The Impact of Volition on the Capacity to Express Matrimonial Consent: A Cross-Disciplinary Issue

Abstract

This article inaugurates a series of scholarly inquiries undertaken by academics from the disciplines of canon law, psychology, and theology, which makes it inherently interdisciplinary. Recognizing the foundations of marital indissolubility, the authors seek to analyze the role of discernment and volition in the formulation of matrimonial consent by nupturients. Each person enjoys the innate right to contract matrimony. This right may be circumscribed by (i) an incapacity to formulate an act of will (give matrimonial consent), (ii) a substantial defect in its formulation, (iii) lack of ability to execute it, or (iv) a prohibition derived from divine law—whether natural or positive—or from man-made law. Accordingly, the authors examine matters pertaining to processes to declare the nullity of marriage, with a focus on the evidentiary role of expert testimony, typically provided by psychologists. Given the interdisciplinary nature of their inquiry, the authors have drawn extensively on the literature from the fields of canon law, psychology, and theological studies. Mindful of its theoretical orientation, the authors regard this article as a prologue to subsequent research on selected matrimonial nullity cases processed by ecclesiastical tribunals, with emphasis on the analysis of opinions issued by tribunal-appointed expert psychologists.

1. Introduction

Matrimonial (marital) consent is an act of volition closely bound to an act of intellect, through which a man and a woman mutually surrender to and receive each other for the purpose of contracting marriage. Decisive is the interior determination of the will, subsequently expressed through words or other equivalent signs. Presumption holds that the uttered words conform to the decision made. Matrimonial consent comprises the decision to contract marriage, the acceptance of its essential properties, and the will to accomplish its purposes. Consequently, prior to the celebration of matrimony, ministers conducting the canonical and pastoral examination ascertain, among other things, the genuine and free volition of the nupturients to marry and the absence, on either side, of any exclusion of its essential properties or purposes. They likewise ascertain that the nupturients do not withhold from each other essential information likely to affect the other’s decision, and that neither conditions the celebration of marriage upon the fulfilment of any extra condition. As a general presumption, the nupturients are deemed to possess the requisite psychological capacity to marry. Yet it must be recognized that the psychological state may bear upon the process of decision-making in contracting marriage, for impairments of the mental faculties can render, in some cases, a person incapable of a human act and, therefore, of formulating matrimonial consent (Majer and Adamowicz 2021, pp. 154–57).

The present study is the first in a planned series aimed at an in-depth reflection—based on the analysis of specific cases—on key issues in the jurisprudence of marriage nullity processes and the possible ways of addressing them. In this introductory article, we will examine the impact of volition on the capacity to express matrimonial consent through the lens of various cognate academic disciplines.

2. Theological Perspective

Absent a theological understanding, the indissolubility of sacramental matrimony would be reduced to the mere outcome of the spouses’ vow before God, given within particular circumstances and form. Placing primary emphasis on the vow obscures the broader dimension of marital consent. The ambit of the decision concerns not only specific commitments toward a particular woman or man but also the fact that marriage, as a sacrament, is embedded in the divine order of creation and covenant and is thereby governed by its laws. Through marital consent, a person enters into this divinely established order, which lies beyond human competence to alter. More specifically, marriage—as a form of vocation—is meant to reflect the creation of man in the “image and likeness” of God. Each spouse is called to grow into a human being in whom God’s image and likeness, though marred by original sin, are progressively revealed. The spouses are to become one in two persons, thus establishing a communion of love that mirrors the relations among the Persons of the Holy Trinity. It is precisely within this likeness that the capacity for irrevocable decisions is inscribed—a capacity which, as Joseph Ratzinger notes, is among the fundamental elements of the human image, reflecting the irrevocability of God’s “yes” in the covenant (Ratzinger 2017, p. 529). This anthropological dimension is actualized in the substance of the essential conjugal obligations: rising above mere biology and self-interest, having the capacity to seek the truth about the good of marriage and of the spouse, and effecting that good in a spirit of sacrifice. This is a beautiful anthropology—one that sees man as never having fallen out of God’s hands and as capable of transcending mere biological and psychological mechanisms and functions. Only in the light of such an anthropology is canonical matrimony possible1 (Merecki 2012, p. 9). Highlighting this point appears essential in relation to the so-called “scientific” vision of man, one grounded in evolutionary and materialist philosophy and frequently advanced as the only admissible one within science (Hofmann and Hayes 2020; Sapolsky 2023). Concurrently, a vision of the human person reduced to mere biology entails the conviction that man is but a tragic aberration of nature, destined for a life whose purpose is confined to biological ends, while all else remains illusory2 (Godin 2003; Müller 2022, pp. 140–41). Pope Benedict XVI highlighted the need to recognize and strengthen, within the vision of man, the capacity for self-transcendence and, arising from it, the capacity for marriage, in his address to the officials of the Tribunal of the Roman Rota on 29 January 2009, “First of all, there is a need for a new and positive appreciation of the capacity to marry belonging in principle to every human person by virtue of his or her very nature as a man or a woman. We tend in fact to risk falling into a kind of anthropological pessimism which, in the light of today’s cultural context, would consider marriage as practically impossible.”3

