to theorize “counterfactuals.” But, of course, given its empirical limitations, it would be a very poor tool for generating ‘counterfactuals’. |
2 | Goffman studied at the University of Chicago, a major centre for symbolic interactionism. |
3 | SGT, in addition to its empirical grounding, provides the conceptual and mathematical foundations of rules and rule systems (Burns and Gomolinska 1998, 1999, 2000; Gomolinska 2002, 2004, 2005)—ironically, classical theory defined games as systems of rules but never developed a conceptualization and mathematics of rules and rule systems (see Appendix A). |
4 | Open games—with their opportunities for creativity and innovation—are obviously less predictable in their interaction and outcome patterns than closed games with fixed action repertoires and given outcomes. Even in many closed games the actors vary to a greater or lesser extent in their interpretations, adjustments, and enactments of the norms and algorithms associated with their roles, introducing variation in the situation (for instance, in superordinate-subordinate interactions, in peer group interactions, or in gender interactions). |
5 | The notion of action determination replaces the single, much more limited notion of ”decision-making” in classical game theory; even the game theoretic maximization principle can be understood as one of several “rationality” norms or rules for determining action. |
6 | Action determination encompasses additional modalities as well such as making a choice among alternatives, or constructing or adopting alternatives on the basis of the emotional qualities of the action (“feel good theory”); or the expressive or symbolic qualities of the action (action oriented to communication and the reaction of others as in “dramaturgy theory”). |
7 | The social rules are often conflated with the “rules” of material and ecological constraints. |
8 | An office or social body of officials specialized for this purpose maintain standards of conduct and regulate behavior in interaction situations. They make final judgments and institute payoffs. In whatever ways the norms and institutional arrangements are established and maintained, sociological approaches provide language and analytic tools to describe and analyze a wide variety of interaction situations distinguishable by their norms and institutional arrangements. |
9 | Examples of complex games are found in Ugo Corte’s ethnographic work on the social world of surfing and big wave surfing in particular (forthcoming book). The scarce resources of surfers are waves. Surfers compete with one another, and also collaborate, to catch as many of the best waves during a specific time period without letting any major waves go by un-ridden and thus wasted. Surfing entails a subtle and complex social game—with strategic as well as rule following and ritual behavior—in a natural context of waves that are to be utilized in surfing performances; but in some instances they involve danger and risk, partly derived from the activity itself, partly derived from the complex of social norms surfers try to apply. |
10 | After years of criticism from many social scientists that game theory had little or no place for norms, morality, and institutions—and, therefore, was inappropriate for genuine empirical research on human beings, thei interactions, and groups (Burns 1990, 1994; Burns and Roszkowska 2006, 2008), the rational choice and game theorist Jon Elster “discovered” norms, arguing eventually that they did not fit or conform to rationality conceptions (Elster 1989), including, of course, those of game theory. Later game theory developers took up norms and suggested ways they altered the structure of a game and the behavior of participants (Colman 2003; Gintis 2009, 2010; Grossi et al. 2012; Lanzi 2013; Ostrom 1998; among others); other extensions of game theory include greater attention to communication among agents, social and collective preferences, bounded rationality. These “extensions” so some of what IGT and SGT do—however, they have much of an ad hoc character; a game is not a cultural or institutional object. Its rules are not mathematical objects in the Artificial Intelligence sense as in Burns and Gomolinska (2000) (also, see Gomolinska 2002, 2004, 2005) In the extensions, the most of the researchers have typically ignored the more than 100 years of intensive social science research on norms, culture, and institutions, including the IGT and SGT research of the past 40+ years. Sociology and the social sciences arguably do not fit very easily into the classical game theory paradigm with its highly standardized and limited discourses (see “Concluding Remarks” in Appendix A). |
