Relative and Absolute Decoupling: Conceptual Confusions, Policy Consequences, and a Multi-Level Synthesis

Abstract

Relative and absolute decoupling between economic growth and environmental pressures is one of the most contested topics in ecological economics. This article situates the decoupling debate within a philosophical and normative framework, building on recent critical contributions and on empirical evidence that challenges the green growth narrative. Through a critical analysis of key methodologies, including the TDI, LMDI decomposition, the CAPRO ratio, and MRIO models, it shows that the choice of indicators is not neutral but carries implicit assumptions about progress, ecological limits, and climate justice. The review of empirical results indicates that robust, sustained absolute decoupling is rare and often undermined by rebound effects, outsourcing, or temporary crisis-driven contractions, whereas relative decoupling dominates. On this basis, the article advances a multi-level decoupling synthesis that integrates empirical indicators with normative thresholds such as planetary boundaries, sufficient absolute decoupling, and climate justice, thereby reframing sustainability assessment from the narrow question of technical feasibility to the broader issue of ecological and ethical legitimacy.

1. Introduction

The debate on green growth and decoupling has become one of the most contested issues in ecological economics and sustainability policies (Parrique et al., 2019). At its core lies a philosophical question: can economic prosperity be reconciled with planetary boundaries? Proponents of green growth argue that technological innovation and efficiency improvements will make possible an absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use and emissions (OECD, 2022). Critics, however, emphasize empirical evidence suggesting that such a decoupling is, at best, relative, temporary, and insufficient to meet climate targets (Haberl et al., 2020). This debate is not merely technical, because it also involves normative judgments about how we define well-being, how we measure progress, and how justice is distributed across present and future generations. This article situates the debate on decoupling within a broader philosophical and political–economic framework. By combining a review of methodological approaches with a critical examination of their epistemological assumptions, the article argues that current claims of absolute decoupling function more as a political myth than as a scientifically grounded trajectory. The article further proposes a new conceptual framework, a multi-level synthesis of decoupling that integrates measurement instruments with the normative principles of planetary boundaries and climate justice. The aim is not only to assess whether decoupling is empirically possible but also to ask what kind of development it legitimizes and under what ethical conditions it can be considered sustainable. The article makes three interrelated contributions. First it systematizes the main quantitative approaches to decoupling and shows how their design choices embody specific assumptions about progress, ecological limits, and climate justice. Second, it introduces the Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis, a normative-evaluative framework that treats indicators such as Tapio decoupling index (TDI), Logarithmic Mean Divisia Index (LMDI), multi-regional input–output (MRIO), and Carbon Productivity-GDP/CO₂ (CAPRO) as empirical inputs, filters them through explicit sufficiency thresholds derived from planetary boundaries and justice principles, and classifies resulting trends as ecologically sufficient or normatively insufficient. Third, by applying this synthesis to reinterpret existing empirical cases and projections, the article reframes the decoupling debate from the narrow question of whether decoupling occurs to the broader issue of the legitimacy of green-growth and post-growth pathways.

In addition, debates on sustainability and environmental policy increasingly highlight the importance of multi-level governance and the way in which authority, responsibilities, and resource flows are organized across scales. Research on regional hydro-politics shows how the “production of scale” in governance arrangements shapes who gains and who loses from resource use and environmental pressures. For example, Da Silva and Hussein (2019) analyze the La Plata River Basin and the Guarani Aquifer System in South America to demonstrate how conflicts and cooperation over shared waters are structured through overlapping local, national, and transnational institutions. This perspective is directly relevant for decoupling, since patterns of relative and absolute decoupling are always embedded in multi-level governance configurations and cross-border supply chains. The Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis proposed in this article is therefore “multi-level” not only in an analytical sense linking indicators to thresholds, but also in the way it invites decoupling outcomes to be interpreted within the scalar politics of contemporary sustainability governance.

Theoretical Foundations: Relative and Absolute Decoupling

The debate on green growth and decoupling has become one of the most discussed issues in ecological economics and sustainability policies (Hickel, 2019). Hickel and Kallis (2020) describe the concept of green growth as assuming that absolute decoupling between GDP and resource use or emissions is possible. This assumption is often linked to the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis, which suggests that environmental impact initially increases with income, but decreases in advanced stages of development. The authors criticize this as a political myth that neglects biophysical limits, positioning the debate between technological optimists and degrowth critics who call for a reconceptualization of the very purpose of growth. In the literature, a standard distinction has been made between relative decoupling and absolute decoupling. Relative decoupling refers to a situation in which environmental pressures, such as emissions, energy use, or material throughput, continue to increase in absolute terms, but at a slower rate than GDP, so that the intensity of impact per unit of output declines. Absolute decoupling, by contrast, requires that total environmental pressures decrease in absolute terms while GDP keeps growing, implying a genuine separation between economic activity and biophysical impacts. In other words, relative decoupling describes efficiency gains within an overall growth trajectory, whereas absolute decoupling sets a stricter condition by demanding that economic growth be compatible with an outright reduction in aggregate environmental burdens (Andreoni & Galmarini, 2012; OECD, 2022; Lange et al., 2020).

