Priority to Self-Interest? Economic Development? Or Ecological Coordination? The Turnover of Local Officials and Environmental Governance in China
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses
3. Methodology and Data
3.1. Methodology
3.2. Samples
3.3. Main Variables
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. Results
4.1.1. Empirical Results for Hypothesis 1
- After controlling for the different explanatory variables listed in columns (1)–(4), official turnover still has a significant promoting effect on the investment of private enterprises in pollution control. As shown in Table 2, the turnover of the municipal party secretary increases the proportion of the investment in pollution control by 0.541. Moreover, the regression coefficients in columns (1)–(4) range from 0.541 to 0.583, which has a certain robustness.
- The benchmark conclusion of this paper shows that the turnover of officials in prefecture-level cities may have a positive effect on the investment of local private enterprises in pollution control, which supports hypothesis 1. Investment in pollution control plays an important factor in environmental quality.
4.1.2. Empirical Results for Hypothesis 2
4.1.3. Further Robustness Test through Different Types of Official Turnover
4.2. Discussion
4.2.1. Deepening Analysis for the Formation of Interest Collusion between Local Officials and the Private Enterprises Creating Pollution
- Priority to self-interest. When local officials give priority to self-interest and fetch illegal income from the private enterprises creating pollution, they would usually act as an umbrella for the private enterprises creating pollution. Lots of pollution activities may be ignored and, thus, escape from the relevant laws [23,24]. This kind of interest collusion may mainly come from local officials’ pursuit of personal profit. Through all kinds of profit transmissions, interest collusion probably forms between local officials and the private enterprises creating pollution.
- Priority to economic development. It is well-known that the “GDP only” preference is the long-standing policy orientation in China, which is the key performance measure for local officials. If local officials want to be promoted, they give priority to economic development, so environmental protection is usually neglected [25,26]. The private enterprises creating pollution sometimes play an important role in regional economic development, which reduces local officials’ resolution to enhance environmental governance when they worry about the decline of local GDP growth. This kind of interest collusion may mainly be attributed to local officials’ promotion, which makes local officials give priority to economic development, even though private enterprises create lots of pollution.
4.2.2. Key Points for Why the Positive Effect of Local Officials’ Turnover on Environmental Governance Is Difficult to Keep
- One reason may lie in the lack of systematic and effective institutions to prevent interest collusion. An interest collusion is usually difficult to be eliminated. It tends to be one complicated local relationship network when an interest collusion forms firmly. It appears more obvious that the deterrence of same-city transfer seems to be limited when we compare the differences in the environmental effects between inter-city transfer and same-city transfer [23,24]. Local promotion may just be the internal evolution of a local relationship network. Therefore, a set of systematic and effective institutions could help to thoroughly break through a local relationship network.
- Another reason may be the temporary administrative measures taken for environmental supervision. Due to the “GDP only” preference, local officials usually take temporary administrative measures to reduce the aggravating pollution under the pressure of heavy environmental supervision from the central government. Local officials often take a one-size-fits-all approach to deal with this “environmental storm” supervision, which has a great effect on local economic development and social livelihood [27]. When one round of environmental supervision is finished, the measures of reducing pollution taken by local officials tend to be weakened. Long-term mechanisms may need to be strengthened [28]. The key point to coordinating economic development and environmental protection probably lies in making local officials realize that they can promote economic development through environmental protection.
4.2.3. One Possible Way to Coordinate Economic Development and Environmental Protection through Ecosystem “Green Wealth”
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
- Local officials’ turnover may have a positive effect on the investment of private enterprises in pollution control. However, the effect of local officials’ turnover on the investment in pollution control seems to not be persistent.
- The interest collusion between local officials and private enterprises is one main reason to explain the environmental effect brought about by the turnover of local officials. The existing interest collusions may hinder the government’s enforcement of corporate investment in pollution control. The formation of interest collusions probably lies in two different types: priority to self-interest and economic development given by local officials.
- The reasons why the positive effect of local officials’ turnover cannot last for long may refer to temporary administrative measures or a lack of systematic and effective institutions. The lack of systematic and effective institutions could not break through local relationship networks thoroughly. When environmental supervision is finished, the temporary measures for pollution control also tend to be weakened.