11 | Concerning gender, women express or emphasize in many of their interactions their identity-as feminine—utilizing makeup, “feminine” or even “sexy” clothes (especially, lipstick and other face makeup, special bras, high-heel shoes, dresses). In the face of constructing and reproducing their female identities, men may misinterpret this behavior as an ‘invitation,’ a “come-on”, a “readiness for sex”. It is not surprising that young girls may hardly understand the full meaning of what they are doing as they try to assume the identity of “women”. |
12 | All the approaches focus on the the phenomena that social actors interact, are interdependent, and are affected by (respond to) game outcomes. SGT is based on an elaborated theory of rules and rule regimes, with mathematical foundations. Games are rule systems together with agents and resources (technologies, material conditions). Rule System Theory also describes and explains social institutions and cultural foundations in which most games are embedded. |
13 | The sociological approaches emphasize that actors involved in the game and/or external actors with sufficient powers can restructure and even transform a game, for instance, changing a zero-sum game into a coordination game, or a coordination game into a competitive or zero-sum game (relational control).SGT treated the PDG as a 3-person game with the DA structuring the game conditions (that is, the particular PD action possibilities of the agents as well as their payoffs) (Buckley and Burns 1974). |
14 | In open games, the action possibilities and outcomes are not all specified—and participations and/or third party or external agents may propose new options (or eliminate possible options). Participants and/or external agents may open up or close down a game or game complex for purposes of introducing new options and/or eliminating existing options. Such processes relate to the potential creativity of game and contextual agents. |
15 | As Burns and Roszkowska have shown in their work on group negotiation, potential equilibria patterns are predictable but given the openness of many negotiation games, the particular equilibrium realized may one among several possibilities, and may differ to varying degrees from the normatively ideal one. |
16 | The sociological approaches focus on diverse social relationships among interacting agents: cooperative, caring, sexual, conflictive, ritualistic/ceremonial, powering including forms of authority and violence, regulative; also, social relationships of solidary, which call for attention to cooperatve norms and particular norms of distribution; as well as status relationships which entail asymmetrical norms of interaction and payoffs (see Appendix A). SGT and IGT have considered such relationships as friendship, enmity, neutral relationships, superior-subordinate relationships, institutionalized in groups and organizations such as those involving leadership. |
17 | Actors have different roles, different positions of status and power, different endowments; also, there is diversity in role components: value, model, act, judgment/modality, etc. The actors participating in a game may operate in different social and psychological worlds—with the likelihood of violating one another’s expectations or predictions. |
18 | It is well-established in the social sciences that actors’ knowledge of their interaction situations is limited and variable, and there are often major asymmetries. Also, actors “creatively” manipulate information and its interpretation—there are “information wars.” |
19 | Normative as well as ritual and ceremonial types of actions have been particularly emphasized by sociologists, at the same time that SGT and IGT in their adaptations of classical game theory, recognize and analyze strategic (“rational”) forms of action and interaction. As indicated above, game players in open games may adapt and restructure games, actors roles and relationships, their particular value, action, and judgment complexes. |
20 | One may also refer to homogenous versus heterogenous games and interaction situations. |
21 | In the sociological perspective, there is a world of multiple values, which results in mixed motive games and decision dilemmas for participants, for instance between instrumental gain and norm realization, or between different norms, or divergent instrumentalities. Actors and groups, through their transformative capabilities, may adapt and transform value complexes, taking into account new value considerations or excluding older established values and norms. Given that humans are social animals, they display “caring-for-other” behavior, concern with others, putting “others ahead of oneself” (Goffman 1969, p. 92), serving a community, or an abstract ideal, or “the Law,” or “God.” Some or many of their values concern then taking other matters (than themselves) into account and sacrificing for them. Because of normative dilemmas, “temptations and pressures,” contextual factors, deviation from institutional arrangements, particular roles and role relationships, and norms occurs. Under some conditions such as revolutionary change, deviation and disruption becomes widespread. There is social disorder, chaos.