Andreoni and Galmarini (2012) clarify that the former refers to a reduction in emissions intensity per unit of GDP, while the latter requires an absolute decline in emissions under conditions of economic growth. Druckman and Jackson (2009), from a consumption perspective, show that traditional production-based accounting often hides the real carbon footprint, due to the outsourcing of polluting production. The OECD (2022), summarized by De Freitas and Kaneko (2011), places this distinction within a clear framework between “economic goods” and “environmental bads.” In the same direction, Lange et al. (2020) add the notion of sufficient absolute decoupling, emphasizing that only rapid and sufficient reductions can meet the 1.5 °C target of the Paris Agreement. The tradition of ecological economics has provided the theoretical foundations of this debate through notions such as throughput and the law of entropy. Georgescu-Roegen (2014) and Martínez-Alier (2012) argued that every economic system is constrained by material and energy flows, and that a steady-state economy is necessary for sustainability. This logic has inspired the development of degrowth as a critical paradigm. Kallis (2011) describes degrowth as a political, economic, and cultural project that challenges the growth imperative; Kallis (2011) link it to prosperity beyond GDP, while Kallis et al. (2025) position it as part of the post-growth paradigm, alongside models such as steady-state, doughnut economics, and wellbeing economics. In addition to theoretical critique, the literature has also developed alternative frameworks. Haberl et al. (2020) place the decoupling debate within the framework of planetary boundaries, emphasizing that the promise of green growth rests on a fragile assumption. Tilsted et al. (2021), drawing on Stoknes and Rockström (2018), propose the concept of genuine green growth (GGG), where economic growth can only be called green if it respects planetary boundaries. D’Amato and Korhonen (2021) analyze three parallel narratives, green economy (GE), circular economy (CE), and bioeconomy (BE), using the Framework for Strategic Sustainable Development (FSSD) to explain how these approaches attempt to harmonize social, environmental, and economic objectives. The FSSD is a systems-based sustainability framework that provides strategic guidelines for transitioning towards more sustainable socio-economic structures. It integrates ecological, economic, and social dimensions and is commonly used to evaluate the coherence of policy narratives such as the green economy, circular economy, and bioeconomy (D’Amato & Korhonen, 2021). Meanwhile, Mikayilov et al. (2018) highlight the historical responsibility of developed countries for absolute reductions, linking this debate to the dimensions of climate justice. Other perspectives highlight the weaknesses of decoupling; in this vein, Kronenberg et al. (2020) situate degrowth within transition studies, using a multi-level and multi-phase perspective to conceptualize it as a democratic and deliberate transition. Lenaerts et al. (2021) divide the debate between green growth optimists, who place their faith in technology, and degrowth theorists, who emphasize the impossibility of achieving absolute decoupling at the required scale.

Akizu-Gardoki et al. (2020) add the notion of the Well-being Turning Point (WTP), showing that, beyond a certain threshold, increased energy consumption does not improve well-being, thereby reinforcing the critique of the growth imperative. Brockway et al. (2021) emphasize that rebound effects erode half of the savings achieved through efficiency, challenging the feasibility of absolute decoupling. The debate has also taken on conceptual dimensions. Geare (2013), in his analysis of Cents and Sustainability, distinguishes between “physical growth” and “economic growth” but views this distinction as theoretically unclear and empirically unsupported. Krähmer (2020) speaks of the “myth of decoupling” that underpins the discourse of sustainable development, setting it against the degrowth perspective. Koch (2015) links climate change to the very logic of capitalism, arguing that capitalist production, focused on exchange value, is in constant conflict with ecological sustainability. Beyond theoretical analyses, some authors highlight the institutional and practical dimension. Schandl et al. (2016) employ the concepts of social metabolism and industrial metabolism to demonstrate the historical link between economic growth and material use, stressing the need for systemic transformations. Bithas and Kalimeris (2022) identify the tension between coupling and decoupling, where declines in material intensity are often obscured by outsourcing, while total consumption continues to rise. Sanyé-Mengual et al. (2019) criticize the narrow focus on CO₂ as an indicator, proposing a broader distinction between resource, pressure, and impact decoupling. Meanwhile, Infante-Amate et al. (2025) connect the notion of green growth to international institutions such as the OECD (2022), UNEP (2021), and the World Bank (2012), which continue to promote absolute decoupling as the pathway to global sustainable development. As Jackson (2016) and Hubacek et al. (2021) argue, claims of decoupling collapse once global supply chains and planetary boundaries are taken into account. Thus, the debate is not merely technical but a philosophical and normative question about the meaning of growth, well-being, and ecological justice on a planet with insurmountable limits (Spash, 2020).

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between relative decoupling and absolute decoupling and the consequences that result from their misinterpretation. As emphasized by Lange et al. (2020), only sufficient absolute decoupling can lead to sustainability, while reports of relative decoupling are often used as a political “success,” creating the illusion of green growth (Ward et al., 2016). The figure synthesizes these theoretical and political tensions by showing that the absence of absolute decoupling results in misguided and insufficient policies to meet climate targets.

Figure 1. Conceptual pathways of economic–environmental decoupling. From the central concept of decoupling, the arrows on the left illustrate a pathway where relative decoupling (GDP↑ with total emissions↑) is misused and presented as a policy success, ultimately leading to negative policy consequences (illusion of green growth, misleading statistics, weak/insufficient policies). The arrows on the right illustrate a pathway where absolute decoupling (GDP↑ with total emissions↓) is required to achieve true sustainability. Arrows indicate the conceptual flow and feedback between these stages (Generated by author).

In conclusion, the literature on decoupling presents a paradigmatically divided landscape. One camp relies on technology and international institutions to promote green growth; the other, connected to the tradition of degrowth, emphasizes biophysical limits, rebound effects, outsourcing, and the impossibility of achieving sufficient decoupling.

2. Methodology

This article employs a critical–synthetic methodological approach rather than a purely empirical design. The method consists of three interrelated steps.

First, a structured literature review was conducted, focusing on empirical and conceptual contributions to the debate on relative and absolute decoupling. The review included peer-reviewed journal articles, systematic reviews, and policy documents published by international institutions (OECD, 2022; UNEP, 2021; World Bank, 2012). Key methodologies considered were the TDI, LMDI, MRIO models, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approaches, and the CAPRO ratio.

Second, these methodologies were examined not only for their technical results but also for their epistemic assumptions. Following Hickel and Kallis (2020) and Haberl et al. (2020), the analysis paid particular attention to whether methods capture relative or absolute decoupling, how they treat outsourcing and rebound effects, and whether they integrate ecological thresholds.

Third, the findings were synthesized into a novel conceptual framework—the Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis. This framework integrates empirical indicators (TDI, LMDI, MRIO, CAPRO) as inputs, which are then interpreted through filters derived from normative thresholds: planetary boundaries, sufficient absolute decoupling, and principles of climate and intergenerational justice. The resulting outputs are not limited to technical results but extend to normative judgments on the legitimacy of sustainability claims. Methodologically, the Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis functions as a rule-based evaluation framework, analogous to a simple decision-support or multi-criteria assessment scheme in operational research.

By combining systematic review, critical discourse analysis, and conceptual synthesis, this methodological approach advances beyond narrow technical assessments of decoupling. It reframes the debate by showing that measurement instruments are not neutral tools, but carry normative implications for how sustainability, legitimacy, and justice are defined.

