Search Results (59)

This paper advances Divine Compositionalism (DC) as a comprehensive theistic ontology capable of integrating divine sovereignty with genuine human libertarian freedom. Here we extend DC’s commitment to physical causation in natural mechanisms, to human agency, arguing that DC can accommodate a novel, integrated free will position without collapsing into classical occasionalism or reductive determinism. In a six-category ontology, God remains the continuous, existence-conferring cause of all physical processes, including the neurological and biological substrates of decision and action, while human agents possess genuine causal power to generate originate thoughts, intentions, and choices. In a precise mapping to the neuroscience of proximal intention formation, a model is given proposing that God acts differentially within the structures of human neurophysiology in an occasionalist manner and in a concurrentist manner with human agent free will. This preserves agent moral responsibility and divine non-culpability for sin and evil, while affirming God’s providential governance. By reconceptualizing the relationship between divine causality and human freedom, DC offers a synthetic position that transcends the traditional libertarian–compatibilist dichotomy. Freedom is neither illusory within a deterministic system nor an autonomous power severed from divine causality, but a contingent participation in God’s ongoing creative act. The result is a biblically grounded, metaphysically coherent framework that seeks to offer a theistic ontology in which God’s continuous, existence-conferring action in nature harmonizes with the genuine moral freedom of human persons. Full article

Contemporary bioethical debate over biotechnological enhancement, genetic engineering, prosthetics, and neuroenhancement largely takes place within a metaphysical framework inherited from post-Cartesian European philosophy. In this framework, humanity is essentially something received or given, and biotechnological intervention is a transgression against that givenness. This paper argues that medieval Islamic philosophy, particularly Ibn Tufail’s account of human environmental agency in Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and Maimonides’ integration of body and soul into a single moral–physical economy, offers conceptual resources that reframe this debate. According to the viewpoint developed here, the human is constitutively a self-shaping being whose formation is mediated through bodily and environmental conditions that the human reciprocally shapes. Biotechnology is therefore not a rupture in the human story but the latest expression of a perennial human practice. This reframing does not dissolve bioethical concern but relocates it: the question is not whether to engage in self-shaping (as we always have), but what forms of self-shaping conduce to the integrated flourishing of an embodied person. Full article

Despite non-theistic proposals on offer to ground moral realism, theism still offers a far more stable, robust, and well-integrated metaphysical context for objective moral facts and moral values. Moral realism is not truly “at home” within such non-theistic frameworks, which include Cornell school-type naturalistic moral realism or non-naturalistic, non-theistic Platonist moral realism. Theism’s deep connection to moral facts and moral values is more natural, unifying, and basic than these alternatives. Furthermore, theism offers a more comprehensive explanatory account for other central features of our human experience, as well as key features of the universe in which we find ourselves. Full article

“Properness, correctness and uprightness” (zheng 正) refers to a common and significant concept in Chinese philosophy. In Chinese philosophical discourse, zheng embodies moral ideals. To date, scholarly attention has focused on compound concepts incorporating zheng, such as “central and zheng” (zhongzheng 中正), “the position of zheng” (zhengwei 正位), and “make the family in accordance with zheng” (zhengjia 正家), as their research objects. However, the independent philosophical meaning of zheng in the Yijing 易經 remains underexplored. Through etymological research and textual analysis, this study reveals three philosophical dimensions of the Yijing. First, it distinguishes zheng from “in correspondence to” (dang 當). It shows that dang refers to a judgment about physical alignment with time and position in theoretical situations, lacking strong moral force. Second, it argues that zheng in the Yijing originates from a metaphysical concept of a perfect ideal, broadly referring to the ideal perfect way (zheng dao 正道). The Yijing emphasizes the metaphysical level of zheng (in accordance with the perfect way), and possesses zheng as a strong moral binding force for continuing self-improvement. However, zheng does not directly function as the presupposed rationale for moral judgments and choices. Third, it examines the way of cultivating zheng (yang zheng zhi dao 養正之道) as a theory of moral cultivation (gongfu 工夫). This practical path, articulated through the hexagrams Meng 蒙 and Yi 頤, is interpreted as a form of purifying the heart/mind (xin 心) to align with the cosmic heart/mind. The study demonstrates that the moral source and moral cultivation process in the Yijing refers to a theory of “cultivating one’s heart/mind (xin 心) through practice”. It provides a perspective for understanding the moral perfectness, heart/mind and morality in the Yijing. Full article

