You are currently viewing a new version of our website. To view the old version click .
Mathematics
  • This is an early access version, the complete PDF, HTML, and XML versions will be available soon.
  • Feature Paper
  • Article
  • Open Access

27 December 2025

Optimizing Low-Carbon Supply Chain Decisions Considering Carbon Trading Mechanisms and Data-Driven Marketing: A Fairness Concern Perspective

,
and
School of Business, Macau University of Science and Technology, Taipa 999078, Macau
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Mathematics2026, 14(1), 104;https://doi.org/10.3390/math14010104 
(registering DOI)
This article belongs to the Special Issue Operations and Supply Chain Management with the Application of Mathematical Models, 2nd Edition

Abstract

As low-carbon supply chains increasingly integrate green transition strategies with digital transformation, coordinating high-cost green technology investments with data-driven marketing (DDM) becomes a complex managerial task. While these dual investments are essential for market growth, the inherent tension between economic efficiency and fairness concerns often triggers strategic friction phenomenon whose impact under cap-and-trade regulations remains insufficiently explored. This paper investigates the strategic implications of fairness concerns in a low-carbon supply chain in which a manufacturer invests in carbon emission reduction and a retailer engages in data-driven marketing (DDM), under a cap-and-trade regulation. We formulate four Stackelberg game models—Neutral Benchmark (NF), Retailer Fairness (RF), Manufacturer Fairness (MF), and Bilateral Fairness (BF)—to analyze the interplay between behavioral equity and economic efficiency. The main analytical results indicate that (1) fairness concerns universally function as an “efficiency tax” on the supply chain system, where the rational benchmark consistently yields the highest system efficiency. In contrast, bilateral fairness concerns lead to the worst performance due to double friction effects. (2) Counter-intuitively, the retailer can “weaponize” fairness concerns to extract surplus from the leader. Specifically, in environments with high carbon emission reduction costs, a fairness-concerned retailer compels the manufacturer to grant significant wholesale price concessions, thereby achieving higher profits than in a purely rational setting. (3) The manufacturer’s fairness creates a “Benevolence Trap” for the follower; to balance equity, a fair manufacturer tends to underinvest in green technologies, which severely contracts market demand and, unlike the retailer fairness scenario, fails to yield economic benefits for the retailer. (4) A critical “regime-switching” dynamic exists regarding the carbon trading price. While the retailer benefits from fairness strategies in nascent carbon markets, a pivot to rationality becomes optimal as carbon prices surge and efficiency dividends dominate. These findings offer novel managerial insights for supply chain members to navigate behavioral complexities and for policymakers to align incentive mechanisms.

Article Metrics

Citations

Article Access Statistics

Article metric data becomes available approximately 24 hours after publication online.