Abstract
In this paper, we propose a two-way hybrid satellite–terrestrial relay scheme employing Fountain codes (FCs). In the proposed model, a satellite and a ground user exchange data through a group of terrestrial relay stations, in the presence of an eavesdropper. In the first phase, the satellite and the ground user simultaneously transmit their encoded packets to the relay stations. The relay stations then apply a successive interference cancelation (SIC) technique to decode the received packets. To reduce the quality of the eavesdropping links, a cooperative jammer is employed to transmit jamming signals toward the eavesdropper during the first phase. Next, one of the relay stations which can successfully decode the encoded packets from both the satellite and the ground user is selected for data forwarding, by using a partial relay selection method. Then, this selected relay performs an XOR operation on the two encoded packets, and then broadcasts the XOR-ed packet to both the satellite and the user in the second phase. We derive exact closed-form expressions of outage probability (OP), system outage probability (SOP), intercept probability (IP), and system intercept probability (SIP), and realize simulations to validate these expressions. This paper also studies the trade-off between OP (SOP) and IP (SIP), as well as the impact of various system parameters on the performance of the proposed scheme.
1. Introduction
Hybrid satellite–terrestrial relay schemes have emerged as a promising solution to overcome the inherent limitations of conventional satellite and terrestrial systems [1,2,3], where terrestrial relay stations are used to support the communication link between the satellite and ground users. The models can enhance the system throughput and reliability, and they are considered as a key enabler for beyond-5G and 6G networks. In recent years, research on the systems have advanced in several closely related directions, including system reliability improvement, physical-layer security, spectrum sharing, and advanced multiple-access schemes. For example, the authors in ref. [4] presented a space–air–ground free-space optical network that employs a high-altitude relay to improve the robustness of satellite communication links. Beyond reliability enhancement, security has become a critical concern in the systems due to the broadcast nature of satellite transmissions. In refs. [5,6], the authors investigated the secrecy performance of the schemes in the presence of eavesdroppers. Specifically, ref. [5] focused on the secure scenarios with multiple eavesdroppers, whereas reference [6] introduced relay station selection methods to enhance secrecy outage probability. The authors in ref. [7] analyzed the relationship between intercept probability at the eavesdropper and outage probability at the legitimate receiver for the secure models. In addition, reference [7] introduced both full relay selection and partial relay selection to improve the security–reliability trade-off, under the impact of co-channel interference. These works collectively indicate that relay selection plays a pivotal role in balancing reliability and security in the networks.
Another important research direction considers spectrum efficiency through cognitive radio techniques. Published work [8] proposed the schemes operating in a cognitive radio environment, where the satellite and the relay station are secondary transmitters, and they are allowed to use the licensed spectrum if their transmissions do not degrade performance of the primary users. Meanwhile, full-duplex relaying has been explored as an effective means to further enhance spectral efficiency in the systems. In ref. [9], full-duplex relaying techniques were applied into the scheme, allowing the terrestrial stations to transmit and receive data at the same time. Moreover, the technique was applied to select the best terrestrial station to improve the throughput and the performance, under the impact of co-channel interference. More recently, intelligent reconfigurable environments have been incorporated into the models. Reference [10] presented the scenario assisted by reconfigurable intelligent surfaces . In contrast to the traditional relaying schemes, where the relay nodes actively process the received signals, -aided relaying models rely on passive reflective elements that reflect the incoming signals toward the desired ground users in an optimized way. Compared with conventional active relays, RIS-assisted relaying offers a low-power and hardware-efficient alternative, making it attractive for satellite–terrestrial integration.
In parallel, non-orthogonal multiple access has been introduced into the systems to improve connectivity and spectral efficiency. In refs. [11,12,13], is applied into the systems, enabling the satellite to transmit different data to multiple ground users at the same time. In addition, the ground users have to use successive interference cancelation to extract their desired data from the received signals. In ref. [11], the authors derived expressions of for the scheme, where the direct links between the satellite and the ground users are assumed to exist. The authors of ref. [12] studied the and performance for the secondary users in the secure cognitive scenarios. Reference [13] evaluated the performance of multi-relay models. These studies demonstrate that is an effective multiple-access technique for , but they mainly focus on fixed-rate transmissions.