2.1. Clarification of Key Decoupling Methods

To avoid ambiguity, this paper briefly clarifies the main indicators and methods used in the methodological discussion. The TDI expresses the percentage change in environmental pressures relative to the percentage change in GDP and is widely employed to classify different decoupling regimes, such as relative, absolute, or negative decoupling. LMDI decomposition, by contrast, breaks down changes in emissions into several contributing factors, typically energy intensity, carbon intensity, structural change, and overall economic activity, thus identifying the specific drivers behind observed decoupling patterns (De Freitas & Kaneko, 2011). MRIO approaches, including quasi-multi-regional variants (QMRIO), extend this analysis to global supply chains by linking production- and consumption-based accounts. They capture embodied emissions in trade and reveal cases where apparent domestic decoupling is in fact driven by outsourcing (Druckman & Jackson, 2009; Haberl et al., 2020). The CAPRO ratio (GDP/CO₂), frequently used in the literature on Genuine Green Growth, provides a macro-level indicator of carbon efficiency, although improvements in CAPRO do not automatically entail sustained absolute reductions in emissions (Tilsted et al., 2021). Finally, the Well-being Turning Point (WTP) represents a threshold in per capita energy use beyond which additional throughput no longer increases human well-being (Akizu-Gardoki et al., 2020). To provide a clearer and more structured comparison of the main tools used in the decoupling literature, this section contrasts the four key methodologies discussed in the paper: the TDI, LMDI decomposition, MRIO/QMRIO models, and the CAPRO ratio. Table 1 summarizes what each method measures, the accounting perspective it adopts, and its main strengths and limitations in relation to the debate on relative and absolute decoupling.

Table 1. Comparative overview of key decoupling methods.

Method	Measures	Perspective/Data	Strengths	Key Limitations
TDI	% change in pressures vs. % change in GDP.	Territorial, single-country time series (CO2, energy).	Simple; intuitive decoupling regimes; widely used.	Ignores absolute levels and drivers; misses outsourcing and planetary-boundary context.
LMDI	Change in emissions split into activity, structure, energy & carbon intensity.	Territorial, sectoral energy and emissions data.	Identifies driver contributions; additive; useful for policy analysis.	Mostly national/territorial; sensitive to factor choice; no check of ecological sufficiency.
MRIO	Embodied emissions in traded goods allocated to final demand.	Multi-regional, consumption-based IO tables with environmental extensions.	Reveals outsourced emissions; contrasts territorial vs. consumption-based decoupling; captures global chain effects.	Data- and model-intensive; limited coverage; complex; rarely tied to sufficiency thresholds.
CAPRO	GDP per unit of CO2 emitted (carbon productivity).	Macro intensity indicator from territorial CO2 and national GDP.	Very easy to compute and compare; directly links GDP to carbon intensity.	Captures only efficiency; emissions may still rise or exceed planetary boundaries; ignores other pressures and causal drivers.

As shown in Table 1, the four methodologies do not simply offer different technical lenses on the same phenomenon; they embody distinct assumptions about what counts as progress and which pressures are rendered visible or invisible. TDI and CAPRO focus on macro-level elasticities and carbon productivity and are therefore suited to identifying relative decoupling trends, but they can overstate success when absolute pressures continue to rise or remain above planetary boundaries. LMDI decomposition offers a more detailed breakdown of drivers, yet it usually remains confined to territorial accounts. MRIO and QMRIO models overcome this by tracing embodied emissions along global supply chains, but they are data-intensive and still rarely tied to explicit sufficiency thresholds. These differences justify the need for the Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis, which treats the outputs of each method as empirical inputs that must be interpreted through ecological and justice-based filters.

2.2. Methodological and Epistemic Issues

In the literature on decoupling, a fundamental distinction is made between relative decoupling, where emissions grow more slowly than GDP, and absolute decoupling, where total emissions decline while GDP continues to increase (Andreoni & Galmarini, 2012). This distinction has served as the basis for methodological approaches that measure the decoupling of economic growth from environmental pressures and has guided the development of a series of quantitative indicators, such as the TDI, OECD models, or LMDI decomposition. However, not all authors rely on these instruments. For example, Hickel and Kallis (2020) adopt a synthetic approach, analyzing the empirical literature and international projections (Schandl et al., 2016; UNEP, 2021). They conclude that the existing evidence for absolute decoupling is scarce and insufficient to meet climate targets (Hickel & Kallis, 2020, pp. 472–474), thereby shifting the debate from technical measurement toward epistemic and normative questions about the legitimacy of the green growth narrative. In line with this, Ward et al. (2016) show that there is no empirical evidence for a sustainable absolute decoupling at the global level, casting doubt on the foundations of the green growth narrative. From the use of different approaches emerges the question: Is decoupling homogeneous? Decomposition approaches have been widely applied; for example, Andreoni and Galmarini (2012), drawing on Sun et al.’s (1998) method, analyze changes in CO₂ through four factors: carbon intensity, energy intensity, structural sectoral changes, and economic activity. Druckman and Jackson (2009) develop a QMRIO model combined with the Lifestyle and Resource Analysis (LARA) model, enabling them to measure the carbon footprint across socio-economic classes. A QMRIO model is a hybrid input–output framework that combines national input–output tables with socio-economic disaggregation, enabling the calculation of carbon footprints across household groups or sectors. It captures indirect and embodied emissions through global supply chains and is widely used to identify consumption-based decoupling patterns (Druckman & Jackson, 2009). The Lifestyle and Resource Analysis (LARA) model is an analytical tool used to assess the environmental impacts associated with household lifestyles by linking expenditure categories with resource use and emissions factors. When combined with QMRIO, it allows a more granular evaluation of how different social groups contribute to or benefit from decoupling processes (Druckman & Jackson, 2009).

This combination of methods shows that decoupling is not homogeneous but distributed differently across social groups and consumption patterns. Similarly, Lange et al. (2020) propose an analytical model that measures the impact of digitalization through four effects: the direct impact of the ICT sector, efficiency improvements, the stimulation of economic growth, and the tertiarization of the economic structure. De Freitas and Kaneko (2011) highlight the role of LMDI as the most consolidated method for decomposing emission factors, while Haberl et al. (2020), through a systematic review of over 11,500 studies, categorize three groups of methods: (i) statistical analysis (TDI, OECD), (ii) decomposition models (LMDI), and (iii) input–output and axiomatic indicators. The authors criticize the fact that most studies measure only environmental pressures without linking them to biophysical boundaries. Alternative methodologies include CAPRO = GDP/CO₂ (Tilsted et al., 2021), which demonstrates that the choice of emissions accounting method, territorial, production-based, or consumption-based, directly affects the results for green growth. Mikayilov et al. (2018) employ a time-varying coefficient cointegration (TVC) model showing that the elasticity of emissions with respect to GDP changes over time, indicating that decoupling dynamics are not stable but evolve across different development stages.

