K.E. Løgstrup: Phenomenology of the Social World and Systematic Theology

Abstract

In K.E. Løgstrup’s (1905–1981) theology, the point of intersection between phenomenology and systematic theology is our life experiences. In this article, Løgstrup’s way of combining phenomenology and theology is explored from the 1930s to the 1970s. The idea that life is not an amorphous abyss, but God’s creation runs like a connecting thread throughout Løgstrup’s oeuvre. This idea negating a nihilistic understanding of life requires a phenomenology of the social world that explores both the ethical and the metaphysical implications of our life experiences. Human beings are interdependent animals, and in this interdependency, an anonymous and unavoidable ethical demand makes itself present, saying that you have to take care of the life you have in your hands. Sovereign expressions of life are phenomena that support the ethical demand and the idea of creation. In the 1970s, Løgstrup broadened the perspective and explored how the universe is present in our life experiences through our bodily existence and our senses. Even so, there is not an unbroken way from these metaphysical considerations to theology. Christian Faith is based on God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. Life experiences are just the horizon against which it is possible to understand what the Christian message is. Systematic theology connects phenomenology on the one hand and the proclamation of the Gospel on the other hand.

1. K.E. Løgstrup and Max Scheler

Philosophy was a significant part of K.E. Løgstrup’s theological work from the very beginning. As a student of theology in Copenhagen in the second half of the 1920s, he was immersed in the study of philosophy. He followed professor of philosophy Frithiof Brandt’s lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason for two years, and from his own teacher in systematic theology Eduard Geismar, he received an optional reading list in Kant. Thanks to Geismar, who had some connections to Max Scheler, Løgstrup may have been introduced to phenomenology in his student days (Põder and Rabjerg 2016, pp. 191–92). Gradually, phenomenology emerged as a basic frame of reference in Løgstrup’s theology.

After having graduated in theology in 1930, Løgstrup continued his studies abroad in the first half of the 1930s. He went to Freiburg (Martin Heidegger), Göttingen (Hans Lipps, Friedrich Gogarten), Vienna (Moritz Schlick), Paris (Henri Bergson), and Strasbourg (Jean Hering). His prime interest was philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and theology. When the Faculty of Theology in Copenhagen in November 1930 announced the topic for the price essay for the year 1931 as being A Presentation and Evaluation of Max Scheler’s Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Value (likely Geismar’s idea), Løgstrup flung himself into the work and delivered his manuscript in January 1932. In May 1932, he was awarded a gold medal for his essay, written during his stay in Göttingen and Strasbourg, (Põder and Rabjerg 2016, p. 189; Rabjerg 2022, pp. 173–75; Stern 2019, pp. 7–8).

Løgstrup’s essay about Max Scheler’s value ethics was his first step into the field of phenomenology. It is important primarily as a prelude to his own work on phenomenology and as an approach to his intellectual development. As Løgstrup deepened his insight into the phenomenological way of thinking, some of the ideas he defended in 1932 were abandoned, and new perspectives came to the fore. Løgstrup never returned to Scheler explicitly in order to continue his initial discussion with him. However, basic questions and assumptions in his essay about Max Scheler continued to mark his way of thinking for the rest of his life.1

Løgstrup recognized the importance of Scheler’s value ethics as an impressive investigation into the understanding of values. However, regarded as an ethical theory, Scheler’s phenomenological ethics was fundamentally flawed from Løgstrup’s point of view. The crucial point was that Scheler failed to recognize the importance of the ethical “ought”. My obligation to act in a certain way in a specific situation requires more than just insight into the realm of values. It requires an “ought”. Ethics is not just about what “is”, but also about what “ought to be” (Løgstrup [1932] 2016, p. 130f).

More than 20 years later, this “ought” became a hallmark of Løgstrup’s ethics in his most famous book, The Ethical Demand (1956). However, the idea was present in a nutshell already in his very first academic work in 1932.

A substantial part of Løgstrup’s evaluation of Scheler’s ethics is an exploration of what the ethical “ought” implies. Løgstrup agrees with Scheler that ethics requires a certain understanding of life. However, the problem from Løgstrup’s point of view is that Scheler’s understanding of life is static. Løgstrup, on the other hand, argues in favor of a dynamic understanding of life in which life is a battle between opposing forces (Rabjerg 2022, p. 182). In the real world, values are threatened by extinction and endangered by annulment. We are forced into this battle by an ethical command. We are called upon and have to take sides in one way or another. Consequently, there has to be someone calling. Thus, the ethical “ought” takes ethics into metaphysics and religion. From a theological point of view, values are God’s creation, and God forces every one of us into the battle between good and evil. This is so because human beings as such are not good, but evil. Human beings are sinners, and for this reason, God has to force us into the battle between good and evil (Løgstrup [1932] 2016, p. 141ff).

