A Miracle for Whom? Al-Sharīf Al-Murtaḍā’s Theory of Audience-Relative Miracles

Abstract

This article examines the theory of miracles formulated by the distinguished Shī’ī-Mu’tazilī theologian, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (965–1044 CE), specifically to contextualize his controversial doctrine of Qurʾānic iʿjāz, known as ṣarfah. The study reconstructs al-Murtaḍā’s general theory of miracles by analyzing his primary works and comparing his positions with standard Muʿtazilī theology. The investigation focused on how his metaphysical and moral frameworks interact to define the nature of miracles. I argue that al-Murtaḍā articulated a “minimal theory of miracles,” wherein miracles function as restricted, localized, and audience-relative “breaches of norms” (khawāriq al-ʿādāt) rather than violations of universal laws. In his view, miracles are morally necessary but temporally restricted acts of God, designed solely to authenticate a prophet to their immediate community. Al-Murtaḍā’s theory shifts the evidential burden of prophetic proof—including the Qur’ān—from continuing intrinsic supernatural qualities to discrete historical testimony. Finally, this study suggests that al-Murtaḍā appears to offer a rationally coherent alternative notion of miracles, that may well succeed from some of the most pressing contemporary intellectual challenges.

1. Introduction

Muslim scholars, despite their innumerable disagreements, uphold miracles as essential proof for confirming a prophet’s message (al-Taftazani 1989, vol. 5, p. 19; al-Hilli 1996, p. 474).1 However, despite this consensus regarding their necessity, the ontological nature of miracles represents a critical point of debate among Islamic intellectual traditions. The fundamental discussion surrounding miracles hinges on two divergent conceptions of Divine agency and intervention. On one side, the Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn) generally assert that God directly orchestrates all events within the created order, thereby conceiving of miracles as direct Divine actions that breach the natural norms. On the other hand, the Muslim Peripatetics (falāsifa) advocate for a deterministic worldview predicated upon the necessary causation, and typically explain miracles through natural causation. In spite of this fundamental disagreement, almost all classical Muslim scholars uphold that a valid miracle must represent an event perpetually infeasible for ordinary human beings.2

Within this complex theological and philosophical discourse, the renowned Imāmī-Mu’tazilī theologian Al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (355–436/965–1044; henceforth al-Murtaḍā), occupies a distinctive position. In contrast to the prevailing consensus, al-Murtaḍā appears to advance a minimalist criterion regarding the essential requirement for miracles. His theory dictates that the impossibility of replicating a miracle needs only to be established for the prophet’s immediate audience, rather than for all human beings throughout all of history.

This article undertakes the reconstruction of al-Murtaḍā’s general theory of miracles. While Al-Murtaḍā is widely known for advancing a contentious idea concerning the Qurʾānic iʿjāz,3 the doctrine of ṣarfah (Divine “turning away” or “diversion”), and this doctrine has attracted considerable focus in classical Islamic scholarship and received some, though comparatively less, attention in recent academic studies of Qurʾānic iʿjāz, his broader theoretical framework for understanding miracles has received insufficient scholarly examination. This oversight represents a significant gap in our understanding of his ṣarfah doctrine, as al-Murtaḍā’s claim about the Qurʾān emerges from and depends upon his general theory of miracles. Therefore, this article addresses this gap by reconstructing al-Murtaḍā’s general theory of miracles, thereby providing the essential conceptual foundation necessary for a proper understanding of his ṣarfah doctrine and its place within the broader landscape of Islamic theological debates about miracles.

The article demonstrates that al-Murtaḍā grounds his theory in two fundamental principles: occasionalist metaphysics and the Divine moral obligation to authenticate genuine prophetic claims. By bridging these two principles, al-Murtaḍā’s framework presents miracles as localized, audience-relative departures from local norms rather than violations of universal laws of nature. Such a framework, I argue, is a clear departure of the common Muʿtazilī theory of miracles, which maintains that the norms which miracles must breach should be universal.

The academic study of Islamic theories of miracle, particularly those concerning Qurʾānic iʿjāz, still requires more systematic examination through detailed case studies of individual theologians.4 This article tries to contributes to that scholarly enterprise by analyzing al-Murtaḍā’s general theory of miracles and the arguments he advances in its support. The article proceeds through two main sections. First, I will provide a biographical sketch and a contextual introduction to the intellectual environment from which his theory emerged. Second, I will examine the Muʿtazilī foundational metaphysical and moral worldview, establishing the conceptual framework that undergirds al-Murtaḍā’s theory of miracles. Finally, I will analyze al-Murtaḍā’s theory of miracles and their function within prophetic authentication. While a detailed examination of al-Murtaḍā’s ṣarfah doctrine itself extends beyond the scope of this study, I hope that the following study establishes the necessary theological and philosophical foundations that render that doctrine intelligible, plausible, and coherent within his broader intellectual framework.

2. Al-Sharīf Al-Murtaḍā: Life and Works

Before examining the theological foundations underlying al-Murtaḍā’s doctrine of ṣarfah, it is essential to briefly provide the biographical and intellectual context that shaped his theology.5 This section accordingly presents a short biography of al-Murtaḍā and surveys his principal theological works, focusing particularly on the texts that outline his theory of miracles and his formulation of the ṣarfah doctrine. After that, I will also provide a short survey of the previous literature on al-Murtaḍā’s theory of miracles, demonstrating the conceptual gap this study intends to fill.

