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An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions

1
University of the Philippines School of Economics, Encarnación Hall, Osmeña cor. Guerrero Sts., Diliman, Quezon City 1101, Philippines
2
Department of Economics, University of Hawaii, 2424 Maile Way, Saunders Hall 542, Honolulu, HI 96822, USA
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2019, 10(3), 31; https://doi.org/10.3390/g10030031
Received: 3 July 2019 / Revised: 26 July 2019 / Accepted: 30 July 2019 / Published: 1 August 2019
PDF [1195 KB, uploaded 1 August 2019]

Abstract

We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to investigate possible behavioral factors that may explain deviations from theoretical predictions. The main findings show that agents display rational behavior when forming coalitions, especially when they know that a large proportion of their opponents play myopic strategies from the outset. Over time, however, agents learn to behave more strategically and even more rationally, thus enabling agents to display more of the behavior predicted by the coalition formation model with farsighted agents.
Keywords: coalition formation; power accumulation; self-enforcement; experiment coalition formation; power accumulation; self-enforcement; experiment
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited (CC BY 4.0).
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Jandoc, K.; Juarez, R. An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions. Games 2019, 10, 31.

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