2. Sin and the Concept of Love

Løgstrup’s concept of sin triggers a question that will occupy him in years to come: If human beings are evil, how can we explain that life nevertheless seems to contain some kind of goodness? Løgstrup does not avoid this problem by declaring that the goodness we recognize is, in fact, an illusion. Nor does he conclude that we are partly evil and partly good. His answer is that goodness is God’s creation.

Løgstrup develops his understanding of goodness in his discussion with Scheler about the concept of love. Love is a gift. This goes not just for the love I receive but also for my love towards others. If I love my neighbor, it is not my own achievement, it is a gift. Of course, in my selfishness, I do not take my neighborly love as a gift; but even so, that does not alter the fact that neighborly love exists as grace in my life. Neighborly love is a gift, even if I do not recognize it as such (Løgstrup [1932] 2016, p. 154ff).

Løgstrup’s concluding remarks in his essay about Scheler is that ethics cannot be founded on phenomenology alone. A phenomenological approach is useful, but not sufficient. In order to account for the ethical “ought”, ethics needs metaphysics and religion as well (Løgstrup [1932] 2016, pp. 142f, 181).

At this stage, there is not a sharp distinction between metaphysics, theology, and religion in Løgstrup’s way of thinking. His ethics in 1932 is decidedly religious. However, in his dynamic understanding of life, we recognize the first stage on Løgstrup’s path to a philosophical phenomenology in which life is understood as created, in accordance with the first article in the Apostle’s creed: “I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of Heaven and Earth”. This Credo runs like a connecting thread throughout Løgstrup’s works, from beginning to end.

What Løgstrup is searching for in 1932, and will develop later on, is a phenomenology that accounts for our life experiences in a dynamic understanding of life (Rabjerg 2022, p. 184). His prime interest is not phenomenology as such, but phenomena contained in our life experiences. What Løgstrup misses in Scheler is not just a proper understanding of love, but also experiences of guilt and regret (Løgstrup [1932] 2016, p. 133f; Rabjerg 2022, p. 179). In short, ethics ought to be concerned with real people in the real world. Hence, what ethics needs and what theology needs is a phenomenology of the social life that explores our life experiences (Løgstrup [1932] 2016, pp. 142, 145).

In the wake of his Scheler essay, Løgstrup immersed himself in the study of phenomenology. His prime interest in years to come was not ethics, but epistemology. Basic questions regarding the nature and origin of knowledge had to be solved before he could return to ethics.

3. Phenomenology and Transcendental Idealism

In 1933, Løgstrup once again delivered a manuscript to the University of Copenhagen. This time it is in order to obtain a doctoral degree in theology. His thesis is entitled: Det religiøse motiv i den erkendelsesteoretiske problemstilling (The Religious Motif in the Epistemological Problematic). The epistemological problematic Løgstrup is referring to is the subject–object relation in the theory of knowledge. His manuscript contains a twofold thesis. On the one hand, Løgstrup maintains that the understanding of the subject–object relation in transcendental idealism (the epistemological scheme) contains a religious motif. Transcendental idealism is the epistemology of the modern age, going back to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. On the other hand, Løgstrup argues that the phenomenological breakthrough in modern philosophy has rendered this epistemological scheme obsolete. Phenomenology represented by Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Hans Lipps has broken down the epistemological scheme. This second thesis occupies the largest part of Løgstrup’s manuscript.

The source of disagreement between transcendental idealism and phenomenology is the epistemological separation of subject and object in transcendental idealism. This separation installs the subject as a detached observer outside the world. According to Løgstrup, Husserl and then Heidegger in Sein und Zeit have destroyed this epistemological scheme. Human beings are not detached observers but are involved or “thrown” into the world in which they seek to obtain knowledge. Human beings are participants, always committed in one way or another (Løgstrup 1933, p. 237).

It is easy to understand why Løgstrup favors this phenomenological approach to knowledge. Phenomenology makes way for our life experiences, which is the knowledge we obtain by living in the world, and not just by observing it at arm’s length. From this point of view, Heidegger is more in accordance with Løgstrup than Husserl is. Heidegger’s phenomenology is closer to ordinary life experiences in the social world. For the same reason, Løgstrup is also fascinated by the meticulous observations of life and language in the works of Hans Lipps.

Løgstrup’s work on the concept of existence in Husserl and Heidegger led him to a revised concept of metaphysics. Inspired by Heidegger, Løgstrup introduces the expression “metaphysics of existence” (da. “tilværelsens metafysik”). Launching metaphysics as a desideratum was not mainstream in the 1930s. Metaphysics has never been held in high regard in protestant theology, and the protestant critique of metaphysics was strengthened in the 1930s, both in Karl Barth’s theology of revelation and in Rudolf Bultmann’s theology of hermeneutics. To Barth and his followers, metaphysics was just a kind of natural theology as opposed to God’s own revelation. From Bultmann’s point of view, metaphysics conveyed a false understanding of man and his world as objectified. Later, Gerhard Ebeling expressed this critique as “Situationsvergessenheit”, “obliviousness to the human condition” (Christoffersen 2020, p. 175).

