Search Results (459)

An approximate optimal control issue for modular unmanned systems (MUSs) is presented via a cooperative differential game for solving the trajectory tracking problem. Initially, the modular unmanned system’s dynamic model is built with the joint torque feedback technique. The moment of inertia of the motor rotor has positive symmetry. Each MUS module is deemed as a participant in the cooperative differential game. Then, the MUS trajectory tracking problem is transformed into an approximate optimal control problem by means of adaptive critic design (ACD). The approximate optimal control is obtained by the critic network, approaching the joint performance index function of the system. The stability of the closed-loop system is proved through Lyapunov theory. The feasibility of the proposed control algorithm is verified by an experimental platform. Full article

Electrical energy supply services are characterised by unpredictable risks that affect both distribution network operators (DSOs) and electricity consumers. This paper presents an innovative cooperative game theory (GT) framework to enhance electric energy supply reliability and demand-side flexibility by aligning the interest of DSOs and consumers. The research investigates the performance of the proposed GT model under different distribution network (DN) topologies and fault intensities, explicitly considering outage durations and restoration times. A cooperation mechanism based on penalty compensation is introduced to simulate realistic interactions between DSOs and consumers. Simulation results confirm that adaptive cooperation under this framework yields significant reliability improvements of up to 70% in some DN configurations. The GT-based approach supports informed investment decisions, improved stakeholder satisfaction, and reduced risk of service disruptions. Findings suggest that integrated GT planning mechanisms can lead to more resilient and consumer-centred electricity distribution systems. Full article

The value of personal data can only be unlocked through efficient circulation. This study explores a multi-party collaborative mechanism for personal-data trading, aiming to improve data quality and market vitality via incentive-compatible institutional design, thereby supporting the high-quality development of the digital economy. Symmetry enhancement refers to the use of strategies and mechanisms to narrow the information gap among data controllers, operators, and demanders, enabling all parties to facilitate personal-data transactions on relatively equal footing. Drawing on evolutionary-game theory, we construct a tripartite dynamic-game model that incorporates data controllers, data operators, and data demanders. We analyze how initial willingness, payoff structures, breach costs, and risk factors (e.g., data leakage) shape each party’s strategic choices (cooperate vs. defect) and their evolutionary trajectories, in search of stable equilibrium conditions and core incentive mechanisms for a healthy market. We find that (1) the initial willingness to cooperate among participants is the foundation of a virtuous cycle; (2) the net revenue of data products significantly influences operators’ and demanders’ propensity to cooperate; and (3) the severity of breach penalties and the potential losses from data leakage jointly affect the strategies of all three parties, serving as key levers for maintaining market trust and compliance. Accordingly, we recommend strengthening contract enforcement and trust-building; refining the legal and regulatory framework for data rights confirmation, circulation, trading, and security; and promoting stable supply–demand cooperation and market education to enhance awareness of data value and compliance, thereby stimulating individuals’ willingness to authorize the use of their data and maximizing its value. Full article

At present, although there are a variety of assessment systems to rate the financing ability of enterprises, these systems suffer from the problems of outdated indicators and subjective weighting methods. In this paper, the impact of ESG performance on financing ability is taken as an evaluation index and combined with 13 other indexes to construct a new TOPSIS assessment system. Cooperative game theory in the form of the entropy weight method and a BP neural network is used to avoid the subjectivity of weighting. After establishing the evaluation model, we selected cross-sectional data from 4590 listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in 2023 to train the evaluation model and explore the impact of various indicators on financing capabilities. The results show the following: (1) Total revenue and total assets of main board companies are the main factors affecting financing ability. (2) Total revenue growth rate, total revenue, and R&D costs of Science and Technology Innovation Board Market (STAR Market) companies are the main factors affecting the financing ability. (3) Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) companies’ total revenue and R&D costs are the main factors affecting financing ability. This study uses data from 2023. In practical applications, it is recommended to use the latest data for evaluation and analysis, and to update the weights every six months. Full article