Unlike the aforementioned published works, this paper considers the scheme using Fountain codes . [14,15,16] have proven to be effective in wireless networks due to the simple implementation and adaptability to varying environmental conditions. are particularly well-suited for multi-user broadcast networks since the transmitter can generate encoded packets from its original data, and continuously send them to the intended receivers. In addition, allow the receivers to recover the original data once a sufficient number of encoded packets have been collected, even in the presence of packet losses. In refs. [17,18], the authors considered the schemes employing . The authors of ref. [17] evaluated the and performance for the secure scheme, with the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Moreover, reference [17] employs a cooperative jammer that not only disrupts the eavesdropper with jamming signals but also works with the ground user to eliminate the noises from the received signals. Published work [18] studied the trade-off for the multicast schemes using and PRS. Unlike refs. [17,18], this paper studies two-way models, while refs. [17,18] only consider the one-way ones. However, these works do not address two-way information exchange, which is essential for bidirectional satellite–ground communications.
Two-way relaying (refs. [19,20]) has attracted significant attention due to its capability to improve spectral efficiency and throughput by allowing two sources to communicate simultaneously in both directions through one or multiple intermediate relays. In a conventional model [21], during the first two phases, the first source transmits its data to the intermediate relay, which then forwards the data to the second source. Similarly, the next two phases are used to relay data from the second source to the first source via the relay node. As a result, the conventional model uses 04 phases, and it achieves a throughput of only 2 data over the four phases. To enhance throughput for the models, the relays in ref. [22] perform an operation on the data received from two sources at two first phases, and then transmit the packet to both the sources in the third phase. As a result, the models in ref. [22] only use three phases, and they are called a Digital Network Coding -based . Published work [23] introduced two-phase scenarios using Analog Network Coding , where the relays amplify the signals received from two sources in the first phase, and then transmit the amplified signals to both the sources in the second phase. In refs. [24,25], the and techniques are jointly employed at the relays in the models so that only two phases are used. Indeed, in refs. [24,25,26], two sources at the same time send their packets to the relays which will perform the technique to extract the received packets. Next, the relays perform the operation over two packets before broadcasting the packet to two sources in the second phase. Hence, both the schemes using and the schemes using and DNC only use two phases for the data exchange.
Until now, there have been several reports related to models [27,28,29,30]. The authors of ref. [27] examined the system integrating simultaneous wireless information and power transfer. Reference [28] analyzed the performance and the throughput for the system using and considering the effects of hardware impairments. Also, the impact of hardware imperfection on performance of the networks was investigated in ref. [29], emphasizing the practical constraints introduced by non-ideal transceivers. Reference [30] proposed adaptive relay selection for TWR-HSTRNs, confirming that dynamic selection significantly improves throughput and spectral reuse efficiency. These studies confirm that the networks can significantly improve spectral efficiency and throughput, yet their integration with Fountain coding and cooperative jamming remains largely unexplored.
Despite these extensive studies, the joint consideration of , Fountain-coded transmissions, and cooperative jamming for physical-layer security has not yet been adequately addressed. Different from the related works [27,28,29,30], this paper proposes the scheme using and the cooperative jamming technique. In the proposed scheme, a satellite and a ground user exchange data via the help of terrestrial relay stations, with the presence of an eavesdropper. Using , the satellite and the ground user generate , and exchange them with each other. In the first phase, the satellite and the ground user at the same time transmit their to all relay stations. The relay stations then apply to extract the received packets. In addition, to degrade the quality of the eavesdropping links, a cooperative jammer is employed to transmit interference toward the eavesdropper during the first phase. In the second phase, one of the relay stations which can successfully decode the packets from both the satellite and the ground user is selected for data forwarding, using the approach. The chosen relay performs the operation on two received , and subsequently broadcasts the packet to both the satellite and the user in the second phase. Before the data transmission ends, the satellite, the ground user, and the eavesdropper attempt to collect enough so that they can recover the desired data.
Now, the main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
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- First, we propose the novel scheme that integrates , , relay station selection, and cooperative jamming. The proposed scheme enhances system throughput through the use of and enables simple implementation and reduced delay by employing , improves communication reliability via and ensures secure communication through cooperative jamming.
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- Second, under practical fading conditions, we derive exact closed-form expressions of , system outage probability , , and system intercept probability , and validate these formulas through simulations. In addition, all derived formulas are expressed in closed form, which makes them highly useful for system design and performance optimization.