Hence, marital indissolubility arises from the very essence of the human being, created in the image and likeness of God, and from matrimonial consent, which functions as a ratification inscribing this specific union within the order of creation and covenant. Acknowledging that the sources of marital indissolubility surpass human decision, consideration must be given to the role of human discernment and volition in eliciting matrimonial consent and thus in integrating the spouses’ lives into the covenant reality. In the sacrament of matrimony, the will of three parties is essential: that of both spouses and that of God. As the divine will is perfect, the aforesaid ratification may be rendered invalid solely on account of a defect in the will of the spouses. The significance of will—and, in exceptional cases, the potential incapacity to express or exercise it, as suggested by anthropological principles—is therefore a fundamental issue in the practice of adjudicating in cases to declare the nullity of marriage.

Given that free will constitutes a personal attribute—a faculty permitting autonomous determinations (Wyrostkiewicz 2005, p. 580), and that incapacity to elicit or exercise it renders matrimonial consent invalid, a crucial question arises: Does human decisional autonomy imply a severance from reality, from all things and all persons? Does every act of choice signify the operation of free will? The very expression “free will” refers to two values: will and freedom. W. Wicher explains this as follows: “Will is not, of itself, an unconditioned faculty, being contingent upon reason, instincts, affections, setting, upbringing, heredity, innate propensities, and, ultimately, the grace of God. In other words, freedom of will denotes a volition marked by: person’s independence from external constraint, independence from causality within psychic processes, and the self-determining power to select both aims and motives” (Wicher 1969, p. 126). From a theological stance, the expression “independence from external constraint” may raise concern. Would not the action of divine grace—manifested, for instance, through the commandments—constitute an external constraint? As J. Ratzinger points out, quite the opposite is true, “only when our will rests in the will of God does it become truly will and truly free” (Ratzinger 2000, p. 187). Within the ambit of matrimonial consent and its possible invalidity, no less critical and problematic would be the notion of independence from causality within psychic processes.

Internal psychic processes include, among others, genetic propensities, neurochemical disorders, developmental factors, personality traits, trauma and stress, lifestyle, and chronic illnesses. In such a complex and multifaceted field of inquiry, it must be emphasized that not all of these processes necessarily preclude or permanently impair the ability to make a decision on marital consent. The period of engagement assumes a pivotal role in preparing for marriage. Throughout this period, the Church obliges the betrothed to attend a series of meetings with pastors and psychologists, principally to confirm their capacity to make the matrimonial decision and to undertake the obligations intrinsic to the sacrament. Within this framework, the betrothal period serves as a time in which the prospective spouses learn more about each other, including about their personality structures and psychological dispositions, etc. When earnestly embraced, betrothal is not only a time for making an individual and free decision to establish the sacramental bond but, ultimately, a shared decision of the couple (matrimonial consent). It is also a period for the acceptance, or rejection, of recognized frailties, deficiencies, and defects. Thus, within the ecclesial context, free will in contracting matrimony is conceived as autonomy, or independence, from causality operative within psychic processes.

