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21 pages, 296 KB

Open AccessArticle

Is Divine Law Indispensable to Moral Obligation? A Reply to Elizabeth Anscombe

by Jeffery Jay Lowder

Religions 2025, 16(11), 1331; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16111331 - 22 Oct 2025

Viewed by 192

This paper assesses Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential argument in her 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” which holds that secular moral obligation is metaphysically incoherent without a divine law framework. This paper reconstructs her argument—dubbed the “divine indispensability argument”—in standard form and then presents eight [...] Read more.

This paper assesses Elizabeth Anscombe’s influential argument in her 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” which holds that secular moral obligation is metaphysically incoherent without a divine law framework. This paper reconstructs her argument—dubbed the “divine indispensability argument”—in standard form and then presents eight targeted objections that fall under three general types—challenges to its intelligibility, internal and external inconsistency, and substantive improbabilities—demonstrating that each strand refutes her thesis. Finally, it shows that her proposed remedy inherits the very defects she attributes to secular ethics and concludes that moral obligation remains fully coherent within nontheistic frameworks. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

14 pages, 230 KB

Open AccessArticle

A Kantian Approach to Objective Morality and God’s Existence

by Anne Jeffrey and Kelsey Maglio

Religions 2025, 16(10), 1268; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16101268 - 3 Oct 2025

Viewed by 420

Abstract

In this article, we explain how Kant upends the terms of the debate concerning the relationship between God’s existence and an objective morality by looking at his moral-teleological argument for God’s existence in the third Critique. We explain Kant’s rejection of external sources [...] Read more.

In this article, we explain how Kant upends the terms of the debate concerning the relationship between God’s existence and an objective morality by looking at his moral-teleological argument for God’s existence in the third Critique. We explain Kant’s rejection of external sources of moral normativity and his method of grounding moral authority in the normativity of practical reason. We then turn to Kant’s argument justifying a practical belief in God as the moral author of nature. Kant’s claims about how we must conceptualize organisms teleologically and, as a result, how reason seeks an unconditioned end of nature, brings together our moral purpose with a conception of nature as an organized whole. Since our teleological concepts of organisms seem to require that human beings serve as the final, unconditioned end of nature, but morality and nature might be incompatible and divergent, we must also believe in a moral author of nature. This belief guards against demoralization and creates a unified view of the human moral agent and the world she inhabits, which Kant thinks of as indispensable for our practical lives. Kant notoriously blurs the lines between theology and ethics in nonstandard ways. Although he rejects many traditional approaches to grounding ethics in a conception of divine commands or eternal law, he still devotes a considerable amount of time to discussing the role of religion as a bulwark of the moral life. The goal of this paper is to defend Kant’s relevance to a discussion of the relationship between an objective ethics and the existence of God; his contribution deserves our notice precisely for the ways in which it promises to shift the terms of the contemporary debate and complicate possible answers to the question of whether there can be an objective morality without God. In contemporary philosophical literature, Kant’s argument contending that we must hope in God from a practical point of view on pain of irrationality of acting from duty has enjoyed substantial discussion. Here, however, we focus on a lesser-known suite of arguments that in order to so much as cognize ourselves and other species as the sorts of natural beings they are, we must believe in a supersensible moral author of these natures. This set of arguments ultimately dovetail with the more well-known argument for theistic hope and operate in much the same way. But they touch on facets of Kant’s whole philosophical system, such as his account of teleological judgment and the unity and final end of all of nature. Our goal is to explicate these arguments and illuminate their relevance of these Kantian arguments to the debate about the relevance of God to objective morality. We will argue that while an objective ethics is possible without God due to the active role of practical reason in rational agents, belief in God’s existence strengthens the claims of morality, both for psychological reasons but also by providing a more unified conception of moral and natural reality. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

12 pages, 215 KB

Open AccessArticle

Goodness and Godness in Cosmic Agapism

by Asha Lancaster-Thomas

Religions 2025, 16(10), 1238; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16101238 - 27 Sep 2025

Viewed by 302

Abstract

This paper concerns itself with postulating the necessity of God for Good, in answer to the titular question posed in this edition: “Is an Ethics without God Possible?”. To achieve this end, I consider a specific pantheistic ethic centered on Murdochian love and [...] Read more.

