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Water
  • Review
  • Open Access

1 March 2022

Watershed Eco-Compensation Mechanism in China: Policies, Practices and Recommendations

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Northwest Institute of Historical Environment and Socio-Economic Development, Shaanxi Normal University, 620 West Chang’an Street, Xi’an 710119, China
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
This article belongs to the Section Water Resources Management, Policy and Governance

Abstract

Watershed eco-compensation (WEC) is considered a significant environmental policy instrument for watershed ecological protection and management. However, in the legislation and practice of eco-compensation in China, the development of the WEC mechanism is still in the initial stages. In this paper, the institutional opportunities and challenges of WEC are analyzed from the existing policies, laws, and economical instruments. Theoretically, WEC in China has seen a combination of punitive-based “Watershed Ecological Damage Compensation (WEDC)” and incentive-based “Watershed Ecological Protective Compensation (WEPC)”. Through a comparative analysis of domestic and foreign watershed compensation practices, the results demonstrate that most of China’s WEC projects have an insufficient legal basis, a single compensatory subject, insufficient compensation funds, and an imperfect market-oriented compensation mechanism. To improve watershed eco-compensation in China, it is recommended to strengthen legislation, select diversified eco-compensation approaches, and establish a market-based and systematic eco-compensation mechanism for watersheds.

1. Introduction

The watershed’s ecological environment and water resources contribute significantly to agricultural production and the people’s well-being [1,2]. However, excessive exploitation and utilization of watersheds harm the watershed ecosystem environment. The reduction in biodiversity, water quality degradation, and decline in ecosystem stability have become severe [3,4,5]. Watersheds are typically public goods for both the upstream and downstream, evidently characterized by non-competitiveness and non-exclusiveness. Therefore, the externalities lie in the public goods, evidently characterized by non-competitiveness and non-exclusiveness. On one hand, for instance, soil conservation and afforestation may generate positive externalities in the watershed ecosystem; on the other hand, phenomena such as discharge pollution and excessive exploitation and utilization have negative externalities in the watershed ecosystem. It is unrealistic to achieve zero externalities [6,7].
Moreover, externalities are often overlooked in individual economic decisions [8]. Meanwhile, it is just for the two attributes of public goods that there will be the phenomena of “public tragedy” and “free-riding” during the use of watershed resources [9,10]. Watershed eco-compensation (WEC) is widely accepted as an effective method for internalizing environmental externalities of conservation and as an economic facilitator of ecological environment management [11,12,13,14,15,16]. Compensatory mechanisms protect natural resources, biodiversity, ecosystem balance, ecological function, ecosystem services, and other ecological values [17,18,19]. Take Xin’an River as an example; without WEC, developers may damage the ecosystem because they can benefit from the ecosystem and evade responsibility for their negative environmental externalities. Meanwhile, ecosystem protectors don’t have incentives to protect the environment from which they are unlikely to benefit [20]. Thus, ecological conservation has increasingly promoted the compensatory mechanism [21]. According to the statistics, at least 56 countries have laws and policies in place that are needed for compensatory environmental protection [22].
Eco-compensation is a combination of “Ecological Compensation (EC)” and “payments for ecosystem services (PES)” in China [23]. It can be seen in Table 1. EC is a required compensatory method to internalize negative environmental externalities, and its history is concise. EC of wetlands came into existence in the 1970s in America [24]. At present, ecological compensation is frequently applied worldwide [25]. For instance, the German Federal Nature Conservation Act required compensatory measures to be taken to keep the essential functions in nature and landscapes unaltered after a project in 1976. In 2011, there was a New Zealand ecological compensation proposal for Mt. Cass Wind Farm. In 2017, EC policy applied to the Fen River in Shanxi Province in China aimed to control water pollution. Meanwhile, PES are a voluntary deal between suppliers and purchasers through clearly defined environmental services for continuously secured provisions [26]. Additionally, PES are applied to internalize positive environmental externalities and carried out in other countries. However, they are a relatively new economic instrument. Moreover, PES are based on the principle that the beneficiary pays rather than the polluter [20,27]. In reality, most PES cases cannot be applied to all standards in the definition and are closer to the revised “PES-like” cases [28,29].
Table 1. Comparison of theoretical backgrounds of punitive-based and incentive-based eco-compensation in China.
EC and PES have played an essential role in China’s environmental management [30]. At present, the focus of WEC research is on the governance compensation model for the water environment from upstream to a downstream area of the watershed [24,31]. The WEC instrument is classified into two types in China: watershed ecological damage compensation (WEDC) and watershed ecological protective compensation (WEPC). WEDC refers to ecological loss from development and utilization activities conducted according to the law and does not include damage caused by watershed pollution or illegal activities [32,33]. It was conceived as being punitive-based to internalize negative environmental externalities and follow the polluter-pays principle in China.
On the other hand, WEPC was designed as an incentive-based policy to internalize positive environmental externalities, following China’s beneficiary-pays and provider-gets principles (Figure 1) [34]. As a result, WEC has received wide attention as an innovative environmental protection policy. Well-designed policies and mechanisms will effectively reduce hitchhiking in the watershed environment and ameliorate water quantity and quality [12,16]. However, policies and laws relevant to WEC are still imperfect in China, especially the lack of economic policies, resulting in an unequal allocation of ecological and financial benefits among victims, protectors and beneficiaries [10]. In addition, the conflicts of interest in transboundary river basin pollution highlight China’s ecological governance strategies [35].
Figure 1. The benefits flow and property rights matrix: interest distribution by property rights and obligations and major policy choices [34]. In China, on the one hand, EC and punitive-based eco-compensation are adopted in the first quadrant, following the polluter-pays principle. On the other hand, PES and incentive-based eco-compensation are adopted in the second quadrant, according to the beneficiary-pays and provider-gets principles.
Moreover, a few previous surveys and optimal pollution control policies have been combined with the trans-regional water environmental preferences by using different game methods [36,37], particularly with eco-compensation criteria, and it is challenging to effectively solve the problem of transboundary watershed pollution [38]. In response to this issue, the General Office of the State Council of China officially enacted the “Opinions on Improving Ecological Protection Mechanism” in May 2016. Hence, it is essential to construct a WEC mechanism conducive to dealing with the environmental protection and economic development relationships between upper and lower reaches, achieving sustainable development of the whole watershed.
This paper summarized and discussed the present policies, laws, and economic instruments relevant to WEC in China and PWES projects abroad based on the official documents and data. Moreover, the analysis of gaps and challenges in the existing institutional system also implicates the need and potential of the WEC mechanism for future development. Then, we conducted a comprehensive investigation of WEC practice from two aspects of WEDC and WEPC in China and discussed the fundamental impact factors—for instance, the mission, stakeholders, approaches, and modalities. At the end of the paper, it was proposed to explore new ideas and methods for bidirectional WEC research and construct diversified and market-based systematic WEC mechanisms in China.