However, from Løgstrup’s point of view, metaphysics is not a withdrawal from the human condition. In contrast, the metaphysics of existence is necessary in order to stick to the human condition. It is metaphysics without answers to the basic questions of how and why existence is as it is. There is not a comprehensive overview of life and being in this metaphysics, and there are no “first causes”. Metaphysics of existence just ties a human being to his existence in the world and blocks any attempt to withdraw from life and the world in the manner of an uncommitted observer. Life is a riddle and an enigma, and the metaphysics of existence describes how life’s enigmatic character is implied in our life experiences. Hence, the basic mood in this metaphysics is not security, but anxiety (Løgstrup 1933, pp. 256–59; cf. Christoffersen 2020, p. 180f).

Beneath this philosophical conflict between transcendental idealism and phenomenology is a theological conflict, which Løgstrup returns to at the end of his manuscript. In the transcendental separation between subject and object, the world is understood in accordance with our apparatus of knowledge. In the end, this means that we as human beings are installed as creators of the observable world (Løgstrup 1933, p. 277f). However, this contradicts the theological claim that the world is created by God and not by us. Hence, if theology wants to stick to The First Article of Faith, it has to renounce the theory of knowledge in transcendental idealism (i.e., Kant and Kantianism).

Løgstrup rejects transcendental idealism both for philosophical and theological reasons. His theological critique does not replace the philosophical critique but lends theological legitimacy to the philosophical critique. Even so, this has no bearing on his philosophical argument. It is not Løgstrup’s intention to make the philosophical critique valid philosophically for theological reasons. In contrast, the philosophical critique has to stand on its own feet.

In Løgstrup’s manuscripts from the first half of the 1930s, we meet a young theologian who is restlessly searching for the philosophical consequences implied in a Christian theology of creation. From Løgstrup’s point of view, creation theology is not a scientific or quasi-scientific theory of how the universe came into being sometime in the past. It is a way of understanding how life appears in our everyday experiences.

Løgstrup’s interest in the point of intersection between philosophy and life experience is motivated by an ethical concern. Løgstrup’s examination of the concept of love in his Scheler essay is a good example of what he is aiming at. Love is unfolded, not as the lover’s own achievement, but as a gift. My neighborly love is something I receive, not something I create. If I take it as my own achievement, the result is Pharisaism (Løgstrup [1932] 2016, p. 150ff).

In 1933, Løgstrup’s metaphysics of existence is a not comprehensive theory. It is just a keyword to indicate the metaphysical questions and assumptions in our life experiences. To what extent this explication requires Christian theology is still an open question.

4. Løgstrup, Martin Heidegger and Søren Kierkegaard

Although Løgstrup in his dissertation manuscript agrees with Heidegger in Heidegger’s destruction of the epistemological separation between subject and object, Heidegger is not the answer to Løgstrup’s search for a phenomenological alternative. As in the Scheler essay, the crucial point is ethics. Although Heidegger’s understanding of life in Sein und Zeit is more dynamic than Scheler’s, Heidegger as a philosopher does not take a stand on ethical questions. The philosopher’s task is ontological, and Heidegger’s ontology is without ethical assumptions, at least according to Heidegger himself. Heidegger has no ambitions regarding how people ought to conduct their lives.

At this point, Løgstrup parts company with Heidegger. Life is ontologically a battle between good and evil, according to Løgstrup, and the philosopher cannot withdraw from this battle. Life is not a free lunch, not even for philosophers. Because Heidegger excludes the ethical demand from his ontology, he cannot provide the ontological tools Løgstrup needs in order to develop an ethical alternative to transcendental idealism (Løgstrup 1933, p. 253f). Heidegger is useful in order to destroy the house built by transcendental idealism, but not when it comes to constructing a new building on the burnt-out ruins.

In Søren Kierkegaard, on the other hand, ethics belongs to a phenomenological understanding of human existence. It is not farfetched to think that Kierkegaard would have been a more suitable companion to Løgstrup than Heidegger would. However, from Løgstrup’s point of view, Kierkegaard’s phenomenology of existence comes with another problem. In Kierkegaard, the ethical demand as an infinite demand is based on the absolute difference between God and humanity. The ethical demand does not make its way into our relationships with other people as real and concrete beings. In contrast, the ethical demand ignores man in his actuality and ultimately becomes a religious demand. This abstract and vacuous demand is without ethical content, and this is not what Løgstrup is looking for (Løgstrup [1950] 2013a, pp. 172–75; [1968] 2013b, 2023). Løgstrup’s ethical concern takes him towards a phenomenology of the social world that differs significantly not just from Scheler, Husserl, and Heidegger, but also from Kierkegaard.

