Deconstructing Corruption: From (Un)Fixed Definitions to Evolving Perspectives

Abstract

This piece examines the persistent conceptual and normative challenges surrounding corruption in international law. It revisits classical definitions and perceptions of corruption, highlighting their influence on contemporary understandings. It critiques the approach of key international instruments, which, despite extensive efforts to combat corruption, have refrained from providing a unified definition, opting instead for pragmatic frameworks that result practically on criminal types. The analysis interrogates the traditional classification of corruption into petty and grand forms, acknowledging the growing recognition of institutional corruption as a distinct and equally destructive category. The article also highlights the bias in existing frameworks that focus predominantly on public-sector misconduct, often overlooking harmful practices in the private sector that are closely linked to broader dynamics of institutional corruption. Finally, it engages with the dual characterization of corruption as both a criminal offence and a potential violation of human rights. It argues for a paradigm shift: international law should focus less on definitional debates and more on recognizing the tangible harms of corruption, enabling accountability and reparations for acts that undermine democratic institutions and violate human rights.

1. Introduction

The understanding of corruption and its impact is a highly complex issue—too intricate to be fully captured through text-book definitions without oversimplifying its gravity or the extent of its effects. This complexity helps explain why scholars disagree on which elements should be considered when defining it. Moreover, corruption constantly evolves and manifests in diverse ways, making it difficult to establish a universal definition. Despite the existence of extensive legal frameworks at international, regional, and national levels, corruption is typically addressed through descriptions of criminal offenses rather than a singular, comprehensive definition.

As pointed out by Anja Matwijkiw and Bronik Matwijkiw when analyzing the scope of the term corruption it is necessary for the scholar to “concede to a need to adjust the lens on corruption in the first place.” (Matwijkiw and Matwijkiw 2025). When analyzing different definitions and conceptions it is important to “step on the shoes” to understand the background that has made different scholars and international organizations to bring such concrete definitions (or why deliberately decide not to come up with one).

The present article aims to analyze the different angles and perspective that have arisen around attempt on defining corruption, understanding it as definitions or conceptualizations that strive from different emotional and ideological backgrounds, normative descriptions and different analysis that result from certain elements that are brought to discussion from a pragmatic perspective, which means the existence of specific cases that allow delving on different edges of the issue.

The aim is to create an overview of what has been presented until now when discussing corruption and not to try to create a definition which could narrow the scope of such broad problematic around the world and different societies. The discussions around corruption and what should be encompassed have growth since the 1990s with the boom of the anticorruption movement, however some criteria and discussions seem to keep concurring and evolving, in some cases towards very opposite directions, creating tension in scholarship.

The present work begins with revisiting the classical perceptions of corruption, examining the earliest and most influential definitions that have shaped scholarly and political understanding of the problem. These foundational perspectives provide a critical backdrop against which contemporary debates have emerged. Further, the analysis over international instruments will delve into comparing used-language, terminology, and scope to understand why the organizations have opted to go on describing the concept through criminal types rather than trying to define corruption as such. A short examination of key international instruments will reveal how their approaches in representative legal and political situations and cases have contributed to shaping diverse perspectives on corruption within various conventional frameworks.

Consequently, Section 4 revisits the classic classification of corruption into petty and grand forms, while also acknowledging the growing recognition of political corruption (for some authors also referred as institutional corruption) as a category that recognizes the systematic concurrence of corruption rather than one just centred in individual acts. This classification invites further discussion on the actors involved: is corruption to be conceived primarily as a public matter involving state officials and institutions, or does it equally encompass transactions that involve the private sphere and the scenarios in which these different sectors collide?

Moreover, it interrogates the enduring bias in both theory and practice that has positioned the public official as the archetypal subject of corruption. This focus has not only shaped legal definitions but also influenced the strategies and policies designed to address the problem. This is an issue that has been popularly revisited by scholars, however the implications that the debate seems to have in anti-corruption policies are minimal, since the barrier of the public sector bias seems to not be surpassed.

Finally, the article turns to a crucial normative question: should corruption be treated merely as a criminal offence, or does it also constitute a violation of fundamental human rights? Although viewing corruption through a dualist lens may oversimplify the issue, this perspective reveals underlying tensions in how the international community addresses corruption. It also has important consequences for accountability and justice, particularly in cases before regional and national courts and in the growing discussion of a “right to freedom from corruption,” which raises questions about civil society’s standing in national legal actions (Greaves et al. 2025). Through this layered exploration, the article aims to shed light on how historical, legal, and normative dimensions of corruption intersect and where future efforts to conceptualize and combat it might be headed.

2. From Classic Perspectives to Foundational Definitions

The origins of conceptualizing corruption derived from the idea of how systems should work, or towards which goals they should work. Authors have spoken about the aristotelic (Mulgan 2012) description of corruption arising from the comparison of a political system with the human body. When it is not working the way, it should be, it is corrupted. It has also a religious connotation with how sin corrupts the body and the soul (Sommer et al. 2015).

Furthermore, corruption started to be analyzed from a moral perspective, including the differentiation of right from wrong, where the values of society are directed toward the search of the common good, which has great influence on its identification (Carlà-Uhink and Morcillo 2024). When comparing this to how corruption is perceived nowadays, it is noticeable that most of the times the identification of corruption is about fitting the situation or case to what the law has been shaped to describe what corruption is and moral debates are missing.

Ideally, we must look beyond the criminal types that have been created to acknowledge corruption and consider the lack of morales and ethics that lay around a broken system (Pardo 2017a), that despite not been considered a crime per se, does not allow for it to work as it should. For example, in modern democracies, if corruption is reduced to be conceived towards actions of bribery but the whole picture is ignored, it could be missed how the influence of powerful people can affect the real goals of a democracy like acting in favor of the wellbeing of the population, through actions that are considered licit, though not necessarily perceived as ethical.

