Language Abuse: The Politicization and Categorization of People on the Move Through Language and Narrative

Abstract

Over the last three decades, the once-distinct terms ‘asylum’ and ‘immigration’ have become conceptually intertwined. This process is almost complete in Europe, where politicians, media, the public, and even academia often speak of these concepts interchangeably. Blurring these concepts has implications for migratory people: it removes legal rights borne by the state and diminishes the claims of humanitarian protection seekers within these movements. We have simultaneously witnessed the recategorization and reinterpretation of the statuses of vulnerable populations on the move, using geolegality to exclude them from otherwise legally entitled protections. We speak to the problems with narrowing the eligibility for protection through geolegality while simultaneously contributing to conceptual indistinction between people that discredits their identities as rights bearers. This short essay reflects on the ethical dilemmas of language use by researchers in shaping and contributing to this situation.

1. The 2015 Arrivals, Terminology, and Ethical Dilemmas

In Europe, the debate over migration is appreciably shaped by the soi-disant ‘refugee crisis’ (Geddes and Scholten 2016). In the period since the Arab Spring there has been an increase in the movement of people into Europe, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, further exacerbated by related political instability such as the Syrian civil war, militant Islamist insurgency, humanitarian crises, and deepening poverty. Numerically, arrivals and ‘the crisis’ peaked in 2015 when more than one million people entered Europe via these routes (Wagner et al. 2016). This compared to just 280,000 in 2014 (Frontex 2016).

The increase in arrivals to Europe overran unprepared and frequently decentralized asylum systems, creating chaos within the EU’s asylum, migration, and border control systems (Geddes and Scholten 2016). Prior to 2015, the EU lacked a unified and effective asylum and immigration system that would serve as a united response and consequently, systems quickly become overwhelmed (Wagner et al. 2016), reinforcing the image of crisis. The ‘visibility’ of arrivals in the early period also reinforced the perception of excess and inundation, further driving support for nationalist discourses. As a result of said ‘crisis’, the newly elected EU commission quickly sent a series of communications regarding new measures to be implemented immediately to shore-up the coherence of the Common European Asylum System. The cornerstone of these measures was the so-called Dublin Regulation, which required refugees to apply for asylum in the first EU member state to which they arrived, resulting in the perception of an uneven sharing of the burden of processing asylum claims on states such as Italy and Greece, leading to wide disagreements, largely between the Eastern and Western European nations, as to how to approach mass migration1 (Nascimbene 2016). It also meant that some especially nationalist member states such as Hungary and Poland, like some other countries within the zone, (temporarily) re-introduced internal border controls in the Schengen zone. This represented a small but important breakdown in one of the key pillars of the European Union’s integration and cross-border mobility agenda (Klaus 2017). Equally, prolonged border controls with Italy were introduced by France, Switzerland, and Austria, violating the Schengen code in the opinion of various experts. Yet, the arrival of four million Ukrainian refugees in a few weeks in 2022 was absorbed well into the EU. This was facilitated by a completely different political process in which those fleeing Ukraine were welcomed under the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD), a little-known framework that was formulated in 2001 in the wake of the conflicts associated with the former Yugoslavia. Little dissent was expressed at the 2022 meeting of the European Council amongst member states (Parusel and Varfolomieieva 2022). Therefore, we could argue here that the problem was largely shaped by the ‘attitude’ towards asylum seekers as supposed to a coherent and consistent approach to asylum reception. As Rea et al. (2019) rightly pointed out, there was no refugee crisis, let alone a migrant crisis, but rather, a refugee reception crisis.