Abū al-Qāsim ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī, also known as al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (355–436/965–1044), remains as one of the most formative figures in Imāmī theology. He was born into an exceedingly prominent family in Baghdad period often referred to as the “Shīʿī Century,” under tolerant Būyid rule. He inherited the title of chief syndic (naqīb) of the Ṭālibids, making him the foremost leader of the Shīʿī community in Baghdad. His substantial wealth and legendary 80,000-volume library enabled him to become a major patron of scholarship through his Dār al-ʿIlm (House of Knowledge). While actively engaged in Baghdad’s political life as a diplomat and mediator, al-Murtaḍā dedicated his life to intellectual work (Brockelmann 2012; Abdulsater 2017, pp. 16–22).

Al-Murtaḍā’s enduring legacy rests on his remarkable achievement of systematically transforming the often-scattered Imāmī doctrinal responses into a coherent rationalist theology. Building directly upon the foundation laid by his teacher, al-Shaykh al-Mufīd’s (c. 948–1022 CE/c. 338–413 AH), al-Murtaḍā skillfully employed Muʿtazilī discourse and methods to reframe and fortify Imāmī theology into a powerful systematic framework.6 His theological synthesis was so successful that it became the mainstream school of Imāmī thought for nearly two centuries, until Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s thirteenth-century shift toward Aristotelian philosophy marked a new intellectual direction.

Unlike most of his contemporaries, a substantial portion of al-Murtaḍā’s intellectual legacy has survived.7 His two most comprehensive theological summa, al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī uṣūl al-dīn, supplemented by his al-Dhakhīra fī ʿilm al-kalām, provide an exhaustive treatment of nearly every theological topic of his time, structured in a manner that closely mirrors Muʿtazilī theological works. Of particular significance for this article is al-Murtaḍā’s monograph dedicated to the Qurʾānic iʿjāz: al-Mūḍiḥ ʿan jihat iʿjāz al-Qurʾān (The Elucidator Concerning the Nature of Qurʾānic iʿjāz). While al-Murtaḍā discusses the miracle of the Qurʾān in his other works, this treatise represents his most comprehensive and dedicated analysis of the subject. Al-Mūḍiḥ was presumed lost to scholarship (Abdul Aleem 1933, p. 79), until the discovery of a sole surviving manuscript approximately two decades ago. This significant find, which unfortunately still lacks several initial folios, was subsequently published in 2003. The recovery of this text is thus foundational for any detailed modern analysis of al-Murtaḍā’s theory of miracles and his ṣarfah doctrine.

It is important to note that the reliability of research on al-Murtaḍā has recently improved. While numerous editions of his works were published over the previous decades, many of these earlier texts suffered from editorial inadequacies and textual corruptions. This challenge has been largely remedied by the recent completion of a new critical edition of his collected works. Completed in thirty-eight volumes between 2019–2020, this edition provides reliable texts crucial for further research. This article relies exclusively upon, and cites, this new critical edition throughout.

Previous Literature on al-Murtaḍā’s Theory of Miracles

Western scholarship has typically operated under the assumption that the Muslim consensus holds the Qurʾānic iʿjāz to reside solely in its linguistic features (Neuwirth 1983, pp. 166–67). Consequently, the rival view, i.e., the ṣarfah doctrine, was often treated as an ancillary claim within the iʿjāz discussion, rather than being taken seriously as an independent topic of study. This tendency was compounded by the fact that the primary works of ṣarfah’s proponents were lost, rendering their ideas only partially accessible, often filtered through the writings of their opponents. It was also common, even among Muslims, to ascribe the formulation of the idea of the Qurʾānic iʿjāz primarily to the Ashʿarī theologians, notably al-Bāqillānī. Richard Martin (1980) was one of the first Western scholars to direct attention to the early Muʿtazilī roots of the notion of Qurʾānic iʿjāz, including the ṣarfah doctrine. Martin mentions al-Murtaḍā as a defender of ṣarfah (Martin 1980, pp. 182–83); however, it is important to note that al-Murtaḍā’s main writings on the subject were not available to him at that time (Martin 1980, p. 183, n. 29). Vasalou (2002) has also included a brief discussion of ṣarfah that touches upon al-Murtaḍā’s ideas within her paper on trends in Qurʾānic iʿjāz.

The state of the art shifted significantly with the recovery and publication of al-Murtaḍā’s core text. Hussein Ali Abdulsater’s extensive monograph (2017) provides a comprehensive biographical and intellectual analysis of al-Murtaḍā and appears to be the first major academic work published after the discovery and 2003 publication of al-Mūḍiḥ. His account of al-Murtaḍā’s theological views, particularly the ṣarfah doctrine, is highly detailed. Yet, due to the historical nature of his work, Abdulsater’s focus is primarily descriptive rather than in-depth theological analysis. More recently, Toriq (2022) offered a detailed analysis of al-Murtaḍā’s ṣarfah doctrine in his thesis.

A wealth of modern Arabic and Persian studies has illuminated the life and thought of al-Murtaḍā and the ṣarfah doctrine. Notable contributions include four papers from the ten-volume festschrift published for the International Congress Commemorating the Millennium of Sayyid Mortezā ʿAlam al-Hudā: Fath Abadi and Taheri Nejad (2021) examine al-Murtaḍā’s ṣarfah based on his primary works; Razavi (2021) traces the historical developments of ṣarfah; Goli and Akran (2021) focus on al-Murtaḍā’s analysis of Qurʾānic rhetoric in comparison with Arabic poetry; and Nasiri (2021) offers a critique of the ṣarfah doctrine. Other recent works, such as Al-Hinai (2019), have surveyed various renditions of ṣarfah, while Al-Maliki (2023) has reviewed the doctrine’s proponents and opponents, including al-Murtaḍā.