5. A Judeo-Christian Understanding of Creation

Løgstrup had to re-write his thesis three times before he eventually obtained his doctorate in 1943. The obstacle was to begin with Prof. Frithiof Brandt, who repeatedly rejected Løgstrup’s critique of the subject–object scheme. This scheme is unavoidable even to Løgstrup, Brandt concludes, and Løgstrup’s efforts to come to terms with the subject–object scheme require a far more comprehensive reading of the modern theory of knowledge. However, rather than continue with this topic, a better solution would be, according to Brandt, to write a book about phenomenology; or why not a book about Søren Kierkegaard’s idea that “truth is subjectivity”? (Hansen 1996, pp. 45–46).

Nevertheless, Løgstrup stuck to his topic, and during the re-writings, he developed and clarified his own thinking. When he delivered his manuscript for the third time (in 1940), the manuscript was more explicitly about the understanding of life in theology on the one hand and in transcendental idealism on the other. This time prof. Anders Nygren joined the evaluation committee instead of Brandt. Once again, the manuscript was returned, but this time the theological part was not up to the mark.

Then in 1943, Løgstrup’s manuscript was finally accepted, entitled: Den Erkendelsesteoretiske Konflikt mellem den Transcendentalfilosofiske Idealisme og Teologien (The Epistemological Conflict Between Transcendental Idealism and Theology). The basic idea in the final version is the same as in 1933. However, the understanding of life is now emphasized as the major point of disagreement. From a theological point of view, life is not an amorphous abyss shaped culturally by man, as in transcendental idealism, but something specific, created by God. Transcendental idealism and creation theology are incompatible. If theology feels obliged to stick to The First Article of Faith, as Løgstrup does, it becomes a theological task to refute the understanding of life in transcendental idealism. The easiest way to do this would of course be for theology to withdraw to its own territory and refute transcendental idealism for explicitly theological reasons. However, from Løgstrup’s point of view, this would imply a withdrawal from life experiences as well, thus admitting that theology has no bearing on people’s everyday lives. Hence, the understanding of life in transcendental idealism must be refuted philosophically.

Even if Løgstrup’s critique of transcendental idealism in 1942, as in 1933, is based on phenomenological philosophy, the Judeo-Christian understanding of life and culture plays a more prominent part. Although the manuscript is shortened, this part is expanded. Especially noteworthy is that Løgstrup now deliberately adds “Jewish” to “Christian” (Løgstrup [1943] 2011, p. 173ff).

We are in the middle of World War II, and Denmark is occupied. Løgstrup is well aware of Nazi anti-Semitism and the persecution of Jews. He has spent years in Germany for study purposes. His wife is German, and he has German friends. The word “Jewish” in Løgstrup’s thesis is a signal of resistance, marking the insoluble bonds between Jews and Christians. A couple of years later, Løgstrup had to go into hiding because of his resistance to the occupants. However, the word “Jewish” is not added on just for the occasion. Old Testament ethics plays a major role in Løgstrup’s argument.

In The Old Testament, ethics is based on revelation. God has revealed the law to Israel. However, this is not the main point in Løgstrup’s argument. He is neither interested in the revelation nor in the content of the law as such. Løgstrup’s attention is attracted to a certain peculiarity in The Old Testament, namely that the law is numerous and yet not casuistic. This is a puzzling fact, and the explanation is, according to Løgstrup that beneath the law is an understanding of life as shaped, structured, and created by God. Acknowledgment of the law comes when the created life is violated, and since life may be violated in so many ways, the law is numerous and, by necessity, open-ended. The law cannot be organized as an all-encompassing and coherent casuistry or construed as a confined corpus derived from a basic principle. The law is just a secondary reaction to the violation of God’s will (Løgstrup [1943] 2011, pp. 133–37).

Løgstrup has not come to this understanding of the Old Testament solely on his own. His argument leans heavily on the Old Testament scholar Walter Eichrodt and Eichrodt’s Theologie des Alten Testament (1933–1939), but that is not the point. The point is that Løgstrup develops an argument that applies to ethics in general, and not just for the Old Testament. Ethics is something secondary; it presupposes an understanding of life as created and given. The ethical demand or the laws of life appear when life, as created, is violated and destroyed. If we had not violated and destroyed life as it is given, the ethical demand would have been unnecessary and unknown.

This distinction between life as primarily given and ethics as something secondary is unfolded by Løgstrup in an unorthodox understanding of the life and teaching of Jesus. Jesus is not an ethicist or a moral philosopher. His teaching is not moral philosophy or moral precepts. In his life and teaching, we are exposed to life as a given, life as it is from the Creator’s hand. This life is completed in compassion, forgiveness, graciousness, and service. This is not ethics; it is life, pure and simple (Løgstrup [1943] 2011, p. 151). However, because we are sinners, we are unable to live this kind of life, and because we are unable to live this kind of life, we need ethics. Ethics is a substitute, and as a substitute, it is a human achievement (Løgstrup [1968] 2013b, pp. 127–31; 2023, pp. 96–99).