2. Material and Methods

In recent years, the concept of EC has been applied widely as a state policy and legal regime in the governance of watersheds. This review first analyzed the primary federal policy and development planning files related to watershed protection in the last few years. Since the1990s, watershed pilot projects have been implemented in many provinces, including but not limited to the main streams and tributaries of major river basins, such as the Yellow River, Yangtze River, and Huai River, and crucial lakes [10]. However, these pilot projects have not had legal support until the revised Environmental Protection Law of 2014. One of them formally provided a legal basis and stipulated that “the State establishes a sound the ecological compensation policy”.
Meanwhile, the local and central governments must provide funding and encourage local governments to develop market-oriented cooperation [39]. In 2019, President Xi Jinping proposed that the Yellow River watershed’s ecological protection and high-quality development should rise as a national strategy. These analyses mainly concentrated on goals and management policies relevant to WEC (Table 2) and understanding the ecological situation as well as the highest level of compensation in the overall state policies for development goals. This critical legal backing would prepare for an even more comprehensive application of EWS or other eco-compensation policies in China.
Table 2. Primary policy documents and contents related to the WEC.
Furthermore, provisions related to water environment protection were analyzed via collecting direct legal origins of EC, such as fundamental legislation and regulations for ecological protection of watersheds, to elaborate and summarize the legal infrastructure and implementation foundations of WEC (Table 3). Examining critical regulations and laws can illuminate the existing framework of the legal system, analyze the gaps between legislation and application, and determine the potential for future enhancements.
Table 3. Overview of current laws and regulations concerning WEC.
Economic instruments play a role in improving and innovating ecological compensation methods in management practices [40]. The existing mechanism is essential for reconciling economic development and watershed environmental protection. Last but not least, this study investigates other management instruments concerning watershed eco-compensation, including water–pollution emission transactions, transboundary water pollution, water use rights transactions, water resource protection, green credit, pollution levy, pollution discharge rights trading, and the compensated use of emissions rights and environmental pollution responsibility insurance. The primary analysis factors include applicable principles, competent sectors, relevant regulations, calculation methods, and eco-compensation-relevant expenditures in watershed ecological system protection (Table 4). The leading systemic weaknesses and challenges are condensed and analyzed based on the information and the data of the laws mentioned above and relevant tools.
Table 4. Economic instruments relevant to WEC in China.
To achieve a thorough understanding of the external circumstances for WEC system construction, this section also systematically lists information related to policy developments, reflecting the favorable political circumstances and development opportunities for constructing the WEC systems. Finally, we assess the advancements of China’s WEC practices and construct the WEC system. The authors have been closely followed the development of eco-compensation for watershed services pilot schemes in China since 2008, covering the significant policies and legislative documents, the funding sources for WEC, the principles and approaches of EWS, and requirements and measures (Table 5). However, some provinces have not enacted comprehensive policies and regulations. The authors collected related data and information employing field investigations and pilot schemes. This review analyzes the practice’s efficiency from some notable factors of the WEC system (covering goals and missions, stakeholders, approaches, and measures). The comprehensive analysis and arrangement of the information will contribute to the formulation of feasible responses and recommendations for improving the WEC system.
Table 5. The WEDC pilot schemes in China.

