Search Results (39)

To enhance blockchain scalability, sharding technology enables parallel transaction processing, but existing solutions often neglect node heterogeneity, which introduces security risks and performance bottlenecks. This paper proposes a novel dynamic sharding scheme that dynamically allocates validators to shards based on their historical performance scores and computational power, ensuring balanced shard capacity and higher attack resistance. A tailored reward–penalty mechanism further incentivizes participation and discourages malicious behavior. Experimental evaluations demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms prominent sharding protocols, including Elastico, OmniLedger, and RapidChain, by achieving higher throughput and lower latency. The proposed scheme effectively addresses node heterogeneity and enhances the overall scalability and security of blockchain systems. Full article

This study asks whether Ethereum’s proof-of-stake (PoS) incentives not only make economic sense on paper but also feel attractive to real validators who may be loss-averse and sensitive to risk. We take a canonical Eth2 slot-level model of rewards, penalties, costs, and proposer-conditional maximal extractable value (MEV) and overlay a prospect-theoretic valuation that captures reference dependence, loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and probability weighting. This Prospect-Theoretic Incentive Mechanism (PT-IM) separates the “money edge” (expected accounting return) from the “felt edge” (behavioral value) by mapping monetary outcomes through a prospect value function and comparing the two across parameter ranges. The mechanism is parametric and modular, allowing different MEV, cost, and penalty profiles to plug in without altering the base PoS model. Using stylized numerical examples, we identify regions where cooperation that pays in expectation can remain unattractive under plausible loss-averse preferences, especially when penalties are salient or MEV is volatile. We discuss how these distortions may affect validator participation, economic security, and the tuning of rewards and penalties in Ethereum’s PoS. Integrating behavioral valuation into crypto-economic design thus provides a practical diagnostic for adjusting protocol parameters when economics and perception diverge. Full article

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence has driven a surge in demand for computing power. As the core computing infrastructure, data centers have expanded in scale, escalating electricity consumption and magnifying a regional mismatch between computing capacity and energy resources: facilities are concentrated in the energy-constrained East, while the renewable-rich West possesses vast, untapped hosting capacity. Focusing on cross-regional data-center migration under the “Eastern Data, Western Computing” initiative, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising the Eastern Local Government, the Western Local Government, and data-center enterprises. The central government is modeled as an external regulator that indirectly shapes players’ strategies through policies such as energy-efficiency constraints and carbon-quota mechanisms. First, we introduce key parameters—including energy efficiency, carbon costs, green revenues, coordination subsidies, and migration losses—and analyze the system’s evolutionary stability using replicator-dynamics equations. Second, we conduct numerical simulations in MATLAB 2024a and perform sensitivity analyses with respect to energy and green constraints, central rewards and penalties, regional coordination incentives, and migration losses. The results show the following: (1) Multiple equilibria can arise, including coordinated optima, policy-failure states, and coordination-impeded outcomes. These coordinated optima do not emerge spontaneously but rather depend on a precise alignment of payoff structures across central government, local governments, and enterprises. (2) The eastern regulatory push—centered on energy efficiency and carbon emissions—is generally more effective than western fiscal subsidies or stand-alone energy advantages at reshaping firm payoffs and inducing relocation. Central penalties and coordination subsidies serve complementary and constraining roles. (3) Commercial risks associated with full migration, such as service interruption and customer attrition, remain among the key barriers to shifting from partial to full migration. These risks are closely linked to practical relocation and connectivity constraints—such as logistics and commissioning effort, and cross-regional network latency/bandwidth—thereby potentially trapping firms in a suboptimal partial-migration equilibrium. This study provides theoretical support for refining the “Eastern Data, Western Computing” policy mix and offers generalized insights for other economies facing similar spatial energy–demand asymmetries. Full article

