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Electronics
  • Article
  • Open Access

30 October 2021

Detection of Security Attacks in Industrial IoT Networks: A Blockchain and Machine Learning Approach

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Systems and Computing Engineering Department, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá 111711, Colombia
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Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
This article belongs to the Special Issue Artificial Intelligence Applications in Next Generation Communication Infrastructures Security

Abstract

Internet of Things (IoT) networks have been integrated into industrial infrastructure schemes, positioning themselves as devices that communicate highly classified information for the most critical companies of world nations. Currently, and in order to look for alternatives to mitigate this risk, solutions based on Blockchain algorithms and Machine Learning techniques have been implemented separately with the aim of mitigating potential threats in IIoT networks. In this paper, we sought to integrate the previous solutions to create an integral protection mechanism for IoT device networks, which would allow the identification of threats, activate secure information transfer mechanisms, and it would be adapted to the computational capabilities of industrial IoT. The proposed solution achieved the proposed objectives and is presented as a viable mechanism for detecting and containing intruders in an IoT network. In some cases, it overcomes traditional detection mechanisms such as an IDS.

1. Introduction

The Internet of Things (IoT) has managed to permeate various fields from home automation to industries with critical infrastructure, achieving in the latter cases, complement or in some cases replace the operation of industrial control systems such as SCADA. The wide applicability of the IoT devices allows to technify fields of the industry whose technological maturity has been relatively low. Some of the most relevant examples are associated with oil exploitation and electricity production, both fields directly associated with the national cyberdefence [1,2].
While the change of paradigm to IoT has brought great benefits, it has also generated new challenges in terms of cybersecurity and cyber defense. For example, the design of technology and architectural solutions associated with new production techniques has had to consider the possibility of strengthening IoT communications and devices to ensure the availability, integrity, and availability of information deployed on these resources. In these cases, it is necessary to establish methodologies and procedures in charge of establishing countermeasures, safeguards, and continuities that allow for the control of data cybersecurity [1,3].
The need to protect and classify the information inside the IoT infrastructure by the owners of the technology has awakened in the attackers the investigation of new techniques and mechanisms to obtain, manipulate, extract or eliminate the information processed there. This situation is completely unacceptable for the critical cybernetic infrastructures of a nation, where the damage to a portion of the technology can generate catastrophic consequences in legal, economic, social, and even environmental terms, for the entire state [1,4].
One more reason that justifies the need to work more on the security of the IoT devices is the lack of baselines. The IoT market is functionally similar, but its vendors manufacture these devices in very different ways. A 2017 IoT security survey [5] showed that 96% of businesses believe there should be regulations for IoT security. If there is no standardization or verification of device security, situations like the Mirai botnet can be easily replicated.
The IoT security issues have been addressed by seeking various defense strategies according to the layers of the IoT model: Perception, Network, and Application. For the perception layer, security strategies are based on hardware security These security strategies are described as follows [6]:
  • Authentication: Apply cryptographic hash algorithms to counter side channel attacks.
  • Privacy: Using symmetric or asymmetric encryption algorithms can prevent unauthorized access to sensor information while it is being captured or sent to the next layer.
  • Sensitive information: With a K-Anonymity approach it is possible to protect personal or location data.
  • Risk analysis: Allows to identify new threats and helps to determine the best way to prevent information leaks and ensure appropriate security strategies.
The network layer is exposed to many types of attacks, due to the transmission medium used. The techniques of the layer can be condensed into the following three [6]:
  • Authentication: A point-to-point authentication process can prevent unauthorized access to the IoT network.
  • Privacy: Monitoring network activity against any type of intrusion and activating information integrity mechanisms ensures defense against such attacks.
  • Routing Security: Implementing routing algorithms that guarantee the use of alternative paths can help the system to determine errors and have contingency mechanisms in case of intrusion.
Finally, the application layer or software provides access to the IoTs and needs to be secured. Its categories are as follows [6]:
  • Authentication: Blocking access to non-self-hosting users with strong authentication mechanisms and the creation of user profiles that allow access segregation.
  • Intrusion detection: Intrusion detection techniques can provide solutions to many security threats by generating alerts in case of suspicious activity.
  • Information security: Use of encryption technologies to prevent information theft and other malicious activities.
In order to manage the risk associated with exposure to these threats, it is necessary to establish sufficient controls that focus on the need to ensure cybersecurity, especially the integrity of the information distributed over these critical networks.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes several aspects of security problems for IIoT technology, such as its security layers and different methods to assure security capabilities in IoT, namely, Blockchain and Machine Learning. In Section 3, we propose a Machine Learning technique as well as a Blockchain method to detect and mitigate several types of attacks. Then, in the Section 4, we show the outcomes related to comparisons between our approaches and a traditional method for detecting attacks. Finally, in Section 5, we present attractive conclusions about using Blockchain and Machine Learning as a mixture solution for reducing security attacks.