This article argues that racism did not originate with the modern invention of race but crystallized out of a much older imperial grammar that had already learned how to naturalize domination through embodied difference. Long before race emerged as a named category, ancient and medieval empires developed durable ways of converting historically produced hierarchies into features of nature, the cosmos, and divine order. Through a comparative genealogy spanning early Mesopotamian epic, Near Eastern imperial inscriptions, Egyptian visual regimes, Greek philosophy and historiography, biblical scripture, South Asian metaphysics, late antique encyclopedism, and medieval Marian devotion, the article shows how inequality was repeatedly anchored in the body, in genealogy, in geography, and in moral psychology. Across these traditions, political authority is consistently masculinized, while subordination is feminized, animalized, or rendered reproductively vulnerable. Patriarchy and racialization thus emerge as co-constitutive imperial technologies rather than as separate or sequential phenomena. Modern racism did not invent hierarchy; it rendered an ancient logic portable, inheritable, and globally scalable by fastening domination to visible human difference. By situating race within a longue durée history of empire and male domination, the article reframes contemporary debates on racism as questions of imperial continuity rather than modern deviation. Full article

The intricate relationships between humans and animals have long shaped philosophical, cultural and scientific inquiry. This narrative review examines evolving conceptions of animal consciousness, agency and sentience within broader historical, ethical and epistemological contexts. Drawing on philosophy, ethology, neuroscience, psychology and animal studies, it critically engages debates on anthropocentrism, cognitive ethology, moral considerability and relational ontology. By tracing the shift from mechanistic models of animality to embodied and affective accounts of consciousness, the analysis highlights how contemporary scholarship destabilises traditional forms of human exceptionalism. Building on this interdisciplinary synthesis, the article advances a symbiotic humanist orientation that integrates evolutionary continuity with multidimensional models of consciousness and differentiated normative responsibility. The argument culminates in the articulation of a Stratified Relational Responsibility Model (SRRM), which reconciles ontological continuity with asymmetrical accountability. Within this framework, shared evolutionary conditions ground moral considerability, while the emergence of reflexive and institutional normativity intensifies human ethical obligation. The model offers a non-anthropocentric yet normatively robust account of human–animal relations, situating human distinctiveness not in metaphysical superiority but in heightened responsibility within multispecies ecological systems. Full article

Twenty-five years ago, Germain Grisez introduced a significant alternative to the Scholastic account of transubstantiation in terms of substance and accidents, and in particular to Aquinas’s version thereof. Although Grisez’s specific proposal fails, it exemplifies a broader type of account on which bread and wine are transformed into Christ insofar as, through this transformation, the person of Christ comes to incorporate a new sort of bodily reality. Grisez himself proposed that bread and wine are transformed into new parts of Christ’s natural body. Although his Thomistic critics have good reason to reject this proposal, they fail to disarm his objections to the Thomistic account. In contrast with both, I suggest that the Eucharist can be fruitfully understood as a divinely authoritative, metaphysically robust extension of the Incarnation from the realm of nature to that of culture, on the model of hypostatic union. So understood, it reveals the true meaning of culture by inserting into the heart of human culture an act of cultural creativity—in the mode of self-gift rather than self-assertion—that transcends the capacity of any merely human maker in such a way as to verify the doctrine of transubstantiation. This account presupposes the pervasive role of human making, and therefore of culture, in the constitution of the world. It also, however, presupposes the reality of the natural and moral orders as distinct from the cultural, and the complete dominion of the suffering and risen Christ over His own body, the goods of the earth, and all human culture. Full article

In a certain sense, the experience of beauty is objectless. Obviously, only in a certain sense: for the experience evidently makes some objects manifest—namely, the object found beautiful. Yet to find an object beautiful means finding that it somehow, given the juxtaposition of its material elements, expresses something beyond conception, which thus directs us towards something that could never be given as an object of experience. Kant thus claimed that beauty ultimately expresses the purportedly supersensible basis of all being, accounting for the sense of meaningfulness and repose engendered by the experience of beauty. Levinas, expanding on such ideas, calls this an expression of the sacred. Levinas, however, thus worries about our appreciation of beauty: for if the sacred, as he argues, discloses an ostensibly unmanifestable mystical or metaphysical absolute as if it were at one with the material forces that traverse and underlie beings, then beauty’s repose ultimately represents the moral complacency of a disclosure that all is right on some “deeper level.” By contrast, the holy, which reveals itself in the relation to another and which Levinas opposes to the sacred, represents a different unmanifestability—of the other as such and of the infinite responsibility to which the other’s appeal, by decentering one absolutely, subjects one thereby—but this encounter, instead of inviting complacency, thus incessantly challenges us. In the following, I clarify Levinas’s position by explicating his account of beauty and his claim that beauty manifests an unmanifestable sacred and then discussing Levinas’s distinction between the sacred and holy and explicating his worries about the sacred. I conclude by discussing the caution he believes we should exercise in appreciating beauty, but also the latter’s exigency, a consideration that can help resolve issues in Levinas scholarship as well as current debates on the moral value of art. Full article