Ensuring product quality and safety is fundamental to sustainable production and consumption. With the rapid advancement of digital technologies such as blockchain and big data, quality and safety traceability systems have become essential tools to enhance transparency, accountability, and governance efficiency across supply chains. The sustainable functioning of these systems, however, depends on the coordinated actions of multiple stakeholders—including governments, enterprises, consumers, and industry associations—making the study of technological and institutional interactions particularly significant. This paper extends evolutionary game theory to the context of technology-enabled sustainable governance by constructing a tripartite game model involving government regulators, traceability enterprises, and consumers from both technological and institutional perspectives. Unlike existing studies, which focused solely on government regulation, this research explicitly incorporates the role of industry associations in shaping stakeholder behavior and integrates consumer rights protection mechanisms as well as the adoption of emerging technologies such as blockchain into the model. Analytical derivations and MATLAB-based simulations reveal that strengthening reward–penalty mechanisms and improving digital maturity significantly enhance enterprises’ incentives for truthful information disclosure; consumers’ verification and reporting behaviors generate bottom-up pressure that encourages stricter governmental supervision; and active participation of industry associations helps share regulatory costs and stabilize cooperative equilibria. These findings suggest that combining technological innovation with institutional collaboration not only improves transparency and strengthens consumer trust but also reshapes the incentive structures underlying traceability governance. The study provides new insights into how multi-stakeholder coordination and technological adoption jointly foster transparent, credible, and resilient traceability systems, offering practical implications for advancing digital transformation and co-governance in sustainable supply chains. Full article

A strategic fulcrum for leading high-quality economic development and shaping the nation’s future. Core competitiveness lies in how governments can effectively stimulate consumer demand for green consumption and motivate enterprises to pursue green technology innovation through the development of precise and efficient innovative regulation models. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, encompassing the government, enterprises, and consumers. We analyze the strategic interactions and evolutionary path among these three entities under conditions of bounded rationality and information asymmetry. The research reveals the following: (1) the government can effectively guide enterprises towards genuine green innovation through enhanced rewards for substantive innovation and increased penalties for strategic innovation; (2) consumer purchasing decisions are significantly shaped by economic benefits, perceived social value, and government subsidies, with their market choices forming a critical external supervisory force; and (3) government regulatory strategies are dynamically adjusted in response to market integrity levels and social welfare, with a tendency to implement innovative regulation when “greenwashing” risk is elevated. In conclusion, simulation analysis is conducted using MATLAB 2018a, and governance recommendations are offered based on three dimensions: precise government regulation, enhanced corporate responsibility, and enhanced consumer capabilities. These recommendations offer both a theoretical basis and a practical path for establishing an integrated green innovation governance system based on incentive constraint empowerment. Full article

Metaverse safety training (MST) is popular in highway construction projects (HCPs). While researchers have statically examined the influence of MST, one of the essential gaps is that the interaction among stakeholders on how to improve MST effect is neglected. This paper adopts a game theory approach to illustrate the dynamics among stakeholders, namely, contractors, subcontractors, and construction crews, regarding MST within the framework of HCPs. A tripartite evolutionary game model is developed to analyze the interaction among contractors, subcontractors, and construction crews. The evolutionary stability of the stakeholders’ strategies and the equilibrium point were elucidated by solving the proposed model. A numerical simulation was conducted to validate the rationality of the results. The results show that the choice of behavioral strategies and their evolutionary paths for each stakeholder are closely related to the behavioral strategies of other stakeholders in the game, with significant differences in effects on each other’s initial strategies. The incentive mechanism must match the incentive measures provided to subcontractors and construction crews, ensuring a stable MST. The reward and penalty system implemented by contractors heightens the awareness of subcontractors and construction crews partly. This model provides practical recommendations to enhance training interactions, optimize strategies, increase security awareness, and streamline resource allocation. Full article