Moreover, human decisions and the exercise of free will require a profound apprehension of the Creator’s will, of the person himself or herself, and of the truth about humanity and life vocation. Hence, there must be a close collaboration between reason and free will, in which—according to the understanding of St. Thomas Aquinas—we are dealing with a will that desires the good as presented by reason, or, as John Paul II put it, “deliberate will,” cognizant of truth, experiencing it, and discerning good from evil. It therefore needs conscience, which leads to freedom and yields to the guidance of the Holy Spirit. Conscience is not a purely passive implementation of divine law but entails “a genuine hermeneutical effort that invokes the freedom of the subject” (Melina 1991, p. 112). While it applies norms subjectively and directly, it should mirror the divine law, the objective truth (Wróbel 1994, pp. 51–52), and embody natural moral laws (Kowalczyk 1992, pp. 121–22). Hence, the Church unceasingly reminds us of the necessity of conscience formation, including through the ordinary Magisterial teaching, conceived as an aid to man in the attainment of personal freedom.

Thus, within this theological framework, the following progression can be discerned: the collaboration of reason and free will (conscious will), truth, conscience, and freedom. Should any of these constituent elements be destabilized or denied, a human person risks, contrary to his or her God-given nature, transforming the gift of freedom into its own negation. In particular, contemporary theologians caution against a conception of freedom severed from truth, thus elevating freedom to the status of an absolute and the fount of values. As one modern moralist notes, “The graver peril of such forms lies in person’s frequent beguilement by the mere semblance of freedom, leaving them unaware of their bondage and disinclined to seek true liberation” (Nagórny 2003, p. 70).

The exercise of the gift of freedom and free will is closely linked to the use of reason, the pursuit of truth, and moral growth. The weakness of human will may therefore stem from neglect, whether culpable or not, or from external and uncontrollable factors. This reality is reflected in the provisions of the Code of Canon Law. Particular attention must be directed to the gradation of acts of will. There is a perfect act of will, denoting full volitional consent, and an imperfect act of will marked by diminished freedom, lack of full volitional consent, conditioned, and encumbered with doubt or even resistance (Ciuła 2014, p. 126).

3. The Perspective of Canon Law

As provided in Can. 1057 § 1 CIC, matrimony is constituted by the consent of persons qualified to contract it, expressed in accordance with the law, a consent which no human authority is able to substitute.4 This fundamental principle of canonical matrimonial law highlights the centrality of consent in the legal construct of marriage. The definition found in the 1983 Code of Canon Law echoes the teaching of the Second Vatican Council. The constitution Gaudium et spes (48) affirms that “the intimate partnership of married life and love has been established by the Creator and qualified by His laws, and is rooted in the jugal covenant of irrevocable personal consent.”5 Marital consent stands as the efficient cause of marriage and a necessary condition for its existence.

In Can. 1057 § 2 CIC, the ecclesial legislator provides, “Matrimonial consent is an act of the will by which a man and a woman mutually give and accept each other through an irrevocable covenant in order to establish marriage.6

Also, the Catechism of the Catholic Church provides a definition of marital consent—it is “a human act by which the partners mutually give themselves to each other;”7 moreover, “the consent must be an act of the will of each of the contracting parties, free of coercion or grave external fear. No human power can substitute for this consent. If this freedom is lacking the marriage is invalid.”8

Each human being possesses the innate right to contract matrimony. This right may be circumscribed by (i) an incapacity to formulate an act of will (give matrimonial consent), (ii) a substantial defect in its formulation, (iii) lack of ability to execute it, or (iv) a prohibition derived from divine law—whether natural or positive—or from man-made law. Thus, for the valid celebration of marriage, an act of will must be lawfully expressed by persons legally qualified to marry and unencumbered by matrimonial impediments. Furthermore, such consent must be entirely free from force.

The examination of the validity of marital consent concerns the following grounds for the nullity of marriage: incapacity to give consent (incapacitas); absence of consent; defects vitiating consent (vitia consensus); and failure to observe the prescribed form for expressing marital consent (leges irritantes) (Góralski 1992, p. 202).

What, then, is the actual bearing of volition upon the validity of matrimonial consent and, consequently, upon the very existence of sacramental matrimony if such consent is the fundamental and efficient cause whereby marriage between a woman and a man becomes a fact?

