Pricing Reform Progress: Evidence from Sovereign Spreads and Consensus Forecasts
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The Literature
3. Estimation Strategy and Data
4. Baseline Panel Results
5. Extension: Impact of Reforms on Sovereign Credit Quality
5.1. Indicator of Reform
5.2. Estimated Impact of Reforms
6. Summary and Policy Implications
Funding
Institutional Review Board Statement
Informed Consent Statement
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Appendix A. Tables and Figures
| Model Number | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | |||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth fcst. | −0.352 | *** | −0.091 | * | ||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.051) | (0.049) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Inflation fcst. | 0.330 | *** | 0.430 | *** | ||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.062) | (0.061) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Fiscal balance fcst. | −0.232 | *** | −0.043 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.060) | (0.067) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Public debt fcst. | 0.000 | −0.070 | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.056) | (0.051) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Current account fcst. | −0.220 | *** | −0.105 | * | ||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.056) | (0.058) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Domestic uncertainty index | 0.132 | ** | 0.023 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.057) | (0.034) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Real oil prices, all economies | −0.230 | *** | … | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.067) | … | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Real oil prices, oil exporters | −0.472 | *** | −0.421 | *** | ||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.076) | (0.080) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Real oil prices, oil importers | 0.060 | 0.173 | ** | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.101) | (0.080) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| VIX | 0.277 | *** | 0.359 | *** | ||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.045) | (0.042) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Level of reform | −0.119 | * | 0.030 | |||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.062) | (0.048) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Balance of reform | 0.226 | *** | 0.192 | *** | ||||||||||||||||||||
| (0.061) | (0.047) | |||||||||||||||||||||||
| Intercept | −0.021 | −0.024 | −0.024 | −0.023 | −0.022 | 0.076 | 0.014 | 0.017 | 0.003 | −0.006 | 0.001 | −0.006 | 0.004 | |||||||||||
| (0.057) | (0.056) | (0.059) | (0.061) | (0.059) | (0.079) | (0.061) | (0.058) | (0.061) | (0.061) | (0.062) | (0.060) | (0.048) | ||||||||||||
| Number of observations | 2130 | 2122 | 2141 | 2151 | 2138 | 1348 | 2164 | 2164 | 2164 | 2179 | 2100 | 2100 | 1281 |

Below is a list of the direction of changes in the constituencies to improve each subcomponent of the reform indicator.
|
| Model Number | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GCC | Qatar | GCC and Qatar | ||||||||||
| Real GDP growth fcst. | −0.218 | *** | −0.221 | *** | −0.219 | *** | −0.219 | *** | −0.219 | *** | −0.221 | *** |
| (0.065) | (0.066) | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.065) | (0.066) | |||||||
| GCC (total effects) | −0.059 | −0.044 | −0.150 | ** | −0.1429 | ** | ||||||
| (0.060) | (0.061) | (0.066) | (0.066) | |||||||||
| Qatar (total effects) | −0.172 | ** | −0.129 | * | −0.171 | ** | −0.129 | * | ||||
| (0.078) | (0.072) | (0.079) | (0.072) | |||||||||
| Inflation fcst. | 0.468 | *** | 0.462 | *** | 0.438 | *** | 0.438 | *** | 0.466 | *** | 0.462 | *** |
| (0.071) | (0.071) | (0.052) | (0.052) | (0.071) | (0.071) | |||||||
| GCC (total effects) | 0.399 | *** | 0.368 | *** | 0.381 | *** | 0.36271 | *** | ||||