Kronenberg et al. (2020) apply transition management frameworks (multi-level and multi-phase perspective), positioning degrowth as a manageable socio-technical transition. For energy and well-being, Akizu-Gardoki et al. (2020) use an extended GMRIO to calculate TPEF, which they compare with alternative indicators such as HDI, HPI, BLI, and IHDI, testing the concept of the Well-being Turning Point (WTP). This indicator is a threshold-based measure suggesting that, beyond a certain level of per capita energy use or resource consumption, additional throughput no longer improves human well-being. It directly challenges the growth paradigm by showing that high levels of human development can be achieved with significantly lower resource use (Akizu-Gardoki et al., 2020).

These diverse approaches show that methodological instruments are not merely neutral tools of measurement, but carry deep assumptions about progress, justice, climate justice, and the meaning of sustainability, shifting the debate from technique toward philosophical reflection on the legitimacy of development.

Brockway et al. (2021), through CGE models and macroeconomic analyses, show that rebound effects often exceed 50%, casting doubt on strategies that rely exclusively on technological efficiency. At a critical level, Krähmer (2020) shows that most reported cases of decoupling occur in developed countries, while emissions are often displaced to the Global South through supply chains. Sanyé-Mengual et al. (2019) use LCA (top-down and bottom-up approaches) to construct a Consumption Footprint for the EU, demonstrating that CO₂ alone is not a sufficient indicator of multiple environmental pressures. Lenaerts et al. (2021), using the Kaya identity, show that, in order to meet the Paris Agreement targets, emissions per unit of GDP must fall by around 9% per year, far faster than the historical trend of 1.8% per year. Koch (2015) makes a distinct contribution by situating the analysis at two levels: (a) the mode of production, where capitalism as a system deepens ecological crises, and (b) varieties of capitalism, where institutional differences explain variation in emissions across countries. He criticizes instruments such as the EU ETS, considering them insufficient to secure absolute decoupling. These findings indicate that reported cases often represent only relative decoupling, where emission intensity falls but absolute emissions continue to rise, while evidence for sustained absolute decoupling remains scarce and uncertain. This clearly distinguishes between statistical improvements that create the illusion of success and the real structural transformations that would be required to meet climate targets.

Finally, some authors emphasize the discursive character of existing methods. Geare (2013) criticizes the book Cents and Sustainability, viewing the use of theoretical graphs as rhetorical rather than analytical evidence. Albert (2020) relies on existing scenarios to show that technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution have not yet demonstrated absolute decoupling at the global level. Meanwhile, Hinderer and Kuckertz (2024) employ an empirical approach with surveys of global entrepreneurs, combining OLS regressions with social indicators such as IHDI to measure attitudes toward the paradigms of green growth, degrowth, and agrowth. These analyses indicate that, despite methodological and discursive diversity, most of the evidence supports only relative decoupling, while proof of sustained absolute decoupling at the global scale remains unfulfilled.

In conclusion, the methodological landscape on decoupling is rich and multidimensional, from statistical models (TDI, OECD, LMDI) to MRIO (Eora, GTAP, Exiobase, GMRIO), CGE models, FSSD, CAPRO, and IHDI. Nevertheless, epistemological limitations remain clear: most methods measure isolated pressures, often ignoring biophysical boundaries and the normative dimensions of sustainability. As Brockway et al. (2021) emphasize, this gap indicates that the issue of decoupling is not merely a technical measurement problem but a broader debate about the limits of our knowledge concerning the interaction between economy and ecosystems

3. Results

3.1. Empirical Patterns and Their Limits

Before turning to specific country and regional case studies, it is useful to illustrate schematically the difference between relative and absolute decoupling. Figure 2 shows a stylized case where GDP grows faster than emissions, leading to relative decoupling as impact intensity declines, but total environmental pressures continue to rise. Figure 3, by contrast, depicts absolute decoupling, where GDP continues to increase while total emissions fall in absolute terms. These schematic trends clarify the conceptual distinction that underpins the empirical patterns discussed in the following subsections.

Figure 2. Relative decoupling between GDP and emissions: GDP continues to grow, while emissions still increase but at a slower rate, implying declining impact intensity but no absolute reduction in environmental pressures.

Figure 3. Absolute decoupling between GDP and emissions: GDP grows while total emissions decline in absolute terms, indicating a genuine separation between economic activity and biophysical impacts.

3.2. Resource Use

Hickel and Kallis (2020) emphasize that there is no robust evidence for absolute decoupling in global resource use; the documented cases are temporary and usually reflect only relative decoupling, as seen in some OECD countries after the 2008 crisis. At the global level, however, the data show recoupling, where GDP growth continues to be accompanied by an increase in resource consumption (Hickel & Kallis, 2020, pp. 471–474). Ward et al. (2016) support this finding by arguing that there is no empirical evidence for sustained absolute decoupling. The historical analyses of Bithas and Kalimeris (2022) make the contrast even sharper: although material intensity (MI) declined significantly during the period 1900–2009 (by up to 80% in the U.S. and 64% globally), absolute resource use grew dramatically (+857% globally, +1721% in the U.S., +4786% in Japan). On a per capita basis, the increase was equally pronounced (+1291% in Japan and +705% in China). This gap clearly shows that relative decoupling, even when it occurs, does not translate into sustained absolute decoupling, since efficiency improvements alone are insufficient to reduce environmental pressures under conditions of economic growth.

3.3. Carbon Emissions

For carbon emissions, Hickel and Kallis (2020) find that, although the EU and the U.S. have shown instances of decoupling after 2006, at the global level emissions continue to rise. Moreover, even the most optimistic IPCC scenarios rely on untested technologies such as BECCS (Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage), raising doubts about the sustainability of these trajectories (Hickel & Kallis, 2020, pp. 476–479). In Asia, the cases of China and ASEAN countries present a different picture: while there are temporary signs of relative decoupling, rapid industrial expansion has led to sharp increases in resource use and emissions, making it very difficult to achieve climate targets. National-level studies provide a mixed picture. Andreoni and Galmarini (2012) show that in Italy (1998–2006), GDP grew by 12%, energy consumption by 18%, and CO₂ emissions by 10%, indicating only partial relative decoupling. Druckman and Jackson (2009) find that in the UK (1990–2004), household emissions increased by 15%, while embedded emissions from imports rose from 31% in 1990 to 40% in 2004. They also reveal sharp social inequalities: the wealthiest households emit 64% more than the poorest. In Brazil, De Freitas and Kaneko (2011) document a case of absolute decoupling in 2009, with GDP +0.3% and CO₂ −4.7%, but for the period 2004–2009, relative decoupling dominated.