When reviewing different definitions that scholars have given to corruption, it is almost certainly that they have arisen from emotional or even ideological perspectives of the authors when describing the context in which they are fitting the phenomena of corruption. As Susan Ackermann pointed out, it is a term whose meaning shifts with the speaker (Rose-Ackerman and Carrington 2013). For example, Werner Troesken describes corruption as the “illicit sale of political influence” (Troesken 2006), his definition arises when explaining the origins of corruption by the end of the XIX century in US politics and resumes corruption as action that politicians or people with political influences take due to the illicit sale of will, which up until that moment could be considered through two main actions: bribery or intimidation. This form of defining corruption takes relevance when the author attempts to contextualize and exemplify how important was the public utility regulation in the United States given the advantages that politicians and private actors were taking when buying the wills of municipal or local authorities for their own benefits on the management of public resources and services.

For other authors, corruption is also considered a form subversion (Glaeser and Goldin 2006). This seems very interesting because subversion tends to be thought of as an aggressive manifestation against and stablished authority, but thinking of its real meaning in a form of menacing and undermine a social order or a system, corruption indeed is a subversive, silent enemy of “how the system should work”.

This is the moment in which conception of corruption as two simple crimes (bribery or intimidation) starts to evolve, since the consideration of “Legal or illegal strategies that powerful interest might follow to weaken the impact of regulations or shape the rules to their benefit” (Uslaner 2008) are being considering too. For example, legal strategies such as lobbying, push for specific legislation to be approved (or removed), litigation, campaign donations, among others; are a form to corrupt the system to favor the interests of specific actors.

Susan Rose Ackerman provides a short definition “misuse of public power for private or political gain.” (Rose-Ackerman and Carrington 2013) whose similar wordings have been adopted by Transparency International, the leading anticorruption civil society organization. However, in words of Ackerman, “misuse’ must be defined in terms of some standard.” She emphasizes that these standards are already recognized as crimes in various countries (bribing, embezzling, fraud, etc.) but other standards answer to conflict of interests, to which the borderline between legality and illegality is difficult to draw (Rose-Ackerman and Carrington 2013).

Besides international law scholars, key figures of international organizations have also contributed to the conceptualization of corruption. For example, on his capacity as UN Secretary General, Kofi A. Annan’s seemed to have recognized a broader conceptualization of corruption when he expressed the following: “Corruption is an insidious plague […]. It undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to flourish” (Annan 2003). The significance of these metaphorical works opens another perspective of corruption. Considering it a plague, it makes a resemblance to the corruption of the human body, as something close to an illness but on a great scale that is not only affecting one individual but the entire population. This allows us to appreciate corruption from a different standpoint, not only as a conduct that is considered criminal committed by a public official, but in the common wording on acknowledging significant issues that threaten human rights and society.

Moreover, Annan acknowledges the importance of the role of corruption on the continuing and success of organized crime activities and terrorism, which gives the sense of corruption as a transboundary activity that threatens more than one country at a time. Indeed, this is more of an analogical description of corruption and its effects. However, it gives an idea of the United Nations perspective on addressing corruption from that moment on. Unfortunately, this wording was not so well reflected on the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (hereby UNCAC) when it was drafted and ratified by states during his office as Secretary General as it was again to be treated as a criminal offense with no consideration on the extent of its harm towards, in that moment, the millennium goals.

While the United Nations’ approach marked an important milestone, the conceptualization of corruption has continued to evolve through the contributions of scholars and civil society, who have sought to capture its broader social, political, and human rights dimensions. For example, Transparency International (TI) made a proposal for a definition which covers any of the offences in Articles 15–25 of the UNCAC as part of a scheme that (1) ‘involves a high level public official’ and (2) the commission ‘results in or are intended to result in gross misappropriations of public funds or resources, or gross violations of the human rights of a substantial part of the population or of a vulnerable group’ (Transparency International 2025).

This definition is very complete on its essence, which is the first that directly describes corruption as a criminal offense but also as an issue that amounts to violation of human rights however it keeps the attention around the role of public officials misrepresenting the role that private actors play in corruption schemes. Nevertheless, the concrete definition that TI has used for its advocacy on the fight against corruption is “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain” (Transparency International 2025). To which authors like Graham brooks have expressed its reservations on acknowledging TI definition since it has limitations on considering the wide-ranging political and cultural nature of corruption (Brooks 2016).

Scholarly contributions addressing corruption have progressively evolved toward more holistic approaches. As Paul Heywood argues, many of the failures in practical anti-corruption efforts are closely linked to the ways in which corruption has been theorized and conceptualized within academia (Heywood 2017). His observation is particularly significant because these potentially flawed conceptual frameworks have shaped both domestic and international strategies, underscoring the need for academic work that is not only theoretically robust but also operationally relevant for practitioners and policymakers. On the one hand, Heywood criticizes the excessive reliance on the Principal–Agent (P–A) model, which tends to reduce corruption to the individual acts of agents acting against the interests of their principals (the public interest); thus, simplifying it to the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, as previously noted. In more recent scholarship, Rebecca Dobson, Elizabeth David-Barrett, and Robert Barrington propose a four-dimensional definition of corruption, describing it as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain that harms the public interest, typically breaching laws, regulations, and/or integrity standards.” (Phillips et al. 2025). A comprehensive analysis could be developed from the constitutive elements embedded in this definition (namely, abuse, entrusted power, private gain, and public interest). However, for the purposes of this article, it is particularly relevant to highlight their attempt to create a practical test that enables practitioners and researchers to assess whether a systemic government failure qualifies as corruption. This is especially pertinent in an era when nearly all forms of governmental failure risk being labeled as corruption, even as the concept itself is increasingly narrowed in courts to quid pro quo exchanges.

Considering these evolving perspectives, it becomes evident that the conceptualization of corruption has never been static but rather the product of continuous negotiation among scholars, international organizations, and civil society actors that unfortunately have not always been materialized in the reform of existent instruments or effective public policy. The tension between viewing corruption as a criminal offense and as a cause of violation of human rights reflects deeper divergences in how accountability, justice, and prevention are understood across jurisdictions. This ongoing dualism between punitive and rights-based approaches has profoundly influenced the drafting and interpretation of international legal instruments. The following section therefore turns to an examination of these instruments to explore how their language, scope, and underlying assumptions have shaped the global anti-corruption agenda.