In the face of escalating ecological crises, this study explores the ecological wisdom embedded in Laozi’s concept of “Dao” and Ralph Waldo Emerson’s belief in the “Over-Soul,” conducting a systematic comparative analysis of their views on nature within the framework of ecological religion. Laozi’s “Dao” serves as the cornerstone of Daoist thought, emphasizing the unity of heaven, earth, and humans as the origin and governing law of the universe. It advocates “Dao follows nature” (道法自然), urging humans to relinquish excessive interference and utilitarian desires, humbly integrating into nature’s inherent rhythms for harmonious coexistence while inspiring reverence for nature’s sacredness and inherent worth. Emerson’s “Over-Soul,” central to New England Transcendentalism, posits a universal spirit permeating all existence, with nature as its outward manifestation and symbolic expression of the divine. Through direct engagement with nature, individuals access spiritual elevation, moral insight, and reverence for all life forms. Despite distinct cultural origins, both Laozi and Emerson sacralize nature, foster opposition to anthropocentric exploitation, and envision harmonious human–nature relations—albeit through different pathways: Wuwei and surrender for Laozi; intuitive communion for Emerson. While their metaphysical visions do not fully align with modern ecocentric notions of objective intrinsic value (as articulated in contemporary environmental ethics), they offer profound resources for reverent coexistence. This comparative study deepens cross-cultural understanding of ecological wisdom, challenging modernity’s instrumental worldview and providing philosophical insights for constructing a rational, reverent ecological ethic. By bridging Eastern and Western mystical traditions, it highlights their shared potential to inspire sustainable development, spiritual renewal, and a transformative shift toward coexistence with the non-human world. Full article

Wang Chong established the most extensive and complex theoretical system of fate in the pre-Qin and Han dynasties, drawing upon Confucian and popular theories. The cores of Confucian and popular theories of fate lay respectively in moral cultivation and technical approaches, leaving room for human autonomy in determining fate. However, based on his own experience of unfulfilled potential and his admiration for the Daoist concept of “nature”, Wang Chong denied the causal relationship between individual behaviors and the occurrences of good or bad fortune. In this way, Wang Chong’s theory of fate deprived individuals of their initiative over destiny as found in Confucian tradition and popular beliefs, thus moving towards the extreme of fatalism. The theory of fate served as a key instrument for Wang Chong in his “opposition to falsehood and fallacy” (jixuwang 疾虚妄), occupying a significant position within the philosophical system of Lunheng. Through this theory, Wang Chong criticized the prevailing theories of the interaction between Heaven and humanity centered on moral principles, as well as the numerology and worship of ghosts and deities rooted in technical principles. In doing so, he set apart himself from traditional Confucian scholars, and laid important intellectual groundwork for the subsequent development of metaphysical discourse in China. Full article

This article reconceptualizes entropy not as a metaphysical substance but as a structural constraint that shapes the formation, energetic cost, and durability of records. It links the coarse-grained—and typically irreversible—flow of time to questions of moral responsibility and divine justice. Drawing on the second law of thermodynamics, information theory, and contemporary cosmology, it advances an analogical and operational framework in which actions are accountable in an analogical sense insofar as they leave energetically costly traces that resist erasure. Within a Qur’ānic metaphysical horizon, concepts such as kitāb (Book), ṣaḥīfa (Record), and tawba (Repentance) function as structural counterparts to informational inscription and revision, without reducing theological meaning to physical process. In contrast to Kantian ethics, which grounds moral law in rational autonomy, the Qurʾān situates responsibility within the irreversible structure of time. Understood in this way, entropy is not a threat to coherence but a condition for accountability. By placing the Qurʾānic vision in dialog with modern science and theology, the article contributes to broader discussions on justice, agency, and the metaphysics of time within the science–religion discourse. Full article