6. The Ethical Demand

Løgstrup’s main point in 1943 is the same as in the Scheler essay: Ethics is necessary because we are sinners, living in a sinful world. In the meantime, however, Løgstrup has learned to distinguish between life as created, on the one hand, and ethics, on the other. Life is God’s creation; ethics is man’s achievement. Both life as created and ethics as man’s achievement can be accounted for phenomenologically. No revelation is needed.

In his Scheler essay, Løgstrup discarded Scheler’s phenomenological ethics because Scheler could not account for the ethical “ought”. In the wake of his disputation, Løgstrups develops a phenomenology of the social world in which the ethical demand is incorporated. In 1956, a comprehensive presentation of his new insights was published in The Ethical Demand.2 However, it is worth noticing that Løgstrup introduced the fundamental ideas in this book in 1950, in an article with the heading “Humanism and Christianity”.

“Humanism” was not a positive word in protestant theology in the twentieth century (cf. Christoffersen 2010). An article about Humanism and Christianity written by a protestant theologian was expected to draw the front lines between two rival cultural and social movements. However, in this article, Løgstrup takes a different course. Løgstrup’s starting point is the understanding of life implied in our everyday world. He outlines a phenomenology of the social world, in which the basic reality is that we are mutually interdependent. Human beings are interdependent animals, and that is fundamental to our life experiences: “We never have something to do with another human being without holding something of that person’s life in our hands” (Løgstrup [1956] 2010, p. 25; 2020a, p. 15; 1950, p. 456; 2019a, p. 132). These famous lines from The Ethical Demand were his opening lines in 1950.

We have to receive our lives from the hands of others, as they have to receive their lives from our hands. We are each other’s world and each other’s fate. For this reason, there is always something at stake in our relationship with other people. It can be very little, a spiritedness withered or awakened, a loathing deepened or lifted. However, it can also be terrifyingly great so that whether the other person’s life flourishes or not is simply down to us (Løgstrup 1950, p. 456; 2019a, p. 133). Hence, an ethical demand arises, saying that you have to take care of the life you have in your hands. This ethical demand is unavoidable, coming from an unavoidable interdependence. We have to take a stand, whether we like it or not (Løgstrup [1956] 2010, p. 27; 2020a, p. 17).

The ethical demand is not anyone’s property. It is an anonymous demand grounded in our mutual interdependence. It goes without exception. However, the ethical demand does not say how and in which way we have to take care of the other. The right action is always dependent on context and situation. In order to understand what is right to do, we have to use our insight, imagination, and understanding (Løgstrup [1956] 2010, p. 32; 2020a, p. 21).

The ethical demand triggers a conflict between two mutually exclusive claims. On the one hand, we have to meet the other’s needs and wishes, and on the other hand, we have to decide for ourselves what is in the other’s best interest. The first option leads to appeasement and acquiescence and the second option leads to usurpation and abuse. In this conflict between selflessness and self-assertion, there is no way out. We just have to find understandable solutions to balance the two extremes. Humanism is, amongst several other things, the awareness of this conflict and the willingness to strike a balance (Løgstrup 1950, p. 463; 2019a, p. 138).

From Løgstrup’s point of view, this understanding of life expressed in interdependence and responsibility is the most basic presupposition in humanism, as in Christianity, including Judaism. It is common ground between humanism and Christianity. The difference between humanism and Christianity is not ethical; it is religious (Løgstrup 1950, p. 472; 2019a, p. 144). Christianity proclaims that the ethical demand is God’s demand. The ethical demand is theologically speaking God’s anonymous presence in our world. However, this does not remove the conflict. The conflict is rather intensified, in the sense that Christianity proclaims that the demand is immoderate because it is divine (Løgstrup 1950, p. 470; 2019a, p. 142).

Løgstrup’s article about humanism and Christianity was at odds with hegemonic ways of thinking in protestant theology, not least in Denmark, where the Tidehverv movement fronted an uncompromising combination of neo-orthodoxy and existentialism, inspired by Søren Kierkegaard. To begin with, Løgstrup was associated with the Tidehverv movement. However, during the first half of the 1950s, conflicts between Løgstrup and leading representatives for the movement came to a head. In The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup summarizes and elaborates his position on this controversy.

In The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup’s starting point is trust. Trust is basic in our everyday life. Trust is not a decision; it is a prerequisite for our ability to socialize with other people:

In advance, we believe one another’s word, in advance we trust one another. This may indeed seem strange, but it is integral to being human. It would be hostile to life to behave otherwise. We simply could not live; our life would wither away and become stunted, if we were in advance to meet each other in distrust, or assume that the other person is stealing and lying, dissembling and leading us on.

(Løgstrup [1956] 2010, p. 17; 2020a, p. 9)

Normally, we do not pay any attention to trust. However, when trust is impossible, as in a situation of war or when we discover that somebody is lying, we realize the importance of trust. Both in trust and in mistrust we are each other’s world. Trust is interdependency, and from this interdependency grows the ethical demand (Løgstrup [1956] 2010, p. 27; 2020a, p. 17).