The 2015 arrivals and the resulting discourse of chaos contributed to a rise in right-wing political and populist movements throughout the EU in such diverse countries as Germany, Finland, Hungary, and Austria. These movements have gained electoral support and are popular for their nationalist, anti-establishment, anti-multiculturalist, and anti-immigrant rhetorics (Geddes and Scholten 2016). These right-wing nationalist actors are, however, not the only parties responsible for such discourse. Rather, the discourse of crisis and anti-immigrant sentiments has been mainstreamed and is now represented in narratives across the political spectrum (Kreis 2017; Pettersson and Augoustinos 2021; Schuster 2011). Further, we have witnessed the politicization of migration discourse at all levels—supranational, national, and local—with its consequent anti-immigrant policies (Dotsey 2020). Even while the EU continues to accept Ukrainian refugees under the TPD, it has adopted a more centralized framework, known as the ‘New Pact on Migration and Asylum’ which is set to take effect in 2026.2 While it remains to be seen how effective this reformed system will be and to what extent it will be applied uniformly to refugees, regardless of their place of origin, the Union has in the interim implemented restrictive border control mechanisms, including the strengthening of Frontex, the coastguard agency, while also externalizing the problem by completing several bilateral arrangements with non-EU members such as Turkey, Libya, and Tunisia to limit migration to the EU. The agreement with Turkey has been particularly criticized for its lack of attention to human rights abuses within Turkey. While it has also been crticized for its real efficacy with regard to stemming the flow of irregular migration to the EU, it has in fact blocked around three million Syrians in Turkey. The deal with Libya was also seen as especially egregious since it gave direct support to the Gaddafi regime before it collapsed (Haferlach and Kurban 2017; Lumley-Sapanski et al. 2021). A new agreement was signed by Italy in 2017, despite the civil war in Libya. The EU is now adopting a centralized but severely restrictive approach with several member states unilaterally taking measures to discourage arrivals, and/or putting bilateral agreements in place with non-EU member states, with the most important one being the EU–Turkey agreement, as well as that of Italy–Libya and agreements between small groups of states, such as through the Khartoum Process. These externalization policies have restricted territorial access and increased risks of human rights violations in third-party states (Lumley-Sapanski et al. 2021).

This restrictive approach to migration governance also includes the reinterpretation of legal rights to seek protection (or asylum) and, with it, the right to seek and claim asylum or other forms of humanitarian protection upon arrival. The terms and labels used to classify people who move across borders contain massive implications for the rights and protection they are legally entitled to. The UNHCR defines a refugee as anyone who:

…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

(UNHCR 2019b)

This definition comes from the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which was subsequently amended in the 1967 Protocol. As far as international law is concerned, the definition has not been updated since. There is no legal definition at the international level for the term ‘migrant’. Often the term migrant is used to distinguish between a refugee, who moves due to fear, and those that move voluntarily. The problem with this distinction is that the reasons for migration are often complex (Dotsey 2018) and intertwined and the difference between ‘forcible’ movement and ‘voluntary’ movement is often indistinguishable. More recently, ‘migrant’ has been used as a blanket term to refer to anyone who moves across borders, voluntarily or otherwise. However, the UNHCR recommends against this catchall usage, specifically because doing so can lead to the loss of rights and protections as required by signatories to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol (UNHCR 2019a). All EU member states are parties to both the Convention and the Protocol.

While international treaties are legally binding upon state parties to the treaty, states comply with their obligations through national legal frameworks, which are often the primary source of law for both authorities and for those seeking protection. Definitions contained in international law are often, although not always, incorporated into national law. In the case of the EU, the Treaty of the European Union explicitly commits the EU to international law, and while the EU itself is not a party to the 1951 Convention, the EU incorporates the principles of the Convention into the Common European Asylum System. However, there is nothing that prohibits states from introducing additional categories into their own law, and it is generally up to individual states to determine how to classify individuals once they enter a state’s sovereign territory. This implies that it is states, not international organizations, that determine whether an individual will be granted asylum. The UNHCR defines asylum as a protected legal status of a refugee. Therefore, individuals can be categorized as refugees, forced migrants, humanitarian migrants, asylum seekers, or ‘economic’ (labor) migrants by the receiving state, and each label contains different rights and protections, as determined by the receiving state. The receiving state can also revoke or alter this status, even while remaining in compliance with international law, as long as state is not in violation of the non-refoulement principle, which prohibits states from returning individuals to a territory where their life would be in danger. This implies that as individuals move from one country to another, their status is continuously changing. In so doing, individual legal identities shift between legality and illegality; humanitarian migrant and asylum seeker; and refugee and (ir)regular or economic migrant, depending on the geographical context and receiving countries’ legal frameworks (Ehrkamp 2016; Gorman 2017). Instead of recognizing the complex legal and political dynamics due to geolegality, these identities are captured in another even broader category known as ‘mixed migration’, which refers to both forced and voluntary migration (Dotsey 2020; Van Hear 2011). Indeed, even while the UNHCR cautions against catchall terminology, it advocates for the term ‘mixed movement’ when the movement contains both migrants and refugees. Confusingly, the agency also says, “When the movement is composed of refugees, it shouldn’t be characterized as a ‘mixed movement’” (UNHCR 2019a).