This study proposes a discrete multi-agent Q-learning framework for the online tuning of PID controllers in continuous dynamic systems with limited observability. The approach treats the adjustment of each PID gain ($k_p$, $k_i$, $k_d$) as an independent learning process, in which each agent operates within a discrete state space corresponding to its own gain and selects actions from a tripartite space (decrease, maintain, or increase its gain). The agents act simultaneously under fixed decision intervals, favoring their convergence by preserving quasi-stationary conditions of the perceived environment, while a shared cumulative global reward, composed of system parameters, time and control action penalties, and stability incentives, guides coordinated exploration toward control objectives. Implemented in Python, the framework was validated in two nonlinear control problems: a water-tank and inverted pendulum (cart-pole) systems. The agents achieved their initial convergence after approximately 300 and 500 episodes, respectively, with overall success rates of $49.6\%$ and $46.2\%$ in 5000 training episodes. The learning process exhibited sustained convergence toward effective PID configurations capable of stabilizing both systems without explicit dynamic models. These findings confirm the feasibility of the proposed low-complexity discrete reinforcement learning approach for online adaptive PID tuning, achieving interpretable and reproducible control policies and providing a new basis for future hybrid schemes that unite classical control theory and reinforcement learning agents. Full article

The multi-timescale optimization dispatch method for integrated energy systems proposed in this paper balances sustainability and low-carbon characteristics. It first incorporates shared energy storage resources such as electric vehicles into system dispatch, fully leveraging their spatiotemporal properties to enhance dispatch flexibility and rapid response capabilities for integrating renewable energy and enabling clean power generation. Second, an incentive-penalty mechanism enables effective interaction between the system and the green certificate–carbon joint trading market. Penalties are imposed for failing to meet renewable energy consumption targets or exceeding carbon quotas, while rewards are granted for meeting or exceeding targets. This regulates the system’s renewable energy consumption level and carbon emissions, ensuring robust low-carbon performance. Third, this strategy considers the close coordination between heating, cooling, and electricity demand response measures with the integrated energy system, smoothing load fluctuations to achieve peak shaving and valley filling. Finally, through case study simulations and analysis, the advantages of the multi-timescale dispatch strategy proposed in this paper, in terms of economic feasibility, low-carbon characteristics, and sustainability, are verified. Full article

The integration of renewable energy into the grid has led to problems such as low utilization rate of energy storage resources (“underutilization after construction”) and insufficient system stability. This paper studied the co-evolution mechanism of power market entities empowered by shared energy storage. Based on the interaction among power generation enterprises, power grid operators, and government regulatory agencies, this paper constructed a three-party evolutionary game model. The model introduced a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism as well as a random interference mechanism, which makes it more in line with the actual situation. The stability conditions of the game players were analyzed by using stochastic differential equations, and the influences of key parameters and incentive mechanisms on the stability of the game players were investigated through numerical simulation. The main research results showed the following: (1) The benefits of shared energy storage and opportunistic gains had a significant impact on the strategic choices of power generation companies and grid operators. (2) The regulatory efficiency had significantly promoted the long-term stable maintenance of the system. (3) Dynamic incentives were superior to static incentives in promoting cooperation, while the deterrent effect of static penalties is stronger than that of dynamic penalties. (4) The increase in the intensity of random disturbances led to strategy oscillation. This study suggested that the government implement gradient-based dynamic incentives, maintain strict static penalties to curb opportunism, and enhance regulatory robustness against uncertainty. This research provided theoretical and practical inspirations for optimizing energy storage incentive policies and promoting multi-subject coordination in the power market. Full article

