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Article

Pricing and Emission Reduction Strategies of Heterogeneous Automakers Under the “Dual-Credit + Carbon Cap-And-Trade” Policy Scenario

College of Management Science, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu 610059, China
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Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Mathematics 2025, 13(14), 2262; https://doi.org/10.3390/math13142262 (registering DOI)
Submission received: 4 June 2025 / Revised: 2 July 2025 / Accepted: 10 July 2025 / Published: 13 July 2025

Abstract

Against the backdrop of increasingly severe global climate change, the automotive industry, as a carbon-intensive sector, has found its low-carbon transformation crucial for achieving the “double carbon” goals. This paper constructs manufacturer decision-making models under an oligopolistic market scenario for the single dual-credit policy and the “dual-credit + carbon cap-and-trade” policy, revealing the nonlinear impacts of new energy vehicle (NEV) credit trading prices, carbon trading prices, and credit ratio requirements on manufacturers’ pricing, emission reduction effort levels, and profits. The results indicate the following: (1) Under the “carbon cap-and-trade + dual-credit” policy, manufacturers can balance emission reduction costs and NEV production via the carbon trading market to maximize profits, with lower emission reduction effort levels than under the single dual-credit policy. (2) A rise in credit trading prices prompts hybrid manufacturers (producing both fuel vehicles and NEVs) to increase NEV production and reduce fuel vehicle output; higher NEV credit ratio requirements raise fuel vehicle production costs and prices, suppressing consumer demand. (3) An increase in carbon trading prices raises production costs for both fuel vehicles and NEVs, leading to decreased market demand; hybrid manufacturers reduce emission reduction efforts, while others transfer costs through price hikes to boost profits. (4) Hybrid manufacturers face high carbon emission costs due to excessive actual fuel consumption, driving them to enhance emission reduction efforts and promote low-carbon technological innovation.
Keywords: cap-and-trade policy; dual-credit policy; monopoly market; pricing strategy; emission reduction investment; MSC: 91-10 cap-and-trade policy; dual-credit policy; monopoly market; pricing strategy; emission reduction investment; MSC: 91-10

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MDPI and ACS Style

Wu, C.; Zhang, Y.; Zhao, J.; Wang, C.; Chun, W. Pricing and Emission Reduction Strategies of Heterogeneous Automakers Under the “Dual-Credit + Carbon Cap-And-Trade” Policy Scenario. Mathematics 2025, 13, 2262. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13142262

AMA Style

Wu C, Zhang Y, Zhao J, Wang C, Chun W. Pricing and Emission Reduction Strategies of Heterogeneous Automakers Under the “Dual-Credit + Carbon Cap-And-Trade” Policy Scenario. Mathematics. 2025; 13(14):2262. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13142262

Chicago/Turabian Style

Wu, Chenxu, Yuxiang Zhang, Junwei Zhao, Chao Wang, and Weide Chun. 2025. "Pricing and Emission Reduction Strategies of Heterogeneous Automakers Under the “Dual-Credit + Carbon Cap-And-Trade” Policy Scenario" Mathematics 13, no. 14: 2262. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13142262

APA Style

Wu, C., Zhang, Y., Zhao, J., Wang, C., & Chun, W. (2025). Pricing and Emission Reduction Strategies of Heterogeneous Automakers Under the “Dual-Credit + Carbon Cap-And-Trade” Policy Scenario. Mathematics, 13(14), 2262. https://doi.org/10.3390/math13142262

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