This tendency to broadly group individuals without attention to their identities or motivations has the effects of “stripping away attributes of social distinction and class” (Gatrell 2013, p. 49). Individuals moving across space have multifaceted and overlapping motivations for leaving their home countries that confound the (legal) categories into which they are often pigeonholed. Hence, it is difficult to identify one trigger responsible for people fleeing conflict, oppressive regimes, and adverse conditions, particularly one that is in accord with the legal grounds stipulated in the 1951 Geneva Convention for claiming asylum (Perruchoud and Redpath-Cross 2011, p. 79). While many Western countries have used instruments such as humanitarian and subsidiary status to provide protection to individuals who do not meet the standards of the Refugee Convention but who risk life upon returning home, this outdated and narrow definition does not capture the complex reality of the current migratory process. International law draws a sharp line between refugees and migrants; however, this distinction is nuanced in practice. As Gibney rightly argues:

The attempt to escape situations of famine and below subsistence poverty are obviously economic reasons for migration. Yet they are every bit as violent and life-threatening as political or military causes of departure and thus can be constitutive of refugee status … Moreover, in many states political instability and civil war are often inextricably associated with—if not the direct result of—economic underdevelopment.

(Gibney 2004, p. 13)

Therefore, language is deeply important as it is intimately tied to very real life-and-death outcomes for millions of individuals. At the same time, working definitions are vague and antiquated. While labels remain elusive and outmoded, it is equally important that those practicing in this space are careful with their language and apply it appropriately and consistently. This includes writers and researchers. This article continues by critically analyzing how discourses work to effectively force refugees into invisibility and undermines the legality of asylum claims.

2. Beyond Politicization, Restrictive Measures, and Categorization

Restrictive measures have historically been a part of European and other Western countries’ immigration policies, even during periods of high migratory flows. Despite the tremendous resources and effort expended on restrictive measures in many Western societies, asylum applications and the arrival of so-called ‘economic’ (labor) migrants have remained high over time (Castles 2004; Gibney and Hansen 2003; Gibney 2004). However, the number of asylum applications in the EU has varied over the years and has recently decreased.3 For instance, in 2024, there was a notable drop in applications, likely due to new restrictions, such as the aforementioned bilateral agreements with Turkey, Libya, and others. As North–South wealth disparities and a lack of alternative modes of legal entry (particularly for the poor) persist, as the number of weak and failed states grows, and as telecommunication and transportation advancements increase, leading to larger transnational diasporas, it is likely that movements of people across space will continue to grow (see Cinalli and Dotsey, forthcoming).

Migration governance solutions require trilateral dialogues between immigrants, receiving states, and host countries to facilitate outcomes favorable to all parties. At the root of the challenge is the epistemic and ontological problem of discourse. Current discourses, as noted, conflate identities of individual migrants with implications for the public and political perception of their cultural threat and economic burden. In turn, these discourses shape the public perception of the scope of migration as ungovernable and unmanageable and recast migrants themselves as ‘clandestine’ (Lumley-Sapanski and Dotsey 2022). Perhaps more critically, the discourses which question the validity of asylum claims, conflating forced migrants with other categories, seemingly intentionally challenge individual asylum seekers’ right to seek asylum. In so doing, the rhetoric itself preemptively rejects claims of asylum seekers as bogus.