7. Sovereign Expressions of Life

Implied in the ethical demand is the presupposition that life in our mutual interdependency is a gift. Løgstrup admits that the understanding of life as a gift can be denied and dismissed as pure fantasy (Løgstrup [1956] 2010, p. 134f; 2020a, p. 100f). However, our life experiences make us aware of phenomena that are given in a certain way, and these phenomena may support the idea that life is a gift. In The Ethical Demand, trust is a good example. However, in the discussions following The Ethical Demand, Løgstrup realized that to substantiate his idea of life as a gift, he had to expand and further develop the phenomenological basis. In the 1960s, he coined the term sovereign expressions of life, focusing on phenomena like mercy, the openness of speech and sincerity, and of course trust.

These phenomena are basic in our mutuality, but their fundamental character is not due to someone’s decision. They are given with life itself. Without these phenomena, life would not have been possible. We cannot live without them, and we cannot destroy them without destroying life itself. Implied in the sovereign expressions of life is an understanding of life as given. Life is not an amorphous abyss; it is given in a certain shape. In other words, created (Løgstrup [1968] 2013b, pp. 95–107; 2023, pp. 68–78; 2007, pp. 49–82).

Sovereign expressions of life are not ethical precepts; they are the soil in which ethics grows and develops. To act according to the ethical demand is not to trust each and all in every situation, or the same as always telling the truth. There are situations in which trust and openness of speech would be catastrophic (Løgstrup [1972] 2019b, pp. 17–33; 2007, pp. 83–102). Nevertheless, even when trust and truth are discarded, we must realize that these phenomena are prerequisites for life. Hence, sovereign expressions of life may help us to understand what the ethical demand requires in a specific situation (Løgstrup 1982, pp. 103–32; 2007, pp. 123–39, 149–65).

Our ability to live is not just about “courage to be” (Paul Tillich); it is also about vitality, vigor, and life-sustaining powers. Sovereign expressions of life are sources of life and an oasis of life. Trust, mercy, and sincerity are life renewing, physically as well as mentally. In sovereign expressions of life, the world we live in breaks through our self-centeredness. We are pulled out of ourselves and become receptive to the world in which we are interwoven. We are externalized, so to speak; our minds are opened. In sovereign expressions of life, we forget ourselves, and thus, paradoxically, become ourselves (Løgstrup [1968] 2013b, p. 98f; 2023, p. 71; 2007, p. 53f).

Phenomena like envy, jealousy, and hatred are quite the opposite. They are obsessive. In envy and jealousy, we are obsessed and self-absorbed; our minds are closed and crippled and our life-renewing forces are dried out. In these self-centered phenomena, we—once again paradoxically—lose ourselves. Life is a gift, not an achievement (Løgstrup [1968] 2013b, p. 95; 2023, p. 69).

Løgstrup’s investigations into the sovereign expressions of life are led by an ontological concern. It is an ontological difference between trust and distrust, mercy and cruelty, truth and lies. If we imagine a life without distrust, cruelty, and lies, this life might perhaps seem Utopian, but not unbearable. Life without some kind of trust, mercy, and openness of speech, on the other hand, would be unbearable. Our lives depend on these phenomena. Life is not an amorphous abyss; it is given in a certain shape.

8. From Phenomenology of the Social World to the Universe

Sovereign expressions of life are phenomena of fundamental importance in our interpersonal relationships. However, we are not just woven together with other people. We are also woven together with the universe through our bodily existence and our metabolism (Løgstrup 2013c, p. 11). This perspective was present in Løgstrup’s thinking from the very beginning, but he did not develop it from a phenomenological point of view until his later years (Løgstrup 2015, p. 116ff; Jensen 2007, p. 213).

Through our bodily senses, our sight, our sense of hearing, the ability to touch and smell and taste, life is sustained and renewed. Sound, color, and shape: The sound of music, the sight of a seemingly enduring countryside, a gentle touch, the blue color in a painting—these are sensory experiences that break through our self-absorbed minds. From a sense-based physiological point of view, our sense organs are transducers that convert the outer world to perceptions in our heads. From a phenomenological point of view, our sense organs pull us out of our self-centeredness and drag us into the world. The world of color and sound is not just inside our heads. Through color and sound, we are in the external world (Løgstrup 2015, pp. 211–17).

Løgstrup did, of course, realize that life is not always experienced as a gift. Sickness, pain, sorrow, and death may overtake the zest for life. However, these deficient modes of life cannot determine our understanding of what life is from an ontological point of view. It is when the zest for life is lost that we understand what life genuinely is (Løgstrup [1956] 2010, p. 139f; 2020a, pp. 104–5).