- One possible way in the future to coordinate economic development and environmental protection is to fully realize the value of ecosystem “green wealth”. The deep exploration of ecosystem “green wealth” may promote regional economic development.
- Personnel turnover may bring positive environmental effects to a certain extent. When interest collusion seriously hinders environmental governance, it is suggested to take the way of personnel turnover to overcome this issue. Meanwhile, it is also suggested to design a set of systematic and effective institutions and long-term measures to efficiently make full use of the personnel turnover policy. It is also suggested to take the way of inter-city transfer rather than same-city transfer to thoroughly break interest collusions.
- It is necessary to consider the important role of local officials in environmental governance. The policy preferences of local officials usually have a great effect on environmental governance. Promoting local officials’ priority from self-interest and GDP preference to the value of ecosystem services is an important way to promote environmental governance. Future work should test whether attitudes and understanding of “green wealth” in new officials affect the outcomes of environmental governance.
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A
Year | No. of Enterprise Surveyed | No. That Have Official Turnover | Share (%) | No. of Cities Surveyed | No. That Have Official Turnover | Share (%) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
2006 | 1219 | 160 | 13% | 88 | 16 | 18% |
2008 | 1229 | 198 | 16% | 80 | 13 | 16% |
2010 | 1556 | 55 | 4% | 42 | 3 | 7% |
2012 | 1596 | 782 | 49% | 20 | 8 | 40% |
Total | 5600 | 1195 | 21% | 230 | 40 | 17% |
Proportion of Investment in Pollution Control (%) | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Inter-City Transfer | Same-City Transfer | |||||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | |
Official turnover in the current year (1 = have) | 0.791 *** | 0.776 *** | 0.763 *** | 0.761 *** | 0.092 | 0.147 | 0.091 | 0.159 |
(0.266) | (0.266) | (0.265) | (0.266) | (0.128) | (0.143) | (0.129) | (0.143) | |
Environmental regulation | ||||||||
Proportion of sewage charges (%) | 1.828 *** | 1.527 *** | 1.830 *** | 1.531 *** | 1.595 *** | 1.224 *** | 1.595 *** | 1.223 *** |
(0.321) | (0.320) | (0.322) | (0.321) | (0.244) | (0.168) | (0.244) | (0.169) | |
Firm characteristics | ||||||||
Average profit rate of enterprises (%) | 0.014 ** | 0.014 ** | 0.005 | 0.004 | ||||
(0.007) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.004) | |||||
Enterprise operating income (log) | 0.063** | 0.063** | 0.037 | 0.037 | ||||
(0.026) | (0.027) | (0.025) | (0.026) | |||||
Enterprise age (year) | −0.029 *** | −0.025 ** | −0.014 * | −0.012 | ||||
(0.011) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.008) | |||||
Firm owner characteristics | ||||||||
Enterprise owner’s age (year) | −0.011 ** | −0.009 | −0.006 | −0.005 | ||||
(0.005) | (0.006) | (0.004) | (0.005) | |||||
Enterprise owner’s college education (1 = yes) | 0.300 *** | 0.199 ** | 0.210 * | 0.121 | ||||
(0.086) | (0.091) | (0.112) | (0.118) | |||||
Enterprise owner’s gender (1 = female) | −0.074 | 0.006 | 0.017 | 0.116 | ||||
(0.203) | (0.221) | (0.192) | (0.215) | |||||
City Characteristics | ||||||||