4. Domestic WEC and Foreign WEPS Practices and Comparisons

Building a WEC mechanism is essential to considering the overall situation according to the ecological priority and green development from the perspective of the comprehensive protection and sustainable utilization of the watershed ecosystem as a precondition to meeting the watershed’s economic and social development needs [49]. In addition, WEC should be guided by the national long-term strategic plan, and regional governments should adjust implementation strategies and explore regionally appropriate measures according to their own circumstances. Thus, the desire to pursue an excellent ecological environment in the watershed can be realized.

4.1. Current Practice of WEC in China

WEC mechanisms and policies have received widespread attention from society. Large amounts of funds, material resources, and labor have been invested in protecting the watershed ecosystem to ensure the ecological security of the watershed and the sustainable use of water resources. WEC is mainly implemented by the local and central governments, including government financial subsidies for critical ecological functional regions such as protecting water sources. Following the “Polluter pays” principle, WEDC(Table 5) is negotiated on and determined based on the cost of water pollution control and the economic loss caused by water resource protection. Most WEDC mechanisms are carried out according to the environmental control measures supervision system or the environmental impact assessment (EIA) framework. Compensation is usually implemented through negotiation under the supervision and guidance of the competent authority. However, the inter-regional agreements and cooperation reflect the market-oriented mechanism to some extent. Nevertheless, purely market-oriented or economic approaches have not been entirely applied [52,53,54,55,56] The governmental “red-headed” documents are the main forms that the higher-level government uses to formulate payment requirements and related compensation regulations. They represent official regulations and are an essential and ordinary means by which eco-compensation schemes originate in China.
The positive incentives mainly include social honor, financial rewards, and promotion. The downstream beneficiary should compensate upstream residents for their sacrifices to preserve the water ecological environment. In China, the WEPC (Table 6) mechanism has mainly been applied to compensation in transboundary watersheds, mainly through signed agreements and financial transfers between governments to achieve ecological protection of the watershed. The scope of WEPC implementation includes two provinces or two cities of a transboundary river. For example, the Anhui and Zhejiang provinces established a horizontal eco-compensation mechanism in the Xin’an watershed in 2011, and the Shandong and Henan provinces established a horizontal ecological compensation mechanism in the Yellow River Basin in 2021. In practice, adhering to the “Beneficiary compensates” modality, most WEPC cases are usually implemented by governmental financial assistance and subsidies.
Table 6. The WEPC pilot schemes in China.
The punitive-based WEDC for construction programs concerns watershed users and related government departments. The negative incentives involve mandatory punitive measures, with priority given to administrative or economic penalties. Administrative penalties mainly involve the removal of officials who fail to meet the assessment standards of the relevant departments, and economic penalties involve the reduction of financial transfers for poor local environmental protection. According to their conditions, most critical ecological functional areas have implemented various WEDC mechanisms. As a result, there are similarities and differences in the legislative progress or policy, such as the source of compensation obligation, compensation modality, implementation framework, and specific contents (Table 5), such as Qingshui River, Pinghu, and Nansi Lake.
In existing WEC pilot practices (Figure 2), WEC is applied in a WEDC–WEPC mixed mode. On one hand, excessive discharge of upstream pollutants causes damage to or deterioration of the downstream water environment, which is the most intuitive and obvious phenomenon; therefore, the “up to down” and WEDC compensation modes are proposed, and related research results are abundant [50]. On the other hand, some protection facilities to maintain or improve water quality should be built in the upstream area so that the downstream can indirectly enjoy better water quality. Therefore, the downstream beneficiaries should provide reasonable compensation to the upstream, namely a “down to up” and WEPC mode [52,53].
Figure 2. Geographical distribution of 10 pilot schemes for WEC in China.
In short, the local practice of WEC has the following characteristics: (1) In the current watershed EC, the improvement of watershed legislation or policies is considered an essential means and development goal to improve the water environment quality watershed at this stage. According to the analysis of local practices in China watersheds, it is proposed that no matter whether it is at the national or regional level, there is a lack of legal basis for EC in watersheds. Therefore, strengthening and improving legislation is considered the basis for establishing, developing, and improving the WEC mechanism [54]. (2) In current practice, WEC includes two basic types: WEPC and WEDC. The legislation of WEPC lags behind WEDC. (3) Most inter-provincial WEC practices are in the attempt stage. The compensation mechanism still has an insufficient legal basis and a lack of ecological compensation consultation platform and relevant financial system. Although it emphasizes implementing diversified ecological compensation methods, the implementation structure has not yet been developed [55,56,57]. (4) In the application model of WEC, the effectiveness of WEC has been mainly dependent on the leadership of the government and enterprises. The application of the WEC market-based mechanism is not yet sufficient. Though the report of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly stated that “The establishment diversified and market-oriented eco-compensation mechanism” is listed as one of the crucial objectives “To accelerate the reform of ecological civilization system and build beautiful China.”, such as “Measures for Eco-Compensation in the Nansi Lake Basin” in Shandong and “Framework Agreement of Environmental Protection” between Shaanxi and Gansu province, which propose exploring the market-based method, there are fewer practices available for reference [58]. It is still necessary to further examine the watershed eco-compensation theory and successful experiences in foreign countries. The main aspects of the payment for watershed ecosystem services’ (PWES) practices will be discussed as follows.