3.4. Empirical Case Studies and Indicators

Tilsted et al. (2021) test the concept of Genuine Green Growth (GGG) in the Nordic countries. The results show that, under territorial accounting, Denmark and Sweden achieve CAPRO (GDP/CO₂) growth of around 5% per year, but under production-based or consumption-based accounting, no Nordic country meets the GGG criteria. To remain consistent with the 1.5 °C target, CAPRO would need to grow by 6–14% annually, a historically unattainable pace. D’Amato and Korhonen (2021) analyze the narratives of the Green Economy (GE), Circular Economy (CE), and Bioeconomy (BE) in concrete political contexts: GE has been strongly promoted by UNEP (2021) and the OECD (2022), CE has been adopted as a strategy by the EU and China since 2008, while BE is linked to biomass and bioenergy policies. These narratives have produced fragmented applications, often lacking coherence. Mikayilov et al. (2018) examine data for 12 Western European countries (1861–2015) and show that there is no evidence of absolute decoupling; in eight countries (e.g., Germany, the UK, Sweden), there is only relative decoupling, while in four countries (e.g., Switzerland, Austria) there is not even relative decoupling. Hubacek et al. (2021), using data from 116 countries (1990–2018), find that only 32 countries achieved absolute decoupling of GDP from territorial emissions, and only 23 from consumption-based emissions. Just 14 countries achieved both simultaneously. Most higher-income countries show more positive results, while lower-income countries remain strongly coupled to rising emissions.

3.5. Digitalization and Energy

A specific strand of empirical research concerns the effects of digitalization. Salahuddin et al. (2016) find that in OECD countries a 1% increase in internet users raises per capita electricity consumption by 0.026%. Sadorsky (2012) shows that in emerging economies this effect can reach up to 0.108%, while Ishida (2015) finds a long-run negative effect in Japan. Lange et al. (2020) synthesize these studies, showing that most evidence suggests a positive relationship between digitalization and energy use, with only limited exceptions. These findings imply that, even when digitalization contributes to efficiency improvements (relative decoupling), it rarely translates into an absolute reduction in total energy consumption. On the contrary, additional demand effects often drive higher emissions, making absolute decoupling even more difficult to achieve.

3.6. Degrowth Cases and Alternative Pathways

Empirical studies on degrowth provide key evidence. Kronenberg et al. (2020) analyze initiatives such as Cargonomia (Budapest) and Transition Towns, showing the feasibility of alternative practices. Akizu-Gardoki et al. (2020) identify a Well-being Turning Point (WTP) of ~98.67 MWh per person, beyond which energy use no longer improves well-being, with Romania as a “role model” for achieving HDI > 0.8 within planetary boundaries. Kallis (2011) cites Cuba as an example of high human development without continuous growth, while Kallis et al. (2025) highlight Japan after the 1990s, Greece during the financial crisis, Cuba’s ecological agriculture, and Victor’s Canadian models. Kallis et al. (2025) add cases such as Kalahari hunter–gatherers, shrinking cities (Leipzig, Detroit), and eco-communes in Barcelona, showing reduced throughput without declining well-being. Finally, Kallis et al. (2025) demonstrate that even wealthy countries achieving temporary absolute decoupling (2005–2015) failed to meet Paris targets, and no country secures high social outcomes without exceeding planetary boundaries. These findings confirm that relative decoupling, and even temporary absolute decoupling, remain insufficient for long-term sustainability.

3.7. Rebound Effect and Critical Analyses

Brockway et al. (2021) collect evidence from 21 CGE studies and 12 methodological analyses, showing a wide range of rebound effects from 12% to over 200%. Most suggest an average rebound of 50–70%, which erodes the benefits achieved by technological efficiency, making relative decoupling insufficient for climate objectives. Concrete cases include the United States, where the rebound effect reaches approximately 100% (Bruns, 2019). Krähmer (2020) illustrates the limitations of territorial measurements by showing that consumption-based emissions in Copenhagen are 3–4 times higher than production-based ones, highlighting externalization. Moreover, his modeling scenarios predict that even under post-carbon policies, the city’s consumption will cause strong increases in displaced emissions by 2050. In the same critical line, Geare (2013) observes that the literature on decoupling often relies on theoretical graphs and rhetoric, as in the case of Cents and Sustainability, without sufficient empirical evidence. These findings highlight that most of the evidence implies only relative decoupling, while robust evidence for absolute decoupling remains uncertain and insufficient to justify the green growth narrative.

3.8. Large-Scale Projections

Schandl et al. (2016) project that by 2050 global GDP will triple, while energy and material use will remain tightly coupled with growth, implying that without very strong policies (e.g., a global carbon price of $236/t), even relative decoupling is insufficient, let alone absolute decoupling at the required scale. Infante-Amate et al. (2025) show that 60% of historical CO₂ reductions occurred during recessions, reflecting only fragile forms of relative decoupling rather than green growth. Lenaerts et al. (2021) add that although the EU achieved 3.4% annual reductions (1990–2016), this falls far short of the ~9% required for absolute decoupling; U.S. territorial declines are likewise inadequate. Albert (2020) reinforces this skepticism, noting that Fourth Industrial Revolution technologies lack empirical evidence for global absolute decoupling and may create new risks (biosecurity, cybersecurity, techno-authoritarianism). Mastini et al. (2021) stress that decarbonization is easier under slower GDP growth, underscoring that relative decoupling under rapid growth remains insufficient. Finally, Hinderer and Kuckertz (2024) bring this debate into business practice, showing that degrowth-oriented entrepreneurs favor “scaling slow” to respect ecological limits, while “scaling fast” aligns with the green growth paradigm. To illustrate how the Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis can be used in practice, three empirical cases discussed in the results section are summarized in Table 2. For each case, the table reports the main indicator(s) employed, the relevant normative threshold(s), the resulting classification in terms of relative or absolute decoupling, and the broader narrative implication for green-growth or post-growth pathways.

Table 2. Example application of the Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis.