3. Solution Proposal

To define the architecture to be worked on, it was decided to use the architectural models proposed for the Industrial IoT by Kirupakar and Shalinie in [22], where Cloud, Edge and Network are contemplated. Through these three layers, it is sought to standardize the processing of these kinds of distributed networks.
In this architecture (See Figure 1), the collector node is in charge of centralizing the communications of the edge and is the point where the greatest computational load is performed. This node is connected individually to each sensor node, and its main functions are to store temporary data from the sensors, process it and deliver it to the next layer of the IIoT model, the Cloud. For this proposal, the processing of the Machine Learning and Blockchain algorithms are executed in the Collector node, requiring that this node concentrates all the data and has a higher processing capacity than the sensor nodes.
Figure 1. Proposed architecture.
Regarding the sensor nodes, those are connected individually to the collector node and report to it the data acquired. For the case study, nodes have communication channels where they receive alerts to activate the defense mechanisms against the attacks described in the test scenarios. In this way, the computational load is not affected by the need to perform reprocessing or robust information encryption processes.

3.1. Machine Learning and Blockchain Algorithm’s Selection

Taking into account the low computational power of the equipment on the device layer in the deployments of IoT systems; in the algorithm selection phase, we prioritize those that will generate the least computational load for the nodes, without neglecting their main function.
Details of the selected algorithms and their implementation for both machine learning and blockchain can be found below.

3.1.1. Machine Learning Algorithm

For the selection of the Machine Learning algorithm, a comparative performance analysis was carried out among the existing algorithms, seeking to prioritize the execution time and the required computational effort. One of the design constraints for the selection of the algorithm is that it should be a supervised algorithm. This is in order to test especially the main objective of the project and obtain a functional solution, which can evolve according to the needs of a specific IIoT solution.
Taking into account the previous premise, and based on the fact that the attacks to the IIoT security are identified, the K nearest neighbors algorithm (KNN) was chosen. KNN is a supervised Machine Learning algorithm, which requires a computational calculation associated only with the distance between the nodes as can be seen in Algorithm 1 [23]. Also, this algorithm, besides being a lightweight solution is suitable for this kind of problem, since the identification of threats can be carried out considering packet parameters and network traces, this thanks to its properties as a universal classifier [24].
Algorithm 1: KNN Algorithm
  Data: Training Data Set, Test Data
  Result: Predicted class for each Test Data
  Initialization of the KNN sets
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  Attack prediction for the test data
  Offline process:
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  Real time attack prediction for the captured packets
  Online process:
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The complexity of the KNN algorithm is calculated according to the following formula: O ( n + k ) , where n is the total number of preloaded samples and k is the distance from the analyzed value (See Algorithm 1). In this sense, the algorithm is able to adapt to the needs of our solution.
The training of the machine learning model was carried out according to Figure 2; on the one hand, offline training was carried out with data from the proposed scenario attacks, as seen in the first steps of the scheme. On the other hand, and for the test scenarios, data from the attacks defined in real time were used.
Figure 2. Classification Model.
For the training, first, the data is organized and classified according to the controlled attacks that are to be studied in the network; once the algorithm is trained with this data, it is tested on real-time traffic, and the packets are classified in defined time intervals, as observed in the second process.
The intrusion detection model is based on the identification of intruders by means of packet capture, focusing on the parameters of the TCP/IP model packets presented in Table 2. It is important to remark that these parameters were chosen for their importance in the target integrity attacks.
Table 2. Selected TCP/IP parameters.