This paper concerns itself with postulating the necessity of God for Good, in answer to the titular question posed in this edition: “Is an Ethics without God Possible?”. To achieve this end, I consider a specific pantheistic ethic centered on Murdochian love and evaluate a potential contradictory element to this brand of ethic, while also highlighting several important terminological considerations integral to the debate concerning objective moral realism. I tentatively provide a demonstration of moral goodness without a ‘capital G’ God while examining and demystifying the underpinning concepts of goodness and ‘Godness’ (the nature of God). Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

26 pages, 292 KB

Open AccessArticle

Ethical Norms Are Based on Consensus, and Ethics Compatible with Darwinian Evolution Is Necessary for Consensus

by Yuanxin Liu

Religions 2025, 16(9), 1152; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16091152 - 5 Sep 2025

Viewed by 580

Abstract

Harrison has argued that ethics requires a god and, thus, keeps ethical norms from being threatened by evolutionary debunking. This paper argues that consensus is a better guarantee for ethics than gods, and ethics compatible with evolution is necessary for us to achieve [...] Read more.

Harrison has argued that ethics requires a god and, thus, keeps ethical norms from being threatened by evolutionary debunking. This paper argues that consensus is a better guarantee for ethics than gods, and ethics compatible with evolution is necessary for us to achieve consensus. To reduce the divide between theists and atheists and to prevent us from losing our pursuit of the common good, I start from the key consensus already achieved by Sterba and Harrison, that is, ethics does not specifically require God. It follows that ethics does not require gods and is our own affair. The Darwinian evolutionary theory shows that, when we are adapting to the environment, we develop different behaviors. This provides a common ground for understanding our differences and motivates us to adapt to a new environment where we, who are vastly different, have to live together. Finally, I take Confucian ethics as an example to show how ethics that begins with blood relations has given rise to our golden rule. Thus, the Darwinian evolutionary theory should not be seen as a threat. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

17 pages, 302 KB

Open AccessArticle

God, Ethics, and Evolution: An Islamic Rejoinder to Sterba’s Moral Critique

by Elif Nur Balci

Religions 2025, 16(8), 1070; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081070 - 19 Aug 2025

Viewed by 1119

Abstract

This paper engages with James Sterba’s arguments from an Islamic theological perspective, particularly drawing on the Mu‘tazilite tradition. It focuses on three central themes: (1) the position of God in the face of horrendous evils, (2) the relationship between divine command theory and [...] Read more.

This paper engages with James Sterba’s arguments from an Islamic theological perspective, particularly drawing on the Mu‘tazilite tradition. It focuses on three central themes: (1) the position of God in the face of horrendous evils, (2) the relationship between divine command theory and moral objectivity, and (3) the compatibility of Darwinian evolution with objective morality. First, I challenge Sterba’s claim that the existence of a wholly good and powerful God is logically incompatible with horrendous evils by proposing a “theistic structuralist” framework inspired by the Mu‘tazilite scholar Qadi Abd al-Jabbar. Second, while largely agreeing with Sterba’s critique of divine command theory, I incorporate a Mu‘tazilite view that grounds moral objectivity in God’s inherently good nature. Third, I support Sterba’s argument—against Sharon Street—that Darwinian evolution does not undermine moral objectivity, but I further argue that a consistent defense of this view ultimately requires the existence of God. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

16 pages, 278 KB

Open AccessArticle

Objective Moral Facts Exist in All Possible Universes

by Richard Carrier

Religions 2025, 16(8), 1061; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081061 - 16 Aug 2025

Viewed by 2506

Abstract

The question of whether a God is needed to justify or ground moral facts is mooted by the fact that true moral facts exist in all possible universes that contain rational agents. This can be demonstrated in three stages. First, it is necessarily [...] Read more.

The question of whether a God is needed to justify or ground moral facts is mooted by the fact that true moral facts exist in all possible universes that contain rational agents. This can be demonstrated in three stages. First, it is necessarily the case that true moral facts can only be described as the imperatives that supersede all other imperatives. Second, it is necessarily the case that for any rational agent there will always be true hypothetical imperatives that supersede all other imperatives. And third, if there are true hypothetical imperatives that supersede all other imperatives, they are then, necessarily, the only true moral facts. As this follows for any rational agent in any possible universe, the presence of God is irrelevant to the existence of moral facts. God could be more capable of identifying those true moral facts, but he cannot author or ground them. And though a God could casuistically alter moral imperatives by altering the corresponding physics, he is constrained in what he can make true this way by moral fundamentals that are always necessarily true. God is therefore not necessary for there to be moral facts. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

15 pages, 219 KB

Open AccessArticle

The Moral Hope Argument

by Eric Reitan

Religions 2025, 16(8), 1060; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081060 - 16 Aug 2025

Viewed by 431

Abstract

This essay develops a distinct moral argument for the reasonableness of believing in God (conceived as a perfectly good creator) inspired by the pragmatic argument for “the religious hypothesis” advanced by William James in “The Will to Believe.” It also contextualizes the argument [...] Read more.

