Is the Free-Energy Principle a Formal Theory of Semantics? From Variational Density Dynamics to Neural and Phenotypic Representations
1
Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 1A1, Canada
2
Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 1A1, Canada
3
Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, WC1N 3AR, UK
4
Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences, and Humanities, University of Wollongong, Wollongong 2522, Australia
5
Institute of Psychiatry, Psychology and Neuroscience (IoPPN), King’s College London, London SE5 8AF, UK
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Entropy 2020, 22(8), 889; https://doi.org/10.3390/e22080889
Received: 17 July 2020 / Revised: 6 August 2020 / Accepted: 7 August 2020 / Published: 13 August 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Probabilistic Inference in Goal-Directed Human and Animal Decision-Making)
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance—in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations—is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account—an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
View Full-Text
Keywords:
variational free-energy principle; active inference; neural representation; representationalism; instrumentalism; deflationary
▼
Show Figures
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited
MDPI and ACS Style
Ramstead, M.J.D.; Friston, K.J.; Hipólito, I. Is the Free-Energy Principle a Formal Theory of Semantics? From Variational Density Dynamics to Neural and Phenotypic Representations. Entropy 2020, 22, 889.
AMA Style
Ramstead MJD, Friston KJ, Hipólito I. Is the Free-Energy Principle a Formal Theory of Semantics? From Variational Density Dynamics to Neural and Phenotypic Representations. Entropy. 2020; 22(8):889.
Chicago/Turabian StyleRamstead, Maxwell J.D.; Friston, Karl J.; Hipólito, Inês. 2020. "Is the Free-Energy Principle a Formal Theory of Semantics? From Variational Density Dynamics to Neural and Phenotypic Representations" Entropy 22, no. 8: 889.
Find Other Styles
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.
Search more from Scilit