This study investigates the adoption of blockchain technology (BCT) and financing decisions for capital-constrained manufacturers in live streaming supply chains, where product quality information is asymmetric. Although BCT can improve information transparency and consumer trust, its high cost hinders widespread adoption. Based on supply chain financing theory, this research uses a game-theoretic model with linear demand to analyze manufacturers’ BCT adoption and financing strategies under different capital conditions, comparing four scenarios: non-adoption and non-financing (NN), adoption and non-financing (NB), adoption with loan financing from Multi-Channel Networks (MCNs) (LB), and adoption with investment cost-sharing financing from MCNs (CB). Results show that BCT adoption increases market demand and manufacturer profits. The LB strategy is optimal when the manufacturer has sufficient capital and the MCN has a low-investment cost-sharing ratio. In contrast, CB is preferred when the MCN bears a higher share of investment costs, regardless of the manufacturer’s capital. The manufacturer’s financing choice also influences MCN cooperation: MCNs favor CB under high commission rates and low cost-sharing ratios but prefer NB if investment costs are high. These results suggest that manufacturers should select financing based on their capital and cost-sharing terms, while MCNs can adjust cooperation strategies according to commission rates and cost-sharing levels. Full article

To address issues such as inadequate robustness in dynamic obstacle avoidance, instability in formation morphology, severe resource conflicts in multi-task scenarios, and challenges in global path planning optimization for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operating in complex airspace environments, this paper examines the advantages and limitations of conventional UAV formation cooperative control theories. A multi-UAV cooperative control strategy is proposed, integrating adaptive game theory and deep reinforcement learning within a unified framework. By employing a three-layer information fusion architecture—comprising the physical layer, intent layer, and game-theoretic layer—the approach establishes models for multi-modal perception fusion, game-theoretic threat assessment, and dynamic aggregation-reconstruction. This optimizes obstacle avoidance algorithms, facilitates interaction and task coupling among formation members, and significantly improves the intelligence, resilience, and coordination of formation-wide cooperative control. The proposed solution effectively addresses the challenges associated with cooperative control of UAV formations in complex traffic environments. Full article

The interconnectivity of avionics systems supports the need to incorporate functional safety and information security into airworthiness validation and maintenance protocols, which is critical. This necessity arises from the demanding operational environments and the limitations on defense resource allocation. This study proposes an optimization model for the strategic deployment of defense mechanisms, leveraging the dynamic interplay between attack and defense modeled by non-cooperative game theory and aligning with the maintenance schedules of civil aircraft. By developing an Attack–Defense Tree and conducting a non-cooperative game analysis, this paper outlines strategies from both the attacker’s and defender’s perspectives, assessing the impact of focused defense improvements on the system’s security integrity. The results reveal that the broad expansion of defense measures reduces their effectiveness, whereas targeted deployment significantly enhances protection. Monte Carlo simulations are employed to approximate equilibrium solutions across the strategy space, reducing computational complexity while retaining robustness in capturing equilibrium trends. This approach supports efficient allocation of defense resources, strengthens overall system security, and provides a practical foundation for integrating security analysis into avionics maintenance and certification processes. Full article

Vertical alliances within agricultural supply chains serve as critical institutional vehicles for deepening triple-sector integration (primary–secondary–tertiary) in rural economies, driving agricultural modernization, and advancing rural revitalization. However, sustaining alliance stability constitutes a complex dynamic process wherein inadequate stakeholder engagement and collaborative failures frequently precipitate alliance instability or even dissolution. Existing scholarship exhibits limited systematic examination of the micro-mechanisms and regulatory pathways through which multi-agent strategic interactions affect alliance stability from a dynamic evolutionary perspective. To address this gap, this research focuses on China’s core agricultural innovation vehicle—the Agricultural Industrialization Consortium—and examines the tripartite structure of “Leading Enterprise–Family Farm–Integrated Agricultural Service Providers.” We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model to systematically analyze (1) the influence mechanisms governing cooperative strategy selection, and (2) the regulatory effects of key parameters on consortium stability through strategic stability analysis and multi-scenario simulations. Our key findings are as follows: Four strategic equilibrium scenarios emerge under specific conditions, with synergistic parameter optimization constituting the fundamental driver of alliance stability. Specific mechanisms are as follows: (i) compensation mechanisms effectively mobilize leading enterprises under widespread defection, though excessive penalties erode reciprocity principles; (ii) strategic reductions in benefit sharing ratios coupled with moderate factor value-added coefficients are critical for reversing leading enterprises’ defection; (iii) dual adjustment of cost sharing and benefit sharing coefficients is necessary to resolve bilateral defection dilemmas; and (iv) synchronized optimization of compensation, cost sharing, benefit sharing, and value-added parameters represents the sole pathway to achieving stable (1,1,1) full-cooperation equilibrium. Critical barriers include threshold effects in benefit sharing ratios (defection triggers when shared benefits > cooperative benefits) and the inherent trade-off between penalty intensity and alliance resilience. Consequently, policy interventions must balance immediate constraints with long-term cooperative sustainability. This study extends the application of evolutionary game theory in agricultural organization research by revealing the micro-level mechanisms underlying alliance stability and providing a novel analytical framework for addressing the ‘strategy–equilibrium’ paradox in multi-agent cooperation. Our work not only offers new theoretical perspectives and methodological support for understanding the dynamic stability mechanisms of agricultural vertical alliances but also establishes a substantive theoretical foundation for optimizing consortium governance and promoting long-term alliance stability. Full article