The proportion of the secondary industry (%) | 0.009 | 0.012 * | 0.010 | 0.012 * | 0.010 * | 0.010 * | 0.010 * | 0.010 * |
(0.006) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.007) | (0.005) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.006) | |
GDP per capita (log) | 0.141 | 0.112 | 0.157 | 0.119 | 0.034 | −0.009 | 0.035 | −0.009 |
(0.101) | (0.105) | (0.102) | (0.105) | (0.093) | (0.094) | (0.093) | (0.093) | |
Fiscal deficit rate (%) | 0.377 *** | 0.339 *** | 0.394 *** | 0.349 *** | 0.225 *** | 0.208 ** | 0.231 *** | 0.213 ** |
(0.094) | (0.093) | (0.097) | (0.095) | (0.087) | (0.088) | (0.088) | (0.089) | |
Samples | 3951 | 3624 | 3923 | 3605 | 4003 | 3663 | 3966 | 3636 |
Log-likelihood | −10,020.2 | −9193.5 | −9957.4 | −9152.0 | −9301.0 | −8500.7 | −9226.0 | −8448.5 |
R-squared | 0.139 | 0.107 | 0.141 | 0.108 | 0.125 | 0.074 | 0.127 | 0.074 |
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Variables | Count | Mean | s. d. | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Proportion of investment in pollution control (%) | 5600 | 0.703 | 3.830 | 0.000 | 85.714 |
Official turnover (1 = have) | 5600 | 0.213 | 0.410 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Proportion of sewage charges (%) | 5600 | 0.148 | 0.587 | 0.000 | 10.000 |
Average profit rate of enterprises (%) | 5600 | 8.148 | 15.505 | −100.000 | 100.000 |
Enterprise operating income (log) | 5600 | 16.445 | 2.539 | 0.000 | 24.937 |
Enterprise age (year) | 5600 | 8.031 | 4.930 | 0.000 | 27.000 |
Enterprise owner’s age (year) | 5600 | 46.062 | 8.433 | 15.000 | 90.000 |
Enterprise owner’s college education (1 = yes) | 5600 | 0.888 | 0.315 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Enterprise owner’s gender (1 = female) | 5600 | 0.099 | 0.298 | 0.000 | 1.000 |
Proportion of secondary industry (%) | 5600 | 50.825 | 9.155 | 15.700 | 85.920 |
GDP per capita (log) | 5600 | 10.263 | 0.727 | 8.410 | 11.800 |
Fiscal deficit rate (%) | 5600 | 0.994 | 1.166 | −0.143 | 13.409 |
Proportion of Investment in Pollution Control (%) | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (1)′ | (2) | (2)′ | (3) | (3)′ | (4) | (4)′ | |
OLS | Tobit | OLS | Tobit | OLS | Tobit | OLS | Tobit | |
Official turnover in the current year (1 = have) | 0.411 *** | 0.543 ** | 0.453 *** | 0.545 ** | 0.423 *** | 0.583 ** | 0.452 *** | 0.541 ** |
(0.142) | (0.222) | (0.150) | (0.237) | (0.148) | (0.232) | (0.150) | (0.238) | |
Environmental regulation | ||||||||
Proportion of sewage charges (%) | 1.783 *** | 2.479 *** | 1.494 *** | 2.499 *** | 1.791 *** | 2.491 *** | 1.497 *** | 2.513 *** |
(0.297) | (0.359) | (0.307) | (0.434) | (0.311) | (0.371) | (0.308) | (0.435) | |
Firm characteristics | ||||||||
Average profit rate of enterprises (%) | 0.016 ** | 0.034 *** | 0.015 ** | 0.033 *** | ||||
(0.006) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.010) | |||||
Enterprise operating income (log) | 0.050 ** | 0.613 *** | 0.050 * | 0.613 *** | ||||
(0.025) | (0.093) | (0.025) | (0.095) | |||||
Enterprise age (year) | −0.028 *** | −0.011 | −0.024 ** | −0.009 | ||||
(0.010) | (0.018) | (0.010) | (0.018) | |||||
Firm owner characteristics | ||||||||
Enterprise owner’s age (year) | −0.012 ** | 0.007 | −0.010 * | −0.011 | ||||
(0.005) | (0.008) | (0.005) | (0.010) | |||||
Enterprise owner’s college education (1 = yes) | 0.251 ** | 0.921 *** | 0.152 | 0.264 | ||||