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- Finally, based on the analytical framework, we provide comprehensive performance insights that reveal the fundamental security–reliability tradeoff in the proposed scheme and demonstrate how critical system parameters influence both reliability and security performance.
The remaining structure of this paper is presented as follows. Section 2 presents the system model of the proposed model. Section 3 analyzes the exact and asymptotic and performance for the proposed scheme by deriving closed-form expressions. Section 4 performs computer simulations to validate the derived expressions. Finally, Section 5 provides conclusions.
2. System Model
In Figure 1, we present a system model of the proposed scheme, where the satellite and the ground user attempt to exchange their data via the help of terrestrial relay stations denoted by . We assume that there is no direct link between and due to being obscured. Let and denote the data of and , respectively. Using the node creates the from the original data . Then, and exchange their via the help of the terrestrial relay stations. In order to successfully reconstruct the desired data , must gather at least . In addition, due to delay constraints, the maximum number of exchange rounds is limited by [18], where It is worth noting that, in this paper, a generic framework is considered without restricting to a specific implementation (e.g., LT or Raptor codes), since the analysis is performed at the packet level and depends only on the number of successfully received .
Figure 1.
System model of the proposed TW-HSTR scheme using .
Due to the presence of the eavesdropper , the transmitters , , and employ the randomize-and-forward strategy [31] by randomly using code-books. Moreover, the cooperative jammer is employed to generate the jamming noises over , as well as to cooperate with the relays for removing these noises from their received signals. We assume that the and nodes can securely exchange information about the jamming signals, enabling to cancel them before decoding the desired data, while the node is unable to do this [17]. Similarly, attempts to collect at least packets to reconstruct the original data . Finally, all the nodes including , , , and are assumed to be single-antenna wireless devices.
We denote as channel coefficient of the link, where is a transmitter and is a receiver, i.e., Then, the corresponding channel gain is denoted by , i.e., Assume that all channels are block and flat, i.e., remains unchanged during one phase, and varies independently after each phase.
As given in ref. [18], the satellite links (i.e., , and ) are Shadowed-Rician channels, and has the following probability density function :
where and are the expected power of the multi-path and Line of Sight components, respectively, is a fading parameter, and is a confluent hypergeometric function of the first kind [18].
For ease of presentation and analysis, we can assume that the channel gains and are identical and independent, i.e., and for all Using [18], cumulative distribution function of in (1) can be expressed under the following form:
where
For the terrestrial links, we assume that all the channels are Rayleigh fading. Hence, the channel gain is an exponential random variable whose and can be expressed, respectively, as
where , , and is a fading parameter of the link. We also assume that the channel gains and are identical and independent, i.e., and for all and for all the and nodes.
We now describe the exchange of in Figure 1, which is carried out over two time slots. At the first time slot, and at the same time transmits and to all the relay stations, while generates the jamming noises. Therefore, the received signals at and can be expressed, respectively, as
where , and are transmit power of the , , and , respectively, and are modulated signals of the packets and , respectively, is transmitted signal of , and are Gaussian noises at and , respectively.
Since the node can cooperate with the jammer to remove the jamming noise (the component ), Equation (5) can be rewritten as
Remark 1.
Since the satellite is the well-equipped device, it is reasonable to assume that the transmit power of is higher than that of the ground user , i.e., . In addition, the channels between and the relay station exhibit the component. Moreover, the terrestrial link between and experience Rayleigh fading which does not contain . Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the link is better than the link. Similarly, we can assume that the link is better than the link. Therefore, the and nodes will decode the packet first. If the decoding of is successful, and will remove out from their received signals and will then decode [18]. It is noted that, if and cannot decode correctly, then they cannot also decode correctly because they cannot perform the operation. Finally, it is assumed that the Gaussian noises at all the receivers have zero mean and variance of .
From (7), we can express the signal-to-noise ratio obtained at for decoding and , respectively, as
where and
Since the eavesdropper cannot remove the jamming noises out from the received signals, from (6), the obtained at for decoding and can be formulated, respectively, as
Considering the terrestrial relay stations which can decode both and successfully. Without loss of generality, we can denote the set of successful relay stations as , where and is the number of successful relay stations.
If , then , and, in this case, no operation takes place during the second phase. Let us consider the case where ; one of the relay stations belonging to the set is selected by using the method as
In (10), the selected relay station is denoted by , which is the relay providing the highest channel gain to the ground user .
Remark 2.