This article examines the theory of miracles formulated by the distinguished Shī’ī-Mu’tazilī theologian, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (965–1044 CE), specifically to contextualize his controversial doctrine of Qurʾānic iʿjāz, known as ṣarfah. The study reconstructs al-Murtaḍā’s general theory of miracles by analyzing his primary works and comparing his positions with standard Muʿtazilī theology. The investigation focused on how his metaphysical and moral frameworks interact to define the nature of miracles. I argue that al-Murtaḍā articulated a “minimal theory of miracles,” wherein miracles function as restricted, localized, and audience-relative “breaches of norms” (khawāriq al-ʿādāt) rather than violations of universal laws. In his view, miracles are morally necessary but temporally restricted acts of God, designed solely to authenticate a prophet to their immediate community. Al-Murtaḍā’s theory shifts the evidential burden of prophetic proof—including the Qur’ān—from continuing intrinsic supernatural qualities to discrete historical testimony. Finally, this study suggests that al-Murtaḍā appears to offer a rationally coherent alternative notion of miracles, that may well succeed from some of the most pressing contemporary intellectual challenges. Full article

“Ubuntu/Botho/Hunhu” is a philosophical concept commonly used in Sub-Saharan Africa, arising out of the Bantu languages of its peoples. It is familiar in South Africa and Zimbabwe, for example, and through it, reference is made both to the way of being human and to the morality of the actions performed by people. Understood from the philosophical perspective, Ubuntu as an ethic is dignity-based. Naturally, Ubuntu is not the only metaphysical and moral worldview present in the diversity of contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, for given the presence of Catholic Christian believers, “Catholic Social Teaching” (CST) is also encountered. In countries like South Africa and Zimbabwe, Catholic parliamentarians are involved in State apparatuses, as members of provincial and municipal legislatures, and judicial officers may be of the Catholic tradition. Given the holistic nature of the human, it is a significant challenge for the believer to abandon their axiological systems when entering the public sphere. Like the African Ubuntu/Hunhu tradition, CST is dignity-based, although the arguments from within each for the attainment of dignity are divergent. Whilst acknowledging the inherent dignity of the person in both traditions, this study takes a different approach by highlighting contrasts. In divergences, human dignity and relationships in society will be explored, as the study extends novel moral actions for the good of the Ubuntu-inspired society. Full article

Drury reports Wittgenstein telling him, “I am not a religious man but I can’t help seeing every problem from a religious point of view, I would like my work to be understood in this way”. My paper attempts to make sense of this strange claim. I first consider the meaning Wittgenstein gives to ‘religious’ in speaking of questions he explicitly designates as such, and then explain how that (sort of) meaning could also apply to the (other) characterisations he provides of his philosophical work. I also consider the subsidiary question, and suggest two very different reasons as to why Wittgenstein nonetheless did not consider himself ‘a religious man’. While I find much confusion in what Wittgenstein says about religion, his crucial insight is that both religious and philosophical thinking are characterised by the same kind of difficulty. Both spring from our moral–existential confusion and despair over finding, or accepting the sense we find, in our life with others. In the later parts of this paper, I show how the metaphysical I–world perspective of the Tractatus (the first specific form taken by Wittgenstein’s own ‘religious point of view’) exemplifies this very rootedness of philosophical/religious thinking in despair, and how in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, including in some of his later explicitly religious remarks, an I–You perspective starts to emerge, one where our difficulties in sense-making are seen as the other side of our difficulties in opening ourselves to each other in love. I also suggest, however, that an unresolved tension nonetheless remains in Wittgenstein’s late thinking between an I–You orientation and a focus on collective normativity. Finally, I suggest that foregrounding love tends to dissolve the very idea of specifically ‘religious’ problems quite generally, and so leaves us with a double question about how to understand religion as such, and about whether, or how, we can give coherent sense to Wittgenstein’s idea that his point of view is specifically ‘religious’. Full article

This essay examines the reception of Western mystical theology in early twentieth-century Russian religious thought, showing how leading Russian thinkers—such as Ivanov, Frank, Bulgakov, and Berdyaev—reinterpreted Meister Eckhart’s central categories (Gottheit, Abgeschiedenheit), often in significant conjunction with Nietzschean and Tolstoyan doctrines. It reconstructs a distinctive philosophical current—“mystical anarchism”—emerging at the intersection of apophatic theology, political eschatology, and the critique of violence. Through a detailed analysis of primary texts, the essay argues that Russian philosophers radicalized the doctrine of detachment into a political ontology of freedom, aimed at challenging both metaphysical authority and social coercion. While drawing extensively on negative theological traditions, their most original contributions appear not in strictly speculative or metaphysical terms, but rather in the ethical and political domain. Particular attention is given to Berdyaev’s notion of an “apophatic sociology,” which articulates freedom as the negation of all power of man over man and as the condition of a communal life no longer bound by abstract categories of morality and knowledge. The article concludes that Russian religious thought offers an original contribution to understanding mysticism as a resource for ethical and critical philosophy. Full article