With the widespread application of artificial intelligence in real estate price prediction, model explainability has become a critical factor influencing its acceptability and trustworthiness. The Shapley value, as a classic cooperative game theory method, quantifies the average marginal contribution of each feature, ensuring global fairness in the explanation allocation. However, its focus on average fairness lacks robustness under data perturbations, model changes, and adversarial attacks. To address this limitation, this paper proposes a hybrid explainability framework that integrates the Shapley value and Least Core attribution. The framework leverages the Least Core theory by formulating a linear programming problem to minimize the maximum dissatisfaction of feature subsets, providing bottom-line fairness. Furthermore, the attributions from the Shapley value and Least Core are combined through a weighted fusion approach, where the weight acts as a tunable hyperparameter to balance the global fairness and worst-case robustness. The proposed framework is seamlessly integrated into mainstream machine learning models such as XGBoost. Empirical evaluations on real-world real estate rental data demonstrate that this hybrid attribution method not only preserves the global fairness of the Shapley value but also significantly enhances the explanation consistency and trustworthiness under various data perturbations. This study provides a new perspective for robust explainable AI in high-risk decision-making scenarios and holds promising potential for practical applications. Full article

Methane emissions are responsible for approximately $0.5$$°\mathrm{C}$, or about 30%, of total greenhouse-gas-induced warming. For many countries, methane represents an even larger share of their overall warming footprint. Assessing the warming contributions of individual methane-emitting countries to global warming is not straightforward due to methane’s short atmospheric lifetime and the non-linear (convex) relationship between radiative forcing and the atmospheric concentration of this gas. This study addresses this challenge using a simple climate model in combination with a warming allocation approach derived from cooperative game theory. Applying this method, the warming contributions of several high-methane-emitting countries and regional groupings are quantified relative to the early industrial period. The analysis reveals that the commonly used marginal attribution method underestimates methane-induced warming by approximately 20%. This discrepancy is due to the substantial rise in the atmospheric concentration of methane since early industrial times. Full article

Designing fair and sustainable pricing mechanisms for health insurance requires accurate risk assessment and the formulation of incentive-compatible strategies among stakeholders. This study proposes a hybrid framework that integrates machine learning with game theory to determine optimal, risk-based premium rates. Using a comprehensive dataset of insured individuals, the XGBoost algorithm is employed to predict medical claim costs and calculate corresponding premiums. To enhance transparency and explainability, SHAP analysis is conducted across four risk-based groups, revealing key drivers, including healthcare utilization and demographic features. The strategic interactions among the insurer, insured, and employer are modeled as a repeated game. Using the Folk Theorem, the conditions under which long-term cooperation becomes a sustainable Nash equilibrium are explored. The results demonstrate that XGBoost achieves high predictive accuracy (R² ≈ 0.787) along with strong performance in error measures (RMSE ≈ 1.64 × 10⁷ IRR, MAE ≈ 1.08 × 10⁶ IRR), while SHAP analysis offers interpretable insights into the most influential predictors. Game-theoretic analysis further reveals that under appropriate discount rates, stable cooperation between stakeholders is achievable. These findings support the development of equitable, transparent, and data-driven health insurance systems that effectively align the incentives of all stakeholders. Full article