4.2. The Practices of PWES in Foreign Countries

The earliest payment for watershed ecosystem services (PWES) (Table 7) projects were watershed management and planning projects in foreign countries, such as the Tennessee Watershed Management Plan in 1986. More than 180 PWES projects have been carried out in at least 56 countries around the world [59,60]. There are about 40 are developing countries, and about two-thirds of the total number of cases are in developing countries. The number of successful cases is around 46. In addition, the marketization of PWES projects abroad was relatively quicker, had a wide range of products, covered a wide range of areas, and showed a strong link with other water management practices. These characteristics enabled foreign PWES practices to better address basin variability and improve the applicability and efficiency of PWES. Examples of typical overseas PWES cases are shown in Table 4.
Table 7. Typical cases of Payment for Watershed Ecosystem Services (PWES) in foreign countries.
In brief, the analysis of typical foreign PWES products and projects shows that PWES practices are characterized by the following features: (1) Diversified and market-based compensation models. Most of PWES projects adopted payment for services mechanism in a market transaction model, supplemented by a government compensation model; (2) the sources of funding for PWES projects were diversified, with funds coming mainly from taxes and fees on the use of watershed services, fiscal expenditures, donations, loans, sewage charges, public debt, and trust funds; (3) compensation methods were diversified, mostly in the form of financial compensation (i.e., payments or compensation to watershed service providers and protectors), and to a lesser extent in the form of project-based compensation (i.e., investment of compensation funds or funds in watershed protection projects), complemented by policy compensation and Chilean technical compensation; (4) the abroad PWES funds were managed by private administrators and independent from the government, but the objectives of the fund’s operations were consistent with national planning, and various associations and NGOs played an important role in the implementation of PWES projects; and (5) the local community was widely involved, with various stakeholders participating in the PWES projects, and there was a high level of enthusiasm for the PWES projects.

