Search Results (151)

Achieving the construction sector’s dual carbon objectives necessitates scaling green energy adoption in new residential buildings. The current literature critically overlooks four unresolved problems: oversimplified penalty mechanisms, ignoring escalating regulatory costs; static subsidies misaligned with market maturity evolution; systematic exclusion of innovation feedback from energy suppliers; and underexplored behavioral evolution of building owners. This study establishes a government–suppliers–owners evolutionary game framework with dynamically calibrated policies, simulated using MATLAB multi-scenario analysis. Novel findings demonstrate: (1) A dual-threshold penalty effect where excessive fines diminish policy returns due to regulatory costs, requiring dynamic calibration distinct from fixed-penalty approaches; (2) Market-maturity-phased subsidies increasing owner adoption probability by 30% through staged progression; (3) Energy suppliers’ cost-reducing innovations as pivotal feedback drivers resolving coordination failures, overlooked in prior tripartite models; (4) Owners’ adoption motivation shifts from short-term economic incentives to environmentally driven decisions under policy guidance. The framework resolves these gaps through integrated dynamic mechanisms, providing policymakers with evidence-based regulatory thresholds, energy suppliers with cost-reduction targets, and academia with replicable modeling tools. Full article

This study introduces a novel tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic interactions among electric vehicle (EV) aggregators, local governments, and EV users in vehicle–grid interaction (VGI) markets. The core novelty lies in capturing bounded rationality and dynamic decision-making across the three stakeholders, revealing how policy incentives and market mechanisms drive the transition from disordered charging to bidirectional VGI. Key findings include the following: (1) The system exhibits five stable equilibrium points, corresponding to three distinct developmental phases of the VGI market: disordered charging (V0G), unidirectional VGI (V1G), and bidirectional VGI (V2G). (2) Peak–valley price differences are the primary driver for transitioning from V0G to V1G. (3) EV aggregators’ willingness to adopt V2G is influenced by upgrade costs, while local governments’ subsidy strategies depend on peak-shaving benefits and regulatory costs. (4) Increasing the subsidy differential between V1G and V2G accelerates market evolution toward V2G. The framework offers actionable policy insights for sustainable VGI development, while advancing evolutionary game theory applications in energy systems. Full article

AI-powered health assistants offer promising opportunities to enhance health management among older adults. However, real-world uptake remains limited, not only due to individual hesitation, but also because of complex interactions among users, platforms, and public policies. This study investigates the dynamic behavioral mechanisms behind adoption in aging populations using a tripartite evolutionary game model. Based on replicator dynamics, the model simulates the strategic behaviors of older adults, platforms, and government. It identifies evolutionarily stable strategies, examines convergence patterns, and evaluates parameter sensitivity through a Jacobian matrix analysis. Results show that when adoption costs are high, platform trust is low, and government support is limited, the system tends to converge to a low-adoption equilibrium with poor service quality. In contrast, sufficient policy incentives, platform investment, and user trust can shift the system toward a high-adoption state. Trust coefficients and incentive intensity are especially influential in shaping system dynamics. This study proposes a novel framework for understanding the co-evolution of trust, service optimization, and institutional support. It emphasizes the importance of coordinated trust-building strategies and layered policy incentives to promote sustainable engagement with AI health technologies in aging societies. Full article

The digital economy presents multiple challenges to the promotion of green technologies, including behavioral uncertainty among firms, heterogeneous technological choices, and disparities in policy incentive strength. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model encompassing government, production enterprises, and technology suppliers to systematically explore the strategic evolution mechanisms underlying green technology adoption. A three-dimensional nonlinear dynamic system is constructed using replicator dynamics, and the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) algorithm is applied to identify key cost and benefit parameters for firms. Simulation results exhibit a strong match between the estimated parameters and simulated data, highlighting the model’s identifiability and explanatory capacity. In addition, the stability of eight pure strategy equilibrium points is examined through Jacobian analysis, revealing the evolutionary trajectories and local stability features across various strategic configurations. These findings offer theoretical guidance for optimizing green policy design and identifying behavioral pathways, while establishing a foundation for data-driven modeling of dynamic evolutionary processes. Full article

