Priority to Self-Interest? Economic Development? Or Ecological Coordination? The Turnover of Local Officials and Environmental Governance in China

Under the background of government-oriented environmental governance in China, the environmental effect of local official turnover has become an important issue. How to improve governmental governance is an important issue that profoundly affects local environmental governance. Based on a literature analysis, this paper establishes an environmental-effect identification equation to deeply analyze the environmental effect of local official turnover on private enterprises. Then, this paper empirically analyzes the effect of local personnel turnover on the environmental pollution control of private enterprises and the persistence of this effect. The results show that the turnover of local officials has a positive effect on the pollution control investment of private enterprises, but the effect is not persistent. The interest collusion between local officials and private enterprises tends to be one main reason to explain the environmental effect, and two different types of interest collusions are determined: priority to self-interest and economic development. The reasons why the positive effect cannot last for long may be attributed to a lack of systematic and effective institutions or temporary administrative measures. It is important to make local officials fully realize the “green wealth” value of the ecosystems, to change their economic priorities. Finally, this paper proposes countermeasures for local governments on personnel affairs to promote environmental governance.