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22 | Multiple modalities of action determination and realization include not only normative and ritual rule following, instrumental, habitual, play, but emotional modes of action determination, among others, which depend on social context and, in particular, actors’ roles and relationships and the normative and institutional context generally. |
23 | SGT shifts the basis of choice and action away from maximizing—or even satisficing—in most instances to “following” or enacting social rules, roles, and institutional arrangements—Or in constructing and selecting new alternatives. In the SGT perspective, people do not typically or universally “maximize” or pursue the best action for a particular value but rather normatively appropriate action or “good enough” or “satisficing” ones. Herbert Simon formulated the concept of “bounded rationality”, which is readily incorporated into the multi-value approach of SGT. Interaction and group behavior is patterned, the outputs (and consequences) of behavior are patterned in large part through actors performing their roles and adhering to norms; in addition, they may make strategic choices, take strategic actions to achieve a goal or to realize a role or norm (bounded ratioinality, of course). “Rationality” or instrumental orientation has a place in the sociological approaches—but it is shared or competes with other modalities of action. It is simply one factor recognized in the sociological approaches in what drives or motives human action and interaction. Even self-interested rationality, while important, play even less of a part in many interaction situations. |
24 | But this is not applied universally, as in classical game theory. |
25 | The diverse forms of communication and their uses or functions affect game processes and outcomes: for instance, to provide information or to influence the beliefs and judgments of others. Communication may even entail deception and fabrication. Moreover, actors may or may not use available opportunities in the interaction situation to communicate with one another or to follow the same rules (some degree of asymmetry). Information communicated among actors may become uninentionally distorted or misunderstood. Research has shown, for instance, that particular technical or complex information provided by physicians to patients is often misunderstood by patients. The impact on behavior of different degrees of such knowledge is an empirical question. From a sociological perspective, actors may or may not “cooperate” in “cooperative” games—this will depend in large part on the normative and relational structures in which they are embedded as well as strategic considerations of outcomes in their interaction situations. Even if cooperative interaction (in the sociological sense) is a major part of all human interaction, the game theory approach, while generating interesting analytic and mathematical results (Harsanyi and Selten 1972, 1988; Nash 1950, 1953) has limited relevance to the great diversity and often great complexity of human cooperation. |
26 | SGT has focused on trust in banking and financial situations, established and maintained through particular policies and institutional arrangements (Burns and DeVille 2003). On the other hand, Goffman (1969, pp. 126ff) focused particularly on situations of interpersonal trust and the role of interpersonal rituals that are utilized in establishing and maintaining trust. He writes (Goffman 1969, p. 130), “In the last analysis, we cannot build another into ouns unless we can rely on him to give his work and keep it and to exude valid expression”. And such trust is based on a social fabric of ceremonial thread. “Only through an ‘acceptance’ of the communication of the other (one another) is maximum coordination and collaboration possible, and hence a maximally effective effort,” acting as members of the same team, or sharing a common project. |
27 | Rules and rule systems are key concepts in the new institutionalism (Burns and Flam 1987; March and Olsen 1989; Ostrom 1990; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995), evolutionary sociology (Burns and Dietz 1992), and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel 1967) and are closely related to important work in philosophy on “language games” (Wittgenstein 1953) as well as work in linguistics (Chomsky [1957] 1985, 1965; Pinker 1991). Much contemporary social science research points up that social rule systems—as constituting cultural formations, normative frames, and institutional arrangements—are ubiquitous and partially determinant of social action and interaction. There are cognitive, instrumental, social, aesthetic, and other reasons that human agents introduce, utilize, adhere to, and enforce rules (see later). Of course, some rules are more ephemeral and symbolic than others. Actors may fail (or refuse) to follow (or enforce) some of the rules. |