Matrimonial nullity may thus arise from circumstances impinging upon volition, constraining it to a degree that, under natural law, consent cannot be deemed given validly or effectively (Pawluk 1996, p. 156). For anyone undertaking a juridic act must be naturally and legally qualified9 (Góralski 2018, p. 90). Incapable of contracting marriage are those who lack the sufficient use of reason.10 They are not capable of performing an act of will, which requires prior use of reason and the presence of a certain psychic ability (Graczyk 2012, p. 462). Deficiency in the use of reason may arise, for example, from age, mental disorders, intellectual impairment, or a state excluding consciousness experienced by the nupturient at the time of giving matrimonial consent. In canon law, a minor under the age of seven is referred to as an infant and deemed incapable of directing his or her own actions due to the lack of use of reason.11 Those who are permanently incapable of the use of reason are regarded as infants under the law.12 Absence of the use of reason is tied to the absence of even a minimal understanding of the essence of marriage, an unawareness of the gravity of the decision and its consequences, and a lack of rudimentary knowledge about the union to be contracted. No capacity for even elementary rational deliberation rules out any volition to contract matrimony, for no decision can be made with respect to a reality that the mind neither comprehends nor can encompass. With respect to matrimony, there is a requirement of minimal knowledge about marriage: the nupturient must be aware that marriage is a permanent communion of a man and a woman, ordered toward the generation of offspring through sexual cooperation.13 Therefore, when considering the impact of mental or neurological illnesses and intellectual impairments on the validity of expressing will and marital consent, it is necessary to examine whether the given disorder or degree of cognitive deficit so distorts rational processes and constrains intellect that the individual was unable to apprehend and comprehend the minimal knowledge requisite for marriage. Only in such a case can a marriage be proven invalid due to lack of the use of reason (Can. 1095 no. 1 CIC). If disorders or other circumstances related to intellectual limitations did not affect the minimum knowledge of marriage, but in another significant way prevented the spouse from functioning in the marriage, other grounds for invalidity of marriage for psychological reasons should be considered—canon 1095 n. 2—lack of evaluative discernment regarding the essential marital obligations or Can. 1095 no. 3—incapacity for reasons of a psychological nature to undertake and fulfil the essential marital obligations. Still, in the above cases of grounds for nullity, the will and consent were validly expressed, following a deliberate cognitive process and a will to enter into marriage. The nupturients demonstrate a proper understanding of matrimony; thus, the inquiry focuses on issues of the essential obligations of marriage and the knowledge and competency to assume and fulfil them.

The second ground for matrimonial nullity, which pertains to the examination of the nupturient’s will, is the simulation of matrimonial consent (simulatio consensus matrimonialis). According to Can. 1101 §2, marriage is invalid if either or both of the parties, by a positive act of will, exclude marriage itself (total simulation), some essential element of marriage, or some essential property of marriage (partial simulation). In instances of simulation, volition is the efficient cause. The nupturient’s will is in direct contradiction to the outward manifestation of matrimonial consent, thereby vitiating its validity. Given that matrimonial consent is the founding act of the conjugal bond between the contracting parties, a will opposed to that consent invalidates the marriage.

The essential difference between total simulation and partial simulation lies in the subject of the will. In the case of total simulation, there is a single act of will, namely, the intent to reject marriage entirely, which is directed against the very act of contracting matrimony. In contrast, partial simulation involves two distinct acts of will: one is the intention to marry, while the other signifies the rejection of an essential property or element of marriage. In cases of partial simulation, the nupturient intends to marry but withholds consent to an essential property or element of marriage. Essentially, their will is not to desire marriage or one of its properties or elements.

To prove simulation requires demonstrating the categorical nature of the will—one firmly set on carrying its resolution into effect. This should not be confused or equated with a mere wish or inclination. Rather, a positive (and explicit) and excluding act of will must be elicited with authentic deliberation (Góralski 2021, p. 133).