Aiming at the demands for low-carbon transformation in multi-energy-coupled industrial parks, a model is proposed that incorporates a carbon trading system incorporating incentives and penalties. This model includes joint combined heat and power (CHP) units, carbon capture technologies, and power-to-gas (P2G) conversion equipment. Firstly, we develop a modeling framework for the joint operation of cogeneration units to establish a comprehensive energy system within the industrial park that integrates electricity, heat, gas, and cold energy sources. Subsequently, we introduce a reward and punishment carbon trading mechanism into an industrial park to regulate carbon emissions effectively. With an optimization objective focused on minimizing the overall operating costs of the system while considering relevant constraints, we formulate an optimization model. The Gurobi solver is employed through the Yalmip toolkit to address this optimization problem. Finally, four operational scenarios are established to compare and validate the feasibility of our proposed optimization strategy. The results from our computational example demonstrate that integrating combined heat and power along with carbon capture and P2G technologies—coupled with a tiered reward and punishment carbon trading mechanism—can significantly enhance the energy consumption structure of the system. Under this model, the overall expenses are decreased by 12.36%, CO₂ emissions decrease by 33.37%, and renewable energy utilization increases by 36.7%. This approach has effectively improved both wind power consumption capacity and low-carbon economic benefits within the system while ensuring sustainable economic development in alignment with “dual carbon” goals. Full article

This study aims to develop an optimal underwriting strategy for affordable (H1 and M1) and premium (L1 and M2) electric vehicles (EVs), balancing financial risk and sustainability commitments. The research is motivated by regulatory pressures, risk management needs, and sustainability goals, necessitating an adaptation of traditional underwriting models. The study employs a modified Delphi method with industry experts to identify key risk factors, including accident risk, repair costs, battery safety, driver behavior, and PCAF carbon impact. A sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine premium adjustments under different risk scenarios, categorizing EVs into four risk segments: Low-Risk, Low-Carbon (L1); Medium-Risk, Low-Carbon (M1); Medium-Risk, High-Carbon (M2); and High-Risk, High-Carbon (H1). Findings indicate that premium EVs (L1 and M2) exhibit lower volatility in underwriting costs, benefiting from advanced safety features, lower accident rates, and reduced carbon attribution penalties. Conversely, budget EVs (H1 and M1) experience higher premium fluctuations due to greater accident risks, costly repairs, and higher carbon costs under PCAF implementation. The worst-case scenario showed a 14.5% premium increase, while the best-case scenario led to a 10.5% premium reduction. The study recommends prioritizing premium EVs for insurance coverage due to their lower underwriting risks and carbon efficiency. For budget EVs, insurers should implement selective underwriting based on safety features, driver risk profiling, and energy efficiency. Additionally, incentive-based pricing such as telematics discounts, green repair incentives, and low-carbon charging rewards can mitigate financial risks and align with net-zero insurance commitments. This research provides a structured framework for insurers to optimize EV underwriting while ensuring long-term profitability and regulatory compliance. Full article

Under the “Dual Carbon” strategy, collaborative governance of port atmospheric pollutants and carbon emissions is critical for low-carbon transformation. Focusing on Ningbo-Zhoushan Port (48% regional ship emissions), this study examines government, port enterprises, and public interactions. A tripartite evolutionary game model with numerical simulation reveals dynamic patterns and key factors. The results show the following: (1) A substitution effect exists between government incentive costs and penalty intensity—increased environmental governance budgets reduce the probability of government incentives, whereas higher public reporting rewards accelerate corporate emission reduction convergence. (2) Public supervision exhibits cyclical fluctuations due to conflicts between individual rationality and collective interests, with excessive reporting rewards potentially triggering free-rider behavior. (3) The system exhibits two stable equilibria: a low-efficiency equilibrium (0,0,0) and a high-efficiency equilibrium (1,1,1). The latter requires policy cost compensation, corporate emission reduction gains exceeding investments, and a supervision benefit–cost ratio greater than 1. Accordingly, the study proposes a three-dimensional “Incentive–Constraint–Collaboration” governance strategy, recommending floating penalty mechanisms, green financial instrument innovation, and community supervision network optimization to balance environmental benefits with fiscal sustainability. This research provides a dynamic decision-making framework for multi-agent collaborative emission reduction in ports, offering both methodological innovation and practical guidance value. Full article