In the low-carbon era, there is a serious challenge of climate change, which urgently needs to promote low-carbon consumption behavior in order to build sustainable low-carbon consumption patterns. The establishment of this model not only requires in-depth theoretical research as support, but also requires tripartite cooperation between the government, enterprises and the public to jointly promote the popularization and practice of the low-carbon consumption concept. Therefore, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model and simulation analysis, this study deeply discusses the mechanism of government policy on the strategy choice of logistics enterprises. The stability strategy and satisfying conditions are deeply analyzed by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the logistics industry, government, and consumers. With the help of MATLAB R2023b simulation analysis, the following key conclusions are drawn: (1) The strategic choice of logistics enterprises is affected by various government policies, including research and development intensity, construction intensity, and punishment intensity. These government policies and measures guide logistics enterprises toward low-carbon development. (2) The government’s research, development, and punishment intensity are vital in determining whether logistics enterprises adopt low-carbon strategies. R&D efforts incentivize logistics companies to adopt low-carbon technologies by driving technological innovation and reducing costs. The penalties include economic sanctions to restrain companies that do not comply with low-carbon standards. In contrast, construction intensity mainly affects the consumption behavior of consumers and then indirectly affects the strategic choice of logistics enterprises through market demand. (3) Although the government’s active supervision is a necessary guarantee for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategies, more is needed. This means that in addition to the government’s policy support, it also needs the active efforts of the logistics enterprises themselves and the improvement of the market mechanism to promote the low-carbon development of the logistics industry jointly. This study quantifies the impact of different factors on the system’s evolution, providing a precise decision-making basis for policymakers and helping promote the logistics industry’s and consumers’ low-carbon transition. It also provides theoretical support for the logistics industry’s low-carbon development and green low-carbon consumption and essential guidance for sustainable development. Full article

Credit supervision of practitioners in the water conservancy construction market, a vital pillar of national infrastructure development, significantly impacts project safety and the maintenance of order in the industry. From the perspective of indirect supervision, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government departments, enterprises, and practitioners to analyze the dynamic evolution mechanism of credit supervision. By examining the strategic interactions among the three parties under different regulatory scenarios, we identify key factors influencing the stable equilibrium of evolution and verify the theoretical conclusions through numerical simulations. The study yields several key insights. First, while government regulation and social supervision can substantially increase the likelihood of practitioners’ integrity, relying solely on administrative regulation has an efficiency limit. Second, the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism of the direct manager plays a crucial leveraging role in credit evolution. Lastly, under differentiated regulatory strategies, high-credit practitioners respond more strongly to long-term cost optimization, while low-credit practitioners are more effectively deterred by short-term, high-intensity disciplinary actions. Based on these findings, this study proposes a systematic governance framework of “regulatory model innovation–corporate responsibility enhancement–social supervision deepening.” Unlike previous studies, this framework adopts a comprehensive approach from three dimensions: regulatory model innovation, corporate responsibility enhancement, and social supervision deepening. It offers a more holistic and systematic solution for refining the credit system in the water conservancy construction market, providing both theoretical support and practical approaches. Full article

In China, the recycling system for waste tires is characterized by high output but low standardized recovery rates. This study examines the environmental and health risks caused by non-compliant treatment by individual recyclers and explores the barriers to the large-scale adoption of Pyrolysis Technology. A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model involving pyrolysis plants, waste tire recyclers, and government regulators is developed. The model incorporates pollutants from pretreatment and pyrolysis processes into a unified metric—Carbon Dioxide Equivalent (CO₂-eq)—based on Global Warming Potential (GWP), and designs a Differential Carbon Taxation mechanism accordingly. The strategy dynamics and stability conditions for Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) are analyzed. Multi-scenario numerical simulations explore how key parameter changes influence evolutionary trajectories and equilibrium outcomes. Six typical equilibrium states are identified, along with the critical conditions for achieving environmentally friendly results. Based on theoretical analysis and simulation results, targeted policy recommendations are proposed to promote standardized waste tire pyrolysis: (1) Establish a phased dynamic carbon tax with supporting subsidies; (2) Build a green market cultivation and price stabilization system; (3) Implement performance-based differential incentives; (4) Strengthen coordination between central environmental inspections and local carbon tax enforcement. Full article

With the rapid development of new energy vehicles, the echelon utilization of power batteries has become a key pathway to promoting efficient resource recycling and environmental sustainability. To address the limitation of the existing studies that overlook the dynamic strategic interactions among multiple stakeholders, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, battery recycling enterprises, and consumers. By incorporating consumers’ battery usage levels into the strategy space, the model captures the behavioral evolution of all these parties under bounded rationality. Numerical simulations are conducted to analyze the impact of government incentives and penalties, consumer usage behaviors, and enterprise recycling modes on system stability. The results show that a “low-subsidy, high-penalty” mechanism can more effectively guide enterprises to prioritize echelon utilization and that moderate consumer usage significantly improves battery reuse efficiency. This study enriches the application of the evolutionary game theory in the field of battery recycling and provides quantitative evidence and practical insights for policy formulation. Full article