Another ground for nullity influenced by the will is the contracting of marriage under a condition related to the future.14 A marriage is invalidly contracted when the nupturient wills to subject matrimonial consent to a future contingency. Here again, volition is determinative of the consent, essential for the conjugal bond to exist. Accordingly, the incorporation of specific conditions qualifies the existence of the matrimonial contract. A condition to matrimonial consent may be added exclusively through a volitional act of the nupturient who, although expressing the intent to contract marriage, subordinates its valid conclusion to the realization or non-realization of a specific circumstance or future event (Góralski 2011, p. 225; Majer 2011, p. 825; Viladrich 2002, p. 368). In order to preclude a circumstance in which the validity of the matrimonial bond might be suspended, the ecclesial legislator explicitly prescribes that the existence of a condition related to the future invalidates matrimonial consent. The ratio legis underpinning this norm is grounded in the principle of the indissolubility of marriage. By contrast, where a condition pertains to the past or present time, a marriage so contracted is valid or not, contingent upon the actual existence or non-existence of the subject of that condition.15

The final situation in which the will determines the nullity of marriage is when the union is entered into under coercion or grave external fear.16 From the juridic standpoint, the assessment of invalidity of marriage in cases involving force is relatively straightforward: a decision to marry cannot be elicited under any form of pressure, let alone violence. Any juridic act performed under ineluctable external coercion is absolutely void.17 The expression of matrimonial consent must constitute a volitional act that is free, conscious, and voluntary. Where the sole means for a nupturient to liberate himself or herself from force or grave fear is to choose to marry, such consent is deemed defective, thereby nullifying the matrimonial bond. To demonstrate the existence of fear (metus), which can determine the nupturient’s will, is more intricate. In such cases, the prospective spouse’s will is oriented toward contracting marriage as a safeguard against anticipated evil menaced by a third party, even though fear itself is a state of anxiety and distress experienced by the person (Kantor 2011, p. 100). The will to marry is thus compelled by external factors, yet the nupturient still intends to enter into marriage. Under conditions of coercion, the subject executes the will of the coercing party. In cases of fear, it is important to note that it may even be caused unintentionally by a third party, unlike coercion, which is always deliberate and employed to force specific behavior.

Each declaration of the nullity of marriage based on the aforementioned grounds requires a canonical matrimonial process because marriage enjoys the favor of the law and is presumed valid until proven otherwise.18 Undoubtedly, examining the will—as free, deliberate, and conscious—as the efficient cause of matrimonial consent poses significant evidentiary challenges, particularly given that canon law presumes that externally manifested consent corresponds with the internal act of will.

It should also be remembered that the ability to elicit an act of will need not be of the highest possible degree. Still, it must, however, be “sufficient,” that is, corresponding to the gravity of the act in question.

4. Psychological Perspective

One form of evidence in processes to declare the nullity of marriage may be an expert opinion,19 most often provided by specialists in psychology. The ecclesial legislator mandates the use of expert assistance in matrimonial nullity cases. This obligation is set out in Can. 1678 § 320 and in Article 203 § 121 of the procedural instruction Dignitas connubii, specifically in cases concerning impotence (Can. 1084 § 1) or a defect of consent caused by mental illness or the incapacities listed in Can. 1095.

The instruction, however, envisages a wider recourse to expert opinions. According to the rotal jurisprudenceand canonical doctrine, proposals may be found advocating the appointment of experts in matrimonial processes on additional grounds, such as simulation or force and grave fear (Can. 1101, Can. 1103) (Rozkrut 2007, p. 279).

In cases concerning the nullity of marriage due to “causes of other psychic nature,” judicial practice unfolds at the intersection of three disciplines. This intersection, as experience revealed, engendered the peril of “the exaggerated and almost automatic multiplication of declarations of nullity in cases of marital breakdown, under the pretext of the partners’ immaturity or psychological weakness.”22 This concern was voiced by Saint John Paul II in 1987, merely four years after the promulgation of the revised Codex Iuris Canonici, introducing, among others, Can. 1095 § nos 2–3, and reiterated by Benedict XVI in 2009, attesting to the persistence of the problem over a span of twenty-two years. Opinions of psychology experts introduced a certain dissonance into what had previously been a coherent relationship between the norms of canon law and the theology of the sacrament of marriage. In his 1987 address to the Tribunal of the Roman Rota, John Paul II, discerning the root of this problem, unequivocally affirmed that Christian anthropology is to underpin expert opinions (Rozkrut 2007, p. 283). Also, the procedural instruction Dignitas connubii in Article 205 § 2 suggests that, in order for the assistance of experts in cases concerning incapacity, as mentioned in Can. 1095, to be truly useful, special care must be exercised to ensure that selected experts follow the principles of Christian anthropology.23 This stipulation, however, has shown itself inadequate. Although an expert’s personal convictions may be aligned with Catholic faith, modern psychology is founded upon a concept of the human being divergent from the Christian understanding. Thus, psychological knowledge may, even implicitly, import into the canonical process of declaring the nullity of marriage an anthropology that is at variance with the Christian stance.24 At the core of this divergence lies the will, a reality pivotal to matrimonial consent.