Our understanding of life as valuable and meaningful is especially at stake in our relationship with children. A novelist writing for grown-ups may describe life as a disaster, disappointing, and barely with any value at all. What the reader will make of this nihilistic worldview is his or her responsibility. Writing for children, on the other hand, is something else. A child may hear the nihilistic message as stated, and perhaps lose all her expectations and zest for life. No sane and sound author will take such a risk. It is sacrilege to violate a child’s vigor and expectations for life ahead (Løgstrup 1970, pp. 65–69; 2015, pp. 251–52).

Experiences of life as valuable and meaningful, and hence created, do not amount to an idyllic understanding of life. In contrast, from his Scheler essay in 1932 to his very last publications, Løgstrup underlined that life is a battle between good and evil. As he incorporates the Universe in his phenomenology, this perspective is even strengthened. Destruction, death, and annihilation are not just consequences of sin but are built into the created world (Løgstrup 2015, pp. 292–96).

This also gives Løgstrup’s ethics a new emphasis. The late Løgstrup more emphatically than before underlines that we are born to combat death and destruction. Our resistance to death and destruction is implemented in the way in which life is experienced (Løgstrup 2015, pp. 37–42), and we are sustained by life-renewing forces in this resistance. Death and destruction do not render life meaningless or worthless. In contrast, life becomes something worth fighting for, in spite of the fact that death seems to win in the end.

9. Phenomenology, Systematic Theology and the Gospel

If one is solely interested in Løgstrup’s ethics, the introductory paragraphs in The Ethical Demand are easy to ignore. These paragraphs are not about ethics; they are about proclamation, and they explain, at least to a certain extent, Løgstrup’s prime interest behind this book.

“Proclamation” is of course an important concept in a religious context. However, initially, Løgstrup refers to proclamation not as a specific religious concept, but as proclamation in general. His initial question is this: What does proclamation presuppose if it is not irrelevant to us? The answer is that it has to correspond to something in our existence:

If a proclamation is not to be irrelevant to us, it must correspond to something in our existence. What this is can be many different things: a perplexity in which we find ourselves, a contradiction we cannot escape, a fate we refuse to accept, expectations we entertain, or difficulties that have piled up in front of us.

(Løgstrup 2020b, p. 3)

The proclamation does not have to solve these problems or meet our needs. It just has to touch upon something in our existence. This does not mean that the proclamation has to tell us what we already know. In contrast, “the proclamation can also correspond to something in our existence which we were completely unaware of—until the proclamation disclosed it by addressing it” (Løgstrup 2020b, p. 3).

This correspondence goes for a religious proclamation as well, including a Christian proclamation, which is what Løgstrup has in mind. Hence, it is a theological task “to try to determine in purely human terms what feature it is in our existence that is addressed in the Christian proclamation” (Løgstrup 2020b, p. 3).

The expression “in purely human terms” has caused a furor amongst theologians who believe that Løgstrup ignores the religious content of the Christion proclamation. However, this is not the case. It is not the content of the proclamation that has to be accounted for in purely human terms. It is the presuppositions implied in the idea that the proclamation is addressed to all men. From Løgstrup’s point of view, this is important for at least two reasons.

First, the proclamation has to correspond to something in our existence in order to be understandable. Only then can one accept it for the sake of its content. “Faith without understanding is not faith, but coercion” (Løgstrup 2020b, p. 4).

Løgstrup’s second argument is that if we do not try to express in purely human terms what it is in our existence that is disclosed to us by a religious proclamation, we miss what the proclamation says over and above this disclosure. If the proclamation is nothing more than an existential disclosure, then it is just philosophical, and not religious.

It is not difficult to hear the resonance of Rudolf Bultmann’s hermeneutical program in these arguments. Løgstrup agrees with Bultmann in that the proclamation has to be existentially relevant. The disagreement concerns the understanding of life and the concept of existence. As we have seen previously, Løgstrup’s concept of existence is based on the understanding of our social world, and this is, from his point of view, in accordance with the Christian proclamation:

The proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth touches on one thing in our existence more than anything else: namely, the individual’s relation to the other human being. One of the questions which therefore arises when confronted by this proclamation is: what attitude to the other human being is implicit in Jesus’s proclamation? What view does it take of what is essential in our lives with and against each other, and how can that be stated in purely human terms?

(Løgstrup 2020b, p. 4)

The Ethical Demand is an attempt to give an answer to these questions. If the connections between phenomenology and systematic theology are considered from this point of view, the proclamation of the Gospel has to be taken into account as well. Systematic theology stands in the middle, connecting phenomenology, on the one hand, and proclamation, on the other. Phenomenology carves out a horizon of understanding against which the preaching is understandable. Systematic theology connects preaching to this horizon and helps the preacher to understand how and in what way the Gospel relates to ordinary people’s life experiences (Løgstrup 1970).