4.3. Comparative Analysis of Domestic and Foreign Watershed Eco-Compensation

A comparative analysis of typical WEC practices in China and PWES projects abroad shows that there are significant differences. The main differences in the practice can be seen in the following aspects: (1) Different compensation models. The main mode of compensation is market transaction compensation in foreign countries, while the main mode of compensation is the government’s transfer payment in domestic. (2) Different sources of compensation funds. Foreign compensation funds come from a variety of sources, while domestic compensation funds are mainly government expenditures, which is relatively singular. (3) Different compensation approaches. Most domestic compensation is in the form of project compensation, while foreign compensation is mainly financial compensation, supplemented by project compensation, policy compensation, technology compensation, etc. (4) Different compensation criteria and methods of determining compensation standards. (5) The groups in WEC and PWES are different; there are many groups involved in PWES in foreign countries, including upstream and downstream residents, government, enterprises, NGOs, associations, communities, etc., while in China, the groups involved are mainly government and enterprises. (6) The beneficiaries of compensation are different (mainly water protectors in foreign countries, but fewer in China). (7) There is a large difference in the efficiency and effectiveness of compensation, with foreign PWES generally adopting a market-based trading model, which is efficient and effective. In contrast, WEC in China relies too much on the government, which has a heavy burden on the government, resulting in low efficiency and ineffectiveness.
The reasons for the difference are not limited to the late start of WEC practice in China and the lack of experience. Some other factors also constrain the practice of WEC in China, such as an inadequate legal system and inadequate compensation mechanisms.

5. Recommendation for Establishing WEC Mechanism in China

The central government has set targets for environmental quality and pollutants. The national policy proposes establishing a horizontal WEC mechanism for the upstream and downstream in the administrative regions of all provinces (autonomous regions, municipalities) by 2020. By 2025, the pilot scope of the upstream and downstream horizontal eco-compensation mechanism for the upstream and downstream of the watershed across multiple provinces will be further expanded, aiming to promote watershed ecology. They are establishing horizontal ecological protection and compensation mechanisms between upstream and downstream to improve the water environment, the well-being of the people, and the sustainability of socio-economic development in the watershed.
From the perspective of the structure of the WEC, its mechanisms are supposed to be established to perform the following functions: (1) Act as a balance-of-interests mechanism used to coordinate ecological environment protection and economic development, public and private interests. The ultimate goal is to “realize social justice and fairness” and promote sustainable development [58]; (2) furthermore, the beneficiaries or the governments should compensate the providers of ecological services, or the entities responsible for the water pollution should pay the entities damaged by the water pollution and urge the watershed users to undertake the external environmental costs and intensively utilize watershed natural resources [59]; (3) WEC should encourage the investment mechanisms of multiple subjects and stimulate and guide stakeholders to participate in environmental and ecological protection of watersheds [55]; and (4) the behavior restriction mechanism encourages watershed developers or users, and clarifies the substantive or procedural duties of watershed developers, to preserve the environmental rights of residents and ensure the regular supply of watershed services [56].
The integral protection, scientific management, and sustainable development of the watershed ecosystem require establishing a systematic WEC mechanism [61,62,63]. Besides the government’s guiding role, it is also essential to motivate the vitality of NGOs and market-based instruments [64]. The use of government, market, and society’s multi-party cooperative governance will provide a firm and stable social foundation and long-time support for WEC and ultimately achieve harmonious and sustainable development of society, the economy, and the environment [65]. This chapter mainly puts forward strategies for exploring and establishing a long-term operation of WEC mechanisms under China’s existing watershed practices and environmental protection requirements.

5.1. Promoting Diversified Approaches of WEC

5.1.1. Mixed Eco-Compensation Model in WEC

The primary forms of the WEC are as follows: (1) the critical functional areas are compensated by WEC funds from the government in terms of transfer payments and shared and co-construction; (2) the beneficiaries compensate the environmental protector or individual, who pays opportunity costs for development; (3) local governments and enterprises stimulate ecological protection through financial transfer payments and cross-regional horizontal compensation; (4) users or developers of the watershed resource bear the damage compensation for ecological damage, coordination of environmental benefits, and maintenance of social justice. The three modalities should be combined and promoted as mixed methods to construct a diversified compensation mechanism based on the main functions of supporting, coordinating, and motivating WEC.