28 | The classical game framework is treated as a special, limiting case of the more general SGT (Burns and Gomolinska 2000; Burns and Roszkowska 2005, 2007). |
29 | Informally speaking, a rule complex is a set consisting of rules and/or other rule complexes. A rule complex is obtained according to the following formation rules: (1) Any finite set of rules is a rule complex; (2) If C1, C2 are rule complexes, then C1 ∪ C2 and P(C1) are rule complexes; (3) If C1 ⊆ C2 and C2 is a rule complex, then C1 is a rule complex. In words, the class of rule complexes contains all finite sets of rules, is closed under the set-theoretical union and the power set, and preserves inclusion. For any rule complexes C1 and C2, C1 ∩ C2, C1–C2 are also rule complexes. A complex B is a subcomplex of the complex A if B = A, or B may be obtained from A by deleting some rules from A and/or redundant parentheses. The notion of rule complex was introduced as a generalization of a set of rules. The motivation behind the development of this concept has been to consider repertoires of rules in all their complexity with complex interdependencies among the rules and, hence, to not merely consider them as sets of rules. The organization of rules in rule complexes provides us with a powerful tool to investigate and describe various sorts of rules with respect to their functions such as values, norms, judgment rules, prescriptive rules, and meta-rules as well as more complex objects consisting of rules such as roles, routines, algorithms, models of reality as well as social relationships and institutions. |
30 | A ⊆ gB represents that A is a subcomplex of B. |
31 | Degrees of incompatibility or inconsequentiality may arise among role or agential components. For instance, the rules or the substantive actions of ACT do not fit those specified in MODEL, or they are proscribed in VALUE. Or, the action determination subcomplex DET does not fit actions in ACT, for instance, DET-II is a maximization rule or algorithm but acts or their outcomes are not characterized by cardinal values; so, an application is not possible. lFor a consideration of rule incompatibility and its consequences as well as the way it arises, for instance, as a result of reforming one rule subcomplex without adjustment or modification of other related subcomplexes; see Burns et al. (2017). |
32 | But this does not apply universally to all situations, as in classical game theory. |
33 | DET entails the rule complexes/modalities for determining actions (the three identified and specified here are following or implementing a procedure or algorithm, making a selection among two or more alternatives, construction one or more actions). Problematic situations in the case of DET may arise when actor(s) in several ways: (1) Incompatibility or incoherence between DET rule complexes and those of VALUE or MODEL; (2) situations arising where a choice among alternative alternatives need to be made or new actions constructed to realize actors’ goals in the situation. But the actor or actors do not have the right/authority, capability, or desire to engage in DET-II or DET-III. |
34 | The dictionary definition of a standard operating procedure (SOP) is established or prescribed rules or methods to be followed routinely for the performance of designated actions or operations in designated situations. |
35 | There is always some degree of decision-making in following or implementing a rule, as the agent must make interpretations, adjustments, adaptations. In some instances, if the actual conditions are ambiguous, or contradictory, the agent will tend to engage in a DET-II process to decide on the conditions, that is, whether or not they are appropriate or right. In such cases, as discussed later, one type of modality DET-I is combined with another, DET-II. |
36 | There will typically be additional rule(s) defining and specifying standards of sufficient similarity or consonance in situation S and game G(t). |
37 | Often, the rule has associated “data” about its “implementation” in a defined situation S(t). |
38 | For ACT(i,t) = (a1,a2,…,ap) let the results of judgment of similarity be some expression ascertaining the degree of dissimilarity dj (that is, the gap between a particular action performed or to be performed and the norm or value specifications of vi).
ALG(i,t)(Q(ak),Q(vi)) = dj, where ak ∈ ACT(i,t).
