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Sensors 2016, 16(4), 481;

Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Social Cost Minimization in Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems

Department of Computer Science, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30302, USA
Department of Computer Science and Information Systems, University of North Georgia, Dahlonega, GA 30597, USA
School of Computer Science, Shaanxi Normal University, Xi’an 710119, China
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Academic Editor: Yu Wang
Received: 10 February 2016 / Revised: 22 March 2016 / Accepted: 30 March 2016 / Published: 6 April 2016
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With the emergence of new technologies, mobile devices are capable of undertaking computational and sensing tasks. A large number of users with these mobile devices promote the formation of the Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs). Within a MCS, each mobile device can contribute to the crowdsourcing platform and get rewards from it. In order to achieve better performance, it is important to design a mechanism that can attract enough participants with mobile devices and then allocate the tasks among participants efficiently. In this paper, we are interested in the investigation of tasks allocation and price determination in MCSs. Two truthful auction mechanisms are proposed for different working patterns. A Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG)-based auction mechanism is proposed to the continuous working pattern, and a suboptimal auction mechanism is introduced for the discontinuous working pattern. Further analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms have the properties of individual rationality and computational efficiencies. Experimental results suggest that both mechanisms guarantee all the mobile users bidding with their truthful values and the optimal maximal social cost can be achieved in the VCG-based auction mechanism. View Full-Text
Keywords: Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs); incentive mechanism; cost minimization; auction Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems (MCSs); incentive mechanism; cost minimization; auction

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Duan, Z.; Yan, M.; Cai, Z.; Wang, X.; Han, M.; Li, Y. Truthful Incentive Mechanisms for Social Cost Minimization in Mobile Crowdsourcing Systems. Sensors 2016, 16, 481.

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