3.1.2. Blockchain Algorithm

For the implementation of Blockchain, a lightweight solution was chosen [25] that respected the principles of the technology, and was coupled with the IoT technology. In this sense, a solution was defined where the block chain is located in the collector of the Edge and, through the previous registration of keys, this communicates safely with the nodes of the IIoT network. By centralizing the computational effort in the collector, the load on the nodes is reduced, thus avoiding the effect on the regular computational activities of the business served by the IIoT network.
The proposed algorithm (see Algorithm 2) makes use of SHA-256 and AES technologies to generate a centralized block chain in the collector, together with the communication channels previously established with the nodes [25]. The nodes have 128-bit keys with which they encrypt the communication in the network, and the collector stores it in the block chain. This principle was used maintaining the performance purpose of the architecture and preserving the functions of the edge without reloading the sensor nodes.
Algorithm 2: Blockchain Algorithm with AES
  Data: Edge Node Encryption Key Set (K), Current transaction time, Sensor
     information to be recorded
  Result: Secure storage of Edge sensor information
  Initialization of the chain
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  Capturing communication packets from the node
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  Creating a new block
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  Verification of chain integrity
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4. Experimental Results

In this section, we present the test scenario to be evaluated, namely, the scenario configuration, the launching attacks, and the blockchain and machine learning algorithms setup. This scenario is tested to evaluate the attack detection performance of our proposal against a traditional security solution, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS).

4.1. Scenario Configuration

To test the preservation of data integrity at the network edge, two representative attacks were chosen: a packet injection with false data (a fuzzing attack) and a denial of service attack (DoS) attack from a malicious host on the sensor node network. These controlled attacks were carried out in the test scenario implemented according to Figure 3.
Figure 3. Test scenario.
The nodes of the proposed test scenario were configured using Debian as the operating system for the collector, Raspbian for the nodes, and Kali Linux for the malicious node. This scheme was virtualized under the VirtualBox software with a virtual network card, where the communications between the parties took place. In addition, we used Python 3, HPING3, TShark, and PyCharm.

4.2. Attacks Configuration

We selected the UNSWNB15 dataset to evaluate our proposed scheme. This dataset was generated by the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) [26], which corresponds to a new generation of industrial IoT (IIoT) dataset in order to evaluate and calibrate the performance of artificial intelligence/machine learning cybersecurity applications. This dataset consists of a total of 49 features and nine types of attacks [26]. These attacks include fuzzers, backdoors, analysis, reconnaissance, exploits, generic, DoS, shellcode, and worms (see Table 3). The total number of features were reduced to the features described in Table 2, that is, the following nine features: protocol, frame size, source port, destination port, epoch time, TTL, flags, window size, and sequence number [26]. This reduction was necessary to properly adapt the original dataset (the UNSWNB15 dataset) to our solution architecture explained in Section 3.1.1.
Table 3. List of attacks.
Based on the threat collection developed by the OWASP IoT group for 2018 [27], where it is established that the three most relevant threats to the IoT model are weak passwords, network threats, and insecure interfaces. Two of the most common attacks on this kind of networks were chosen: the spoofing attacks (related to insecure interfaces) and the denial of service attacks (concerning the network threats). In this sense, from the UNSWNB15 dataset, we have selected the DoS and Fuzzers attacks to represent these two of the most common attacks (see Table 3).