We modify expression (4) to express the rule complex or algorithm(s) of comparison and assessment: ALG(i,t)(Q(ak),Q(vi)) = J(i,t)(ak) =dj where it is understood that the judgment of the action ak is based on a comparison and assessment with respect to the given value or norm vi. That is, the desirable qualia of an action Q(vi) are specified by vi and are compared to the expected qualia Q(ak) of the action ak. The different degrees of similarity may be compared by means of > (or ≥). Given two (or more) alternatives, dj, dr, dj > dr (or dj ≥ dr) means that the actor judges that action ak such that ALG(i,t)(ak) = dj better realizes (or, at least not worse in realizing) vi than does as, where ALG(i,t)(ar) = dr. She would then prefer ak to as if and only if ALG(i,t)(ak) > ALG(i,t)(as) (in the case ALG(i,t)(ak) = A:LG(i,t)(ar) the judgment of the two actors is one of indifference in terms of realizing appropriate value(s)). She would chose to enact ak rather than ar (or there is no basis for her to make a choice in the case ALG(i,t)(ak) = ALG(i,t)(ar). More generally, given a repertoire of actions, players are able to rank order (at least, a subset of them) with respect to the capacity or capacities of the actions to realize the value or norm vi:
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39 | This may be formulated as maximizing goodness of fit (Burns and Gomolinska 2000). |
40 | This type of determination would include maximizing on a single dimension, optimizing in a multi-value case or satisficing, etc. |
41 | In related work on creativity and innovation, we specified several procedures and strategies actors use in constructing new entities and processes; such as adaptation, heuristics, trial and error and other approaches to creativity and innovation, for instance, taking an object or process and adapting or modifying it, possibly radically. |
42 | Actors utilize one or more modalities in their action determination complex to determine decisions and actions in relation to other agents in an interaction situation St. Typically, the defined situation and actors’ relationships and roles indicate which one or several modalities are to be employed in the situation: for instance, strategic instrumental action or ritual action or a combination of both (Burns and Roszkowska 2005). |
43 | More generally, SGT stresses the process of following or applying a rule in a certain sense (Burns and Gomolinska 2000). This may not be a trivial matter, as Wittgenstein (1953) and Winch (1958) pointed out. We limit ourselves to the following observations. Some of the actors in an interaction situation may allege a violation of a relevant norm in the situation. This may not entail a dispute over the norm itself, but over its application, an issue of fact. Related problems may arise: some of the actors have conflicting interpretations of the meanings of the norm or of its particular application in the situation S. Or the participants, while adhering to a common norm, introduce different (and possibly incompatible) rules of other sorts, potentially affecting the scope of a norm and normative equilibria in the situation. |
44 | SGT specifies in addition to the action determination principle (ADP) the actors’ MODEL, ACT, VALUE complexes compatible or appropriate for the relationship. Here the actors would operate with MODELS which differentiate them into classes; their VALUE and ACT complexes would consist of asymmetric but complementary rule components as discussed in the main text. |
45 | Corresponding to the ADP for a solidary relationship, the actors’ models would define one another as friends or solidary partners with expectations of mutual predispositions to cooperate and to share gains (and losses). Values and norms in VALUE would orient the actors to cooperation and to sharing gains (and losses). Actions in ACT would appropriately be cooperative ones—and harmful or humiliating type actions would be excluded. |
46 | The actors’ values and action repertoire are oriented to outdoing one another and gaining asymmetric payoffs advantageous for self. Note that this pattern of DET, MODEL, VALUE, and ACT differs from a relationship of indifferent, purely egotistical agents—and the patterns of expected interactions and outcomes in Table A3 indicates this conclusion. |
47 | In line with the ADPs for the actors in adversary relations, their MODELS, VALUES, and ACT complexes are structured toward valuing and strategizing harm to the other (which is likely to lead to mutual self-destruction—unless there is mutual deterrence. (Another possible scenario would be for one to triumph over the other). |
48 | Empathy or caring for one another would not be part and parcel of VALUE in this relationship of indifference. Each is oriented instead to gains for self (and avoidance of losses). Options in ACT would encompass forms of non-collaboration and non-support, hence the likely interaction patterns and outcomes of mutual harm unless they choose to rationally cooperate, which would not be alien for such actors because of their neutrality—in contrast with adversaries or truly competitor actors (“rivals”) where in both cases powerful emotions may be involved. |
49 | In general, the meta-rules and -valuations of a given role or role relationship transform a preference ordering, for instance, that of a personal or isolated individual, e.g. those given initially as in Table A2 (on the basis of the individual assessments). The transformation results is a re-assessment of actions and interactions as well as outcomes (See also Lanzi 2013). |
Classical Game Theory | Sociological Approaches to the Theory of Games |
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I. Games and Game Constraints | |
Game constraints (“rules”) which include physical constraints. Although games are defined in classical theory as systems of rules, there is no conceptual or mathematical theory of rules and rule systems.