In the digital economy, information asymmetry among individuals, data users, and governments limits the full realization of personal data value. To address this, “symmetry enhancement” strategies aim to reduce information gaps, enabling more balanced decision-making and facilitating efficient data flow. This study establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model based on personal data collection and development, conducts simulations using MATLAB R2024a, and proposes countermeasures based on equilibrium analysis and simulation results. The results highlight that individual participation is pivotal, influenced by perceived benefits, management costs, and privacy risks. Meanwhile, data users’ compliance hinges on economic incentives and regulatory burdens, with excessive costs potentially discouraging adherence. Governments must carefully weigh social benefits against regulatory expenditures. Based on these findings, this paper proposes the following recommendations: use personal data application scenarios as a guide, rely on the construction of personal trustworthy data spaces, explore and improve personal data revenue distribution mechanisms, strengthen the management of data users, and promote the maximization of personal data value through multi-party collaborative ecological incentives. Full article

Under the “Dual Carbon” strategy, collaborative governance of port atmospheric pollutants and carbon emissions is critical for low-carbon transformation. Focusing on Ningbo-Zhoushan Port (48% regional ship emissions), this study examines government, port enterprises, and public interactions. A tripartite evolutionary game model with numerical simulation reveals dynamic patterns and key factors. The results show the following: (1) A substitution effect exists between government incentive costs and penalty intensity—increased environmental governance budgets reduce the probability of government incentives, whereas higher public reporting rewards accelerate corporate emission reduction convergence. (2) Public supervision exhibits cyclical fluctuations due to conflicts between individual rationality and collective interests, with excessive reporting rewards potentially triggering free-rider behavior. (3) The system exhibits two stable equilibria: a low-efficiency equilibrium (0,0,0) and a high-efficiency equilibrium (1,1,1). The latter requires policy cost compensation, corporate emission reduction gains exceeding investments, and a supervision benefit–cost ratio greater than 1. Accordingly, the study proposes a three-dimensional “Incentive–Constraint–Collaboration” governance strategy, recommending floating penalty mechanisms, green financial instrument innovation, and community supervision network optimization to balance environmental benefits with fiscal sustainability. This research provides a dynamic decision-making framework for multi-agent collaborative emission reduction in ports, offering both methodological innovation and practical guidance value. Full article

The research and application of green fertilizers have long been constrained by financial and technical barriers. Farmers’ adoption of green fertilizers is also highly dependent on government policy support. As an intermediary organization bridging the government and farmers, the STB plays a crucial role in encouraging the use of green fertilizers. In order to explore the impact of the STB’s research and development investment, as well as government intervention on farmers’ green production behavior, this paper constructs a tripartite dynamic game model involving farmers, the STB, and the government. The study systematically analyzes the decision-making mechanisms of the different stakeholders and their evolutionary paths. The results show the following: (1) Under certain conditions, the system converges to two stable states: government withdrawal (1,1,0) and continued government participation (1,1,1). (2) Government intervention shows a phased decrease. As the green fertilizer production system matures, farmers and the STB gradually form a stable collaborative mechanism. At this stage, the government shifts from direct participation to a supervisory role, with its implementation coefficient increasing to between 0.75 and 1, indicating that government supervision becomes the primary mode of action. (3) The research and development efforts of the STB are influenced by both the intensity of government support and technological breakthroughs. During periods of high-intensity government support (with a research and development investment coefficient between 0.05 and 0.15), and when technological accumulation achieves a critical breakthrough, the growth rate of investment increases significantly (the coefficient jumps to 0.15–0.3). (4) Farmers’ demand for green fertilizers is stable and consistent, and the market-oriented collaboration between the STB and farmers tends to favor green production technology, which verifies the feasibility of the government’s withdrawal of functions in the later stage of the green agricultural transformation. This study provides a scientific basis for decision-making regarding the STB’s research and development of green fertilizers, while also laying a theoretical foundation for promoting the green transformation of farmers through green fertilizer innovation. Full article