In (10), the relay selection is based on the channel state information of the links, which can be easily performed through the exchange of local among the nodes. It is worth noting that this relay selection is difficult to implement between the relay stations and the satellite , because they are located far apart and hence the selection process would introduce a significant delay.
Next, performs the operation as follows: and it will transmit the packet to and in the second phase, which is also overheard by . Then, the obtained at the node can be expressed as
where is transmitted power of all the relay stations, and .
Remark 3.
Firstly, we note that no cooperative jamming technique is performed in the second phase. Secondly, if the node can decode correctly, will obtain the desired packet by performing the operation as For the eavesdropper , it can only obtain successfully in the first time slot. Finally, can successfully obtain in two possible ways: (i) correctly decodes both and in the first phase; (ii) correctly decodes (but ) in the first phase, and from in the second phase, and then performs the operation between and to obtain .
Because the exchange is realized into two phases, the channel capacity of the link is calculated as
where and .
3. Performance Analysis
3.1. Mathematical Preparation
Considering the transmission of the packet between the transmitter and the receiver , we assume that the decoding of is successful if the obtained channel capacity is higher than a threshold , i.e., . If it is assumed that the receiver cannot decode correctly.
3.1.1. Decoding Probability over the Data Links
We first formulate the probability that the relay station can decode both and successfully in the first phase as
Substituting (8) and (12) into (13), we have
where . It is noted that and are intermediate parameters introduced for notational simplicity.
Using (2), we can write in (14) under the following form:
where is a binomial coefficient, i.e., and .
Combining (4), (13), (14), and (15), after some manipulation, we obtain
Our objective is to evaluate the integral in (16). To this end, we first consider the following general integral (see [32], Equation (2.321.2)):
where . From (17), we can obtain the results as in (18), (19), and (20) as:
and
Then, applying (19) to calculate the integral in (16), we then have
It is worth noting that the probability that cannot decode both and successfully is given as .
Considering the successful decoding at the satellite at the second phase, using (2), (11), and (12), we can calculate this probability exactly as
It is noted that the probability that cannot decode successfully in the second phase is expressed as .
Next, we formulate the probability that can decode successfully at the second phase as
Combining (4), (10), and (23), we obtain an exact closed-form expression as
It is also noted that the probability that cannot decode correctly in the second phase is exactly computed as .
3.1.2. Decoding Probability over the Eavesdropping Links
This sub-section derives the decoding probability of and at the eavesdropper . At first, using (9) and (12), we can formulate the probability that can successfully decode both and in the first phase as
where To calculate the integral in (25), we have to write in (25) under the following form:
where .
Combining (4), (19), (25), and (26), can be obtained as
where .
Substituting (27) into (25), and using (18) to calculate the corresponding integral, we finally obtain the following result:
Next, we consider the probability that correctly decodes and incorrectly decodes in the first phase. Indeed, this probability can be formulated as
With the same method as deriving in (25), we can obtain in (29) as
Then, substituting (30) into (29), and using (18) to calculate the corresponding integral, we finally obtain
Now, we calculate the probability that can correctly decode , regardless of the decoding of . Indeed, this probability can be formulated as
With the same method as deriving in (25), we can obtain in (32) as
Then, substituting (33) into (32), and using (18) to calculate the corresponding integral, we finally obtain
Now, we consider the successful decoding of the packet at in the second phase, which can be expressed by an exact expression as
3.1.3. Decoding Probability at High Transmit
We now consider the decoding probability of the data and eavesdropping links at high , i.e., . Indeed, we can set and where and are constants. At high values, we can approximate in (8), and in (9), respectively, as
Using (36), we can approximate in (14) at high region as
Substituting (2) and (4) into (37), and using (18) to calculate the corresponding integral, we then obtain
For in (22) and in (24), it is straightforward that
.
Again, using (36), we can approximate in (25) at high regime as
where With the same manner as deriving , we also obtain the following result:
where .
Similarly, in (29) at high values can be approximately computed as
For in (32), we can approximately calculate it as
Finally, the successful decoding of the packet at in the second phase can be approximated by
3.2. Decoding of One Encoded Packet
We now calculate the probability that one encoded packet can be correctly received by the satellite, the ground user and the eavesdropper.
Let us consider the satellite; the probability that can obtain one packet successfully can be formulated as
Equation (45) implies that, for to successfully obtain , at least one relay station must decode both and correctly in the first phase (i.e., ). In addition, the transmission of between and in the second phase must also be successful. Substituting (21) and (22) into (45), we obtain an exact closed-form expression of .