While numerous scholarly contributions exist—whether focused on al-Murtaḍā as a figure (Abdulsater 2017) or centered on the ṣarfah doctrine itself (Toriq 2022, and the four Persian papers)—they have generally isolated the ṣarfah doctrine without examining the underlying theological and metaphysical frameworks that make it possible. Abdulsater (2017), while being the most comprehensive work to date, briefly notes that al-Murtaḍā’s account of miracles is a minimal position (Abdulsater 2017, p. 192). However, consistent with the historical focus of his book, he does not elaborate on this minimal theory of miracles in detail.

This study aims to fill this conceptual gap by providing a detailed reconstruction of al-Murtaḍā’s theory of miracles, arguing that understanding this foundational framework is essential for fully appreciating his controversial ṣarfah doctrine.

3. Theological Context

To properly position al-Murtaḍā’s theory within its historical and conceptual landscape, we must first establish the major doctrinal boundaries that define the debate on prophetic miracles in general and on the Qurʾānic iʿjāz in particular. The following disputes collectively structure the intellectual environment from which al-Murtaḍā’s theory emerges. Understanding these intersecting debates is therefore essential for appreciating the unique synthesis he ultimately achieves. The three primary disputes that form the context for his theory are:

• The Metaphysical Debate on the Ontological Structure of the World;
• The Debate on Divine moral responsibility;
• The Debate on the nature of the Qurʾānic Iʿjāz.

Although the nuanced variations among different schools and individual scholars preclude detailed analysis here, grasping this basic bifurcation is essential for understanding the broader theological landscape.

First, Muslim intellectual discourse regarding the general idea of iʿjāz has historically crystallized around two principal camps, each characterized by distinct metaphysical commitments that gave rise to correspondingly divergent theories of Divine action (Rudolph 2016, pp. 357–60; Abdulsater 2017, p. 88):

• Muslim theologians (mutakallimūn): These scholars, typically endorsing an occasionalist view concerning the ontological structure of the world, maintained that God directly and continuously orchestrates all events within the created order. This perspective renders God’s miraculous interventions possible and consistent with the ontological structure of the world.
• Muslim Peripatetics (falāsifa): Conversely, (falāsifa) advocated for a deterministic worldview governed by natural laws and necessary causation. This framework systematically challenged the very possibility of Divine interruptions. They typically sought to explain reported miracles through natural causation rather than accepting them as a Divine suspension of natural norms.8 This fundamental tension prompted theologians like al-Ghazālī to argue that the Peripatetics’ rigid causal framework systematically excludes the possibility of miracles (Al-Ghazali 2000, pp. 166–77).9

The second important debate concerns Divine moral responsibility. Muslim theologians developed two primary, often conflicting positions regarding God’s moral obligations (Al-Attar 2010, pp. 57–59):

• The Voluntarist View: Primarily endorsed by the early Ashʿarites, this position maintains that God’s will determines the very nature of justice. Consequently, Divine actions are beyond the scope of human rational judgment and evaluation.
• The Rationalist View: Primarily advocated by the Muʿtazila, this position asserts that God’s actions conform to objective, rationally accessible standards of justice and therefore remain subject to rational moral evaluation.

The last crucial dispute emerges most clearly in debates concerning Qurʾānic iʿjāz. The overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars—arguably all within the orthodox traditions—maintain that the Qurʾān constitutes the most significant miracle of Prophet Muhammad and serves as the primary, if not the exclusive, proof of his prophetic authenticity. Nevertheless, disagreement persists regarding the precise nature of the Qurʾānic iʿjāz: that is, the specific attribute that renders the text miraculous and, consequently, Prophet Muḥammad’s claims authentic. Answers to this question can also be organized into two main camps (Vasalou 2002, pp. 30–31; Malik 2023, pp. 114–15):

• Intrinsic Theories: Representing the majority scholarly consensus, this camp maintains that the Qurʾān is “intrinsically” miraculous. These theories locate the miraculous element within the Qurʾān itself, typically emphasizing its unparalleled linguistic eloquence and rhetorical sophistication. The text is thus held to transcend human capacity by its very nature, being inherently inimitable by any non-Divine agent.
• Extrinsic Theories: Advocated by a minority of theologians, this camp attributes the Qurʾānic iʿjāz to an “extrinsic” Divine intervention rather than to intrinsic textual superiority. The proponents of extrinsic theory typically embrace the ṣarfah doctrine, arguing that God actively and miraculously intervenes to prevent any potential human competitors from matching the Qurʾān.

Al-Murtaḍā presents a unique synthesis of these three fundamental theological positions. The first two—occasionalist metaphysics and the rationalist view regarding God’s moral responsibility—were generally shared by most Muʿtazilī theologians of his era. However, while embracing these two foundations, the mainstream Mu’tazila typically remained open to both intrinsic and extrinsic theories of Qurʾānic iʿjāz, often leaning toward the intrinsic linguistic view. Al-Murtaḍā, by contrast, forcefully rejects all intrinsic theories that locate the miracle within the text’s literary properties.10 Instead, he uniquely champions the extrinsic theory of iʿjāz, i.e., the ṣarfah doctrine, as the “sole viable explanation” for the Qurʾānic iʿjāz. This categorical position distinguishes him from the majority of Muslim theologians. His contribution, therefore, lies not merely in advocating ṣarfah, but in his rejection of all alternative approaches, particularly those dependent on literary evaluation.