This essay develops a distinct moral argument for the reasonableness of believing in God (conceived as a perfectly good creator) inspired by the pragmatic argument for “the religious hypothesis” advanced by William James in “The Will to Believe.” It also contextualizes the argument relative to familiar moral arguments, notably those of C.S. Lewis and Kant. Briefly, the argument developed here holds that when facing more than one coherent picture of reality, each of which could be true based on the arguments and evidence but only one of which fulfills the hope that in a fundamental way reality is on the side of moral goodness (what I call “the ethico-religious hope”), a reasonable person could opt to believe in the hope’s fulfillment and live accordingly. Following James’ approach, however, this argument does not imply that others who do not adopt such a picture are necessarily irrational or less rational. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

8 pages, 164 KB

Open AccessArticle

Can Ethics Exist Without God? A Thomistic Critique of James Sterba’s Axiomatic Morality

by Joseph Brian Huffling

Religions 2025, 16(8), 1058; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081058 - 16 Aug 2025

Viewed by 626

Abstract

This essay explores the question: can we have an objective ethics without God? This question is raised by James Sterba, who argues in the affirmative. As an atheistic ethicist, Sterba is motivated to maintain an objective morality that is not based in theism [...] Read more.

This essay explores the question: can we have an objective ethics without God? This question is raised by James Sterba, who argues in the affirmative. As an atheistic ethicist, Sterba is motivated to maintain an objective morality that is not based in theism and that can withstand the problems with Darwinism. Sterba examines what he sees as one of the most popular theistic attempts to ground human morality, viz., divine command theory. In rejecting both divine command theory and theism, Sterba offers what he believes can offer objective morality: a basic moral norm that all people should adhere to. This article examines Sterba’s criticism of divine command theory along with his own efforts at establishing an objective morality in what he considers a universal abstract principle. In the end, this article argues that Sterba’s axiomatic principle is unclear as to its ontological foundation as well as its causal efficacy in attempting to obligate objective human ethics. It will be argued that Sterba is correct about human nature being the locus of morality, but that atheism fails at providing human teleology to account for such morality. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

17 pages, 220 KB

Open AccessArticle

A Critique of the Neo-Platonist Theory of Moral Value

by Kai Michael Büttner and David Benjamin Dolby

Religions 2025, 16(8), 1054; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081054 - 15 Aug 2025

Viewed by 358

Abstract

Divine Command Theory holds that what is morally right is what is commanded by God. This view faces a form of the Euthyphro dilemma: either God commands actions because they are right, in which case moral standards are independent of God, or actions [...] Read more.

Divine Command Theory holds that what is morally right is what is commanded by God. This view faces a form of the Euthyphro dilemma: either God commands actions because they are right, in which case moral standards are independent of God, or actions are right because God commands them, in which case morality appears arbitrary. A currently influential response among theistic philosophers draws on a distinction between moral duties and moral values. On this view, duties arise from God’s commands, while values are understood—following a neo-Platonist approach—to be grounded in God’s nature. Proponents of this account appeal to an analogy with the role of the standard metre in the metric system: just as a metre is defined by reference to a paradigmatic length, so goodness is defined by reference to God’s character. On this basis, they argue that the existence of moral value depends on God’s existence, and that moral objectivity requires theism. We argue, however, that moral language cannot be understood as involving God in a structurally analogous way to the standard metre. Moreover, the neo-Platonist account does not provide a successful explanation of the normativity of moral language. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

10 pages, 196 KB

Open AccessArticle

Is Ethics Possible Without God?

by Whitley Kaufman

Religions 2025, 16(8), 1053; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081053 - 14 Aug 2025

Viewed by 739

Abstract

This essay defends the position that ethics must be grounded in God, where the notion of ‘God’ is understood as a transcendental source of normativity, though not necessarily a personal being who ‘commands’ moral behavior. The essay argues that the true debate is [...] Read more.