Similarly, we can compute the probability that can obtain one packet successfully as
At high transmit values, using (38) and (39), we can approximate and , respectively, as
For the eavesdropper E; from Remark 3, the probability that can obtain one packet and one packet successfully can be given, respectively, as
Then, substituting (34) into (38), we obtain an exact closed-form expression of . Substituting (21), (28), (31), and (35) into (49), we obtain an exact closed-form expression of . At high values, using (38), (41)–(44), we can approximate and , respectively, as
Remark 4.
We first observe from (47) and (50) that the approximate expressions of , and do not depend on In addition, at high SNR values, and have the same value, i.e., .
3.3. Outage Probability (OP) and Intercept Probability (IP)
Let denote the number of the packets that can correctly obtain after the data exchange ends. Then, if the node is outage. Therefore, we can express at and respectively, as
where and are the probabilities that and cannot successfully obtain one packet and one packet , respectively.
Let denote the number of the packet that can correctly gather after the data exchange ends. If the data is intercepted. Hence, the probability that can intercept and can be given, respectively, as
where and are the probabilities that cannot successfully obtain one packet and one packet , respectively.
Moreover, substituting (47) and (50) into (51) and (52), respectively, we obtain the asymptotic expressions of OP and IP as
Remark 5.
As mentioned in Remark 4, , and do not depend on , and hence do not depend on at high values. Also, since and have the same value at high region.
3.4. System Outage Probability (SOP) and System Intercept Probability (SIP)
is defined as the probability that either the satellite or the ground user experiences an outage. Hence, of the proposed scheme can be formulated as
In (42), is the probability that both and are not in outage.
Next, is defined as the probability that can intercept either the data or the data , and of the proposed scheme can be given as
In (55), is the probability that both and is not intercepted.
4. Simulation Results
In this section, we realize Monte Carlo simulations to validate the formulas of , , , and given in Section 3. We denote the exact theoretical results by and the asymptotic theoretical results by . To ensure that the results converge to the results (with the deviation between them ranging from 0.001 to 0.01), we perform from trials to trials for each Monte Carlo simulation. For analyzing the performance trends and evaluating the influence of the key parameters on the system performance, several parameters are fixed as follows: , and . The transmit power of the transmitters is set up as follows: and .
Figure 2 illustrates (Figure 2a) and (Figure 2b) as a function of in dB with different number of relay stations and with . As observed in Figure 2a, at and decreases as increases (or the transmit power of all the transmitters increases). However, at high values, the values of and converge to the same outage floors, as proved in Section 3. It is also seen that at is lower than that at , and the performance at both and improves substantially with increasing . It is due to the fact that increasing improves the probability that at least one relay station can successfully decode both and in the first phase, and it also enhances the channel quality of the links. However, when , the OP performance of S and D is quite identical because there is no relay selection at the second phase, and the system is hence symmetric for and . It is worth noting that the scheme with corresponds to the random relay selection scheme. Hence, Figure 2a shows that the proposed scheme achieves significantly better performance than the random relay selection scheme.
Figure 2.
OP and IP as a function of (dB) when . (a) Outage probability. (b) Intercept probability.
In Figure 2b, we can observe that and increase as increases. As proved in Section 3, we can see that and converge to statured values at high regime. It is also seen from Figure 2b that is higher , and increases with the increasing of . It is worth noting that does not depend on the number of relays because only decodes directly from the satellite (See Remark 3). On the other hand, can decode indirectly via the relay stations, so depends on the number of relays. In particular, the more relays there are, the greater the opportunity that E will successfully decode .
From Figure 2a,b, we can see that the results confirm the correction of the theoretical results. In addition, we can observe that there exists the trade-off between reliability and security. Indeed, as increases, the and values decrease, but while the and values increase. Furthermore, the proposed scheme obtains better outage performance as increasing ; however, the performance is worse with high value of . Finally, we can see that and which means that the reliability of transmitting the data is better than that of , but the security of is lower.
Figure 3 presents (Figure 3a) and (Figure 3b) as a function of in dB with different values of and with . As presented in Figure 3a, at and significantly decreases as increases. This is because increasing raises the probability that and can receive enough encoded packets and , respectively, thereby reducing outage probability at both and .
Figure 3.