In recent times (see footnote 10), game theorists have introduced “norms” to game theory models but these tend to be conflated with material, ecological, and technological constraints. | Games are systems of social rules and other constraints and enabling factors: the “rules of the game.”12 The “rules of the game” are in large part social rules (distinguished from material and technical constraints such as those of the natural environment as well as humanly constructed or built environments). Normative and institutional factors are axiomatic in any sociological approach to conceptualizing interaction and game processes, although such factors are largely missing from classical theory (or they are conflated with the “rules” of material and ecological constraints). In general, in SGT and Goffman’s approach social norms and institutional factors are an integral part of the description and analysis of game situations. In SGT, there is an explicit game rule complex, G(t)—together with the physical and ecological constraints—that structure and regulate action and interaction (see Appendix A). There is a rich vocabulary of rules, distinct rule categories, and rule processes (Burns and Flam 1987). Goffman (1969, 1961) refers to and utilizes in his investigations the rich variety of rules identified in sociology and the social sciences. |
Game structure is assumed fixed or given. Game transformation—or transformation of any kind including the material and socio-cultural context—was not conceived in the Classical theory. | Game re-structuring and transformation is possible through the actions of game and/or external agents.13 |
Games systems are closed consistent with fixed or given game structures (not transformable except by the game theorist). | Open as well as closed games14—the openness of games is assumed in the possibility of actors’ structuring and transforming games. |
“Equilibrium”. Game equilibrium is the solution to the game. | In SGT there are different types of equilibria, the generalized Nash equilibrium, normative and other social equilibria including equilibria imposed by an authority or dictator.
In SGT “solutions” are defined from a particular standpoint or model of one or more players—or possibly an entire group or organization. Disagreements among actors in a group or interaction situation about appropriate or satisfactory “solutions” can be expected, for instance, in negotiation about a rule change or reform, resulting in game disequilibria unless the actors reach a common “solution”, that is, a particular agreement. A common or general game solution satisfies or realizes the values or goals of a group (and, possibly, many of the players in the game). This is the aim and accomplishment in many instances of negotiation in a group or organization.15 |
II. Agency and Actors’ Capabilities & Endowments | |
The players are anomic beings, “aliens,” “strangers” or—neither with roles or role relationships nor subject to normative and institutional influences. (except as they might be incorporated and at the same time conflated in the utility function along with much else). | Actors in SGT are social agents, typically involved in particular roles and role relationships in groups, organizations, and communities.16 Their behavior (interaction patterns and payoffs are a function of their particular roles and role relationships.17 As game players, diverse types of actors are engaged in varying roles (in some cases shifting and even secret roles). |
Perfect or minimally imperfect information about the game, its players, their options, payoffs, and preference structures or utilities. Crisp information, strategies, decisions. | Participating agents operate with more or less shared models, the MODEL complex (see
Appendix A). Still there may be considerable variation among actors’ models; in divided groups there are typically even differentiated models. Players’ model(s) of the game situation may be based on highly incomplete, fuzzy, or even false information about the game situation as well as game structure. Imprecise (or fuzzy/rough) data as well as imprecise rules and norms, strategies, and judgment processes about the game and game situation (Burns and Roszkowska 2004; Roszkowska and Burns 2010).18 Imprecise (or fuzzy/rough) data as well as imprecise rules and norms, strategies, and judgments are common. Reasoning processes may or may not follow standard logic. At the same time, SGT emphasizes the extraordinary knowledgeability and complexity of human agents in their institutional and normative contexts: in particular, their knowledge of diverse cultural forms and institutions such as family, market, government, business or work organization, and hospitals, among others; this knowledge they bring to bear in their social roles and roles relationships and the concrete game interactions. |
Set of given strategies. Many types of action such as ritual and ceremonial action do not make sense in a purely rational instrumental perspective. Moreover, innovative and creative activities are not part of classical repertoires. | An ACT complex represents the repertoire of acts, strategies, routines, programs, rituals, and actions available to a player in her particular role and role relationships in the game situation (see
Appendix A).19 Creativity and adaptation are common action modalities as the basis of agential innovation, entrepreneurship, and change initiatives. |
Symmetry was a given assumption initially—for instance, actors’ action opportunities and payoffs in their various roles and role relationships | Games may be symmetrical or asymmetrical—this is an empirical question relating to the social structure and population of agents involved in games20 |
Utility function or preference ordering is given and exogenous to the game. There is linear ordering. | In SGT, a player’s value and evaluative structures, VALUE complex (see Appendix A), relate to the social context of the game (institutional setup, social relationships, and particular roles vis-a-vis one another).21 Moreover, in SGT and IGT multiple values in the value complex are typically found in any given game context G. |
Choice or decision-making modality: Instrumental rationality or “rational choice”. Maximization of expected utility as a singular universal choice and action principle. The multiple “rational” players all are assumed to abide by the principle in their given game or interaction situation.