3. Conceptualizations of Corruption from Conventional Lenses

International instruments have historically been reluctant to establish a single definition of corruption. This hesitation is partly due to the complexity of the issue and the broad scope of corrupt practices. However, a significant factor is the diplomatic negotiations during treaty drafting, where states deliberately avoid a fixed definition to maintain flexibility in addressing corruption’s evolving nature. Instead, international treaties describe corruption either by outlining its effects or by specifying the types of conduct that constitute corrupt acts. The primary international legal instrument addressing corruption is the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). However, it was preceded by two key treaties: the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption was the first international treaty on corruption and remains one of the most ratified in the Western Hemisphere, second only to the Organization of American States (OAS) Charter. Its preamble explicitly recognizes the global impact of corruption and the necessity of international cooperation to combat it effectively (Organization of American States 1996). Pragmatically, the instrument aimed to foster cooperation among member states on issues related to corruption, strengthening prosecution efforts and encouraging the development of national legal frameworks. As expected, however, it proved toothless. Although it established a supervision mechanism—MESICIC (Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption)—this body is primarily tasked with monitoring states’ compliance with the Convention. Yet, its effectiveness is severely limited by its total reliance on the political will of the states, as it lacks any form of sanctioning power (OAS Anticorruption Portal n.d.).

Notably, this is one of the instruments within the corpus iuris of the Inter-American System that does not grant the Inter-American Court of Human Rights jurisdiction over matters of interpretation. The reason lies in the instrument’s design: at the time of its adoption, no explicit connection was drawn between acts of corruption and violations of human rights—precisely the legal basis for the Court’s competence. Despite this institutional separation, the Inter-American Human Rights System has not refrained from acknowledging corruption as a pathway to human rights violations (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 2018).

In 2018, the Inter-American Commission published in 2018 a report addressing this link. Moreover, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has recognized corruption as a factor that can lead to the violation of fundamental rights. in rulings such as Ramírez Escobar vs. Guatemala, a case that unveiled corruption networks embedded in the children adoption system, and Viteri Ungaretti vs. Ecuador, a former military leader that was violated in his right to freedom of speech for denouncing corruption acts in the military.

Nevertheless, despite acknowledging the link between corruption and human rights violations, the system still does not grant standing to victims—particularly those represented by civil society organizations—who identify themselves as directly affected in their rights by acts of corruption. In 2020, the Mexican human rights NGO Tojil filed a petition before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, alleging that the Mexican State violated human rights by refusing to recognize citizens as victims of corruption (TOJIL 2023). The petition arises from the embezzlement of public funds by former governor Javier Duarte, in which Tojil sought to represent the people of Veracruz as collective victims. Admitted by the Commission in 2023, the case remains pending and could mark a significant precedent in a region persistently affected by corruption scandals. The second big instrument against corruption before the UNCAC was the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. While not addressing corruption in its entirety, it focuses, specifically on bribery. This treaty set a precedent for how other international organizations would later approach the issue. For example, the European Union’s instruments on corruption acknowledge the influence of the OECD framework (Darrough 2010). This demonstrates how the OECD has taken a leading role—whether positively or problematically—in shaping the multilateral approach to corruption from a Western perspective. In this regard, the influence of the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is undeniable. Enacted in 1977, the FCPA aimed to “bring a halt to the bribery of foreign officials” and to “restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business system.” Two decades later, its legacy extended internationally with the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997, signed by thirty-five countries—including all OECD members and several non-members. Since then, most signatory states have enacted domestic legislation to implement its provisions.

Both the FCPA and the OECD Convention criminalize extraterritorial bribery, thereby targeting the “supply side” of corruption—namely, the companies and individuals who offer bribes. In addition to anti-bribery provisions, these instruments impose accounting and transparency obligations, requiring companies to maintain accurate records and implement internal controls. These measures were introduced following investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which revealed that numerous American companies had concealed corrupt payments through off-the-book slush funds and falsified financial documentation.

While these instruments undoubtedly contributed to improving corporate governance and the functioning of capital markets, their primary focus was not on strengthening democratic institutions or the rule of law. This approach set an early precedent in the global anti-corruption agenda, shaping how international organizations would come to perceive and address corruption—primarily through the lens of bribery and quid pro quo transactions, rather than as a broader threat to democratic governance and human rights.

According to the timeline of its creation, now is time to turn to the UNCAC, as the most comprehensive international treaty on corruption. It refrains from providing a strict definition of corruption. Instead, it focuses on developing criminal classifications, recognizing the role of the private sector in corruption, and framing corruption as a threat to the rule of law, democracy, and security rather than a direct human rights violation. While a comprehensive analysis of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) could be conducted to assess its overall effectiveness, this discussion focuses on the conceptual approach the Convention adopts toward corruption—an approach that has significantly influenced the development of subsequent international instruments and the internal mechanisms adopted by State Parties.

UNCAC stands out as a holistic framework that addresses multiple dimensions of corruption. While it establishes specific criminal offenses, it goes beyond penal measures to encourage the involvement of diverse sectors, including private entities. It also explicitly refers to corruption in the context of political campaign financing and calls for the regulation of such practices—a crucial step in recognizing the systemic nature of corruption. Additionally, the Convention provides mechanisms for interpretation and dispute resolution among States Parties.

Despite its comprehensive nature, the Convention’s enforceability remains limited. To date, only Equatorial Guinea has invoked the dispute resolution provision in two separate cases against France before the International Court of Justice. This highlights a broader trend: UNCAC offers a broad and ambitious framework but lacks the coercive mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance—once again rendering it a robust yet toothless instrument in the global fight against corruption

Returning to a regional instrument, is moment to address what The European Union has developed on the matter. Indeed the EU has a robust framework to combat corruption, with three main instruments standing out: the 1997 Convention on fighting corruption involving EU officials or officials of EU member states, the 2003 Council Framework Decision on combating corruption in the private sector (criminalizing both active and passive bribery), and the 2008 Council Decision 2008/852/JHA, which established a contact-point network against corruption.