Also, al-Murtaḍā’s case is significant for another reason: his treatise, al-Mūḍiḥ ʿan jihat iʿjāz al-Qurʾān (The Elucidator Concerning the Nature of Qurʾānic iʿjāz), represents the earliest complete extant defense of the ṣarfah doctrine. While other theologians reportedly championed this theory, none produced independent works dedicated exclusively to its elaboration, or their works have been lost to history. Al-Murtaḍā’s text thus provides unparalleled access to the doctrine’s earliest arguments.

Therefore, the following analysis proceeds in two stages: first, examining the shared foundational frameworks (occasionalism and rationalist ethics) and, second, turning to al-Murtaḍā’s distinctive general theory of miracles.

4. Muʿtazilī Metaphysical and Moral Frameworks

Understanding al-Murtaḍā’s theory of miracles prerequires an examination of two interconnected frameworks that form the foundation of his approach: the metaphysical and the moral. Aligning with contemporary Muʿtazilī theology, al-Murtaḍā conceptualizes miracles as instances of direct Divine action (or intervention). Consequently, it is necessary to carefully consider both frameworks to fully comprehend his theological position. The metaphysical framework demonstrates the ontological structure of the world and the mechanism of miraculous events (i.e., how God intervenes), while the moral framework addresses the Divine ethical principles that govern when and why such interventions occur.11

4.1. Occasionalist Structure of the World

Contemporary scholarship often presents occasionalism as a distinctively Ashʿarī doctrine, operating under the assumption that Muʿtazilī and Shīʿī theologians, along with Muslim Peripatetics (falāsifa), categorically rejected this position. However, this characterization misrepresents the historical development of occasionalist thought within Islamic intellectual history. Contrary to common scholarly assumptions, occasionalist worldviews did not originate with the Ashʿarites. Rather, they emerged initially within early Muʿtazilī theological circles before gaining systematic articulation and widespread acceptance among Ashʿarī thinkers (Rudolph 2016, pp. 347–54; Bennett 2016, p. 150).

Al-Murtaḍā, likewise, embraced an occasionalist understanding of causation.12 His commitment to occasionalism reflects the prevailing theological consensus among his Muʿtazilī contemporaries (Abdulsater 2017, pp. 64–66). Following the standard occasionalist framework, Al-Murtaḍā denies intrinsic causal dispositions to natural entities and rejects necessary causal relationships between them, positing God as the exclusive agent of all events within the created world, whether directly or through intermediaries (al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 1, pp. 89, 90–98, vol. 2, p. 127; al-Murtaḍā 2019b, p. 171).13 Within this framework, natural phenomena—such as the sun rising in the east and setting in the west—and supernatural events like miracles are ontologically equivalent as manifestations of Divine will. The distinction between these categories lies not in their metaphysical status but in patterns of human experience. Regular occurrences are designated as Divine norms or habits (ʿādah/sunnah), while exceptional events are termed “breaches of norms” (khawāriq al-ʿādāt).

Two critical questions emerge that significantly shape al-Murtaḍā’s understanding of miracles. First, are Divine norms universal natural laws, or can they be localized norms restricted to specific temporal or geographical contexts? And second, if all events are direct Divine actions, what determines when God establishes a norm versus when God chooses to breach it?

Al-Murtaḍā’s responses to both questions initially align with his Muʿtazilī contemporaries. Regarding the first, while certain Divine norms appear universal, he follows the Muʿtazilī affirmation that God also establishes localized norms that govern specific regions or times, and that the established norms in one region may be perceived as disruptions of norms in another (al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, p. 21). Crucially, al-Murtaḍā diverges from other Muʿtazilī theologians in maintaining that miracles can constitute breaches of these localized norms, a position that proves essential for his minimal theory of miracles.

Regarding the second question, al-Murtaḍā follows the Basran Muʿtazilī tradition in maintaining that while God possesses complete ontological freedom to act within all contingent possibilities, Divine actions remain constrained by moral rationality. Al-Murtaḍā’s moral framework generates a crucial theological conclusion: God bears moral obligation to uphold the norms established within creation. Since these norms reflect Divine wisdom and serve creation’s broader purposes, arbitrary or purposeless violations would directly contradict Divine justice and wisdom (Abdulsater 2017, p. 144). Consequently, breaching any established norm requires exceptional moral justification, typically arising only when clear purposes demand such extraordinary action.

This represents a remarkable theological position: while the world lacks causal necessity in the metaphysical sense, it achieves stability through Divine moral consistency. Al-Murtaḍā’s metaphysics of Divine norms is thus undergirded by Divine moral obligation. As the following part will demonstrate, al-Murtaḍā argues that these same moral obligations paradoxically require God to break established norms in cases of authentic prophetic miracles.

4.2. God’s Moral Responsibility

The moral framework that underpins al-Murtaḍā’s approach to miracles emerges from the fundamental Muʿtazilī commitment to Divine justice (al-ʿadl), which constitutes one of their five foundational principles (Bennett 2016, pp. 146–47). This emphasis earned both Muʿtazilī and Shīʿī theologians the designation “the people of justice and unity” (ahl al-ʿadl wa’l-tawḥīd), reflecting their shared adherence to a rational moral theory.

