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Sensors in Hardware Security

A special issue of Sensors (ISSN 1424-8220). This special issue belongs to the section "Electronic Sensors".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: 25 May 2025 | Viewed by 762

Special Issue Editors


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Guest Editor
Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA, USA
Interests: VLSI design; low-power design; hardware security; security engineering

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Guest Editor
Computer Science, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA
Interests: sensing security and privacy; embedded systems security; multimodal sensing

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

On-chip sensors provide an important tool for security, reliability, and overall system monitoring and resiliency. As sensors become increasingly pervasive in modern SoCs and safety-critical IoT applications, such as healthcare and industrial automation, the hardware security challenges and opportunities brought about by sensors need to be systematically investigated. Sensors can enable system defenders to detect attacks, such as probing, spoofing, thermal attacks, fault injections using voltage and clock glitching, etc. Modern CPUs and some SoCs already include a variety of on-chip sensors (e.g., voltage, temperature, current, delay, and aging), but these sensors are typically custom IP blocks that are not easily portable across designs. New approaches are thus needed for some aspects of a packaged system that are not easily accessible to on-chip sensors (e.g., micro-bumps, interposer wiring, bonding wires, and analog components). Systematic methods are needed for fusing the data from a large set of widely spread sensors on a package and then providing fast responses at higher levels of software that are needed to thwart attacks, flush data, and move into safe modes, offering overall system resiliency. The testing and calibration of sensors both at manufacturing and run-time are a challenging problem. Additionally, sensors can leak sensitive information to malicious actors through hardware-enabled channels. Adversaries may use existing on-chip sensors or synthesize sensors from other on-chip sensory components to probe system states and eavesdrop on unauthorized hardware and system-level information, sometimes even through the use of high-level APIs. While capturing critical data, sensor hardware itself can also become a source of side-channel leakage through electromagnetic and thermal emanations. Therefore, regulating proper access to on-chip as well as off-chip sensors is also a huge challenge for designers. Furthermore, the unprotected nature of existing sensors could allow the injection of false information into systems by exploiting the hardware characteristics of sensors, necessitating the need to verify the resilience and security of the sensor itself in hardware systems.

This Special Issue solicits high-quality original research on how sensors affect hardware security in various systems. Topics of interest include, but are not limited to, the following:

Sensor design and optimization;
Sensor testing and validation;
Networks of sensors;
Sensor signal processing;
Sensor security (confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity);
Sensor updates and calibration;
Sensor-based attacks;
Package-level sensing.

Prof. Dr. Wayne Burleson
Dr. Yan Long
Guest Editors

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

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Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 2600 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • hardware security
  • sensor design
  • intrusion detection and prevention
  • trustworthy and confidential sensing

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Published Papers (1 paper)

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Research

23 pages, 3538 KiB  
Article
In Situ Time-Based Sensor for Process Identification Using Amplified Back-End-of-Line Resistance and Capacitance
by Jen-Chieh Hsueh, Mike Kines, Yousri Ahmed Tantawy, Dale Shane Smith, Jamin McCue, Brian Dupaix, Vipul J. Patel and Waleed Khalil
Sensors 2025, 25(11), 3255; https://doi.org/10.3390/s25113255 - 22 May 2025
Abstract
This paper presents an in situ time-based sensor designed to provide process authentication. The proposed sensor leverages the inherent metal routing within the chip to measure the RC time-constants of interconnects. However, since the routing metal is typically designed to minimize resistance and [...] Read more.
This paper presents an in situ time-based sensor designed to provide process authentication. The proposed sensor leverages the inherent metal routing within the chip to measure the RC time-constants of interconnects. However, since the routing metal is typically designed to minimize resistance and capacitance, the resulting small RC time-constants pose a challenge for direct measurement. To overcome this challenge, a “three-configuration” measurement approach is introduced, incorporating two auxiliary components—poly resistor and metal-insulator-metal (MIM) capacitor—to generate three amplified RC time-constants and, subsequently, deduce the routing time-constant. Compared to directly measuring the routing time-constants, this approach reduces measurement error by over 82% while incurring only a 25% area penalty. A straightforward analytical model is presented, taking into account the impact of parasitic capacitances within the discharge path. This analytical model exhibits an excellent concurrence with simulated results, with a maximum difference of only 2.6% observed across all three configurations and a 3.2% variation in the derived routing time-constant. A set of five variants of the time-based sensor are realized using a 130 nm CMOS process. Each variant consists of 44 samples distributed across 11 dies on two wafers. To verify the precision of the proposed sensor, identical resistors and capacitors are fabricated alongside them, forming a direct measurement array (DMA) that is measured using external equipment. After adjusting the routing resistance and capacitance values in the simulations to correspond to the mean values obtained from the DMA measurements, the proposed sensor’s measured results demonstrate a close alignment with simulations, exhibiting a maximum error of only 6.1%. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Sensors in Hardware Security)
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