Case/Region	Indicator(s) Used	Normative Threshold(s)	Classification	Narrative Implication
Nordic countries (Tilsted et al., 2021)	CAPRO (GDP/CO2) growth rates	CAPRO must rise ≈ 6–14%/year to be 1.5 °C-compatible	Relative decoupling with insufficient absolute decoupling	Challenges strong claims of “genuine green growth”; efficiency gains fall short of Paris-compatible pathways
Romania (Akizu-Gardoki et al., 2020)	Per capita energy use (TPEF) and HDI (WTP concept).	HDI > 0.8 within the Well-being Turning Point (~98 MWh per capita).	Close to a sufficient and more just pathway.	Supports sufficiency-oriented, post-growth narratives: high well-being with comparatively low throughput.
Global projections (Schandl et al., 2016; Lenaerts et al., 2021)	Global GDP, materials, energy and CO2 trajectories	Staying within planetary boundaries and Paris-aligned emission reductions (~9% annual decline in emissions per unit of GDP)	No sufficient absolute decoupling at the required scale	Highlights the need for structural change beyond efficiency-driven green growth scenarios.

As summarised in Table 2, the Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis does not merely restate existing empirical findings; it provides an explicit rule-based procedure for classifying observed trends as ecologically sufficient or insufficient. The same empirical indicator (e.g., CAPRO or TPEF) can lead to different judgements depending on whether trajectories respect Paris-consistent carbon budgets, stay within planetary boundaries, or meet minimum social thresholds such as high HDI. In this sense, the framework functions as a decision-support tool: it translates heterogeneous decoupling metrics into transparent evaluations of which green-growth or post-growth narratives are legitimate in a given context.

4. Discussion

The debate on the concept of “absolute decoupling” has generated a clear division in the literature between those who see it as a realistic solution to environmental challenges and those who consider it a dangerous illusion. This debate is not only methodological but also deeply ideological and normative, reflecting different visions about the nature of economic development, global justice, and planetary limits. This debate on decoupling has sparked a profound clash between green growth optimists and degrowth critics. Hickel and Kallis (2020) argue that, even when cases of decoupling are reported, they are rarely sufficient to respect planetary boundaries or to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. For them, the insistence on the green growth narrative is more politically motivated than scientifically grounded, turning into a normative myth that legitimizes the continuation of the current economic model. In the same line, Ward et al. (2016) show that there is no consistent evidence for absolute decoupling at the global level, while Infante-Amate et al. (2025) emphasize that the overwhelming majority of CO₂ reductions in history (around 60%) have occurred during recessions, wars, or crises, and not due to green policies. This fact strengthens the arguments of critics that absolute decoupling is more reversible and contingent than a sustainable trajectory. Various empirical cases support this skepticism. Italy, despite policies on emission trading schemes and efficiency incentives, failed to achieve absolute decoupling (Andreoni & Galmarini, 2012). In the United Kingdom, the wealthiest households emitted over 60% more than the poorest, while imports accounted for about half of the carbon footprint, showing that many of the domestic reductions were the result of offshoring (Druckman & Jackson, 2009). Brazil, on the other hand, achieved a temporary case of absolute decoupling in 2009 thanks to energy diversification and renewable sources, demonstrating that institutional and structural choices can be more decisive than technical improvements (De Freitas & Kaneko, 2011). Copenhagen, however, remains a contrasting example: consumption-based calculations show emissions 3–4 times higher than production-based ones, revealing mechanisms of externalization and the limits of the traditional approach (Krähmer, 2020). In contrast, Romania is mentioned as a “role model,” achieving an HDI above 0.8 with energy consumption within planetary boundaries, showing that a relatively balanced development is possible (Akizu-Gardoki et al., 2020). Happiness economics and the debate on “green GDP” further underscore why the focus on conventional GDP–environment relationships is insufficient for assessing sustainability. Empirical work on subjective well-being has long shown that, beyond a certain income threshold, additional GDP growth yields diminishing or even negligible gains in life satisfaction, a finding consistent with the notion of a well-being turning point and with sufficiency-oriented perspectives in ecological economics. In parallel, proposals for green GDP and related “beyond GDP” dashboards seek to internalize environmental degradation and resource depletion into national accounts, thereby redefining what counts as economic progress. These studies imply that even if relative or absolute decoupling between GDP and environmental pressures were to occur, it would not automatically guarantee improvements in well-being or ecological legitimacy. Instead, they reinforce the need to evaluate decoupling indicators against broader welfare metrics and adjusted income measures that explicitly account for ecological costs and distributive justice.

Beyond welfare metrics and income-adjusted indicators, a further line of critique targets the excessive reliance on technological efficiency. Brockway et al. (2021) show that rebound effects often reach 50–70%, with extreme cases such as the United States (~100%, Bruns, 2019) or Sweden (>60%, Saunders, 2016), thereby eroding the potential savings from efficiency improvements. In the same line, Koch (2015) emphasizes that the Jevons paradox remains present: increases in fuel-use efficiency often stimulate higher demand rather than reduction. He situates this analysis within the framework of the mode of production, arguing that the logic of capitalist accumulation is itself the source of ecological crisis, while instruments such as the EU ETS are insufficient to achieve absolute decoupling. Bithas and Kalimeris (2022) provide additional evidence that, despite the decline in material intensity (MI), absolute resource use has increased massively: globally by 857%, in Japan by 4786%, and in China by 705%, demonstrating that coupling still dominates. This confirms that relative decoupling should not be misinterpreted as an indicator of sustainability. A series of authors have problematized the alternative narratives of green growth. Tilsted et al. (2021) propose the concept of genuine green growth (GGG) but show that results depend on the choice of accounting method: when only territorial emissions are considered, Nordic countries appear as success stories, but when consumption-based emissions are included, the criteria are not met. They warn of the risk of greenwashing, especially when decoupling relies on imported bioenergy. D’Amato and Korhonen (2021) analyze the narratives of GE, CE, and BE, criticizing them as fragmentary approaches: GE is often limited to neoliberal projects, CE is reduced to recycling without addressing the social dimension, while BE risks commodifying biological resources. Haberl et al. (2020) add that most studies focus on pressures (energy, materials, CO₂) but do not connect the results to biophysical boundaries, making decoupling a deficient concept for long-term sustainability. From a more normative perspective, a series of debates emerge between competing approaches. Hickel and Kallis (2020) defend degrowth as an alternative, viewing green growth as a political myth; while Lenaerts et al. (2021) divide the debate between renewable optimists and degrowth critics, emphasizing that the required speed of decoupling (around 9% per year according to their modeling) is far from the historical global trend of 1.8%. Mikayilov et al. (2018) also criticize the optimism of the EKC, showing that the income elasticity of emissions remains positive in most countries and that relative decoupling is not sufficient for climate objectives. Albert (2020) shifts the debate to the consequences of new technologies, emphasizing that the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” may bring not only benefits but also undesirable risks in the form of techno-authoritarianism, biosecurity, and cybersecurity. In the same critical line, Geare (2013) argues that many of the books and narratives such as Cents and Sustainability use theoretical graphs and rhetoric without engaging directly with ecological critics such as Daly, making their analysis fragile.