Given a game, S, a set of actors I = {i,j,…,n}, action repertoires of each and every member j, A = (Ai, Aj,…,Ak) where Ai = (b1,b2,…,bk), outomes (OUTj) for actor j, then EU(S) = MAX ∑Prob OUTj(ACTj)|Enact (ACTj, S) × VAL(OUTj(ACT)) | RULE COMPLEX OF Multiple modalities of action determination (DET) (see
Appendix A).22 The particular modality (modalities) applying depends on the social context, the institutional, normative, and roles applying.23 In other words, the socially defined situation, relevant roles and role relationships and the context dependent rules—that is, social embeddedness—constrain and regulate the actions and interactions of participants. The SGT approach rejects assumptions of super-rationality and maximization of a one-dimensional utility. Instead, it stresses multiple modalities of action determination, for instance, based on acting in normatively appropriate ways, engaging in social rituals and ceremonies At the same time it accepts that in some contexts the actors are instrumental—“even rational self-oriented agents”—in their orientations (see Table A3).24 This makes for dual and multiple drivers of actors’ behavior. Actors judge the appropriateness, applicability, and adaptation of rules, roles, and institutional arrangements in socially defined games or game situations and apply them in rule-following procedures. SGT singles out three key action determination modalities—that rule complexes in DET. The social and material context for one or another action determination is the situational (for instance, conditions of time and space), normative, institutional, and cultural prescriptions. Actors’ rights (defined by social rules) and the time and space as well as resource conditions impact on actors employment of one or another modality (see Appendix A). DET-I. This is a given prescribed (“legitimized” or authorized) or even simply habitual/routine procedure or algorithm (rule complex). It may be that the action or game conditions are such that the actsor(s) do not have the time or rights (authority in rules) to make choices among alternatives (DET-II) or to construct one or more new alternatives (DET-III). DET-II. This type of determination involves an action situation where two or more actions are given, for instance institutionalized alternatives or an intrinsic part of the action situation. Determination here entails first following a principle, rule, procedure/algorithm in selecting or choosing an action among a set of alternatives. Once a selection is made, the actor(s) perform or enacts (according to DET-I) the selected option. DET-III. This modality involves a situation of high uncertainty in there there is no apparent action or set of alternative actions. The agent then constructs or discovers one or more new actions (at least in her perspective) according to a design, set of criteria or other specifications. If the process ends in a singular action constructed, then the actor(s) enact or perform it in accordance with DET-I. If multiple alternatives are generated, then choice is made among the alternatives according to a DET-II rule or procedure. In any case, the ultimate action is enacted or performed according to a DET-I complex. The universal motivational factor in SGT is the human drive to act correctly, rightly, appropriately, as well as effectively to realize or achieve multiple appropriate values and norms through their actions and interactions in particular, appropriate contexts. See Appendix A and, in particular, Table A1 for more about the SGT formalization of action determination. |
III. Social Relations and Structures | |
Classical games lack explicit social structure—there is no appropriate language or conceptualization of such structure. Games are social structurally context free. In general, players do not explicitly have meaningful social relations and the influences that these entail | In the sociologically approaches, games are socially embedded—normative, relational, and institutional structures are identified and taken into account in their influence on the interaction conditions and frames and perceptions, judgments, and interactions of the participating agents. Roles and role relationships are the basis in SGT of a series of conceptualizations and analyses (Burns 1994; Burns and Flam 1987; Burns and Gomolinska 2000). Actors have different roles, different positions of status and power, different endowments; also, there is diversity in the major role components: value, model, act, judgment/modality, action determination complex, etc. The actors participating in a game may operate in different social and psychological contexts—increasing the likelihood of violating one another’s expectations and predictions and generating tensions and conflicts. Actors’ group membership and social roles and relationships play a significant part