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An Agent-Based Empirical Game Theory Approach for Airport Security Patrols

Air Transport And Operations Group, Delft University of Technology, Kluyverweg 1, 2629HS Delft, The Netherlands
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Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
These authors contributed equally to this work.
Aerospace 2020, 7(1), 8; https://doi.org/10.3390/aerospace7010008
Received: 12 December 2019 / Revised: 7 January 2020 / Accepted: 10 January 2020 / Published: 18 January 2020
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Aviation Logistics and Supply Chain Management)
Airports are attractive targets for terrorists, as they are designed to accommodate and process large amounts of people, resulting in a high concentration of potential victims. A popular method to mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks is through security patrols, but resources are often limited. Game theory is commonly used as a methodology to find optimal patrol routes for security agents such that security risks are minimized. However, game-theoretic models suffer from payoff uncertainty and often rely solely on expert assessment to estimate game payoffs. Experts cannot incorporate all aspects of a terrorist attack in their assessment. For instance, attacker behavior, which contributes to the game payoff rewards, is hard to estimate precisely. To address this shortcoming, we proposed a novel empirical game theory approach in which payoffs are estimated using agent-based modeling. Using this approach, we simulated different attacker and defender strategies in an agent-based model to estimate game-theoretic payoffs, while a security game was used to find optimal security patrols. We performed a case study at a regional airport, and show that the optimal security patrol is non-deterministic and gives special emphasis to high-impact areas, such as the security checkpoint. The found security patrol routes are an improvement over previously found security strategies of the same case study. View Full-Text
Keywords: agent-based modeling; patrolling games; security game; airport security; empirical game theory agent-based modeling; patrolling games; security game; airport security; empirical game theory
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Janssen, S.; Matias, D.; Sharpanskykh, A. An Agent-Based Empirical Game Theory Approach for Airport Security Patrols. Aerospace 2020, 7, 8.

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