The 1997 EU Convention does not define corruption explicitly but describes two distinct corrupt practices: passive and active corruption. Article 2 defines active corruption as an act where an individual seeks or requests an undue advantage from a public official, essentially, the bribe-giver (European Union 1997). Article 3 defines passive corruption as the act of a public official who, by abusing their authority, obtains benefits for themselves or others—essentially, the bribe recipient (European Union 1997). The 2003 Council Framework Decision extends this distinction to corruption in the private sector, recognizing the risks posed to market fairness and competition even in the absence of public officials (European Union Council 2003).

Interestingly, despite the extensive array of anti-corruption instruments within the European Union, the 2019 Qatargate, (Sánchez Salgado and Gürkan 2025) a high-profile political scandal involving allegations that Qatar bribed members of the European Parliament and other EU officials to influence decision-making, particularly on issues related to human rights and foreign policy; exposed significant vulnerabilities in the region’s regulatory framework. The case prompted reflection on the blurred line between legitimate lobbying and acts of corruption.

While lobbying is widely accepted as a lawful and regulated practice, the scandal revealed how it can serve as a vehicle for undue influence when transparency and oversight are lacking. The nature of the events surrounding Qatargate points to a form of borderline corruption—legal in form but questionable in substance—raising critical concerns about how such activities should be effectively monitored and controlled within democratic institutions.

Nevertheless, Qatargate might not be the only disconcerting episode related to corruption within the European Union. Beyond its general anti-corruption framework, the EU also applies accession conditionality requirements, known as the Copenhagen Criteria of 1993. These criteria compel prospective member states to meet specific governance standards, particularly regarding corruption, in response to the challenges Eastern European democracies faced in the post–Cold War transition (Bojović and Ćorić 2023). In essence, the criteria require candidate states to: (a) establish and demonstrate functioning rule-of-law systems; (b) enact and implement anti-corruption legislation aligned with EU standards; (c) create independent anti-corruption institutions; and (d) ensure political accountability and transparency within public administration.

The objective was to safeguard the EU’s enlargement process from governance decay and to consolidate integrity and democratic resilience across new member states. Yet, despite these efforts, countries such as Hungary have experienced significant setbacks in combating corruption, leading to the suspension of EU funds and the imposition of sixteen corrective recommendations by the European Commission, measures that have thus far shown limited effectiveness in reversing systemic corruption (Martin and Hajnal 2025). The lesson lies in recognizing that legal compliance frameworks alone are insufficient.

Moving to another regional instrument, The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) takes a different approach. Article I of this treaty explicitly defines corruption as encompassing the “[…] acts and practices including related offences proscribed in this Convention.” (African Union, 2003). This treaty was a natural extension of the African Human Rights System, acknowledging the impact of corruption on development and human rights.

Notably, AUCPCC stands out as a pioneering regional instrument. It takes a distinctive approach, intentionally diverging from the frameworks established by Global North-led instruments. Rather than replicating external models, the AUCPCC seeks to address the specific realities and complexities of corruption on the African continent. This includes not only corruption involving domestic public officials but also the significant role played by foreign actors in perpetuating corrupt practices. By acknowledging these dynamics, the African Union positions its anti-corruption efforts as a vehicle for achieving meaningful reforms, accountability, and potentially reparations for the deep and ongoing harms caused by corruption across the region.

The AUCPCC grants the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) jurisdiction over criminal cases involving grand corruption committed by state parties. However, its capacity to exercise this competence remains severely limited. The Court’s jurisdiction is subsidiary, meaning it can only intervene when a member state fails to prosecute. Furthermore, its authority is constrained by the immunity of high-ranking officials and by the requirement that a case must be of “a serious nature affecting the stability of a state, region, or the Union” (African Union 2003). As J. Hatchard observes, proving that a corruption case poses a threat to stability presents a significant challenge for prosecution, further narrowing the Court’s reach (Hatchard 2019). These restrictions have prevented the Court from addressing emblematic grand corruption cases, such as those involving Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, shielded by immunity, or Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, where the subsidiarity principle barred intervention while domestic proceedings were ongoing.

While the AUCPCC symbolizes a regional commitment to fight corruption, the procedural and jurisdictional limitations of its enforcement mechanisms raise doubts about its practical effectiveness in holding powerful political elites accountable. The latest international instrument regarding corruption is the Arab Convention to Fight Corruption (ACAC), signed on 21 December 2010, by 21 Arab states (excluding Somalia). This late treaty takes yet another approach that differentiates from its predecessors as a regional instrument. Its preamble acknowledges corruption as a crime with diverse manifestations and severe repercussions on moral values, political life, the economy, and society. Moreover, it has a recognition on the participation of victims of corruption, whereas it is not clear if it refers to population or the passive victims in the common theorization of corruption as a crime (the extorted public official or citizen) (League of Arab States 2010).

The adoption of the ACAC represented an important milestone in the Middle East’s commitment to align with global anti-corruption norms. Emerging amid rapid socio-economic transformation and unprecedented wealth accumulation in the region, the Convention sought to strengthen preventive and security measures against corruption, both within the public and private sectors. Over time, Arab states such as Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain expanded their domestic legal frameworks to criminalize corrupt practices and even extended jurisdiction to offenses committed abroad (Modaffari 2023). However, the credibility of these commitments has been increasingly questioned considering allegations such as those surrounding the already mentioned Qatargate, where Arab governments have been accused of exerting undue influence over foreign policymakers and institutions.

Overall, while different treaties adopt varying perspectives on corruption, they share a common goal: to address and mitigate its harmful effects through international cooperation and boost reforms on the national frameworks. Nevertheless, from a pragmatic perspective the discrepancies on establishing a definition or at least a conceptualization that allows to address corruption as a crime or (and) a human rights threat poses a challenge for policy makers.

Graham Brooks on his sociological and criminological perspective points out that there is a complexity of defining corruption in a clear and consistent manner, particularly in an international context (Brooks 2016). Corruption takes many forms and varies across political, economic, and social settings, making it difficult to establish a definition that applies universally. Diverse cultural, legal, and institutional perspectives further complicate this effort, as what is considered corruption in one country may not be viewed the same way in another. As a result, international treaties and agreements struggle to create a precise and unambiguous definition, going instead for a broad description that consolidates the minimum behaviors that could be considered corruption.