During their university training, future psychologists are instructed to conceptualize the human being in terms of mechanisms and functions; they absorb a conceptual framework that conveys a vision of people essentially deprived of free will.25 The very term “will” is often categorically repudiated within the psychological fraternity, and endeavors to resuscitate the tradition of research on volition can even create “allergic reactions,” as noted by Maria Straś-Romanowska in her analysis of the sources of marginalization of this concept.

The category of will has come to be deemed an archaism, evoking psychology’s philosophical descent and its so-called pre-scientific epoch, when it was conceived as a field of knowledge about the soul… Moreover, the notion of will is linked to numerous and diversely framed philosophical doctrines asserting that man is an ontologically free being, albeit in that freedom subject to various constraints. Will, apprehended as an expression of human freedom, namely, as free will, a primordial and essential property of man (and not an acquired quality of the mind, as scientistic interpretations of voluntary acts maintain) was thereby excluded from a psychology aspiring to establish itself as a scientific discipline, cultivated, according to positivist canons, in the image of the natural sciences. According to opponents of research on will in its traditional sense, the notion of “will” implies the existence of some superior and autonomous instance within the human psyche—akin to a homunculus—that governs psychic processes, yet remains inaccessible to objective inquiry. Therefore, will cannot be the subject of scientific research. Concurrently, the notion of “will” conveys a piece of para-information suggesting that man does not wholly belong to the natural world but transcends its cause-and-effect and stochastic laws (Straś-Romanowska 2001).

Consequently, while experts are expected to evaluate the impact of psychopathology on the defendant on their “personal freedom in managing themselves and their essential conduct” (Viladrich 2002, p. 81), the psychological formation that they received at universities or in postgraduate programs has largely abandoned engagement with free will in its classical sense. Psychology, a comparatively recent discipline emerging from philosophy in the latter half of the nineteenth century, has, from its inception, situated the questions of the psyche, including the human will, within the ambit of biological and physiological laws26 (Reber and Reber 2008, p. 619). A scientistic vision of the human person, grounded in materialist monism and research conducted according to methodologies characteristic of the natural and mathematical sciences, likewise prevails in contemporary psychology, especially in academic circles27 (Elliot et al. 2004). Within this framework, free will as an attribute of the person is deemed virtually non-existent. At best, it is construed as an illusion attributable to unconscious processes and causal mechanisms (Bargh 2008, pp. 128–54; Wegner 2008, pp. 226–47), socially advantageous belief or metaphor (Baumeister et al. 2009, pp. 260–68), or an evolutionary achievement of control and self-regulation processes (Baumeister 2008, p. 18).

In practical application, psychologists, when explaining human behavior, accentuate its adaptive character, its function within specific circumstances, and its biological, environmental, and personality determinants. (Personality diagnosis, in contrast to that of character, lacks a moral dimension.) From this perspective, problematic behaviors are not viewed or interpreted as the result of a series of personal decisions or choices but rather as an inevitable, habitualized, and rigidly patterned response to external or social factors, biologically conditioned and/or co-determined by upbringing or life events. Such determinism is not overtly articulated but emerges as a consequence of disregarding the domain of personal decision in the analysis and explanation of problematic conduct28 (Yalom 1980). Overcoming difficulties and limitations consistently is seen as beyond human control and thus rather quickly—even automatically—comes to be equated with incapacity.29