We investigate power indices for simple games with precoalitions which distribute power among players in an external and an internal step. We extend an existing approach which uses the Public Good index both on the external level in the quotient game as well as on the internal level for measuring the leverage of players to threaten their peers through departing the precoalition. We replace the Public Good index in that model by five other efficient power indices, i.e., the Shapley–Shubik index, the Deegan–Packel index, the Johnston index and two indices based on null player free winning coalitions. Axiomatizations of the novel power indices with threat partitions are presented. We also propose a slight modification to the existing framework for threat power indices which guarantees that null players are always assigned zero power. Numerical results for all power indices combined with different threat partitions are presented and discussed. Full article

This paper addresses the synergy between environmental and economic benefits in the green power trading market by constructing a collaborative game model for environmental rights value and electricity energy value. Based on this, a model for maximizing the benefits of flexible resource operation is proposed. Through the combination of non-cooperative and cooperative games, the conflict and synergy mechanisms of multiple stakeholders are quantified, and the Shapley value allocation rule is designed to achieve Pareto optimality. Simultaneously, considering the spatiotemporal regulation capability of flexible resources, dynamic weight adjustment, cross-period environmental rights reserve, and risk diversification strategies are proposed. Simulation results show that under the scenario of a carbon price of 50 CNY/ton (≈7.25 USD/ton) and a peak–valley electricity price difference of 0.9 CNY/kWh (≈0.13 USD/kWh), when the environmental weight coefficient α = 0.5, the total revenue reaches 6.857 × 10⁷ CNY (≈9.94 × 10⁶ USD), with environmental benefits accounting for 90%, a 15.3% reduction in carbon emission intensity, and a 1.74-fold increase in energy storage cycle utilization rate. This research provides theoretical support for green power market mechanism design and resource optimization scheduling under “dual-carbon” goals. Full article

Against the backdrop of global low-carbon transition, the integrated development of electricity and carbon markets demands higher efficiency in the optimal operation of virtual power plants (VPPs) and distribution networks, yet conventional trading mechanisms face limitations such as inadequate recognition of differentiated contributions and inequitable benefit allocation. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a collaborative optimal trading mechanism for VPP clusters and distribution networks in an electricity–carbon coupled market environment by first establishing a joint operation framework to systematically coordinate multi-agent interactions, then developing a bi-level optimization model where the upper level formulates peer-to-peer (P2P) trading plans for electrical energy and carbon allowances through cooperative gaming among VPPs while the lower level optimizes distribution network power flow and feeds back the electro-carbon comprehensive price (EACP). By introducing an asymmetric Nash bargaining model for fair benefit distribution and employing the Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) for efficient computation, case studies demonstrate that the proposed method overcomes traditional models’ shortcomings in contribution evaluation and profit allocation, achieving 2794.8 units in cost savings for VPP clusters while enhancing cooperation stability and ensuring secure, economical distribution network operation, thereby providing a universal technical pathway for the synergistic advancement of global electricity and carbon markets. Full article

Innovation-driven labor markets play a pivotal role in economic development, yet significant disparities exist in how efficiently countries transform innovation inputs into labor market outcomes. This study addresses the critical gap in benchmarking multi-stage innovation efficiency by developing an integrated framework combining Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Super Slack-Based Measure (Super-SBM) for static efficiency evaluation and the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) for dynamic productivity decomposition, enhanced with cooperative game theory for robustness testing. Focusing on the top 20 innovative economies over a 5-year period, we analyze key inputs (Innovation Index, GDP, trade openness) and outputs (labor force, unemployment rates), revealing stark efficiency contrasts: China, Luxembourg, and the U.S. demonstrate optimal performance (mean scores > 1.9), while Singapore and the Netherlands show significant underutilization (scores < 0.4). Our results identify a critical productivity shift period (average MPI = 1.325) driven primarily by technological advancements. This study contributes a replicable, data-driven model for cross-domain efficiency assessment and provides empirical evidence for policymakers to optimize innovation-labor market conversion. The methodological framework offers scalable applications for future research in computational economics and productivity analysis. Full article