At the heart of this orientation lies the ethical theory that posits objective moral standards applicable to both Divine and human agents (Al-Attar 2010, pp. 56–59). Central to this moral framework is the doctrine that ethical categories of good and evil (al-ḥasan wa al-qabīḥ) constitute objective realities accessible through rational inquiry, rather than being solely dependent upon Divine command. Muʿtazilī theologians argued that human reason possesses the capacity to discern moral truths independently, making rational judgment a reliable guide for understanding both human and Divine conduct (Al-Attar 2010, pp. 69–70).

This epistemological position subjects God’s actions to the same moral standards that govern human conduct. This represents a bold theological claim: Divine justice operates according to principles that human reason can comprehend and evaluate. Rather than defining justice as whatever God wills—a position later associated with Ashʿarī voluntarism—the Muʿtazila maintained that God’s actions exemplify justice precisely because they conform to objective moral standards recognizable through rational analysis (Al-Attar 2010, pp. 96–98).

This moral framework generates specific constraints on Divine behavior that prove crucial for understanding miracle theory. Muʿtazilī doctrine holds that God cannot perform morally evil (qabīḥ) actions, including arbitrary interventions or purposeless acts (ʿabath). Every Divine action must serve a discernible purpose (gharaḍ), particularly when God imposes obligations upon rational agents (al-mukallafūn). Such obligations must ultimately benefit their recipients rather than serve arbitrary Divine whims (Al-Attar 2010, pp. 94–95; al-Murtaḍā 2019a, vol. 1, p. 246, vol. 2, p. 71, vol. 2, p. 123).

The implications for miracle theory become apparent when considering prophetic authentication. If God bears moral responsibility to guide humanity toward truth and salvation, then providing clear evidence for distinguishing authentic prophets from false claimants becomes a moral obligation for God (al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, p. 125; al-Murtaḍā 2019b, pp. 170, 259). This moral framework thus transforms miracles from mere displays of Divine power into necessary components of Divine justice. This moral theory shapes al-Murtaḍā’s understanding of when, why, and how miracles occur.

5. Al-Murtaḍā on Miracles

Having established the metaphysical and moral foundations that undergird al-Murtaḍā’s approach to the miracles, I now turn to examine his specific conceptualization of the nature and function of miracles within prophetic authentication.

Although al-Murtaḍā aligns with his contemporary Muʿtazilī theologians regarding the foundational frameworks of miracle theory, his path diverges from them in explaining what miracles actually are and how they function. This divergence centers on his unique understanding of the miracle’s scope and the specific obligation it imposes upon God.

Given that al-Murtaḍā’s ideas closely parallel mainstream Muʿtazilī theology in many respects, identifying his distinctive contributions requires a precise analysis of where he departs from established Muʿtazilī positions. To illuminate these departures, I will compare al-Murtaḍā’s views with those of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadānī al-Asadābādī (d. 415/1025, henceforth ʿAbd al-Jabbār), the most influential Muʿtazilī theologian of his era.14 This comparative approach reveals how al-Murtaḍā developed his unique position within the broader rationalist tradition.

5.1. Drfinition of a Miracle

The first distinctive aspect of al-Murtaḍā’s theory of miracles emerges in his definition of what constitutes a miracle. In a deliberate departure, al-Murtaḍā challenges the standard Muʿtazilī definition employed by his contemporaries, including al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1996, p. 568). While mainstream Muʿtazilī theology defines the miracles based on the etymological origins of the term muʿjiz, al-Murtaḍā consciously adopts a definition based on common usage (taʿāruf).

According to al-Murtaḍā:

The meaning of our saying ‘miracle’ (muʿjiz) in common usage (taʿāruf) is: that which indicates the truthfulness of the one at whose hands it appears and is specifically associated with him.

(al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, p. 18)

The literal meaning of muʿjiz derives from the root ʿ-j-z, signifying “that which renders powerless” or “that which incapacitates”. ʿAbd al-Jabbār, building on this literal meaning of muʿjiz, claims that the miracle is something which people are incapable of replicating. Al-Murtaḍā’s departure from this etymological approach is more than mere terminological preference; his new definition reduces the evidential burden of the miracle. Rather than requiring that the miracles incapacitate people, it suffices for the event to serve as reliable sign of prophetic truthfulness.

However, while not explicitly stated, al-Murtaḍā’s definition establishes a considerably lower threshold than ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s. According to his definition, a phenomenon qualifies as a miracle not because it renders people utterly powerless, but simply because it serves as a reliable indicator (dalāla) of prophetic truthfulness and maintains specific association with the prophetic claimant.

This definition also serves two purposes regarding the Qurʾānic iʿjāz.

First, this definition aligns perfectly with his explanation of the ṣarfah doctrine. Al-Murtaḍā maintains that God did not deprive the Arabs of their capacity (qudrah) to compose a text comparable to the Qurʾān, but rather temporarily withdrew their knowledge (ʿilm) necessary for such composition (al-Murtaḍā 2019b, pp. 58, 70–71, 76).