| (0.073) | (0.081) | (0.081) | (0.093) | |||||||||
| Qatar (total effects) | 0.699 | *** | 0.628 | *** | 0.697 | *** | 0.628 | *** | ||||
| (0.114) | (0.092) | (0.115) | (0.093) | |||||||||
| Fiscal balance fcst. | 0.045 | 0.046 | 0.021 | 0.021 | 0.045 | 0.046 | ||||||
| (0.063) | (0.064) | (0.055) | (0.055) | (0.064) | (0.064) | |||||||
| GCC (total effects) | −0.103 | −0.068 | −0.022 | −0.0019 | ||||||||
| (0.113) | (0.111) | (0.113) | (0.115) | |||||||||
| Qatar (total effects) | −0.447 | ** | −0.319 | −0.444 | ** | −0.319 | ||||||
| (0.206) | (0.255) | (0.208) | (0.256) | |||||||||
| Current account fcst. | −0.081 | −0.082 | −0.108 | −0.109 | −0.081 | −0.082 | ||||||
| (0.058) | (0.058) | (0.053) | (0.053) | (0.058) | (0.058) | |||||||
| GCC (total effects) | −0.107 | −0.078 | −0.095 | −0.069 | ||||||||
| (0.098) | (0.098) | (0.105) | (0.106) | |||||||||
| Qatar (total effects) | −0.052 | −0.102 | −0.054 | −0.102 | ||||||||
| (0.123) | (0.147) | (0.123) | (0.148) | |||||||||
| Balance of reform | 0.224 | *** | 0.204 | *** | 0.215 | *** | 0.212 | *** | 0.218 | *** | 0.204 | *** |
| (0.053) | (0.061) | (0.048) | (0.049) | (0.053) | (0.061) | |||||||
| GCC (total effects) | 0.317 | *** | 0.280 | ** | ||||||||
| (0.087) | (0.100) | |||||||||||
| Qatar (total effects) | 0.334 | *** | 0.334 | *** | ||||||||
| (0.134) | (0.134) | |||||||||||
| Real oil prices | −0.049 | −0.050 | −0.104 | * | −0.105 | * | −0.049 | −0.050 | ||||
| (0.073) | (0.074) | (0.062) | (0.062) | (0.074) | (0.074) | |||||||
| GCC (total effects) | −0.319 | *** | −0.325 | *** | −0.296 | *** | −0.298 | *** | ||||
| (0.087) | (0.084) | (0.094) | (0.093) | |||||||||
| Qatar (total effects) | −0.326 | ** | −0.339 | ** | −0.327 | ** | −0.339 | ** | ||||
| (0.163) | (0.162) | (0.163) | (0.162) | |||||||||
| VIX | 0.308 | *** | 0.306 | *** | 0.337 | *** | 0.337 | *** | 0.308 | *** | 0.306 | *** |
| (0.050) | (0.050) | (0.041) | (0.041) | (0.050) | (0.050) | |||||||
| GCC (total effects) | 0.338 | *** | 0.353 | *** | 0.380 | *** | 0.389 | *** | ||||
| (0.060) | (0.059) | (0.063) | (0.063) | |||||||||
| Qatar (total effects) | 0.231 | *** | 0.255 | *** | 0.232 | *** | 0.255 | *** | ||||
| (0.076) | (0.078) | (0.076) | (0.078) | |||||||||
| Dummy, GCC | 0.041 | 0.040 | 0.043 | 0.042 | ||||||||
| (0.084) | (0.083) | (0.089) | (0.089) | |||||||||
| Dummy, Qatar | 0.027 | 0.030 | −0.005 | −0.002 | ||||||||
| (0.088) | (0.085) | (0.100) | (0.097) | |||||||||
| Intercept | −0.035 | −0.035 | −0.025 | −0.025 | −0.035 | −0.035 | ||||||
| (0.059) | (0.059) | (0.047) | (0.047) | (0.059) | (0.059) | |||||||
| Number of observations | 2013 | 2013 | 2013 | 2013 | 2013 | 2013 | ||||||
| Model Number | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth fcst. | −0.179 | *** | −0.178 | *** | −0.159 | *** | −0.089 | * |
| (0.047) | (0.047) | (0.047) | (0.052) | |||||
| Inflation fcst. | 0.462 | *** | 0.459 | *** | 0.470 | *** | 0.486 | *** |
| (0.050) | (0.050) | (0.048) | (0.064) | |||||
| Fiscal balance fcst. | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.006 | 0.017 | ||||
| (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.056) | (0.068) | |||||
| Current account fcst. | −0.113 | ** | −0.112 | ** | −0.106 | ** | −0.222 | *** |
| (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.064) | |||||
| Balance of reform | 0.232 | *** | 0.228 | *** | 0.239 | *** | 0.218 | *** |
| (0.047) | (0.046) | (0.046) | (0.055) | |||||
| Oil prices and hydrocarbon exports | ||||||||
| Real oil prices | −0.082 | −0.084 | −0.092 | −0.040 | ||||
| (0.065) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.075) | |||||
| Real oil prices, hydro exports = H (total effect) | −0.315 | *** | −0.320 | *** | −0.325 | *** | −0.416 | *** |
| (0.085) | (0.085) | (0.084) | (0.084) | |||||
| Dummy, hydro exports = H | 0.052 | 0.043 | 0.092 | 0.159 | ||||
| (0.089) | (0.092) | (0.093) | (0.106) | |||||
