The groups of local farmers participating in our field experiment were balanced in terms of gender (67% male and 33% female farmers). In addition, the farmer groups were diverse, in terms of age, education level, farm business activity or size of land. Farming activities comprised 12 directions, including viticulture and winemaking, cereal production and beekeeping, dairy farming and meat farming, berries, fruit orchards, and greenhouses and horticulture. We applied combinations of experimental game design and a survey method to obtain a broad picture of farmers’ social preferences. In the next sub section, we show the general situation in Kakheti’s agriculture sector and then we present results from the carried-out field experiments in targeted municipalities.
5.1. Results—General Socioconomic Situation in Kakheti Municipalities
Kakheti is a wine region of eastern Georgia, which comprises eight administrative municipalities with up to 9% of the total country’s population. Among the eight municipalities in Kakheti, we chose four municipalities for our field experiment, which comprises up to 57% of the total regional population of Kakheti. These municipalities are Gurjaani, Telavi (Capital), Lagodekhi, and Kvareli. It should be noted that Telavi is the administrative capital of the Kakheti region. In this section we draw a socioeconomic picture of the Kakheti region in terms of targeted municipalities and create background portrait for our research objective.
According to the general population census data
1, the municipal population of Kakheti is circa 320,000 people, and number of local households (HHs) is 96,600, which means that on average, number of people per HH is 3.
Figure 3 and
Figure 4 show that the population distribution and number of HHs headed by a female, where on average 30% of HHs are led by female in Gurjaani, Telavi Lagodekhi, and Kvareli municipalities. The most populated municipality is Telavi with 58,350 people, including urban and rural populations.
Figure 5 depicts the number of agricultural holdings by legal status of holder in units by targeted municipalities. Only very small number of family farms have legal status, which indicates that agriculture HHs are mostly engaged more in subsistence family farming than being market-oriented farm business entities.
It should be noted that Kakheti is an agriculture-oriented region, which particularly stands out with vineyards and winemaking traditions as an economic activity for the local population. To illustrate this pattern,
Figure 6 shows that 68% and 69% of HHs in Gurjaani and Kvareli municipalities, respectively, hold vineyards and most of the vineyard land holdings are less than 5 ha (
Table 7), which indicates high fragmentation of agriculture landholdings in each targeted municipality.
Figure 7 shows percentage number of local family holdings producing agriculture products mainly for its own consumption. For example, 62% and 69% of local HHs in Gurjaani and Kvareli municipalities are engaged more in subsistence farming activities for their household consumption than being toward market-oriented households.
Figure 8 and
Figure 9 illustrate the utilization level of land cultivation equipment by local farmers, however, very small number of agriculture farmers (circa 5% of HHs) have utilization equipment in ownership (
Figure 9).
5.2. Results—Game Experiments
For measuring behavioural trust, reciprocity, and cooperation potential among farmers in Kakheti, Georgia we applied an experimental study of a trust game, public goods game, and a supplementary survey. The main intention was to identify and assess trustful and trustworthy behaviour among farmers and uncover what the motivating factors behind their behaviour in the trust game and public goods game were. Varying levels of trust, beliefs, and preferences can either promote or deter qualitative indicators for collective actions such as land consolidation. The higher the trust, the more opportunity for cooperation; hence, the land consolidation approach could be a preferred approach. Vice versa, the more different the motives, the riskier the collective action can be, in which case fragmentation is a preferred option.
In total, we received responses from 39 farmers. We visited four municipalities in Kakheti, Georgia—Gurjaani, Telavi, Kvareli, and Lagodekhi—and covered various farming activities from winemaking to dairy production. Farmers from different municipalities face different problems and require an individual approach from the government. Water supply and sanitation problems and rehabilitation of rural and municipal roads are the main priorities for farmers of all four municipalities. Along with common difficulties such as unpaved rural road network and water supply problems, the groups of farmers from individual municipalities specified different priorities; these are: Telavi municipality—rural tourism, Gurjaani municipality—waste management, Kvareli municipality—irrigation and rural tourism, and Lagodekhi municipality—waste management and rural tourism.
The four municipalities are mostly equally represented in this study (
Figure 10).