Amid accelerating population aging and the rapid evolution of digital technologies, the digital transformation of rural elderly care services has become a pivotal strategy for restructuring the rural elderly care system. This study identified the local government, rural elderly care service centers, and the elderly population as the principal stakeholders, and developed a tripartite evolutionary game-theory model to examine the dynamic strategic interactions among these actors under the influence of digital technologies. The model further investigated the evolutionary trajectories and equilibrium conditions of their behavioral strategies. Numerical simulations conducted via MATLAB were employed to validate and visualize the model outcomes. The findings revealed the following. (1) The evolutionary equilibrium of digital elderly care service development in rural areas is jointly determined by the strategic choices of the three parties, with its stability shaped by a complex interplay of cost structures, incentive mechanisms, and utility outcomes. (2) Cost factors exhibit heterogeneous effects across stakeholders. Specifically, excessive regulatory costs diminish the performance incentives of local governments, digital infrastructure and operational expenditures influence service centers’ capacity for precision-oriented service delivery, and the participation of the elderly is constrained by affordability thresholds. (3) Local government behavior demonstrates a pronounced sensitivity to incentives. In particular, rewards and social reputation conferred by higher-level governmental bodies exert a significantly stronger influence than punitive measures. (4) Government subsidies for digital transformation enhance cross-stakeholder synergy through dual transmission channels. Nonetheless, excessive subsidies may escalate fiscal risk, while moderately calibrated penalty mechanisms effectively curb moral hazard within service centers. This study advances theoretical understanding of multi-stakeholder coordination in the context of digitally enabled rural elderly care and provides actionable insights for policymakers aiming to formulate interest-aligned strategies and construct resilient, intelligent governance systems for elderly care. Full article

This study employs evolutionary game theory to analyze the tripartite interaction among government regulators, media publishers, and self-media participants in emergency public opinion management. We establish an evolutionary game model incorporating strategic motivations and key influencing factors; then, we validate the model through systematic simulations. Key findings demonstrate the following: ① the system exhibits dual stable equilibria: regulated equilibrium and autonomous equilibrium. ② Sensitivity analysis identifies critical dynamics: ① self-media behavior is primarily driven by penalty avoidance ($g_3$) and losses ($w_2$); ② media participation hinges on revenue incentives ($m_2$) versus regulatory burdens ($k$); ③ government intervention efficacy diminishes on emergencies when resistance ($v_1$ + $v_3$) exceeds control benefits. The study reveals that effective governance requires the following: ① adaptive parameter tuning of punishment–reward mechanisms; ② dynamic coordination between information control and market incentives. This framework advances emergency management by quantifying how micro-level interactions shape macro-level opinion evolution, providing actionable insights for balancing stability and information freedom in digital governance. Full article

Information collaboration is a core driver of digital transformation and efficiency improvement in agri-food supply chains. This study constructs a quadripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, an information service platform, farmers, and agri-food enterprises. By integrating system dynamics, it analyzes stakeholders’ strategic interactions and evolutionary pathways while exploring the regulatory effects of key parameters in reward and penalty mechanisms on system convergence. The key findings are as follows: (1) The system reaches a stable equilibrium regardless of initial strategy combinations. (2) The reward–penalty mechanism is essential for equilibrium stability, but the reward amount and allocation ratios must meet threshold constraints. (3) Given the significant path-dependent lock-in effect in agri-food enterprises’ strategy convergence under static parameters, a dynamic parameter configuration scheme is proposed to reshape convergence and optimize equilibrium. The simulation results indicate that dynamic parameter regulation sacrifices the regulatory efficiency of the information service platform to enhance the overall collaboration. A joint dynamic reward–penalty strategy improves efficiency but delays platform convergence, whereas a single dynamic incentive offers a balanced trade-off. Based on this, an incentive framework is developed to guide government incentive design. This study expands the theoretical framework of information collaboration in AFSCs and provides practical guidance for policymakers. Full article