4.3. K-Nearest Neighbors Algorithm Setup and Results

The objective of this algorithm setup was to find the correct values for the algorithm, in order to identify, in real time, that the network is under attack. This involves identifying the malicious packets and, then, generating an alert to the nodes.
For this reason, three proof scenarios were defined: in the first, only the traces obtained from the fuzzers attack were used, in the second we used the traces generated by the denial of services attack, and for the third scenario, we combined traces from both attacks.
The tuning of the selected Machine Learning algorithm was done by adjusting the following variables:
  • Number of neighbors: The KNN algorithm is based on calculating the closest distance between the data, that is, it categorizes new data according to its closeness to the others. If this value increases, it takes a greater amount of more distant elements to evaluate.
  • Amount of traces: The amount of traces affects the learning process and load of the algorithm.
For each proof scenario, both the efficiency of the model and the loading time were measured. For the first performance indicator, the model was trained with 80% of the traces and the remaining were used to measure the effectiveness of detection; for the second, the time taken by the model to preload the data was calculated. Many values of the number of neighbors and traces were considered to find the best parameters configuration in order to achieve the best performance in terms of accuracy. Table 4 shows the results obtained in these tests.
Table 4. Machine learning Results.
Notice that, in Table 4, “DoS” indicates traces with normal and DoS traffic, “Fuzzers” indicates traces with normal and Fuzzers traffic, and “DoS and Fuzzers” indicates traces with normal, DoS and Fuzzers traffic. These traces were used for training and testing our KNN algorithm to obtain the best accuracy for detecting these attacks.
Many other configurations were tested (hundreds of them), but for practical reasons, we have not included more results. Anyway, the values obtained in Table 4 were the more representative results in order to select the best parameters configuration. In this sense, the best accuracy achieved (97%) for “DoS” was for 50,000 traces and 224 neighbors. The best accuracy achieved (99%) for “Fuzzers” was for 100,000 traces and 5000 neighbors. Finally, the best accuracy achieved (92%) for “DoS and Fuzzers” was for 120,000 traces and 5000 neighbors.
As a result, it was found that for each of the attack cases tested, the effectiveness of the classification model was greater than 90%. This was achieved by adjusting the parameters “number of traces” and “number of neighbours”. The number of neighbors was based on the square root of the number of traces and decreased as the effectiveness of detection increased [28]. For each of these best cases described previously, we have tested them many additional times for obtaining statistical results. For example, for the best configuration of “DoS”, we have tested it 25 times for 50,000 traces and 224 neighbors in order to determine the confidence interval of the 97% value for accuracy obtained previously. These results are shown in Table 5. In addition, many other metrics are shown as results such as Precision, Recall, and F1-score. For most of these metrics, we have obtained a performance above 90% and upper and lower intervals were so close, showing a very good efficiency for detecting DoS and Fuzzers attacks under the best parameters configuration achieved previously.
Table 5. Confidence interval results.

4.4. Blockchain Algorithm Setup and Results

Notice that through the blockchain algorithm we want to initiate a process of encryption and verification of the integrity of the transactions carried out by the nodes of the IoT network, when the network is under attack. The tuning of the Blockchain algorithm was done by adjusting the following variables:
  • Total number of blocks: This allows us to determine until what point the algorithm can support transactions without wasting time between transactions and verifying the integrity of the chain.
  • Number of simultaneous nodes: This variable allows us to know if it is possible to scale the model to larger and more distributed IIoT networks
The model was tested forcing the registration of the values in the Blockchain by modifying the time between the registration of transactions, in order to generate more hashes of constant value and try to overload the algorithm. For these hashes, the correct position in the chain and the timestamp were verified. In Table 6 and Table 7 we shown the different values of total and simultaneous blocks tested.
Table 6. Blockchain blocks results.
Table 7. Blockchain node results.
As can be seen in Table 6 and Table 7, the proposed blockchain solution supports a high load and handles excellent times. Increasing the number of concurrent nodes and/or overloading the chain with multiple transactions does not affect the response time of the solution, thus guaranteeing the scalability of our proposal.