This lack of clarity poses significant challenges for the development of effective strategies for prevention and enforcement, as varying interpretations lead to inconsistencies in legal approaches and enforcement mechanisms across jurisdictions, each setting its own priorities in addressing corruption. Ultimately, the elusive nature of a universally accepted definition of corruption reflects both its inherent complexity and the difficulties in reaching international consensus on how to combat it. In this context, the international legal framework has largely evolved around a dualist understanding of corruption: distinguishing between petty and grand corruption, thereby promoting a predominantly criminal law–oriented response focused on the identification and punishment of individual misconduct. However, this dichotomy, while useful for categorization, has also constrained the broader understanding of corruption as a systemic and structural phenomenon, highlighting the need to revisit this conceptual divide to build more comprehensive and preventive strategies at both domestic and international levels.

A comparative examination of international and regional instruments reveals the fragmented yet evolving nature of the global anti-corruption regime. Table 1 (United Nations Convention against Corruption [UNCAC], 2003; Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 1996; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 2003; Arab Convention against Corruption, 2010; European Union Law on Anti-Corruption, 2017). synthesizes the principal treaties and conventions addressing corruption, outlining their normative scope, conceptual approaches, enforcement mechanisms, and structural limitations. This overview underscores how the absence of a unified definition of corruption has led to diverse legal interpretations and regulatory models, each reflecting distinct regional priorities and doctrinal understandings. In doing so, it highlights the tension between the criminal law–oriented and human rights–based conceptualizations of corruption that continue to shape contemporary international legal discourse.

Table 1. Summary of Major International and Regional Anti-Corruption Instruments.

Instrument, (Adoption and Entry into Force)	Scope & Coverage	Conceptual Approach to Corruption	Key Mechanisms/Features	Main Limitations
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption (IACAC) 1996/1997	First international treaty focused exclusively on corruption; applies to OAS member states.	Treats corruption as a criminal offense and a governance problem requiring international cooperation.	Establishes MESICIC (Follow-up Mechanism); promotes harmonization of national laws and mutual legal assistance.	Lacks enforcement power; no jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; relies on state political will.
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 1997/1999	Focused on bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions.	Targets the ‘supply side’ of corruption; corporate and financial integrity approach.	Requires states to criminalize foreign bribery, ensure accounting transparency, and adopt corporate compliance mechanisms.	Narrow focus (bribery only); weak connection to governance or human rights; enforcement depends on domestic agencies.
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 2003/2005	Global and comprehensive treaty covering public, private, preventive, and criminal dimensions.	Frames corruption as a threat to rule of law, democracy, and security; avoids a strict definition.	Establishes provisions on prevention, criminalization, asset recovery, and international cooperation; encourages private sector involvement.	No coercive enforcement; limited dispute resolution (only one case invoked before the ICJ); compliance depends on voluntary peer review.
European Union Anti-Corruption Framework (Convention 1997; Framework Decision 2003; Council Decision 2008) 1997/2008	Applies to EU institutions and member states; addresses both public and private sector corruption.	Defines corruption via active and passive conduct; focuses on institutional integrity and internal accountability.	Promotes coordination among EU contact points; extends criminalization to private sector; complements with Copenhagen Criteria for accession.	Fragmented implementation; enforcement disparities among member states; exposed weaknesses in Qatargate scandal.
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC) 2003/2006	Regional treaty covering African states; integrates anti-corruption and human rights objectives.	Defines corruption explicitly; recognizes both public and foreign actors.	Grants African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights limited jurisdiction over grand corruption; promotes national reforms.	Subsidiary jurisdiction; immunity of officials; limited capacity to prosecute high-level cases; enforcement remains weak.
Arab Convention to Fight Corruption (ACAC) 2010/2013	treaty for Arab League states; aims to harmonize preventive and punitive measures.	Considers corruption a crime with social, economic, and moral dimensions.	Extends criminalization to private sector and extraterritorial acts; aligns with UNCAC standards.	Credibility concerns due to allegations of undue influence (e.g., Qatargate); unclear victim framework; enforcement transparency lacking.

Note: Table created by the author based on the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2003), the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996), the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003), the Arab Convention against Corruption (2010), and European Union Anti-Corruption Law (2017).

4. Petty Corruption Versus Grand Corruption… and Institutional Corruption?

Corruption takes many forms, and accordingly to scholars and to TI can generally be categorized into petty corruption, grand corruption, and political corruption (Transparency International 2025). Normally the classification only relied on two categories, petty and grand corruption, nevertheless the evolving features of the problematic led to the consideration of a third category which is political corruption. Each type affects governance, society, and economic development in different ways.

Petty corruption refers to the everyday misuse of power by lower-level public officials when dealing with ordinary citizens. It is commonly encountered when individuals seek access to essential public services such as healthcare, education, or law enforcement (Riley 1999). This form of corruption often involves small-scale bribes or favors, such as a police officer demanding payment to overlook a minor offense, a doctor requesting unofficial fees for treatment in a public hospital, or a school administrator accepting money for student admission. While the amounts involved may be small, petty corruption is widespread and erodes public trust, increases inequality, and restricts access to basic rights and services. This is the type of corruption that encourages the bad perception of citizens that highlights on the formulation of Corruption Perception Indexes.

Grand corruption, on the other hand, occurs at the highest levels of government, where powerful officials manipulate policies, institutions, and resources to benefit themselves and a select few at the expense of the broader population. This form of corruption causes significant social and economic harm by diverting public funds and weakening governance. In a discussion paper, the Global Organization of Parliamentarians Against Corruption (GOPAC) argued that ‘if ordinary corruption is a disease that afflicts the body of the state, then grand corruption is a cancer that turns the very tissues of the state against itself.’ (GOPAC 2013).

A particularly troubling aspect of grand corruption is what is often termed “legal corruption,” (Pardo 2017b), where unethical but technically lawful practices—such as opaque political financing or the seamless transition of public officials into lucrative private-sector roles—allow elites to maintain control and influence. Because those involved in grand corruption often hold the power to prevent investigations or legal consequences, this form of corruption frequently goes unpunished. For that reason, it was necessary to review this type of corruption as a different category because, though, it involves the actions of high-profile officials, it also refers to a mechanism that involves both high- and low-profile officials and different sectors.