in how they play or perform in relation to one another. In general, meaningful other agents and groups influence the perceptions, judgments, and behavior of individual agents in games. A given game may be embedded in other games, causing action and outcome variation. Thus, a sexual game may be embedded in a business negotiation game and vice versa. Goffman elaborated the roles of player as a “party”, a “pawn”, “token”, “informant”, “spy”. A “party”, for example can be an individual or group as a player, pawn, token … (Goffman 1969, 1961). In their roles and interaction situations, actors experience dilemmas, for instance, between doing the “rational thing” (making economic or political gains) versus doing “the right thing.” And as “problem-solvers”, actors innovate changing the game, changing rule regimes (social structure) and resources. |
Limited distinctions in communication conditions and constraints: No communication at all (“non-cooperative games”) or communication opportunities ammong participating players (“cooperatie games”). Communication rules are axioms at the start of the game and apply to all players and plays throughout the game process. “Non-cooperative games” do not allow for communication among participating actors, while “cooperative games” allow for communication (and the making of binding agreements). | Communication as social actions in a sociological perspective. Communication conditions and forms are specified by the rules defining action opportunities and repertoires in a given game situation. There is high variability in communication according to the rule regimes applying.
In whatever ways the norms and institutional arrangements are established and maintained, the sociological approaches provide a language and analytic tools to describe and analyze a wide variety of communication situations distinguishable by their particular norms and institutional arrangements.25 SGT readily incorporates the possibilities of communication among players and the making of binding agreements—which are the bases of what are referred to as “cooperative games” in classical game theory. |
Social power—Lack of power and authority relations in the early formulations. | In sociological perspectives, power and authority relations are part and parcel of the social structure of groups, organizations, and communities. A power structure is based on the rules, social relations, institutional arrangements, resource distribution that determine the distribution of power and meta-power among members in a group, organization, or community. |
Trust is not a concept which classical game theory originally recognized or could readily incorporate—although trust, or a lack of trust, plays a major role in social relations and institutions and substantially affects actors’ interactions. More recent game theory research introduces trust as an “add-on” like norm and interpersonal intimacy (Hardin 2004; King-Casas et al. 2005; Tarrant et al. 2010) (see Appendix A, Concluding Remarks). | Sociological approaches to game theory provide a language and analytic tools to specify and explain trust and trust relationships in interpersonal as well as complex organizational settings.26 |
IV. Empirical Relevance | |
One of the sustained, principal criticisms of classical game theory has been its lack of much empirical relevance, the inability to relate it to much of real social life. This has been empirically demonstrated in a multitude of studies. | The sociological approach of SGT and IGT have demonstrated their effective application in describing, analyzing, and explaining a wide variety of social interactions and game situations—and specifying and explaining interaction patterns and outcomes beyond classical theory’s capabilities. |
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Burns, T.R.; Roszkowska, E.; Machado Des Johansson, N.; Corte, U. Paradigm Shift in Game Theory: Sociological Re-Conceptualization of Human Agency, Social Structure, and Agents’ Cognitive-Normative Frameworks and Action Determination Modalities. Soc. Sci. 2018, 7, 40. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7030040
Burns TR, Roszkowska E, Machado Des Johansson N, Corte U. Paradigm Shift in Game Theory: Sociological Re-Conceptualization of Human Agency, Social Structure, and Agents’ Cognitive-Normative Frameworks and Action Determination Modalities. Social Sciences. 2018; 7(3):40. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7030040
Chicago/Turabian StyleBurns, Tom R., Ewa Roszkowska, Nora Machado Des Johansson, and Ugo Corte. 2018. "Paradigm Shift in Game Theory: Sociological Re-Conceptualization of Human Agency, Social Structure, and Agents’ Cognitive-Normative Frameworks and Action Determination Modalities" Social Sciences 7, no. 3: 40. https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci7030040