Second, al-Murtaḍā’s definitional shift constitutes a direct response to a major objection raised by ʿAbd al-Jabbār against the ṣarfah doctrine. ʿAbd al-Jabbār argued that ṣarfah necessarily leads to one of two positions: either God permanently withheld the knowledge required to imitate the Qurʾān from all humanity throughout history, or the Arabs possessed the requisite abilities but God merely removed their knowledge precisely when they attempted to respond to the challenge. ʿAbd al-Jabbār contended that the first position effectively reduces ṣarfah to the conventional claim that the Qurʾān possesses superhuman qualities, and the second option, which proponents of ṣarfah promote, is unacceptable because it fails to align with the literal meaning of muʿjiz as “rendering powerless,” since the capacity (qudrah) remains intact (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960, vol. 16, pp. 218–20). Al-Murtaḍā, however, avoids this entire dilemma by arguing that the definition of muʿjiz should be grounded in common usage rather than rigid lexical derivation, a move that frees his theory from linguistic constraints and allows him to maintain his understanding of the Qurʾānic challenge.

Al-Murtaḍā subsequently establishes four necessary conditions that must be satisfied for an event to be considered as a genuine miracle:

(C1) That the event must be an action of God;

(C2) That it must violate a norm;

(C3) That it must be irreplicable for people to produce the like of it;

(C4) That it must be exclusive to the claimant in a manner that confirms his claim.

(al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, pp. 18–20)

While al-Murtaḍā provides comprehensive explanations for each condition and systematically addresses potential objections, to emphasize his distinctive contributions to miracle theory, I will analyze these four conditions through two overarching points. First, I will focus on the Divine obligation to authenticate the prophets (C1 and C4), and second, I will focus on what determines the form and force of the miracle (C2 and C3).15

5.2. Miracles Are Obligatory Divine Actions

Consistent with his occasionalist worldview, al-Murtaḍā explicitly requires that miracles constitute direct Divine actions. Thus, the first condition (C1) for a genuine miracle is that it must be an action of God.

Beyond this metaphysical commitment, al-Murtaḍā advances a more specific theological argument rooted in the function of miracles. He contends that since a miracle, by definition, serves as Divine confirmation (taṣdīq) of a prophetic claim, it must necessarily originate from the sender of the prophet, namely God, rather than from the prophet himself. This reflects a fundamental logical requirement of authentic testimony: if the miracle genuinely functions as Divine affirmation of the prophet’s truthfulness, the prophet cannot serve as the agent of his own authentication. Such self-authentication would constitute logical circularity that undermines the evidential value of the miracle (al-Murtaḍā 2019b, pp. 78–80).

This argument parallels al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s reasoning, though ʿAbd al-Jabbār provides a clearer illustration through analogy: if Zayd tells ʿAmr “I am the messenger of Khalid; ask him to validate my claim,” what constitutes validation of Zayd’s claim must be an action from Khalid, not from anyone else. Likewise, when a prophet claims that God has sent him, the reliable indicator of his truthfulness must be an action of God, not from any other person, including the prophet himself (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960, vol. 15, pp. 200–201).

This raises the next critical question: why and when should God intervene in the world to perform miracles? Al-Murtaḍā’s response, which is presented as the fourth condition (C4), reveals the moral dimension of his miracle theory. As previously explained, miracles function as necessary proofs of prophetic truthfulness rather than arbitrary displays of Divine power. When an individual presents a claim to prophecy, God becomes morally obligated to provide authenticating confirmation. Similarly, God must furnish clear validation when authentic prophetic claims require substantiation. The miracle thus represents God’s direct action in fulfilling His moral obligation to affirm His genuine prophet’s truthfulness. Al-Murtaḍā explains:

If it is established that it is a miracle [a norm-breach], then it must be made manifest through a messenger. Therefore, it is necessary that God, just as it is impermissible for Him to manifest it through a liar, so too is it impermissible for Him to enable one who lies in claiming prophethood to perform it. This is because the potential for leading [people] astray is present in both cases. For the reason He does not manifest it through a liar is that such a person would then be indistinguishable from a true messenger in the manifestation of that sign upon him, and it is necessary that God distinguish between them.

(al-Murtaḍā 2019b, p. 283)

This moral obligation derives from the same moral consistency that necessitates God’s adherence to established norms in the world. Just as God remains morally bound to maintain the natural norms that structure the created world, Divine justice requires the affirmation of authentic prophets and the rejection of false claimants (al-Murtaḍā 2019b, p. 284–86).

5.3. Miracles Are Irreplicable Norm-Violations

The second condition (C2) for a genuine miracle is that it must constitute a breach of established norms (khāriqan li-l-ʿādah) (al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, p. 20). Here lies the second, and arguably the most significant, point where al-Murtaḍā departs from standard Muʿtazilī miracle theory to establish his distinctive position.

Other Muʿtazilī theologians likewise maintain that miracles must be norm-breaches, given that if an alleged miracle represents a normal, expected event, it cannot logically provide validation for the prophet’s claim. The logical necessity of this requirement becomes clear through ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s argument: if a prophet claims that his authenticating miracle consists of natural phenomena, such as the sun rising in the east and setting in the west, observers possess no means of evaluating whether this constitutes a genuine Divine confirmation. A normal event lacks the distinctive character necessary to function as Divine authentication, since such events would occur regardless of the prophet’s truthfulness or falsity (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960, vol. 15, pp. 200–1). The crucial question, however, concerns what constitutes a “norm” and, consequently, what qualifies as a “breach” of such norms.