Institutional corruption involves the manipulation of policies, institutions, and decision-making processes to maintain political power and personal wealth. Unlike petty or grand corruption, which may focus on financial gain, political corruption is often centered on preserving control over the political system. L. Lessig and D. Thompson have addressed this type of corruption describing it as the systemic distortions that occur when legal and political institutions are structured in ways that privilege powerful private interests over the public good, even without the presence of criminal conduct (Lessig 2013; Thompson 2013).

This can manifest in various ways, such as election rigging, suppressing opposition voices, diverting public funds for political campaigns, or influencing laws to benefit specific individuals or groups (Philp 1997). By undermining democracy and weakening public trust in institutions, institutional corruption ensures that power remains concentrated among a privileged few, perpetuating inequality and preventing fair governance.

While these types of corruption differ in scale and impact, they are deeply interconnected and reinforce each other. Petty corruption weakens faith in public institutions, grand corruption drains national resources, and political corruption ensures that these unethical practices remain entrenched.

Although institutional corruption results in the institutional capture of the state by powerful elites, many of these well-documented and harmful practices do not qualify as corruption under existing legal frameworks. This is largely because such frameworks tend to narrowly define corruption as quid pro quo exchanges. By focusing exclusively on explicit transactions, the law overlooks the broader, systemic advantages gained through practices like disproportionate campaign financing. These financial contributions, often offered without a direct or immediate return, can create implicit obligations, granting privileged access to decision-makers and shaping legislation and public policy in favour of wealthy donors. Such influence, while not always illegal, produces deeply unjust outcomes that erode democratic principles and institutional integrity.

The persistent divide between petty and grand corruption has shaped international frameworks that largely frame corruption as an abuse of public office. This focus places public officials at the center of accountability, while often neglecting the critical role of private-sector actors in enabling or benefiting from corrupt practices. Such bias has produced a one-dimensional understanding of corruption, where state misconduct is scrutinized, but private complicity remains peripheral. Reassessing this imbalance is essential to building a more comprehensive and effective anti-corruption agenda.

5. The Public Official Bias: A Limited Perspective on Corruption

Different types of corruption can also be analyzed from the perspective of the different actors that are involved. There it is possible to distinguish from three different types; the corruption proper of public officials in which only their role is the relevant (Sartor and Beamish 2020), which could be perfectly exemplified on cases of direct embezzlement of public funds. The second is the corruption that arises between public—private relations, it means, when public officials and the private sector are both directly involved on the corruption act itself, for example, the act of bribery for the obtention of contracts or the benefit of passing a law that benefits the private actor, and finally, the corruption that occurs in a relation between private-private actors (Argandoña 2003), perfect example could be corporate espionage or the bribery of from one corporation to the employee of other corporation to obtain certain advantage. The last occurs only on the private sector, which means that it excludes private—state owned companies. On this type of corruption is that the conception of corruption as a “white collar” crime comes into effect.

This last differentiation of types of corruption is significant to identify the extent of the harm of the corruption act but also to understand the distinctions on who is the victim in the cases that arise from corrupt practices among different sectors. In the case of pure public sector corruption, it has been clear for human rights advocates to link it to the violation of collective and diffuse rights (TOJIL 2023), especially if it is of the embezzlement of funds that were intended for programs like education, health or infrastructure. On the other hand, in what could be called “exclusive private sector corruption”, the victim is the corporation that is losing advantages or has been targeted with the illicit conducts. This helps to renew the mindset that has been giving on treating (in case of extortion) the public official that is requested to comply with certain activity. At first look, it might be considered that corruption that occurs among privates is not harmful but to the parties involved, nevertheless the OECD and EU have been close to these cases, since it has been considered to affect competitivity and fairness in the access of markets (Barutciski and Bandali 2015).

Corruption has for long being conceived as an action proper by the public official, which has arisen to perception that corruption has only one type of main actor: the public official misusing the state resources, for example, embezzlement of public funds. This narrow perspective has led to the belief that reducing the power of public officials and government means of control will reduce corruption. As pointed out by G. Brooks, most academic literature is still marked by a western assumption about the need for free market and liberal constitutional orders. It is inevitable to notice that for some international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund corruption is still seen as merely a public sector issue (Breen and Gillanders 2015). With these assumptions it is difficult to promote a correct worldwide approach to address a systemic issue that has been proven to involve both private and public sector.

Anticorruption policies place a great responsibility on the accountability and regulation on the activities of public officials, even grand corruption places as one of core elements the involvement of a high public official. On the other hand, the role of the private sector, though not ignored on its participation in grand corruption and political corruption, is viewed as a great allied or even as an antithesis of corruption (Brooks 2016), because they are praised on its efficiency and operate under the logic that wealthy people do not need to steal money from the poor.

The dominant liberal narrative surrounding corruption frames its most damaging consequence as the deterrence of foreign investment, which in turn hampers economic growth and perpetuates cycles of inequality. According to this view, countries with strong rule of law attract more investment, as businesses are thought to prefer operating within legal systems grounded in ethics, judicial independence, and predictable enforcement.

While this may hold true for corporations seeking fair competition and stability, it is important not to overlook a more troubling reality: many corporations may in fact prefer environments with weak rule of law, where they can operate with minimal accountability for violations related to environmental protection, labour rights, or national sovereignty. This strategic preference has been illustrated in cases such as the fashion industry’s exploitative practices in Bangladesh and the Odebrecht corruption scandal, in which contracts were deliberately pursued in countries with fragile legal systems to avoid scrutiny and facilitate illicit dealings and not to forget the mining industry and the way it operates for the obtention of exploitation licenses.

Global anti-corruption coalitions and the international community relieve heavily on the role of the private sector on fighting corruption. For instance, the way corruption has been perceived constantly acknowledges the role of public officials; nevertheless, multilateral organizations (OECD, World Bank and International Monetary Fund) and even civil society have had a tendency to downplay the role of private actors in big corruption schemes by keep considering it an issue of the public sector (Marquette 2001).