5.1.2. Multi-Stakeholder Engagement in WEC

WEC is a policy tool to internalize the externalities of watershed ecological services by adjusting the interest relationships between stakeholders [66]. Stakeholders of the WEC mechanism are those who have an impact on the watershed environment or may be affected by the watershed’s utilization, development, and environmental protection. Identifying the significant stakeholders is critical to defining the rights and obligations of the eco-compensation participants. WEPC adheres to the principle of “protector gets” and “beneficiary pays” (BPP). The beneficiaries should compensate the protectors, enterprises, and individuals because of their contribution to protecting the environment. Therefore, the NGOs or other entities play a vital role in those buyers of watershed services rather than the central government [67,68,69].
For WEDC, the main stakeholders are government departments and watershed developers or users. WEDC adheres to the principle of “damager and developer pay”; the damagers should be responsible for the negative impact of their activities on the watershed. In general, the developers of watershed construction programs are responsible for paying compensation fees or compensatory measures. Although the amount and scope of compensation can be negotiated and determined, it still needs to be supervised by related competent authorities. In addition, the multi-stakeholder participation mechanism needs to be continuously improved during the compensation implementation process in current practice.
In general, considering China’s existing watershed management system, the multi-stakeholder of WEC mainly includes governments in pursuit of ecological benefits, market entities in pursuit of economic benefits, and public organizations on the quest for social services. Various environmental NGOs and public organizations can be developed by strengthening the negotiation process through information disclosure and the decision making of the progress and results of compensation approaches [64,67,70]. If proper attention is paid to the disclosure, reporting, and archiving of information, the accountability and transparency of implementing the WEC mechanism will be effectively improved.

5.1.3. Diversified Funding Sources of WEC

The primary target of the WEC institution is to reconcile ecological interests, stimulate social justice, and ensure the maximization of environmental, economic, and social benefits of the watershed. It is an essential mission of WEC to obtain sufficient, sustainable, and stable sources of funds. Undoubtedly, it is necessary to widely mobilize multiple financing channels to realize the purpose of WEC. In general terms, the primary source of funds for WEC is international loans or donations from organizations or environmental NGOs, beneficiary payments, and subsidies or government transfer payments. Diversified WEC aims to absorb other beneficiary market entities and public organizations effectively and, at the same time, fulfill the government’s eco-compensation responsibilities and promote the transformation of diversified compensation, which government public financial compensation transforms to government compensation, market compensation, and social compensation, from purely “blood transfusion” compensation to comprehensive “hematopoietic” payment, which adapts it to the long-term, systematic, and integrated characteristics of ecological protection. It aims to develop a long-term and sustainable mechanism of WEC. Integrating and coordinating the management of various types of special funds for environmental conservation of watersheds, such as river occupation fees and ecological protection taxes, is essential to guarantee the sustainability of compensation funds. The beneficiaries should increase the proportion of their investment in WEPC. Besides central government financial subsidies and financial assistance, it can also incorporate public welfare investments and social donations in the local area. Decentralized funding sources may fail to carry out ecological restoration in time [70]. Therefore, building a WEC fund pool is essential to fully absorbing government transfer payment funds, special ecological compensation funds, remittance funds, and social donation funds. It is conducive to comprehensive management and restoration of large-scale ecosystems across river basins.

5.2. Strengthening Market-Oriented Approaches in WEC

The market-oriented operation mechanism is designed to positively stimulate the market activities of watershed participants [61,62,64,70]. Marked-oriented methodologies mainly include direct payment transactions, third-party intermediary transactions, water rights transactions, trust funds, and PPP water funds in order to explore and apply market-based eco-compensation approaches, give full play to the role of market entities, and solve the problems of ecological environment destruction and unreasonable allocation of the watershed’s environmental resources through ecological resource market transactions [61]. It is different from the governmental financial system, which leans towards the role of essentially guaranteeing guidance and has many shortcomings concerning WEC (for instance, inefficient use of funds, lack of clear goals, and inadequate allocation of special funds). Therefore, it is urgent to implement the market-based mechanism that focuses on voluntary negotiation and paid transactions and to further enhance the effective distribution and economical utilization of eco-compensation through market means. Furthermore, it can relieve the governmental financial investment pressure to a certain extent.

5.2.1. Improving Laws and Regulations on Market-Oriented WEC

China does not have well-established rules and laws regarding the market mechanism, which indicates that the market-based methods must be further strengthened under the legal stipulations of environmental conservation and governance. The Environmental Protection Law explicitly declares that “under the guidance of the state, beneficiaries and environmentally protected areas shall implement eco-compensation through negotiation or by complying with market regulations.” The market rules in the government documents collected above may have already been applied in existing pilot eco-compensation schemes. There is an example of cross-administrative-boundary WEC between Anhui and the Zhejiang [58,68], Henan, and Shandong provinces of China. Clearly defining the rights and responsibilities of environmental or ecological administrative entities in neighboring waters is an essential precondition for effectively carrying out cross-administrative-boundary WEPC.