4.5. Comparative Analysis of the Results Obtained against an IDS

An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a software application that attempts to identify malicious network activity. This tool is being widely used as one of the solution mechanisms to the problem raised in this work. In order to compare the effectiveness of our proposal against this kind of solution, we selected a Snort implementation, specifically EasyIDS [29].
As mentioned above, once the detected real-time traffic is analyzed by our machine learning algorithm, it can generate two possible results. If the traffic is classified as normal traffic, the nodes make transparent communication of the information associated with their sensor devices, as shown in Figure 4. On the contrary, if the captured traffic is classified as malicious traffic, the collector sends an alert to the nodes and requires them to make use of the pre-shared keys to secure the transmission of the information from their nodes, as can be seen in Figure 5.
Figure 4. Normal Capture.
Figure 5. Ciphered transmission.
In order to have a baseline for comparison, we executed the attack scripts were executed from the malicious node (Kali Linux) and was installed and configured the IDS on the edge node. As a result, for the DoS denial attacks the IDS was able to identify 100% of the malicious traffic generated as can be seen in Figure 6; whilst for the packet injection attack, by means of a Fuzzing attack, the IDS was not able to recognize the injected traffic as is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 6. Snort DoS attack result.
Figure 7. Snort Injection Attack result.
Subsequently, the same attack scripts were executed (once again using the Kali Linux node) and the defense mechanism proposed in this article was activated. The following results were obtained: for the Denial of Services attack, our algorithm was able to detect 100% of the malicious traffic, just like the IDS (See Figure 8). On the other hand, for the case of the packet injection attack (Fuzzing attack), our machine learning algorithm was able to identify the malicious traffic and send alerts to the nodes which began to transmit in encrypted mode, as you can see in Figure 9.
Figure 8. Machine Learning DoS attack result.
Figure 9. Machine Learning Injection attack result.
As can be seen, Snort’s chances against a spoofing attack like the one proposed are null; however, they can identify attacks such as denial of service. On the contrary, both types of attacks are identified satisfactorily with the Machine Learning algorithm developed.

5. Conclusions

Combining machine learning and blockchain strategies allowed us to establish a strategy for identifying and mitigating attackers in real time in an IIoT network. Similarly, it reduces the computational efforts of the network nodes, as long as the network is free of intruders and no additional encryption processes are being executed. The proposed solutions found in the state of art tend to focus on independent security solutions and do not contemplate an integrated mechanism for monitoring and securing IIoT networks. This work proposes an integrated system for the detection and containment of intruders on the Edge.
The model developed is capable of identifying diverse attacks under the premise that they must be reproduced and identified previously to train the model. The model is versatile and responds very well to load and scalability increases, where performance fluctuation is very low.
The algorithm proved to be superior in some aspects to traditional solutions such as IDS in the identification of more sophisticated attacks. Thus, contributing to the traditional security of IIoT devices, its real-time identification component is crucial to stop attacks on critical infrastructure and; therefore, avoid significant impact on national security. Taking into account its versatility, it is possible to carry out real implementations that can identify intruders in real time and contain them with little computational effort in networks as small and not very scalable as IoT networks.

Author Contributions

All authors contributed to the fulfillment of this paper. In detail, the paper conceptualization and methodology were accomplished by all the authors. The original draft preparation, the software tests, and the validations were carried out by H.V., while the technique review was accomplished by C.L.-G. and G.A.M. The final review and editing phases were completed by C.L.-G., G.A.M. and Y.D. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

Funding

All authors acknowledge financial provided by the Vice Presidency for Research & Creation publication fund at the Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The original UNSWNB15 dataset [26] used to analyze attacks in IoT networks can be found at https://research.unsw.edu.au/projects/unsw-nb15-dataset (accessed on 1 October 2020).

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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