This essay defends the position that ethics must be grounded in God, where the notion of ‘God’ is understood as a transcendental source of normativity, though not necessarily a personal being who ‘commands’ moral behavior. The essay argues that the true debate is between the naturalistic reduction of ethics and the idea of a transcendental ground for moral normativity. I claim that only the latter can provide a sufficient basis for morality. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

20 pages, 259 KB

Open AccessArticle

A View on the Possibility of an Ethics Without God

by Elliott R. Crozat

Religions 2025, 16(7), 813; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16070813 - 22 Jun 2025

Viewed by 674

Abstract

This article addresses the question, “Is an ethics without God possible?” This question is explored in a special issue, edited by Prof. Dr. James P. Sterba, which directly poses this very inquiry. I argue that an objective ethics without God is epistemically possible. [...] Read more.

This article addresses the question, “Is an ethics without God possible?” This question is explored in a special issue, edited by Prof. Dr. James P. Sterba, which directly poses this very inquiry. I argue that an objective ethics without God is epistemically possible. Having addressed this initial point, I then make the case that an objective ethics without God is metaphysically possible. In other words, there are plausible explanations to support the thesis that ethics exists without God. Lastly, I propose that although God is not required for ethics, it is reasonable to postulate God’s existence to realize aspects of justice. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

11 pages, 170 KB

Open AccessArticle

Prolegomena to the Concept of God When Dealing with the Question: Is Ethics Without God Possible?

by Daniel A. Dombrowski

Religions 2025, 16(5), 651; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050651 - 20 May 2025

Viewed by 591

Abstract

This article examines the assumption that, in order to respond adequately to the question in the title, one must have the classical concept of God in mind. Classical theism is criticized and neoclassical/process theism is briefly defended. Specifically, the classical theistic attribute of [...] Read more.

This article examines the assumption that, in order to respond adequately to the question in the title, one must have the classical concept of God in mind. Classical theism is criticized and neoclassical/process theism is briefly defended. Specifically, the classical theistic attribute of omnipotence receives four criticisms. The hope is that these criticisms prepare the way for a more fruitful response to the question in the title than is possible when the classical concept of God is assumed. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

18 pages, 214 KB

Open AccessArticle

Whether God Exists Is Irrelevant to Ethics

by David Kyle Johnson

Religions 2025, 16(5), 558; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050558 - 27 Apr 2025

Viewed by 851

Abstract

The question of whether ethics is possible without God is a non-issue. While many believe that without God, morality collapses, I contend that the existence or non-existence of God has no bearing on whether ethics is possible, whether moral truths exist, or whether [...] Read more.

The question of whether ethics is possible without God is a non-issue. While many believe that without God, morality collapses, I contend that the existence or non-existence of God has no bearing on whether ethics is possible, whether moral truths exist, or whether ethical inquiry is viable. Ethics is no more secure within a theistic framework than an atheistic one. I establish this by critically examining Divine Command Theory (DCT) and its variants, including Divine Nature Theory, demonstrating that they fail to provide truthmakers for moral statements, explain moral truths, generate moral knowledge, or serve as a practical guide for ethical decision making. If one seeks a way to justify ethical principles or resolve moral dilemmas, appealing to God does not improve the situation; supernatural explanations, including those invoking divine commands or nature, fail to meet the criteria of explanatory adequacy. I conclude by suggesting a secular approach to ethics—drawing from Ted Schick’s inference to the best action—that does not depend on God’s existence. Ultimately, if moral nihilism is a concern, God’s existence offers no solution. If ethics is possible at all, it is possible regardless of whether God exists. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

17 pages, 198 KB

Open AccessArticle

Why Ethics Requires a God and Is Safer from Evolutionary Debunking Threats as a Result: A Reply to Sterba

by Gerald K. Harrison

Religions 2025, 16(3), 360; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030360 - 13 Mar 2025

Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1175

Abstract

Sterba has argued that ethics does not require God and that an atheistic objectivist ethics is compatible with an evolutionary account of our development. This paper argues that though ethics does not require God specifically, it does require a god of some sort, [...] Read more.

Sterba has argued that ethics does not require God and that an atheistic objectivist ethics is compatible with an evolutionary account of our development. This paper argues that though ethics does not require God specifically, it does require a god of some sort, for all normative reasons require a god and moral reasons are simply a subset of normative reasons. Sterba’s criticisms of more orthodox divine command theories of ethics are shown to raise no challenge to my view. Furthermore, even if Sterba’s alternative atheistic objectivist ethics is coherent, it would leave moral norms vulnerable to a particular kind of evolutionary debunking threat in a way that my theistic alternative does not. Full article

(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)

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