ʿAbd al-Jabbār acknowledges that there are both local norms established by people and universal norms established by God (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960, vol. 15, p. 183); however, he maintains that the norms which miracles must breach should be universal in both temporal and spatial dimensions. According to him, a genuine norm subject to miraculous violation must extend temporally from the beginning of God’s creation until the expiration of this world, while simultaneously encompassing all regions of the earth. Although he acknowledges that God’s norms might differ for the inhabitants of the heavens (ahl al-samāʾ) and may operate differently after this world’s termination, for the specific purpose of miraculous authentication, what constitutes a “norm” is exclusively that which remains fixed for all inhabitants of the earth throughout the duration of human responsibility (al-taklīf) (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960, vol. 15, pp. 182–90).

By requiring that miraculous breaches violate universally applicable norms, ʿAbd al-Jabbār establishes an exceptionally high threshold for miracles, a position that is completely consistent with his definition of miracles as “that which incapacitates”. Under this framework, a phenomenon can qualify as miracle only if it contradicts patterns that have remained consistent for all people, in all places, throughout human history. This stringent criterion effectively excludes localized departures from established norms, since such variations would not constitute breaches of truly universal Divine norms. Therefore, he explicitly states that local norms cannot serve as the basis for miraculous authentication; only universal norms established by God are subject to breach in cases of genuine miracles (ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1960, vol. 15, p. 195).

In contrast, al-Murtaḍā requires that miracles violate “the norm specified to the person through whom the miracle is manifested” (al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, p. 20). This formulation acknowledges that miracles depend not on violating universal norms, but on breaching the particular norms established in specific temporal and geographical contexts. A phenomenon needs only transgress the local Divine norms associated with its immediate audience to qualify as genuine miracle.

To elaborate this condition (C2), al-Murtaḍā proceeds to explain his conception of localized norms. He begins by posing a fundamental methodological question: how should we identify breaches of norms?

As for the path to identifying that it [the miracle] is a breach of norm (khāriqan li-l-ʿādah): it is that norms (al-ʿādāt) are known and established among rational people (al-ʿuqalāʾ), and the path to identifying them is through observation (al-mushāhadah) or reports (al-akhbār). Rational people have known that norm (al-ʿādah) has never proceeded with a rising sun from the west, nor with the birth of a child without male and female. So, when this is violated and changed, it is a breach of norm (kharq ʿādah).

[...] Norms may be universal (ʿāmmah) and may be local (khāṣṣah), and the norm of some people of certain lands may proceed with what is a violation of the norms of others. For this reason, we said: What is valid (al-muʿtabar) is the violation of the norms of those for whom that norm is their norm.

(al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, p. 21)

This argument represents the most significant features of al-Murtaḍā’s theory of miracles and establishes a crucial theological foundation for what may be termed a “minimal theory of miracles.” Al-Murtaḍā argues that corresponding to his distinction between universal and localized Divine norms, there exist two categories of norm breaches: universal breaches that transcend all temporal and geographical boundaries, and localized breaches that violate only the norms established for particular communities or in specific contexts.

This distinction is also pivotal for understanding al-Murtaḍā’s approach to prophetic authentication. Since the primary function of miraculous events consists in providing Divine confirmation of the prophet’s authenticity to his immediate audience, it suffices that God breach the localized norms relevant to that specific community. Universal violation of norms is unnecessary when localized intervention adequately demonstrates Divine endorsement to the target audience. As al-Murtaḍā explicitly states in the passage cited above: “What is valid (al-muʿtabar) is the violation of the norms of those for whom that norm is their norm.”

Moreover, this idea of localized norm-breaches is strengthened by the next condition (C3). The third condition regarding the impossibility of replication contains a crucial distinction between categorical and qualitative impossibility. Al-Murtaḍā specifies that the audience need not be categorically incapable of producing something within the general type or genre of the miracle (al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, pp. 21–22). Rather, it suffices that they cannot reproduce its specific distinctive qualities. This nuanced formulation provides the justification for his subsequent argument that while the Arabs possessed general literary capabilities and could produce texts categorically similar to the Qurʾān, they remained unable to imitate it (al-Murtaḍā 2019b, pp. 54–58).

Al-Murtaḍā’s understanding of these two conditions, principle fundamentally transforms our understanding of how Divine intervention operates in the case of miracles. According to this idea of norm breaching, the form of a miracle could respond to specific contextual needs rather than disrupting universal norms. Since the fundamental purpose of a miracle involves providing Divine confirmation of particular prophetic claims before their intended audiences, the norms that should be breached must correspond precisely to the norms recognized and established within the target community’s experiences.

This contextually sensitive approach to miracles yields several theoretically significant implications for understanding the nature of Divine intervention. First, events considered entirely normative within one cultural, temporal, or geographical context may appear genuinely miraculous in another, depending entirely upon the localized expectations. Second, virtually any ordinary occurrence could theoretically function as a miraculous sign if God had established fundamentally different normative patterns within that particular context. Third, extraordinary events lose their miraculous character when they occur with sufficient regularity to establish new normative patterns, since the essential criterion involves deviation from established custom rather than absolute extraordinariness (Abdulsater 2017, pp. 188–89).