Thus far, the primary obligation imposed on the private sector in the fight against corruption has been the adoption of internal transparency measures. Compliance is often deemed sufficient when a corporation produces a manual outlining transparency guidelines and prohibitions against bribery. However, this minimalist approach falls short of addressing deeper accountability challenges. Crucial responsibilities—such as actively protecting whistleblowers or refusing to engage in business with corporate partners implicated in allegations or proven cases of grand corruption—remain unfulfilled. The private sector’s limited engagement in these areas reflects a broader reluctance to assume a more substantive role in combating systemic corruption.

The intention here is not to construct an antagonistic narrative against the private sector’s role in combating corruption, but rather to highlight a critical blind spot in prevailing academic and international discourse. Much of the focus has been directed toward public officials as the primary corrupt actors, which has contributed to the underestimation, or outright neglect, of the private sector’s significant role in perpetuating corruption. Despite repeated involvement in major scandals and judicial proceedings, corporate actors have often evaded accountability. This oversight is, in part, sustained by narratives that promote deregulation and liberalism as the most effective tools for combating corruption. However, such narratives may also serve the interests of corrupt private actors, functioning as strategies to legitimize their operations while avoiding ethical scrutiny or legal oversight. By advocating minimal state intervention, these actors undermine the foundational principles of free market competition and seek to operate free from regulatory mechanisms that could challenge their profit-driven agendas.

This current bias in the conceptualization of corruption is what has shaped the creation of corruption rankings like the Global Index of Corruption created by Transparency international, even though it gives a good indication of the situation of corruption around the world, many scholars and organizations have criticized its inaccuracy when ranking the countries (Johnston 2017). The indexes have reflected a certain dynamic on posing economically stable and wealthy countries perceived as non-corrupt or ranking in the highest positions, whilst least developed countries or economically unstable countries generally are also ranking on the bottom. The important information to highlight is that most of the indicators go around the idea of public trust, it means, the trust of the citizens in its public officials. This revolves around the experiences of citizens with petty corruption or the requests of briberies from public officials and the day to day bureaucracy that might boost the petty corruption (Miller 2015). However countries that experience less bureaucracy and a reduce amount of petty corruption cases tend to generate more trust on the citizenship whereas ranking higher, despite the fact that the big picture regarding grand corruption remains uncovered. This rounds up again to feed the perspective of “more state, more corruption.”

T. Søreide criticizes the methodological inadequacies of the Corrupt Perception Indexes because certain aspects allow wealthy countries to be perceived less corrupt than they are. This occurs mostly because the practices evaluated rely on the trust and perception of its own population but do not consider their actions on foreign practices that promote or allow corruption to have its way. He harshly describes that the CPI create certain narratives that continue to replicate around the world and the media: “poor countries are perceived to be corrupt simply because they are poor while rich countries come out as clean because they are rich’; and ‘[r]umours, prejudices or media attention have an impact on experts as well as on ordinary people.” (Søreide 2006).

This perception at the end, summed up to the perspective of organizations like the World Bank and the IMF on corruption organizations, sets a very dark picture to states that need to be supported by international cooperation programs, with high interests’ rates and conditions that only perpetuate the cycle of poverty and unpayable debts for countries with the worst development indicators. This gives an insight into the fact that, perhaps, civil society needs to investigate new indicators to document corruption, not limiting it on the perception of citizens towards its government but considering the performance of different actors that are part of this systemic issue.

The predominant emphasis on criminalizing corruption, often centered on the misconduct of public officials, has reinforced a legalistic understanding of the phenomenon. While this approach facilitates prosecution and deterrence, it tends to overlook the broader social consequences that corruption inflicts on citizens and institutions. The growing recognition that corruption undermines access to justice, equality, and essential public services has prompted scholars and international bodies to question whether it should be addressed solely as a criminal act or also as a violation of human rights. This conceptual tension between corruption as a legal offense and as social harm sets the stage for examining the persistent debate over whether corruption should be understood primarily as a crime or as a violation of human rights.

6. Dualism of Corruption: A Crime or a Threat to Human Rights?

From the perspective of treaties and scholars, corruption can be conceptualized from two dimensions, as a violation of human rights and as a conventional crime. There is a big importance un understanding that both approaches provide different venues on the creation of policies to fight it as a global issue (Peters 2018). When issuing corruption as a threat human rights, which is the case in treaties like the AU Convention, and as exposed by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Development (United Nations Human Rights Council 2023a) and the Drafting of the Right to Solidarity (United Nations Human Rights Council 2023b), questions like who is responsible for protecting from violations to human rights may arise, upbringing the constant debate if particulars or legal persons are also bounded by obligations of protecting human rights. When addressing it from the perspective of only a conventional crime, not even the as a core crime, the actions of addressing it are towards regulating the conduct, establishing who are the perpetrators, bring them before the jurisdiction to face a fair trial.

Prosecuting criminal cases of corruption presents significant challenges for investigators and enforcement institutions. While international frameworks exist to facilitate cooperation, they often collide with other legal regimes that hinder effective investigation—such as bank secrecy laws and regulations that shield the identities of shareholders in anonymous corporate entities. These legal obstacles complicate cross-border cooperation and make it extremely difficult to gather the evidence needed to build a strong and coherent case. As a result, the many legal and institutional “knots” that must be untangled to bring a corruption case successfully before a court are often too complex to tie together, leading to impunity and frustration in enforcement efforts.

One of the issues that have arisen in practice regarding considering corruption as a crime is that the cultural perception has been to consider it alone a “white collar” crime. Since it might be perceived that it is only financially motivated, non-violent or not engages directly in violence (Brooks 2016). Nevertheless, the causality of grand corruption and political corruption acts with violent acts is a subject of study, since, for example rigging elections by violent means or financing politically motivated groups to engage in acts of violence. When perceiving corruption solely as a crime and neglecting it as a threat to democracy and human rights, there are two conceptualizations in which judicial bodies will inevitably land: First, thinking of it as a white-collar crime and, second, thinking of it as a victimless crime.