A psychologist, upon a reflective review of the discipline, may readily perceive inherent paradoxes in the approach to man. They arise from the acknowledgment of the truth of human dignity while reducing the person to what is merely biological. Thus, on the one hand, the human being is “studied as a <product> of past and present social influences…, while, on the other, issues that are addressed are described as pertaining to the subjective determinants of behaviour” (Straś-Romanowska 2001). The truth about the uniqueness and individuality of each human being is reiterated, yet unifying generalizations concerning people and their behaviors are still taught and employed (Straś-Romanowska 2001). In formulating a nosologic diagnosis, what is unique and specific is set aside, since only then can the diagnosis fit within the established classification. In practice, the declared vision that acknowledges human uniqueness and individuality gives way to a mechanistic view of the person.

The denial of free will within psychological praxis is manifested, but not only, in the oft-repeated assertion that a person has acted wrongly because “they could not have done otherwise; indeed, had they been able to, they would have done so.” It is as though a human person, in the exercise of their freedom, were unable to elect evil, as though they were incapable of having malicious intent. Their volition is determined by extrinsic factors (biology, environment), or they are placed in circumstances that necessitate such a response (no other alternative), or their good intentions are founded upon perceptual distortion or a misjudgment of the situation (through no fault of their own) or lack of understanding. As a result, such thinking provokes inquiry into whether a sense of guilt is legitimate and—within the domain of faith—whether sin is at all possible. Psychology does not, of course, overtly absolve individuals of responsibility for their acts and choices; indeed, psychologists frequently declare quite the contrary. Yet, once the areas deemed in fact determined by factors beyond human control are outlined, the scope of personal responsibility is markedly constricted, becoming vague and difficult to discern. The exclusion of the issues of free will from academic psychology significantly influences how future psychologists will approach love and marriage.

The mechanistic paradigm prevailing in psychology’s conceptualization of love fosters doubt regarding the very possibility of establishing a durable and happy union. This skepticism is deepened by the conviction, foundational to many studies of predictors of relational quality, that a happy union is forged between persons suitably matched with respect to particular features, for instance, neuro-hormonal profiles (Fisher 2006, pp. 93–94), “components” (Sternberg 2007, p. 292), preferred “styles” (Hendrick and Hendrick 2006, pp. 160–61), or “scenarios” (Sternberg 2007, pp. 291–92) of love. The difficulty resides not merely in psychology offering deterministic knowledge about love and matrimony but principally in its incapacity to offer alternative views, being, in essence, primarily preoccupied with the investigation and explanation of determinisms. In consequence, it entrenches a fatalistic paradigm wherein conjugal happiness is presumed to hinge more upon the optimal choice of a partner than upon the engagement with the inescapable challenges of relational life and the broader human condition. If a psychologist becomes overly saturated with this perspective, he or she risks losing sight of the distinctly human perspective in which “compatibility” between spouses is more a goal to be achieved than a starting point, and fulfillment in marriage is reached through sacrifice and the overcoming of egoism, rather than through self-actualization. Accordingly, the adoption of humanistic psychology would likewise seem inadequate for achieving consonance with Christian anthropology. As Benedict XVI points out, “Obviously certain anthropological and ‘humanistic’ currents of thought, aimed at self-realization and egocentric self-transcendence, so idealize the human person and marriage that they end up denying the psychic capacity of a great number of people, basing this on elements which do not correspond to the essential requirements of the conjugal bond. Faced with such conceptions, those engaged in the practice of ecclesial law cannot prescind from the healthy realism.” (see Note 3).

