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Open AccessArticle

Optimal Quality Strategy and Matching Service on Crowdfunding Platforms

by 1,*, 1, 1 and 2,*
1
College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China
2
Department of Finance, Business School of Shantou University, Shantou 515063, China
*
Authors to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Sustainability 2018, 10(4), 1053; https://doi.org/10.3390/su10041053
Received: 22 February 2018 / Revised: 26 March 2018 / Accepted: 29 March 2018 / Published: 2 April 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Internet Finance, Green Finance and Sustainability)
This paper develops a crowdfunding platform model incorporating quality and a matching service from the perspective of a two-sided market. It aims to explore the impact of different factors on the optimal quality threshold and matching service in a context of crowdfunding from the perspective of a two-sided market. We discuss the impact of different factors on the optimal quality threshold and matching service. Two important influential factors are under consideration, simultaneously. One is the quality threshold of admission and the other is the matching efficiency on crowdfunding platforms. This paper develops a two-sided market model incorporating quality, a matching service, and the characters of crowdfunding campaigns. After attempting to solve the model by derivative method, this paper identifies the mechanism of how the parameters influence the optimal quality threshold and matching service. Additionally, it compares the platform profits in scenarios with and without an exclusion policy. The results demonstrate that excluding low-quality projects is profitable when funder preference for project quality is substantial enough. Crowdfunding platform managers would be unwise to admit the quality threshold of the crowdfunding project and charge entrance fees when the parameter of funder preference for project quality is small. View Full-Text
Keywords: crowdfunding platform; matching service; quality threshold of admission; two-sided market crowdfunding platform; matching service; quality threshold of admission; two-sided market
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MDPI and ACS Style

Wu, W.; Huang, X.; Li, Y.; Chu, C.-C. Optimal Quality Strategy and Matching Service on Crowdfunding Platforms. Sustainability 2018, 10, 1053. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10041053

AMA Style

Wu W, Huang X, Li Y, Chu C-C. Optimal Quality Strategy and Matching Service on Crowdfunding Platforms. Sustainability. 2018; 10(4):1053. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10041053

Chicago/Turabian Style

Wu, Wenqing; Huang, Xuan; Li, Yue; Chu, Chien-Chi. 2018. "Optimal Quality Strategy and Matching Service on Crowdfunding Platforms" Sustainability 10, no. 4: 1053. https://doi.org/10.3390/su10041053

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