Corruption cannot be addressed solely as a crime or merely as a violation of human rights. While it is a complex issue, treating corruption only as a human rights violation limits the ability to establish local and effective mechanisms for holding individuals and legal entities accountable. Conversely, viewing corruption solely as a crime restricts the development of comprehensive solutions that recognize the varying degrees of corruption and their significant impact on the enjoyment of human rights. A balanced approach is necessary to ensure both accountability and effective strategies for combating corruption.

In this matter, John Dugard expressed his skepticism towards addressing corruption as an issue of violation of human rights (Dugard 2013), first from the understanding that the biggest and most important convention in the matter addresses the issue as an urgent matter from the perspective of a transnational crime and all the mechanisms and obligations imposed to the parties rely on addressing it as a crime. On the other hand, with the rising on the recognition of and debate of the right of development and the right to solidarity as expressed by Ole K. Fauchald if corruption is only perceived as a crime, entire populations affected by corruption will continue to lack effective mechanisms to claim respect and protection of its rights (Fauchald 2024). This means that so far, the possibility of having locus standi before any judicial mechanism is implausible.

Until now, the mechanisms combatting corruption rely only on the action of local authorities through prosecution or through state agencies specializing on issue cases of corruption. However, when the perception of corruption as a violation to human rights started to solidify, civil society was able to promote through their reports the active involvement of universal human rights organs such as the Human Rights Committee or regional human rights bodies such as the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights.

To this extent, the ICHR dared to define corruption in its resolution 1/18 as “…a complex phenomenon that affects human rights in their entirety, ivil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental, as well as the right to development; weakens governance and democratic institutions, promotes impunity, undermines the rule of law and exacerbates inequality.” (ICrtHR 2018). With this the goal of human rights international bodies has been so far promote policies that address corruption from a human rights approach.

Ultimately, the coexistence of these two conceptualizations: corruption as a criminal act and as a violation of human rights; reveals both the evolution and the fragmentation of the global anti-corruption regime. While criminal law provides the procedural tools for prosecution, the human rights framework introduces the moral and social imperatives that give corruption their broader societal meaning. Yet, the lack of integration between these approaches continues to generate gaps in accountability, leaving victims without effective remedies and states without coherent guidance.

7. Conclusions: Reimagining Corruption

Expecting a definition of corruption that considers all the important aspects that involve the problem as it takes place in different contexts is almost impossible and useless when approaching the issue. Analyzing different definitions and ways in which scholars, international instruments and civil society have been given to corruption is important to have a differentiated perspective on the issues that preconceived them. It is imperative not to ignore the emotional and ideological background of different scholars, as well as the events that give birth or promote the creation of instruments that try to provide a big picture of what corruption is. It is essential that the current normative framework against corruption does not constrain innovative thinking about its possible evolution or the wide-ranging consequences.

Some definitions of corruption are broader than others. Broader definitions consider the various roles of actors and the different contexts in which corruption occurs, while narrower definitions focus on the core elements common to all types of corruption, regardless of the actors involved. Although broader definitions may sometimes seem incomplete or overly general, they are practical given the evolving and diverse manifestations of corruption. Regularly reviewing these definitions and their scope is essential for developing a comprehensive understanding of corruption as a persistent problem across societies.

This understanding helps identify key elements necessary to improve international mechanisms for effective accountability. While corruption may never be fully eradicated, examining it from multiple perspectives can support the creation of diverse but effective strategies to reduce its harmful effects on development and the perpetuation of inequality. Whether corruption is framed as a crime, a human rights violation, or both, such perspectives can equip the international community with new tools to enhance institutional responses. However, international legislation, civil society and scholarship must go beyond these frameworks and elevate the discussions to address the issue more comprehensively.

The UNCAC Coalition, a civil society organization, asserts that states should acknowledge how grand corruption infringes upon collective rights, including self-determination, control over natural resources, the gradual fulfillment of economic, social, and cultural rights, and access to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment. Given this perspective, the inevitable ideological divide between narrow and broad interpretations of corruption mirrors the persistent inequality that arises when development is deprioritized in favor of addressing corruption merely as a conventional criminal threat (The UNCAC Coalition 2024).

Reforms to international instruments are very much needed, and these should move forward from abstract definitions and instead focus on two critical imperatives: first, to reflect deeply on the tangible harms caused by corruption, and second, to recognize populations as its primary victims. Achieving consensus on these points would not only pave the way for greater accountability and reparations for diverse acts of corruption but would also allow international and regional courts to address forms of corruption that have so far evaded scrutiny due to narrow legal definitions. This shift could foster meaningful debates on the legality of practices that, while formally lawful, undermine democracies and human rights such as foreign private financing of political campaigns or certain forms of lobbying that distort policymaking in favour of powerful interests.

The ultimate task for international lawmakers should no longer be the endless theorization of corruption but a decisive engagement with its real-world consequences. Only by confronting the harmful effects of practices that erode democratic institutions and violate human rights can law and policy be reoriented toward effective accountability and reparations. Admittedly, the push to reshape and strengthen international instruments will face significant resistance from powerful actors with vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Yet scholars have a crucial role to play: to move beyond cautious rhetoric and to confront head-on the systemic practices that, though legally sanctioned, perpetuate the same and even worse harms as classic forms of corruption such as bribery or embezzlement. The failure to do so risks allowing these harmful activities to persist unchallenged not because they are any less corrosive, but because the current legal frameworks have yet to recognize them for what they are.

Reconciling the dualist perspectives on corruption, such as crime and as a human rights violation requires a shift toward greater conceptual and institutional coherence. International and regional frameworks should adopt hybrid approaches that integrate criminal accountability with mechanisms for human rights protection, allowing victims to seek remedies beyond traditional prosecution. States should also strengthen judicial independence and enhance cross-border cooperation to ensure that legal barriers, such as immunity and banking secrecy, do not perpetuate impunity. Moreover, anti-corruption policies must expand their focus beyond public officials to include private actors whose participation sustains systemic corruption. Finally, aligning anti-corruption measures with the broader human rights agenda can transform enforcement from a reactive exercise into a proactive framework that safeguards transparency, development, and human dignity.