# Analysis of Behavioral Strategies of Construction Safety Subjects Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

^{1}

^{2}

^{3}

^{4}

^{5}

^{*}

## Abstract

**:**

## 1. Introduction

## 2. Literature Review

#### 2.1. The Characteristics of Safety Behaviors of the Main Contractor and Construction Workers and Their Game Relationship

#### 2.2. Game Theory in the Study of Construction Safety Management

## 3. Methodology

#### 3.1. Evolutionary Game Theory

#### 3.2. Model Hypothesis

**Hypothesis**

**1.**

**Hypothesis**

**2.**

**Hypothesis**

**3.**

**Hypothesis**

**4.**

#### 3.3. Relevant Parameters

#### 3.4. Construction of the Evolutionary Game Model

- (1)
- The game strategy of the construction workers is:

- (2)
- The game strategy of the main contractor is:

#### 3.5. Evolutionary Equilibrium and Stability Analysis

## 4. Results and Discussion

#### 4.1. The Evolution of Safety Behavior Strategies for Construction Workers

#### 4.2. Analysis of the Evolution of Safety Behavior Strategies of the Main Contractor

## 5. Conclusions and Implications

## Author Contributions

## Funding

## Institutional Review Board Statement

## Informed Consent Statement

## Data Availability Statement

## Acknowledgments

## Conflicts of Interest

## References

- Vinodkumar, M.N.; Bhasi, M. Safety management practices and safety behaviour: Assessing the mediating role of safety knowledge and motivation. Accid. Anal. Prev.
**2010**, 42, 2082–2093. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [PubMed] - Rodrigues, F.; Baptista, J.S.; Pinto, D. BIM Approach in Construction Safety—A Case Study on Preventing Falls from Height. Buildings
**2022**, 12, 73. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Ibrahim, A.; Nnaji, C.; Shakouri, M. Influence of Sociodemographic Factors on Construction Fieldworkers’ Safety Risk Assessments. Sustainability
**2022**, 14, 111. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - General Office of the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development Notice on Production Safety Accidents in Housing and Municipal Construction in 2019. Available online: https://www.mohurd.gov.cn/ (accessed on 24 February 2022).
- Su, W.; Gao, X.; Jiang, Y.; Li, J. Developing a Construction Safety Standard System to Enhance Safety Supervision Efficiency in China: A Theoretical Simulation of the Evolutionary Game Process. Sustainability
**2021**, 13, 13364. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Hallowell, M. Safety risk perception in construction companies in the Pacific Northwest of the USA. Constr. Manag. Econ.
**2010**, 28, 403–413. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Wu, C.; Fang, D.; Li, N. Roles of owners’ leadership in construction safety: The case of high-speed railway construction projects in China. Int. J. Proj. Manag.
**2015**, 33, 1665–1679. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Gambatese, J.A. Owner Involvement in Construction Site Safety. In Proceedings of the Construction Congress VI, Orlando, FL, USA, 20–22 February 2000. [Google Scholar]
- Hinze, J. Construction Safety; Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Upper Saddle River, NJ, USA, 2006. [Google Scholar]
- He, B.; Zhang, S.; Zha, J. On the Allocation of Liabilities for Safety among Construction Contract Partie. China Civ. Eng. J.
**2004**, 37, 101–105. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Math. Graphics. Programming. Available online: https://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab.html (accessed on 21 January 2022).
- Guo, H.; Yu, Y.; Skitmore, M. Visualization technology-based construction safety management: A review. Autom. Constr.
**2017**, 73, 135–144. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Zhang, S.; Sulankivi, K.; Kiviniemi, M.; Romo, I.; Eastman, C.M.; Teizer, J. BIM-based fall hazard identification and prevention in construction safety planning. Saf. Sci.
**2015**, 72, 31–45. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Asah-Kissiedu, M.; Manu, P.; Booth, C.A.; Mahamadu, A.-M.; Agyekum, K. An Integrated Safety, Health and Environmental Management Capability Maturity Model for Construction Organisations: A Case Study in Ghana. Buildings
**2021**, 11, 645. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Chan, D.W.M.; Cristofaro, M.; Nassereddine, H.; Yiu, N.S.N.; Sarvari, H. Perceptions of Safety Climate in Construction Projects between Workers and Managers/Supervisors in the Developing Country of Iran. Sustainability
**2021**, 13, 10398. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Wang, X.; Liu, Y.; Qiu, K.; Shen, F. Research on evolutionary game for construction workers participation in safety management. China Saf. Sci. J.
**2016**, 26, 105–154. [Google Scholar] - Seo, H.-C.; Lee, Y.-S.; Kim, J.-J.; Jee, N.-Y. Analyzing safety behaviors of temporary construction workers using structural equation modeling. Safety Science
**2015**, 77, 160–168. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Hsu, W.-L.; Chen, Y.-S.; Shiau, Y.