(0.119) | (0.260) | (0.125) | (0.265) | |||||
Enterprise owner’s gender (1 = female) | −0.144 | −0.795 ** | −0.048 | −0.441 | ||||
(0.186) | (0.333) | (0.204) | (0.360) | |||||
City Characteristics | ||||||||
Proportion of the secondary industry (%) | 0.012 ** | 0.024 ** | 0.012 ** | 0.036 *** | 0.012 ** | 0.024 ** | ||
(0.006) | (0.012) | (0.006) | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.012) | |||
GDP per capita (log) | 0.075 | −0.075 | 0.098 | 0.166 | 0.079 | −0.060 | ||
(0.092) | (0.162) | (0.089) | (0.151) | (0.092) | (0.163) | |||
Fiscal deficit rate (%) | 0.333 *** | 0.611 *** | 0.373 *** | 0.681 *** | 0.343 *** | 0.626 *** | ||
(0.089) | (0.133) | (0.091) | (0.135) | (0.091) | (0.136) | |||
Samples | 4758 | 4758 | 4073 | 4073 | 4407 | 4407 | 4043 | 4043 |
Log-likelihood | −11,959.6 | −8059.3 | −10,287.8 | −6805.8 | −11,131.3 | −7454.0 | −10,223.9 | −6760.6 |
R-squared | 0.112 | 0.027 | 0.099 | 0.040 | 0.128 | 0.033 | 0.099 | 0.040 |
Proportion of Investment in Pollution Control (%) | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (1)′ | (2) | (2)′ | (3) | (3)′ | (4) | (4)′ | |
OLS | Tobit | OLS | Tobit | OLS | Tobit | OLS | Tobit | |
Official turnover in the former year (1 = have) | 0.130 | 0.065 | 0.134 | 0.085 | 0.146 | 0.055 | 0.148 | 0.096 |
(0.109) | (0.168) | (0.124) | (0.185) | (0.119) | (0.175) | (0.128) | (0.189) | |
Environmental regulation | ||||||||
Proportion of sewage charges (%) | 1.622 *** | 2.199 *** | 1.262 *** | 2.145 *** | 1.643 *** | 2.220 *** | 1.263 *** | 2.151 *** |
(0.239) | (0.265) | (0.170) | (0.303) | (0.251) | (0.277) | (0.170) | (0.304) | |
Firm characteristics | ||||||||
Average profit rate of enterprises (%) | 0.002 | 0.010 | 0.002 | 0.009 | ||||
(0.004) | (0.007) | (0.004) | (0.007) | |||||
Enterprise operating income (log) | 0.047 * | 0.510 *** | 0.047 * | 0.510 *** | ||||
(0.025) | (0.107) | (0.027) | (0.111) | |||||
Enterprise age (year) | −0.014 * | 0.001 | −0.012 | 0.001 | ||||
(0.007) | (0.014) | (0.008) | (0.015) | |||||
Firm owner characteristics | ||||||||
Enterprise owner’s age (year) | −0.004 | 0.016 ** | −0.003 | −0.001 | ||||
(0.004) | (0.007) | (0.005) | (0.009) | |||||
Enterprise owner’s college education (1 = yes) | 0.306 *** | 0.833 *** | 0.208 *** | 0.256 | ||||
(0.074) | (0.217) | (0.079) | (0.203) | |||||
Enterprise owner’s gender (1 = female) | 0.128 | −0.315 | 0.217 | −0.015 | ||||
(0.214) | (0.328) | (0.238) | (0.368) | |||||
City Characteristics | ||||||||
Proportion of the secondary industry (%) | 0.009 | 0.015 | 0.008 | 0.021 ** | 0.009 | 0.015 | ||
(0.006) | (0.011) | (0.006) | (0.010) | (0.006) | (0.011) | |||
GDP per capita (log) | −0.033 | −0.172 | 0.029 | 0.086 | −0.033 | −0.164 | ||
(0.106) | (0.176) | (0.104) | (0.159) | (0.105) | (0.175) | |||
Fiscal deficit rate (%) | 0.192 ** | 0.374 *** | 0.223 ** | 0.430 *** | 0.194 ** | 0.375 *** | ||
(0.093) | (0.129) | (0.095) | (0.134) | (0.094) | (0.131) | |||
Samples | 3739 | 3739 | 3214 | 3214 | 3482 | 3482 | 3198 | 3198 |
Log-likelihood | −8644.8 | −5966.4 | −7410.0 | −5017.9 | −8064.6 | −5521.1 | −7377.0 | −4993.5 |
R-squared | 0.129 | 0.032 | 0.082 | 0.039 | 0.144 | 0.037 | 0.083 | 0.040 |
Proportion of Investment in Pollution Control (%) | ||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Inter-City Transfer | Same-City Transfer | |||||||