Degrowth represents the most radical alternative, closely linked to the thought of Georgescu-Roegen (2014), Daly, and Martínez-Alier (2012) on throughput and biophysical limits. Kallis (2011) defines it as a political and cultural project that challenges the growth imperative, while Kallis (2011) illustrate it with concrete cases such as Japan after the 1990s, Greece during the crisis, and community practices such as organic farming in Cuba. Hickel and Kallis (2020) add examples from hunter-gatherer societies in the Kalahari, shrinking cities such as Leipzig and Detroit, or eco-communes in Barcelona, showing that well-being can be maintained even without growth. Similarly, Kallis et al. (2025) emphasize that no country achieves high social outcomes without exceeding planetary boundaries, but suggest that a post-growth scenario, with fairer distribution and reduced throughput, may be more realistic. Mastini et al. (2021) add that the Green New Deal, even in its progressive versions, remains dependent on growth, creating a “GDP dependency” that degrowth seeks to overcome. Pollin (2018) represents the opposite approach, arguing that growth is necessary to finance the transition, while van den Bergh (2011) supports an “a-growth” approach that aims at indifference toward growth, but with a focus on market policies. This clash between green growth, degrowth, and a-growth clearly shows that the debate is a philosophical and normative issue beyond the technique of measurement (Schmelzer et al., 2022). From a practical perspective, empirical studies highlight tensions between narratives. Akizu-Gardoki et al. (2020) identify a “Well-being Turning Point” (~98 MWh per capita), beyond which energy use no longer improves well-being, with Romania as the only country achieving high HDI within planetary boundaries. Salahuddin et al. (2016), Sadorsky (2012), and Ishida (2015) find that digitalization typically raises energy consumption, questioning ICT-based decoupling. Schandl et al. (2016) project that global GDP will triple by 2050, while absolute material decoupling is unattainable without very strong climate policies. Hubacek et al. (2021) further stress that decoupling is often temporary and frequently shifts emissions abroad through supply chains.

In conclusion, the panorama of critiques shows that the debate on decoupling is not merely a technical matter of indicators, but a broader reflection on biophysical limits, social justice, and the political nature of the modern economy. As Jackson (2016) argues, the claims of green growth collapse in the face of the realities of externalization, rebound effects, and planetary boundaries. This debate, therefore, emerges not only as a conflict of methods but also as a paradigmatic clash over the very meaning of growth, well-being, and humanity’s future possibilities on a finite planet. The Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis can also be situated within broader debates in sustainability ethics and theories of justice. Normative frameworks such as Raworth (2018) “doughnut economics,” with its distinction between a social foundation and an ecological ceiling, and O’Neill et al.’s (2018) notion of a “safe and just space” for humanity, explicitly combine planetary boundaries with minimum social thresholds. These approaches operationalize sufficiency and justice through measurable indicators for basic human needs and biophysical limits, demonstrating that ethical criteria can be translated into empirical benchmarks. In a similar vein, the synthesis proposed here treats sufficiency thresholds and climate justice not as abstract ideals but as constraints against which claims of relative or absolute decoupling must be assessed. This positions the framework within the tradition of ecological and distributive justice in ecological economics, where the legitimacy of growth is evaluated according to its compatibility with both planetary boundaries and fair shares of resource use across countries and generations.

The debate can be synthesized around three central elements: the claim made by green growth advocates, the counterclaim advanced by degrowth critics, and the alternative framework that this article proposes.

4.1. Claim

Green growth advocates claim that absolute decoupling is achievable through technological innovation, efficiency gains, and renewable energy transitions. This claim underpins major international narratives (OECD, 2022; UNEP, 2021; World Bank, 2012) and legitimizes the pursuit of continuous GDP growth.

4.2. Counterclaim

Critics counter that empirical evidence shows only relative or temporary decoupling, often undermined by outsourcing, rebound effects, and crisis-driven contractions (Hickel & Kallis, 2020). From a philosophical perspective, such reliance on growth embodies a political myth rather than a scientifically grounded trajectory, obscuring the ethical challenges of justice and planetary limits.

4.3. Framework

To move beyond this stalemate, the article advances a multi-level decoupling synthesis. This framework integrates empirical indicators (TDI, LMDI, MRIO, CAPRO) with normative thresholds (planetary boundaries, sufficient absolute decoupling, climate justice). It reframes the debate from asking whether absolute decoupling is possible to considering under what ethical and ecological conditions decoupling claims can be regarded as legitimate (O’Neill et al., 2018).

4.4. Towards New Framework

The debate on decoupling has reached a critical point. On the one hand, supporters of green growth argue that technological innovation, increased efficiency, and the transition to renewable energy can produce absolute decoupling, a separation where GDP continues to grow while environmental pressures decline in absolute terms. On the other hand, degrowth critics emphasize that what is most often documented in the literature is only relative decoupling, where environmental pressures grow more slowly than GDP but without absolute decline, and that evidence for sufficient absolute decoupling remains scarce and temporary. This contrast has polarized the debate between technological optimism and radical skepticism, often reducing it to a binary choice. What is missing is a framework that clearly distinguishes between relative and absolute decoupling, but also integrates empirical and normative dimensions, offering a more comprehensive way to evaluate the legitimacy of sustainability claims.

In operational terms, the Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis can be understood as a simple evaluative procedure rather than a purely abstract schema:

• Indicator selection. Analysts choose one or more empirical indicators of decoupling appropriate to the case under study (for example, Tapio elasticities, LMDI decompositions, MRIO/QMRIO models, CAPRO ratios, or TPEF-type measures).
• Specification of thresholds. Explicit normative thresholds are defined, such as Paris-consistent carbon budgets, safe per capita material or energy use levels, and fair-share principles of climate and intergenerational justice.
• Comparison and classification. Observed indicator trajectories are compared with these thresholds and classified (for example, as “no decoupling”, “relative but insufficient decoupling”, or “sufficient absolute decoupling”) with respect to ecological adequacy and distributive fairness.
• Decision support. These classifications are used to judge the legitimacy of green-growth or post-growth narratives in the specific context and to prioritize policy interventions.