Figure 11 shows the numbers of surveyed farmers and their land holdings and provides a representative picture of the given municipalities in terms of size and the nature of fragmented land ownership prevalent in Kakheti, Georgia. Surveyed farmers represent wide variety of agricultural activity with 35.9% having grape yards but having representatives of fruit orchards, dairy farming, beekeeping, and so on (
Figure 12).
With regard to the age range of farmers, 41% of respondents fall within the 41–50 age interval, with some representatives in each age group (
Figure 13). Gender distribution among famers was 67% male and 33% female. Of total respondents, 69% had higher education, while 18% had secondary education.
Figure 14 presents the voluntary contribution by senders in the trust game. In particular, 9 out of 39 sending trials (23%) wished to send all 50 tokens. On average, senders sent 29.2 tokens, slightly over 50% of their original endowment (50 tokens). This result contrasts with the results predicted by standard economic theory, which would require players to act selfishly, not giving away anything. Only 15% of senders decided to give 0 to 10 tokens. Most of the players chose numbers around the middle (41%), giving away 20–30 tokens.
The results of the receivers in response to transfers are varying.
Figure 15 shows that most people returned in the range of 40–60% of tokens received, but it is close to even distribution in other ranges too. Five of the receivers (13%) decided not to return anything, while another five (13%) returned 100% of the tripled amount they received. On average, 51% of the received tokens were returned to senders.
The results of trust game show that these farmers were inclined to share close to 50% of their initial endowments and close to 50% of (tripled) received transfers with others. The experiment revealed that on average, senders sent 58.4%, while receivers returned 50.1%. This indicates that trust and trustworthiness is high among respondents, yet Georgian farmers revealed higher trustful than trustworthy behaviour.
Figure 16 shows the results of the public goods games played among farmers. They played six rounds, and the diagram shows that cooperation increased as the game went to the next stage. Optimizing players would choose to free-ride and not contribute towards the public good, but this results in a worse outcome for everyone. Farmers displayed high cooperation ability, with Kvareli municipality contributing the most over the rounds.
The results of the public goods games suggest that Georgian farmers are prone to cooperation and would be willing to share their land and equipment. The fact that there is a high fragmentation and willingness to cooperation suggests that there is friction and barriers to cooperation. These should be addressed by the government if it aims to follow a land consolidation policy.
This finding complements to the trust game results. Only 12.8% expressed selfish behaviour and contributed less than 20% of their allocated tokens towards the public good. Additionally, 23.1% decided to contribute more than 80% of their allocations and displayed high tendency towards cooperation. In other words, by showing trust and sharing their endowment, senders risked others also sharing to benefit everyone.
In
Figure 17, 72% of farmers don’t think that most people can be trusted. While only 3% of them provide an optimistic response. This is in contrast with studies in other countries where trust levels are much higher.
Figure 18 depicts responses regarding cooperation. The study revealed that 34% of farmers have negative expectation for cooperation, while 52% of farmers are inclined towards cooperation.
We combined the results of the trust games (TG) and public goods games (PGG) with complementary survey responses and designed a measure of social capital, consisting of five dimensions. We measured bonding social capital, bridging social capital, and linking social capital with relevant survey questions, which had responses on a scale of 1 to 5. Additionally, we measured trust and reciprocity not only from the questionnaire but from an experimental environment using the trust game. We analysed how farmers behaved in an experimental setup and how close their actions were to their answers to complementary questions. Experimental design allows for extraction of information on how people might act when questions can be answered dishonestly. The fifth dimension of the social capital indicator was taken from the public goods game results, which provides an idea of how cooperative people are in experimental design. All five pillars of the measurement are scaled from 1 to 5 and are summarized in a radar chart.
Figure 19 shows radar charts for four municipalities in Kakheti, Georgia. Here, it is clear that social capital is around the middle range and there is a need for significant development. Linking social capital seems to be most lacking, and Telavi has the lowest score of 1.8 in bridging social capital.
We can see that overall scores are around the middle, mostly within two to three points, but game results of trust, reciprocity, and cooperation are overall higher than other scores. These results suggest that Georgian farmers have high potential for cooperation but outside factors prevent them from being able to do so. Therefore, government should focus on making it easier for farmers to cooperate and creating the required infrastructure for it.