5.2.2. Establishing a WEC Mechanism for Ecological Products in the Watershed

Theoretically, ecological products and services have value attributes, making market transactions of eco-compensation possible, especially for developing and utilizing water resources in the watershed. The environmental damage and pollution caused by water resource developers and users can fulfill WEC through purchasing services and technologies from other market participants. The relevant qualified third parties provide technologies and services concerning WEC under the contract between the two partners. Eco-compensation for environmental damage and pollution caused by water resource developers and users to the watershed ecosystem can be achieved by purchasing services and technologies from other market participants. Under a contract, the relevant qualified third party provides the technologies and services concerning eco-compensation. However, the market-based transaction of WEC is theoretically feasible. It is difficult to quantify the essential elements of EC because of the absence of price mechanisms for environmental activities and imperfect ecological damage assessment methodologies.
Therefore, market participants’ negotiation relies on proposing a cost-effective ecological compensation method [69,70]. The adoption of market-oriented methodologies must be enhanced according to the following aspects: first, it is necessary to develop new industries of green agriculture, green industry, and green service industry and improve ecological damage evaluation technology; second, it is necessary to clearly define the legal obligations of the government, enterprises, are individuals for the environmental management and protection of the watershed, establish the water rights trading system, and implement water rights transactions; third, the upstream and downstream governments in the watershed are the organizers to try to establish enclave economic parks and innovate the ecological environmental protection market management model to promote transactional eco-compensation; fourth, the government must build a standardized supervision system and create a favorable market atmosphere, explore green financial models such as water funds, and formulate regulations for the development and administration of watershed resources, the conservation and construction of watershed ecological environments, and watershed investment and compensation to guarantee the smooth establishment of the WEC mechanism.

6. Conclusions and Future Prospects of WEC in China

WEC has been extensively accepted as an essential governance instrument to improve environmental conservation and sustainable utilization of river resources. Meanwhile, it is urgent to construct the WEC system in China. According to the current environmental policy, legislation, social environment, and legislative and social circumstances, the available pilot programs and the accumulated practices have provided valuable referrals for patterns, strategies, and methodologies to establish a complete WEC system. Constructing a diversified and market-oriented WEC mechanism will help solve many problems in the current WEC, especially the lack of compensation funds and single compensation methods. Besides, this mechanism design complies with the future development trend of eco-compensation and the goal of “building a market-based diversified ecological compensation mechanism” proposed by President Xi Jinping. It is in line with the national strategic plan for developing comprehensive protection and restoration of watershed ecosystems. We should encourage various environmental NGOs and public organizations to participate in WEC, broaden the sources of compensation funds, and build a diversified and market-based WEC mechanism to deal with problems (such as low stakeholder participation, lack of compensation funds, and insufficiency of compensation modality) in implementing WEC.
The rapid development and practice of the WEC system should be improved from the following aspects: (1) Improving eco-compensation legislation is crucial to constructing a WEC system. The key is to formulate specific laws and regulations following the available practice experiences in watersheds, supplemented by the related technical criteria and guidance, as a scientific basis to offer a legislative base for regional legislation and practices. Simultaneously, regional governments should adopt concrete management approaches and criteria based on their natural conditions and levels of utilization and development; (2) Establishing a diversified WEC mechanism needs technological support, including active surveillance and monitoring as well as integrated status evaluation and assessment. It can provide scientific bases and capability guarantees for achieving WEC; (3) The validity of market-oriented compensatory methods is grounded in clear ownership of watershed resources and a favorable policy context. Developing a market-oriented approach to WEC can be modeled after mechanisms such as water rights transactions and carbon emission trading; (4) Government and administrative departments will continue to take a predominant role in driving the efficient operation of WEC projects. Hence, it is vital to incorporate the effectiveness of water ecosystem management into the performance assessment and the objective responsibility regime of watershed eco-environmental conservation. In consequence, the political willingness and motivation for WEC will be strengthened.

Author Contributions

Conceptualization, X.C.; methodology, X.C.; software, J.L.; formal analysis, L.M. and H.W.; data curation, X.C.; writing—original draft preparation, X.C. and L.M.; writing—review and editing, X.C. and L.F.; supervision, L.F. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

Not applicable.

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no competing financial interest.

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