In this way, the synthesis translates an apparently abstract debate on justice and sufficiency into a transparent sequence of empirical and normative steps that can guide both research design and policy assessment. The four steps are illustrated in Table 2 for the cases of the Nordic countries, Romania, and global projections, showing how empirical indicators and normative thresholds jointly determine whether decoupling claims can be considered legitimate and sufficient.

This synthesis rests on the idea that measurement instruments are not epistemically neutral. Indicators such as the TDI, LMDI decomposition, MRIO models, or the CAPRO ratio do not only capture statistical relationships; they also embody assumptions about what counts as progress and whose interests are served by the reported results. By treating indicators as carriers of hidden value judgments, the framework insists that the distinction between relative and absolute decoupling cannot remain merely technical but must always be assessed against clear normative thresholds. The framework consists of three components: empirical inputs (TDI, LMDI, MRIO, CAPRO), normative filters (planetary boundaries, sufficient absolute decoupling, climate and intergenerational justice), and evaluative outputs (judgements about the legitimacy of green-growth or post-growth pathways). Figure 4 summarizes this logic of inputs, filters and outputs in the proposed Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis.

Figure 4. Multi-Level Decoupling Synthesis. Input: empirical indicators (Tapio Index, LMDI decomposition, MRIO models, CAPRO ratio). Filters: normative thresholds (planetary boundaries, sufficient absolute decoupling, climate justice). Output: sustainable policies, post-growth narratives, and criteria to assess the validity and justice of decoupling. Source: Generated by the authors.

This synthesis makes three main contributions. First, it highlights the conceptual confusions that arise when relative and absolute decoupling are reported without reference to sufficiency thresholds. Second, it underscores the normative consequences of relying on partial or misleading indicators, which risk legitimizing unsustainable trajectories under the banner of green growth. Third, it advances a philosophically informed framework that reframes the debate around notions of legitimacy, justice, and planetary boundaries, moving it away from narrow efficiency-based measurements. In practice, this implies reformulating the guiding question of sustainability research. Rather than merely asking whether absolute decoupling is technically possible, we should ask: under what ethical and ecological conditions can decoupling be regarded as legitimate, desirable, and sufficient? This shift brings the debate closer to the core of ecological economics and the philosophy of economics, where legitimacy, distributive equity, and intergenerational justice are treated as central criteria. By advancing this multi-level synthesis, the paper seeks to move beyond the deadlock between green growth optimism and degrowth skepticism. It demonstrates that measurement practices cannot be treated as neutral technical tools but must instead be grounded in normative reasoning. Only through such an approach is it possible to construct a more reflexive and philosophically informed understanding of sustainability in a finite world.

5. Conclusions

The debate on relative and absolute decoupling illustrates both the promise and the profound limitations of approaching sustainability through technical indicators alone. While relative decoupling, where environmental pressures grow more slowly than GDP, has been frequently documented, evidence for sustained and sufficient absolute decoupling remains extremely limited, temporary, or dependent on outsourcing and crisis-driven contractions. This empirical record raises doubts about the viability of green growth as a reliable pathway to sustainability. More fundamentally, it demonstrates that the distinction between relative and absolute decoupling is not merely semantic: it embodies different assumptions about what counts as progress, about how we measure success, and about who bears the costs and benefits of growth. From an epistemic perspective, measurement tools such as the TDI, LMDI decomposition, MRIO models, or the CAPRO ratio are often treated as neutral techniques. Yet these instruments do more than register statistical correlations; they embed normative assumptions about what matters, which boundaries are recognized, and whose welfare is prioritized. For instance, an apparent case of absolute decoupling at the national level may conceal hidden increases in global emissions once trade and consumption-based accounting are considered. Likewise, reporting relative decoupling as a success risks legitimizing continued growth even when ecological limits are being breached. These examples underscore that the empirical distinction between relative and absolute decoupling carries unavoidable normative implications. The contribution of this article lies in advancing a multi-level decoupling synthesis that integrates empirical indicators with normative sufficiency criteria. The framework proposes that empirical inputs, such as elasticity measures, decomposition techniques, or input–output models, should be systematically filtered through normative thresholds. These filters include planetary boundaries, the concept of sufficient absolute decoupling aligned with the 1.5 °C carbon budget, and the principles of climate justice across countries and generations. Only by applying such filters can we move beyond the narrow focus on whether some form of decoupling is observable, toward the more pressing question of whether the observed decoupling is ecologically adequate and socially legitimate. This synthesis reframes the debate in three ways. First, it exposes the epistemic confusion between relative and absolute decoupling, showing why evidence of the former cannot be equated with evidence of the latter. Second, it highlights the normative consequences of treating measurement tools as neutral: indicators that show efficiency gains may mask continued ecological overshoot and distributive injustice. Third, it provides a conceptual bridge between empirical methods and philosophical concerns, recasting decoupling as not only a technical issue but a question of legitimacy, justice, and sustainability. The implications of this approach extend beyond academic taxonomy. For policymaking, the synthesis suggests that reporting efficiency improvements or relative decoupling is insufficient grounds for declaring green growth a success. Policies must be judged against whether they deliver sufficient absolute decoupling in line with planetary boundaries and fairness criteria. For research, the framework encourages greater reflexivity in the use of indicators: instead of multiplying ever more sophisticated models, scholars should ask how measurement choices embody normative commitments, and how alternative framings might better reflect ecological realities. For philosophy of economics, the framework demonstrates that debates about growth and sustainability cannot be separated from questions of value, justice, and legitimacy.

In closing, the debate over relative and absolute decoupling is not simply about whether technological innovation can deliver efficiency gains. It is about whether societies are willing to confront the normative thresholds that define sufficiency, and whether claims of green growth can be sustained once justice and planetary boundaries are taken seriously. The originality of this article rests in reframing decoupling through a multi-level synthesis that makes explicit the ethical and epistemic dimensions of measurement practices. Ultimately, measurement tools should no longer be treated as neutral technical devices. They must be evaluated against criteria of sufficiency and fairness across countries and generations. Only then can the distinction between relative and absolute decoupling become not just a matter of statistics but a meaningful guide to legitimate and sustainable futures.