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
Tobit | Tobit | Tobit | Tobit | Tobit | Tobit | Tobit | Tobit | |
Official turnover in the current year (1 = have) | 0.985 *** | 0.947 ** | 0.926 ** | 0.931 ** | 0.196 | 0.165 | 0.216 | 0.178 |
(0.379) | (0.388) | (0.379) | (0.389) | (0.218) | (0.241) | (0.220) | (0.242) | |
Environmental regulation | ||||||||
Proportion of sewage charges (%) | 2.495 *** | 2.536 *** | 2.520 *** | 2.551 *** | 2.181 *** | 2.117 *** | 2.194 *** | 2.122 *** |
(0.383) | (0.454) | (0.384) | (0.455) | (0.270) | (0.290) | (0.269) | (0.290) | |
Firm characteristics | ||||||||
Average profit rate of enterprises (%) | 0.032 *** | 0.031 *** | 0.014 ** | 0.013 ** | ||||
(0.011) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.007) | |||||
Enterprise operating income (log) | 0.635 *** | 0.636 *** | 0.503 *** | 0.503 *** | ||||
(0.102) | (0.105) | (0.095) | (0.098) | |||||
Enterprise age (year) | −0.012 | −0.011 | 0.002 | 0.003 | ||||
(0.019) | (0.019) | (0.013) | (0.014) | |||||
Firm owner characteristics | ||||||||
Enterprise owner’s age (year) | 0.008 | −0.007 | 0.012 * | −0.006 | ||||
(0.009) | (0.011) | (0.007) | (0.008) | |||||
Enterprise owner’s college education (1 = yes) | 0.939 *** | 0.288 | 0.771 *** | 0.183 | ||||
(0.245) | (0.241) | (0.233) | (0.237) | |||||
Enterprise owner’s gender (1 = female) | −0.687 * | −0.369 | −0.482 | −0.161 | ||||
(0.357) | (0.387) | (0.306) | (0.343) | |||||
City Characteristics | ||||||||
Proportion of the secondary industry (%) | 0.031 ** | 0.023 * | 0.032 *** | 0.024 * | 0.026 *** | 0.017 * | 0.026 *** | 0.017 * |
(0.012) | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | |
GDP per capita (log) | 0.201 | −0.046 | 0.219 | −0.025 | 0.115 | −0.135 | 0.098 | −0.130 |
(0.168) | (0.182) | (0.170) | (0.183) | (0.143) | (0.157) | (0.144) | (0.156) | |
Fiscal deficit rate (%) | 0.685 *** | 0.606 *** | 0.699 *** | 0.620 *** | 0.450 *** | 0.407 *** | 0.447 *** | 0.413 *** |
(0.141) | (0.139) | (0.145) | (0.143) | (0.122) | (0.123) | (0.125) | (0.125) | |
Samples | 3951 | 3624 | 3923 | 3605 | 4003 | 3663 | 3966 | 3636 |
Log-likelihood | −6689.4 | −6046.6 | −6638.3 | −6014.5 | −6389.6 | −5775.1 | −6331.0 | −5739.0 |
R-squared | 0.034 | 0.042 | 0.035 | 0.042 | 0.033 | 0.037 | 0.034 | 0.037 |
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Guo, Y.; Zhang, T.; Li, R. Priority to Self-Interest? Economic Development? Or Ecological Coordination? The Turnover of Local Officials and Environmental Governance in China. Land 2023, 12, 91. https://doi.org/10.3390/land12010091
Guo Y, Zhang T, Li R. Priority to Self-Interest? Economic Development? Or Ecological Coordination? The Turnover of Local Officials and Environmental Governance in China. Land. 2023; 12(1):91. https://doi.org/10.3390/land12010091
Chicago/Turabian StyleGuo, Yanjun, Tuo Zhang, and Ruotong Li. 2023. "Priority to Self-Interest? Economic Development? Or Ecological Coordination? The Turnover of Local Officials and Environmental Governance in China" Land 12, no. 1: 91. https://doi.org/10.3390/land12010091
APA StyleGuo, Y., Zhang, T., & Li, R. (2023). Priority to Self-Interest? Economic Development? Or Ecological Coordination? The Turnover of Local Officials and Environmental Governance in China. Land, 12(1), 91. https://doi.org/10.3390/land12010091