Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer
Abstract
:1. Introduction
2. Motivation
3. Model
3.1. Model Setup
3.2. Strategy Analysis
3.3. Equilibrium
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
1 | Note that, for , we have , and for . For , this condition is always satisfied. |
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Fan, J. Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer. Games 2023, 14, 60. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14050060
Fan J. Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer. Games. 2023; 14(5):60. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14050060
Chicago/Turabian StyleFan, Jijian. 2023. "Delay to Deal: Bargaining with Indivisibility and Round-Dependent Transfer" Games 14, no. 5: 60. https://doi.org/10.3390/g14050060