OP and IP as a function of (dB) when . (a) Outage probability. (b) Intercept probability.
In contrast to , Figure 3b shows that the values increase with increasing , because a larger also enhances the probability that the node receives sufficiently the encoded packets.
From Figure 3a,b, we can see that the results again validate the theoretical results. We also observe that there exists the trade-off between and , as changes from 5 to 7.
In Figure 4, we present both and as a function of in dB with various values of and . Since the IP and OP values converge to their saturated levels at high values, the SIP and SOP values also converge to their saturated levels. Similarly to the performance, the performance also improves as and increase. Conversely, the SIP performance is worse as and increase. However, it is seen that the SIP values in the cases of and are quite similar. This means that, as increases from 3 to 4, the SOP performance improves significantly, while the SIP performance changes only slightly.
Figure 4.
SOP and SIP as a function of (dB).
Figure 5 investigates the impact of the number of relay stations on the and performance with (dB). As observed, the values decrease rapidly as increases. However, when becomes sufficiently large, the values no longer decrease. This behavior is due to the method, i.e., at high values, the quality of the link is good, and hence, the quality of the link dominates the performance. For the performance, we can see that the values rapidly increase as changes from 1 to 3. As , the SIP performance varies only slightly, as also seen in Figure 4 above. Similarly to Figure 2a,b, Figure 5 shows that the proposed scheme achieves significantly better performance than the random relay selection scheme (). In return, the proposed scheme incurs a slightly higher .
Figure 5.
SOP and SIP as a function of with (dB).
To more clearly analyze the impact of and on the security–reliability tradeoff, Figure 6 and Figure 7 present as a function of . To realize this, we first determine the target values, e.g., where changes from to , as presented in Figure 6 and Figure 7. Then, we use the formula derived in Section 3 to find the corresponding transmit power . Next, we use the obtained values of to calculate the corresponding values of . Finally, we plot SIP as a function of SOP.
Figure 6.
SIP as a function of SOP with .
Figure 7.
SIP as a function of SOP with .
Figure 6 presents the trade-off between and with various values of and with . In particular, achieving better performance in the proposed scheme comes at the cost of worse performance. For example, with , if the target value is 0.1, then the value is 0.6869. However, if the required SOP performance is 0.01 then the corresponding performance is 0.7857. Figure 6 also shows that increasing decreases the trade-off between and . For example, with , the value of with are 0.5185; 0.6869 and 0.7955, respectively.
Figure 7 presents the trade-off between and with various values of and with . As we can observe, the trade-off between SOP and SIP is better as increasing . However, as mentioned in Figure 5, as is high enough, both the and performance do not change any more. Indeed, as seen from Figure 7, the SIP performance only changes slightly as and .
5. Conclusions
This paper proposes a two-phase scheme that incorporates , , , , and cooperative jamming. We derive exact closed-form expressions for and , and perform Monte Carlo simulations to validate the analytical results. The obtained results reveal several key characteristics of the proposed scheme. First, the performance saturates at high transmit , implying that the diversity order is zero. Second, the performance at both the satellite and the ground user converges as the transmit becomes sufficiently large, which indicates that their performance becomes balanced at high regime. Third, the performance improves significantly when increasing the number of terrestrial relay stations () and the number of encoded-packet transmissions (). However, both the and performances eventually saturate when the number of relays becomes sufficiently large. In contrast to the outage behavior, the performance is worse as and increase. Similarly to the outage performance, the interception performance also converges when the transmit and the number of relays are sufficiently large. The results further show that the three main factors affecting the security–reliability tradeoff are the transmit power, the number of transmission rounds, and the number of relays. In particular, the SOP–SIP tradeoff becomes better (worse) when increasing the number of relays (increasing the number of transmission rounds). In future work, we will extend our scheme to scenarios involving multiple eavesdroppers, multiple cooperative jammers, and multiple ground users.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization, N.V.T. and T.T.D.; methodology, N.T.H.; software, P.N.S.; validation, T.T.D.; investigation, N.T.H. and N.V.T.; writing—original draft preparation, N.V.T. and T.T.D.; writing—review and editing, P.M.N.; supervision, P.M.N. and T.T.D. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
This paper is supported by Posts and Telecommunications Institute of Technology under grant number 10-2025-HV-VT2.
Data Availability Statement
The original contributions presented in this study are included in the article. Further inquiries can be directed to the corresponding author.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
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