-C.; Liu, H.-L.; Chern, T.-Y. Curriculum Design in Construction Engineering Departments for Colleges in Taiwan. Educ. Sci.
**2019**, 9, 65. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Liu, S.; Mei, Q.; Zhang, Z. On the Evolution of Workers’ Safety Compliance Behavior in Small and Medium-Size Enterprises. J. Syst. Manag.
**2012**, 21, 275–282. (In Chinese) [Google Scholar] - Notice on the Results of the Investigation and Treatment of the “12–16” Fatal Object Strike Accident at Nanjing BoCai Construction Engineering Corporation. Available online: https://nanjing.gov.cn/index.html (accessed on 24 February 2022).
- Ma, Y. Psychological analysis and control countermeasures of intentional unsafe behavior of coal mine employees. Shenhua Technol.
**2010**, 8, 10–13+29. (In Chinese) [Google Scholar] - Wang, J.; Qin, Y.; Zhou, J. Incentive policies for prefabrication implementation of real estate enterprises: An evolutionary game theory-based analysis. Energy Policy
**2021**, 156, 112434. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Coninx, K.; Deconinck, G.; Holvoet, T. Who gets my flex? An evolutionary game theory analysis of flexibility market dynamics. Appl. Energy
**2018**, 218, 104–113. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Sun, Y. Research on Self-Interest Safety Management Mechanism of China’s Construction Firms. Master’s Thesis, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China, 2005. Available online: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CMFD&dbname=CMFD2007&filename=2006134105.nh&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=WY-nCivAV_VGbiNu9VoBTPoONa58rbY-s8Py86DY1zDaGNhnLThplRDc9vuADeWW (accessed on 25 February 2022).
- Chen, B. Study Government Regulation of Construction Safety Research and Countermeasure Analysis. Master’s Thesis, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China, 2009. Available online: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CMFD&dbname=CMFD2009&filename=2009096513.nh&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=MA68ZtEs6FA3a7kGJ38i3jL9TsTAhnyNSJT-ftulRl67QEmxoQ2IV_a00tyGDcOX (accessed on 25 February 2022).
- Xiao, X.; Sun, Y. The Game Analysis of China’s Construction Safety Regulation. Rev. Ind. Econ.
**2009**, 2, 50–63. [Google Scholar] - Zeng, X.; Chen, J. Game analysis and policy commendation of the supervision on the construction safety about construction enter-prises. Constr. Econ.
**2013**, 5, 93–97. [Google Scholar] - Chen, Y.; Wang, J.; Huang, X. Stability Analysis of Tunnel Construction Safety Supervision Strategy Based on SD Model. J. Syst. Sci.
**2021**, 29, 127–131. [Google Scholar] - Feng, Q.; Shi, X.-J.; Xu, W. Power Rent-Seeking Governance in Safety Supervision System of Projects: Based on Evolutionary Game Model among the Subjects. Chin. J. Manag. Sci.
**2015**, 23, 9–14. [Google Scholar] - Cheng, M. Research on Construction Safety Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory. Oper. Res. Manag. Sci.
**2011**, 6, 210–215. [Google Scholar] - Chen, Y.; Lyu, Y.; Chai, F.; Wang, X. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Unsafe Behavior of Construction Workers from the Perspective of Dynamic Incentives. Saf. Environ. Eng.
**2020**, 27, 197–203. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Ma, G.; Wu, Z.; Jia, J.; Shang, S. Safety risk factors comprehensive analysis for construction project: Combined cascading effect and machine learning approach. Saf. Sci.
**2021**, 143, 105410. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Yi, X.; Wu, J. Research on Safety Management of Construction Engineering Personnel under “Big Data + Artificial Intelligence”. Open J. Bus. Manag.
**2020**, 8, 1059–1075. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] [Green Version] - Dasandara, S.P.M.; Dissanayake, P. Limiting reasons for use of personal protective equipment among construction workers: Case studies in Sri Lanka. Saf. Sci.
**2021**, 143, 105440. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Chen, Y.; Zeng, Q.; Zheng, X.; Shao, B.; Jin, L. Safety supervision of tower crane operation on construction sites: An evolutionary game analysis. Saf. Sci.
**2021**, 105578. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Ni, S.; Zou, S.; Chen, J. Evolutionary Game Model of Internal Threats to Nuclear Security in Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plants Based on RDEU Theory. Sustainability
**2022**, 14, 2163. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Huang, Q.; Wang, J.; Ye, M.; Zhao, S.; Si, X. A Study on the Incentive Policy of China’s Prefabricated Residential Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory. Sustainability
**2022**, 14, 1926. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef] - Zhu, C.; Fan, R.; Luo, M.; Zhang, Y.; Qin, M. Simulating policy interventions for different quota targets of renewable portfolio standard: A combination of evolutionary game and system dynamics approach. Sustain. Prod. Consum.
**2022**, 30, 1053–1069. [Google Scholar] [CrossRef]