Dominant psychological concepts of love relegate it to the status of a constellation of biopsychological mechanisms (e.g., neural (Fisher 2006, pp. 89–90)), behavioral: attachment, caregiving, and sexual satisfaction (Shaver and Mikulincer 2006, pp. 40–42) psycho-social patterns (e.g., love styles) (Hendrick and Hendrick 1986, pp. 392–402; Hendrick and Hendrick 2006, p. 150); or narratives of love construed as cultural schemata of romantic relations (Sternberg 2007, p. 289; Sternberg 2019, p. 287). In the Polish context, arguably the most widely adopted framework for conceptualizing love, both among psychologists and non-psychologists, is the six-phase model advanced by Bogdan Wojciszke (Wojciszke 2025, pp. 35–36). According to the model, which develops Robert J. Sternberg’s triangular theory of love in a reductionist manner (Sternberg 1986, pp. 119–35), love is composed of three components: passion, intimacy, and commitment. As a relationship progresses, these components, each having its own dynamics, beginning with passion, intensify and eventually, concluding with commitment, become depleted, leading to the breakdown of the relationship. In the penultimate phase, known as “empty relationship,” once passion and intimacy have extinguished, the only component still sustaining love is commitment, which, however, inevitably continues to weaken. Within this quasi-naturalistic model, commitment—conceived largely as a psychosocial mechanism propelled by inertia—bears scant relation to the reiterated acts of will that furnish the stable framework necessary for the maturation of passion and intimacy. Nor does it have anything to do with a conscious and voluntary obligation to co-create a sacramental marital union. This pessimistic view of the human being, depicting man as governed by various determinisms, renders the premise of the indissolubility of marriage scarcely meaningful and practically impossible, unless regarded as a form of useful illusion.

5. Conclusions

Simply put, experts providing opinions in cases involving the declaration of the nullity of marriage are typically situated between two conflicting anthropologies: the psychological and the Christian, each of which approaches the concept of free will in fundamentally different ways. This conflict proves difficult to reconcile, as evidenced by a large number of expert opinions in which specialists too readily incline toward a deterministic appraisal of the influence of psychological disorders on the incapacity to undertake marital obligations; also, they fail to articulate a determinate position, restricting themselves to vague conjectures and hypotheses, which does not make the judge’s discernment easier at all.

The integration of these two anthropological concepts seems untenable, whether on the theoretical or practical plane30 (Puppinck 2021; Senior 1983). The principal challenge resides in the inseparability of contemporary psychology from its deterministic presuppositions. The entire conceptual framework, including subject matter, methodology, and, most critically, the language of description that subtly shapes thinking, is subordinated to a naturalistic anthropology and to the natural and mathematical paradigm of scholarly inquiry. If a separation effort were to be undertaken, it might appear that little would remain of psychology itself. The remedy is sought not merely in the adoption of “non-reductionist” psychological concepts but in a more radical reconfiguration of psychology around the core of Christian anthropology. In the scholarly literature, one can encounter various versions of so-called Christian psychology; however, in-depth studies that integrate the achievements of psychology with Christian anthropology are rare. Among the few available works, the relatively most advanced appears to be the study by Anna A. Terruwe and Conrad W. Baars, dedicated to a reinterpretation of the psychoanalytic concept of neurosis from the perspective of Thomistic anthropology31. The authors succeeded in developing a model of a psychological disorder that not only took into account mechanisms of emotional repression, freedom of the will, and the objective moral order, but also clarified the interrelations among these elements (Terruwe and Baars 1981). We believe that a meaningful grounding of psychology in Christian anthropology should move in precisely this direction, and furthermore, strive to develop an approach that is properly aligned with it—beginning with the descriptive lexicon, fundamental concepts, and methodological framework. For example, marital love is conceived quite differently when described in terms of “need-love” and “gift-love” (Lewis [1960] 2020; Pieper 1972) than when framed through the lens of “innate behavioural systems…attachment, caregiving, and sex” (Shaver et al. 1988, pp. 68–99; Bowlby 1979, p. 129). Divergent conclusions can be drawn when marital satisfaction or well-being is investigated via quantitative methodologies (experimental or survey-based), as opposed to inquiries into spouses’ decisions underlying their level of fulfilment, conducted through qualitative means—such as monologue analysis (D. K. Kuncewicz 2022; D. S. Kuncewicz 2024). The methodical elaboration of psychology grounded in Christian anthropology holds significance not solely with respect to enhancing the precision of diagnosis by psychological experts and the discernment of judges in marriage nullity processes under canon law. It is a challenge that broadly concerns psychologists, psychotherapists, and their patients guided by faith in God. For all such individuals, it may be crucial that the psychology they encounter and engage with, not merely nominally, but genuinely, is consonant with their professed faith and does not sow confusion within it. Moreover, it can serve to deepen faith and support personal growth.