The discourse regarding the migration question is more complex than often portrayed. While the problem certainly exists, the difficulty surrounding the discourse and attitudes towards migration are an unexamined part of the problem. When the discourse reflects differing attitudes towards different people, it unequivocally reinforces a position of closure (Ambrosini 2025). Within this context, accepted foreigners are not often defined as immigrants but are, e.g., called expats. Expats typically come from more affluent backgrounds, often relocating for work or lifestyle reasons, and are generally embraced by their host countries. In contrast, the term ‘immigrant’ is frequently associated with poor, unwanted foreigners, those who move in search of better opportunities due to economic hardship or instability, and are sometimes viewed with suspicion or reluctance, highlighting differing perceptions and societal attitudes towards these groups. This differentiation reflects underlying biases about social status, economic contribution, and cultural integration, shaping the discourse surrounding migration and nationality. When the focus of the discourse is on control, it raises the question of implementation, which has both external (control of external frontiers) and internal (regulation of society and labor) dimensions (Geddes and Scholten 2016). The public discourse often revolves around only the former; yet, the internal aspect is equally significant. This discursive dynamic is indicative of what Jahn and Straubhaar (1998) call the ‘economic market’ for migrants and the ‘political market’ for regulation. Hence, in the policy-making process, the question is not simply on the content of the legislation but on the extent of balancing the interests of those who call for more migrants and those who call for stringent regulation (Freeman 1995; cf. Castles 2004; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2004; Finoteli and Sciortino 2009; Geddes and Scholten 2016).4 This is especially evident in the European debate and the very different discourses that emerged in 2015 versus 2022. Thus, it is worth noting that the immigration policy-making process is much more complex as lobbyists for different interests seek to influence the policy outcomes.

Here, we would do well as writers and speakers to think critically about the terms we use to represent vulnerable groups. Representing the arrival of asylum seekers as a crisis and ambiguating their identities under the broader term ‘mixed migration flows’ threatens their identities as individual rights bearers. There is an important rationale for why researchers should maintain certain terms such as political asylum or refugee to hold contemporary nation-states responsible for abiding by their humanitarian and legal commitments (Ehrkamp 2016; Gibney and Hansen 2003). We simultaneously recognize the problem of reifying ‘refugeeism’ as well as the challenges that doing so presents in distilling the identities of people to their geopolitical status, while inadvertently minimizing claims of other groups of humanitarian protection seekers. We recognize the challenge this represents and offer this as a preliminary articulation of the need for further discursive attention to the language of migration.

The seriousness and intractability of the migration question call for holistic, gradual, and radical structural transformation of the whole gamut of the current global, national, and local economic, social, and political systems. At the root of this is a need to recognize the multifaceted nature of migratory flows in policy formulation and discourse. Furthermore, discourses of ‘crisis’ should be avoided as it is clear that when migration is framed as a humanitarian act, political will coalesces and policy coordination opens up (Parusel and Varfolomieieva 2022). It is worth noting here that, in reality, European governments, as well as governments of other countries, are reopening their doors to immigration for work while closing them to refugees, highlighting the far-right populist paradox of, e.g., the current Italian government (Ambrosini 2025). Secondly and relatedly, the discourse surrounding burden-sharing amongst EU member states has been undermined by the Ukraine situation. Therefore, it has been shown that this discourse is being strategically deployed to externalize the problem. Finally, to the extent that the EU continues to externalize the problem, the Union should genuinely commit to financially supporting sustainable policies in third countries and not saddle third parties with the entire challenge of controlling migration by tying migration flows to development aid or the prospect of EU membership (Haferlach and Kurban 2017).

Ontologically, disaggregation by migratory status is necessary to ensure that the rights obligated to migrants by the state are recognized and delivered. Yet, failing to acknowledge other groups of migrants as rights bearers epistemologically causes harm. Unfortunately, the more inclusive categories of ‘migrant’ come with a set of stigmas that reinforce conceptualizations of their ‘illegality’ and their mode of entry as clandestine. As academics, we must find a way to both differentiate the identities and attendant rights of migrants and avoid language which communicates the relative morality of individual claims. Reifying differences between groups of humanitarian seekers right to claims is problematic and dangerous to all humanitarian protection seekers.