Against the backdrop of rapidly expanding international trade and escalating environmental challenges, the development of green ports has emerged as a pivotal element of sustainable development. This study addresses the critical issues of insufficient corporate motivation for transformation and inadequate regulatory mechanisms by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government, customs, and port enterprises. Key findings demonstrate that customs supervision significantly reduces enterprises’ transition costs and enhances environmental compliance willingness, though its effectiveness depends on complementary government policies including environmental taxation and fiscal incentives. When regulatory intensity is weak, enterprises persist with conventional practices; conversely, strengthened supervision accelerates strategic convergence toward sustainable governance. This research provides a theoretical foundation for policymakers to formulate green port initiatives while offering practical guidance for enterprises to align with sustainability objectives, thereby contributing to environmentally responsible port development. Full article

This study investigates the evolutionary game dynamics of medical knowledge sharing (KS) among Chinese hospitals under government regulation, focusing on the strategic interactions between general hospitals, community health service centers, and governmental bodies. Leveraging evolutionary game theory, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model incorporating replicator dynamics to characterize the strategic evolution of the involved parties. Our analysis examines the regulatory decisions of the government and the strategic choices of Chinese hospitals, considering critical factors such as KS costs, synergistic benefits, government incentives and penalties, and patient evaluations. The model is analyzed using replicator dynamic equations to derive evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs), complemented by numerical simulations for sensitivity analysis. Key findings reveal that the system’s equilibrium depends on the balance between KS benefits and costs, with government regulation and patient evaluations significantly influencing Chinese hospital behaviors. The results highlight that increasing government incentives and penalties, alongside enhancing patient feedback mechanisms, can effectively promote KS. However, excessive incentives may reduce willingness to regulate, suggesting the need for balanced policy design. This research provides novel theoretical insights and practical recommendations by (1) pioneering the application of a tripartite evolutionary game framework to model KS dynamics in China’s hierarchical healthcare system under government oversight, (2) explicitly integrating the dual influences of government regulation and patient evaluations on hospital strategies, and (3) revealing the non-linear effects of policy instruments. These contributions are crucial for optimizing Chinese medical resource allocation and fostering sustainable collaborative healthcare ecosystems. Full article

Current technological innovation in mega projects faces the problem of mismatch between supply and demand, where technology demand-side entities struggle to translate engineering problems into precise scientific research language, while technology supply-side entities fail to capture authentic scenario parameters from engineering sites. This study employs an evolutionary game model to thoroughly investigate behavioral interaction processes among governance entities, demand-side entities, and intermediary collaborative innovation platforms during technological innovation supply–demand matching. By constructing and deriving a tripartite evolutionary game model, this research analyzes the impacts of initial states, the matching effort coefficient, the innovation risk coefficient, and other factors on the evolution of scientific technological innovation supply–demand matching. Additionally, this study simulates the dynamic evolutionary processes of strategic selection. The findings reveal that the initial states of the three parties do not influence behavioral evolution. Furthermore, the subsidy coefficient, additional benefits, and risk coefficient emerge as the most significant parameters affecting tripartite strategy selection. The research outcomes and managerial implications provide crucial reference value for enhancing the alignment between scientific research supply and demand in mega projects, thereby promoting the transformation of scientific and technological achievements in major railway engineering projects. Full article

Farmer professional cooperatives are the focus objects of agricultural carbon emission reduction; with the use of the advantages of scale economy and technology, one can promote the development of low-carbon agriculture. In order to study the influencing factors of agricultural carbon emission reduction on farmer professional cooperatives, we explore the interaction effects of carbon emission reduction behavior between farmer professional cooperatives and farmers under government interventions. This paper introduces a carbon transaction mechanism as well as reward and punishment polices into a tripartite evolutionary game model between farmer professional cooperatives, governments, and farmers. Based on the model, we identify a stable evolution strategy and perform simulation analysis. The results indicate that the carbon transaction mechanism can effectively suppress the negative effect of increased costs through higher revenues of the carbon transaction, and carbon prices above 60 CNY/ton enable cooperatives to reduce regional emissions. Higher revenues can promote positive carbon emission reduction behaviors of farmer professional cooperatives and farmers. The sharing ratio increases from 20% to 80%, and farmers gain additional benefits by cooperating in the farmer professional cooperative practices to reduce emissions. Rational regulation of carbon transaction price and quota can promote the participation of farmer professional cooperatives in carbon emission reduction practices and promote the farmers’ inclusion into farmer professional cooperatives. Full article