To illustrate the implications of this crucial conception of localized norms, we might examine the medical miracles performed by prophets, for instance those attributed to Jesus. These examples become especially revealing when analyzed through the lens of historical medical development and al-Murtaḍā’s framework of contextual norm-breaches. One might argue that rational people know through reports (al-akhbār) that certain medical limitations constituted Divine norms (ʿādāt) within Jesus’ historical contexts: in that era, conditions such as congenital blindness, leprosy, or paralysis were incurable through any available means, representing established patterns of Divine norms within that temporal and geographical context. The instantaneous healing of such conditions would therefore constitute genuine breaches of the medical norms in first-century Palestine, rendering them authentic miracles. On the contrary, contemporary medical advances have rendered many previously incurable conditions treatable through established medical treatments. Within contemporary contexts, where such treatments represent normal medical practice, similar healings might not qualify as breaches of established norms. This could also be true about norms that are grounded in cultural contexts, like the tradition of literal competitions in Arabia in the time of Prophet Muhammad.

6. Miracles for Later Generations

The minimal miracle theory presented above carries significant implications for post-prophetic generations, regarding the epistemic accessibility of prophetic authentication.

As explained, a miraculous breach in a localized norm might become a norm for future generations, rendering the event non-miraculous to later eyes. Furthermore, even a breach in a universal norm could become epistemically inaccessible to later audiences, as subsequent generations only receive reports of the miraculous event—a report of a norm-breach that might not sound as miraculous for them as it was for the direct audience. The crucial question is: How can later generations establish the miraculous nature of an event?

This temporally bounded understanding of Divine obligation yields a crucial theological implication: what remains available to later generations is not the continuing miracle itself, but rather the historical testimonies documenting both the original prophetic claim and the corresponding Divine intervention that authenticated it.

Al-Murtaḍā advances this principle to its most radical conclusion regarding the Qurʾān. He argues that the historical fact of the Divine intervention (ṣarfah) is so robustly established, that if even someone doubts the Qurʾān’s integrity, this would not undermine the historical authenticity of Muhammad’s prophetic mission. He writes:

However, knowledge of our Prophet’s prophethood does not depend upon knowing that this Qurʾān present among us is precisely the same text with which the challenge was issued. Even with doubt regarding this matter, the authenticity of his prophethood remains established. This is because it is known beyond doubt—as has been demonstrated—that he challenged the Arabs with speech (kalām) which he declared to be the speech of God, the Exalted, and that the angel descended to him with it. It is also established that they did not produce a counter-challenge due to their inability to do so (taʿadhdhur al-muʿāraḍah). This suffices as proof (dalālah) of his prophethood… Therefore, doubt regarding the accuracy of the Qurʾān’s transmission does not compromise the evidence for prophethood under any circumstances.

(al-Murtaḍā 2020, vol. 2, p. 83)

The evidentiary function of the Qurʾān rests not upon its continuing miraculous quality, but upon reliable historical testimony that proves the Divine intervention which prevented the Arabs from producing a comparable text during the original challenge period.

This temporal specificity proves crucial to al-Murtaḍā’s framework: God’s moral obligation to authenticate prophetic claims operates within the historical moment of the prophetic mission, not as a perpetual commitment extending indefinitely into the future. Once the immediate prophetic audience has received adequate authentication through Divine intervention in breaking the norms, God’s obligation is fulfilled, and the mechanism of miraculous intervention ceases. This places the Qurʾān’s miraculous status on equivalent epistemic footing with other historically documented miracles, grounding its evidential value in historical testimony rather than in claims about the text’s perpetual inimitability. Furthermore, subsequent individuals may produce similar norm breaches without compromising the original miraculous status or challenging the authenticity of the Prophet’s mission. God bears no moral obligation to prevent such later attempts through continued intervention, since the Divine purpose of confirming prophetic authenticity has already been definitively accomplished through the original norm-breaking event during the challenge period.

7. Conclusions

Many Muslims believe that the Qurʾānic iʿjāz transcends history, rendering it superior to the temporally bounded miracles of other prophets, because faith in its miracle is not dependent on historical testimony but on its intrinsic, self-evident, continuing supernatural quality (Tabatabai 1975, p. 134). However, this traditional claim, whether true or false, faces increasingly severe challenges in the modern world. For instance, the rapid development of sophisticated generative technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) capable of producing novel and highly compelling literary works, introduces a critical new variable (Malik 2023). The burden of continuously defending the text’s supernatural qualities, and proving that no future technology or human talent could ever replicate the Qurʾān’s literary excellence, becomes intellectually onerous. Al-Murtaḍā’s minimal theory of miracles and his ṣarfah doctrine can avoid this burden, by offering a compelling, rationally coherent answer that grounds the belief the Qurʾānic iʿjāz in historical evidence.

By positioning his thought at the convergence of occasionalist metaphysics and rationalist ethics, I tried to demonstrate that al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s often-neglected theory of miracles, and by extension his controversial ṣarfah doctrine, can offer a compelling and rationally coherent alternative approach. The implications of his minimal theory of miracles could be significant. It transforms miracles to precise, targeted, and temporally defined acts of God designed solely for the authentication of the prophet to the immediate community of his audience. Once prophetic authenticity has been established and acknowledged, the Divine purpose is fulfilled, and continued miraculous intervention becomes morally unnecessary. Consequently, the probative value of miracles for subsequent generations, including the Qurʾān, shifts from the continuing supernatural irreplaceability of the phenomenon to the reliability of historical testimonies.

Ultimately, al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā’s theory constitutes more than a historical theological footnote. By shifting the evidential burden of iʿjāz to discrete historical testimony, al-Murtaḍā provides an alternative model for rendering prophetic proof rationally intelligible. In an era marked by challenges to religion from both historical criticism and modern developments, the innovative force of al-Murtaḍā’s thought continues to merit serious and sustained scholarly engagement.