It is not within phenomenology’s task or ability to make anyone a Christian. Christian faith is based on God’s salvific revelation in Jesus Christ and not on phenomenology (Løgstrup 2015, p. 64). This faith in Jesus as God’s salvific revelation presupposes experiences in which life is understood as valuable, meaningful, and something we are obliged to fight for and take care of. The Gospel is not proclaimed in a world where life is devoid of any meaning or value. In contrast, the Gospel is proclaimed in a world where life is experienced as meaningful, although subjected to death and destruction.

Based on our life experiences alone, death seems to win in the end. The Creator has an ambiguous face. Life is given and life is taken. However, in Jesus Christ, God the Creator of Heaven and Earth has proclaimed his victory over death and destruction and confirmed a life of infinite value in Christ. This Gospel cannot be derived from our life experiences. The Gospel is unexpected from the point of view of the created world (Løgstrup 2015, p. 339). No explanation of death and destruction is given in this Gospel, just a promise that death and destruction will lose in the end (Løgstrup 2015, p. 296).

The task of Systematic theology is to take care of the connection between phenomenology and preaching, and this implies reflecting on the philosophical implications in our life experiences. These reflections belong to the field of metaphysics. Metaphysics is neither religion nor theology; it is philosophy. Løgstrup’s metaphysics is not an all-encompassing system. It is simply some considerations with regard to how the understanding of life as created and as a gracious gift may be accounted for philosophically. It does not prove the idea of creation to be true, but it underpins our life experiences and makes them understandable and even reasonable.

10. Conclusion: Nihilism as a Theological Challenge

Starting with Løgstrup’s first academic work, which was his essay about Max Scheler, we have explored how Løgstrup gradually developed his own phenomenology of social life. His essay about Max Scheler is significant from this point of view because it makes clear to what extent Løgstrup’s efforts from the very beginning were based on an ethical concern.

Løgstrup’s prime interest was not phenomenology per se, as a specific way of doing philosophy. His prime interest was our life experiences. Phenomenology was important as an approach to how life is understood in our everyday life experiences. Løgstrup had a relaxed attitude to methodology and often preferred insights gained by novelists and poets to those of philosophers. Life experience belongs to everybody but is owned by no one. However, phenomenology is not just a confirmation of things we already know. Phenomenological investigations may uncover phenomena we have ignored and perspectives we have overlooked and thus challenge assumptions we have taken for granted.

Løgstrup understood his phenomenology as a challenge to the nihilistic understanding of life as an amorphous abyss, shaped just by our own achievements. In his phenomenology of social life, Løgstrup strives to uncover a specific form of life given in our mutual interdependency. This givenness means in Løgstrup’s understanding that life is created. However, there is a fundamental difference between life as created and ethics. In the sovereign expressions of life, we receive a life that is created. Ethics, however, is not given and not created. Ethics is our own achievement. Sovereign expressions of life are the soil in which ethics is kept alive and nourished, and they come with an ethical demand to take care of life as put in our hands. Ethics, on the other hand, as a way of responding to this demand, is our own responsibility.

Nihilism was a popular target in systematic theology after World War II. Løgstrup criticized his fellow theologians for trying to refute nihilism solely from the point of view of theology. Theologians withdraw to their own religious territory based on revelation and resign to refute nihilism on common ground. From Løgstrup’s point of view, this was to let go of the First Article of Faith, proclaiming God as Creator of Heaven and Earth. Løgstrup’s critique was especially addressed to Karl Barth and his followers (and of course to the Tidehverv movement).

Both with regard to our social world and with regard to our experiences of nature, Løgstrup’s phenomenology is basically about hermeneutics. From this point of view, his phenomenology is related more to (the early) Heidegger and Bultmann than to Husserl, both in agreement and in disagreement.

Even if Løgstrup is concerned with the understanding and interpretation of phenomena in our life experiences, he also uncovers phenomena that, in a certain way, are independent of our interpretations. Sovereign expressions of life are not just about our interpretations but uncover how life in its pre-cultural structures basically is.

Løgstrup’s phenomenology of social life is not a philosophical theory arguing that life as we know it is created. Strictly speaking, it is not a theory at all. Løgstrup’s phenomenology is just a way of uncovering situations and relations where life is experienced as valuable and meaningful. We have received something in life that has made life itself valuable, and thus is worth fighting for. When we experience that life is based on trust and mercy, we also understand that trust and mercy are something we ought to take care of and foster. When I realize that my mind and my vitality are recharged in my sensory perception of the world, I understand that the universe is not my surroundings, it is my origin, and that the preservation of nature is worth fighting for.

From Løgstrup’s point of view, a philosophy that uncovers the givenness of life is a theological necessity in defense of the belief in God as Creator of Heaven and Earth. However, it is not this theological necessity that makes the uncovering of life as givenness a philosophical necessity. Life as meaningful and valuable has to be defended for its own sake. Only when this is the case does the philosophical defense have a theological significance.

The understanding of life as created is not indisputable; it is just a possibility. However, the nihilistic understanding of life is not indisputable either. It is just a possibility (Løgstrup 2015, pp. 276–90).