**Figure 5.**The effect of the amount of labor required for safety behavior and the gain of bravado D on the evolution results.

**Figure 6.**The effect of the probability of the occurrence of safety accident risk α on the evolution results.

Parameter Symbols | Explanation of Parameters |
---|---|

A | Ultimate gain of the construction workers’ safe operation |

B | Ultimate gain of the main contractor’s strict safety management |

C1 | Management costs saved by the main contractor without strict safety management |

D | Gain of non-compliant operation of construction workers |

F | Financial penalties are given by the main contractor to construction workers with the non-compliant operation |

K | Financial penalties to the main contractor for non-strict supervision |

α | Probability of the accident |

S1 | Losses to be borne by construction workers when the accident occurs |

S2 | Losses to be borne by the main contractor when the accident occurs |

t | Time |

The Main Contractor | |||
---|---|---|---|

Y1 Strict Supervision (q) | Y2 Non-Strict Supervision (1 − q) | ||

Construction workers | X1 Safe operation (p) | A B − C1 | A B − K |

X2 Non-compliant operation (1 − p) | A + D − F, B − C1 | A + D − α(S1), B − K − α(S2) |

(p, q) | detj | Sign | trj | Sign | Stability |
---|---|---|---|---|---|

(0, 0) | (αS1 − D)*(−C1 + K + αS2) | + | (αS1 − D) + (F − C1 + K + αS2) | + | Unstable point |

(0, 1) | (F − D)*−(−C1 + K + αS2) | + | (F − D) − (F − C1 + K + αS2) | − | ESS |

(1, 0) | −(αS1 − D)*(K − C1) | + | −(αS1 − D) + (K − C1) | − | ESS |

(1, 1) | −(F − D)* − (K − C1) | + | −(F − D) − (K − C1) | + | Unstable point |

Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. |

© 2022 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

## Share and Cite

**MDPI and ACS Style**

Wu, F.; Xu, H.; Sun, K.-S.; Hsu, W.-L.
Analysis of Behavioral Strategies of Construction Safety Subjects Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory. *Buildings* **2022**, *12*, 313.
https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12030313

**AMA Style**

Wu F, Xu H, Sun K-S, Hsu W-L.
Analysis of Behavioral Strategies of Construction Safety Subjects Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory. *Buildings*. 2022; 12(3):313.
https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12030313

**Chicago/Turabian Style**

Wu, Fan, Haiying Xu, Kuo-Shun Sun, and Wei-Ling Hsu.
2022. "Analysis of Behavioral Strategies of Construction Safety Subjects Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory" *Buildings* 12, no. 3: 313.
https://doi.org/10.3390/buildings12030313