| VIX and credit ratings, public debt, and domestic uncertainty | ||||||||
| VIX | 0.322 | *** | 0.341 | *** | 0.271 | *** | 0.331 | *** |
| (0.039) | (0.049) | (0.036) | (0.053) | |||||
| VIX, ratings = H (total effect) | 0.271 | *** | ||||||
| (0.058) | ||||||||
| VIX, debt to GDP = H (total effect) | 0.416 | *** | ||||||
| (0.083) | ||||||||
| VIX, domestic uncertainty = H (total effect) | 0.435 | *** | ||||||
| (0.058) | ||||||||
| Dummy (ratings, debt/GDP, DU) | 0.037 | 0.136 | 0.071 | |||||
| (0.088) | (0.113) | (0.064) | ||||||
| Intercept | −0.037 | −0.045 | −0.099 | −0.052 | ||||
| (0.053) | (0.059) | (0.061) | (0.070) | |||||
| Number of observations | 2013 | 2013 | 2013 | 1297 | ||||
| 1 | A major empirical problem in estimating a reduced-form bond yield equation is the downward bias in coefficients arising from possible reverse causality from the left to the right-hand side variables. As pointed out by Laubach (2009), bond yields and the fiscal balance may be negatively associated due to a common factor such as the business cycle, creating potential biases in the estimation. An economic slowdown may be associated with lower interest rates (through monetary easing) while at the same time worsening the fiscal balance (through automatic stabilizers). This reverse causality may not be unique to fiscal variables since growth and inflation can also be affected by bond yields through the same business cycle. As Laubach argues, such an identification problem is difficult to resolve without a structural model, but can be reduced by using forecast variables—fiscal deficits and other macroeconomic variables expected in year(s) ahead are less likely to be strongly correlated with the current state of the business cycle. Chan et al. (2015) and Gadanecz et al. (2018) apply similar approaches. |
| 2 | See Table A2 for the constituencies of the 5 sub-components. Regulation worsened, due mainly to “Negative interest rates” which fell amid high inflation after COVID-19, “Hours regulation” based on World Bank’s Doing Business indicators, and “Conscription” that started in 2014. |
| 3 | The five sub-components generally improved for two GCC states, converged to the middle (some components improved, and other components worsened) for two other GCC states, and remained broadly unchanged for one GCC state. |
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| Univariate | Multivariate | |
|---|---|---|
| Macroeconomic forecasts | ||
| Real GDP growth fcst. | (−) | … |
| Inflation fcst. | (+) | (+) |
| Fiscal balance fcst. | (−) | … |
| Public debt fcst. | … | … |
| Current account fcst. | (−) | … |
| Domestic uncertainty | (+) | … |
| Reform | ||
| Average | (−) | … |
| Balance | (+) | (+) |
| External shock | ||
| Real oil prices, oil exporters | (−) | (−) |
| Real oil prices, oil importers | … | (+) |
| VIX | (+) | (+) |
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© 2026 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license.
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Miyajima, K. Pricing Reform Progress: Evidence from Sovereign Spreads and Consensus Forecasts. J. Risk Financ. Manag. 2026, 19, 32. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19010032
Miyajima K. Pricing Reform Progress: Evidence from Sovereign Spreads and Consensus Forecasts. Journal of Risk and Financial Management. 2026; 19(1):32. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19010032
Chicago/Turabian StyleMiyajima, Ken. 2026. "Pricing Reform Progress: Evidence from Sovereign Spreads and Consensus Forecasts" Journal of Risk and Financial Management 19, no. 1: 32. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19010032
APA StyleMiyajima, K. (2026). Pricing Reform Progress: Evidence from Sovereign Spreads and Consensus Forecasts. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 19(1), 32. https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm19010032

