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Is an Ethics without God Possible?
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Is an Ethics without God Possible?

A special issue of Religions (ISSN 2077-1444). This special issue belongs to the section "Religions and Humanities/Philosophies".

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (1 July 2025) | Viewed by 6210

Special Issue Editor

Prof. Dr. James P. Sterba

E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Philosophy Department, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA
Interests: moral and political philosophy; philosophy of religion
Special Issues, Collections and Topics in MDPI journals

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

The two previous Special Issues of Religions that I guest-edited confronted the following questions: “Is the God of traditional theism logically compatible with all the evil in the world?” (https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions/special_issues/god_compatible_evil) and “Do we now have a logical argument from evil? (https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions/special_issues/evil)” This third Special Issue will address a related question—“Is an ethics without God possible?” 

Notably, some theists maintain that an (objective) ethics can only be grounded either in God’s commands or in his nature. These same theists, along with some atheists, maintain that an (objective) ethics without God is not possible. Other theists maintain, along with still other atheists, that an (objective) ethics must be grounded in a standard that does not depend on the existence of God for its justification. For these theists, along with like-minded atheists, an (objective) ethics without God is possible. Which view, therefore, is correct?  Contributors to this Special Issue must defend one of the available alternatives over the others, and, in doing so, it may be helpful to consider the view I defend in “An Ethics without God that is Compatible with Darwinian Evolution” (published in Religions: https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/15/7/781). Contributors are also encouraged to examine the contributions of two other completed Special Issues of Religions on the topics of “God and Ethics”, (https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions/special_issues/A00AZSX32V) and “God, Ethics and Christian Traditions" (https://www.mdpi.com/journal/religions/special_issues/god_ethics_traditions). Nevertheless, these are only recommendations; what is important is that contributors defend one of the available alternatives over the others.

Prof. Dr. James P. Sterba
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

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Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1800 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

Keywords

  • God’s commands
  • God’s nature
  • objective ethics
  • theism
  • atheism
  • Darwinian evolution

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Published Papers (10 papers)

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Research

17 pages, 302 KiB  
Article
God, Ethics, and Evolution: An Islamic Rejoinder to Sterba’s Moral Critique
by Elif Nur Balci
Religions 2025, 16(8), 1070; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081070 - 19 Aug 2025
Viewed by 253
Abstract
This paper engages with James Sterba’s arguments from an Islamic theological perspective, particularly drawing on the Mu‘tazilite tradition. It focuses on three central themes: (1) the position of God in the face of horrendous evils, (2) the relationship between divine command theory and [...] Read more.
This paper engages with James Sterba’s arguments from an Islamic theological perspective, particularly drawing on the Mu‘tazilite tradition. It focuses on three central themes: (1) the position of God in the face of horrendous evils, (2) the relationship between divine command theory and moral objectivity, and (3) the compatibility of Darwinian evolution with objective morality. First, I challenge Sterba’s claim that the existence of a wholly good and powerful God is logically incompatible with horrendous evils by proposing a “theistic structuralist” framework inspired by the Mu‘tazilite scholar Qadi Abd al-Jabbar. Second, while largely agreeing with Sterba’s critique of divine command theory, I incorporate a Mu‘tazilite view that grounds moral objectivity in God’s inherently good nature. Third, I support Sterba’s argument—against Sharon Street—that Darwinian evolution does not undermine moral objectivity, but I further argue that a consistent defense of this view ultimately requires the existence of God. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
16 pages, 278 KiB  
Article
Objective Moral Facts Exist in All Possible Universes
by Richard Carrier
Religions 2025, 16(8), 1061; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081061 - 16 Aug 2025
Viewed by 962
Abstract
The question of whether a God is needed to justify or ground moral facts is mooted by the fact that true moral facts exist in all possible universes that contain rational agents. This can be demonstrated in three stages. First, it is necessarily [...] Read more.
The question of whether a God is needed to justify or ground moral facts is mooted by the fact that true moral facts exist in all possible universes that contain rational agents. This can be demonstrated in three stages. First, it is necessarily the case that true moral facts can only be described as the imperatives that supersede all other imperatives. Second, it is necessarily the case that for any rational agent there will always be true hypothetical imperatives that supersede all other imperatives. And third, if there are true hypothetical imperatives that supersede all other imperatives, they are then, necessarily, the only true moral facts. As this follows for any rational agent in any possible universe, the presence of God is irrelevant to the existence of moral facts. God could be more capable of identifying those true moral facts, but he cannot author or ground them. And though a God could casuistically alter moral imperatives by altering the corresponding physics, he is constrained in what he can make true this way by moral fundamentals that are always necessarily true. God is therefore not necessary for there to be moral facts. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
15 pages, 219 KiB  
Article
The Moral Hope Argument
by Eric Reitan
Religions 2025, 16(8), 1060; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081060 - 16 Aug 2025
Viewed by 134
Abstract
This essay develops a distinct moral argument for the reasonableness of believing in God (conceived as a perfectly good creator) inspired by the pragmatic argument for “the religious hypothesis” advanced by William James in “The Will to Believe.” It also contextualizes the argument [...] Read more.
This essay develops a distinct moral argument for the reasonableness of believing in God (conceived as a perfectly good creator) inspired by the pragmatic argument for “the religious hypothesis” advanced by William James in “The Will to Believe.” It also contextualizes the argument relative to familiar moral arguments, notably those of C.S. Lewis and Kant. Briefly, the argument developed here holds that when facing more than one coherent picture of reality, each of which could be true based on the arguments and evidence but only one of which fulfills the hope that in a fundamental way reality is on the side of moral goodness (what I call “the ethico-religious hope”), a reasonable person could opt to believe in the hope’s fulfillment and live accordingly. Following James’ approach, however, this argument does not imply that others who do not adopt such a picture are necessarily irrational or less rational. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
8 pages, 164 KiB  
Article
Can Ethics Exist Without God? A Thomistic Critique of James Sterba’s Axiomatic Morality
by Joseph Brian Huffling
Religions 2025, 16(8), 1058; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081058 - 16 Aug 2025
Viewed by 163
Abstract
This essay explores the question: can we have an objective ethics without God? This question is raised by James Sterba, who argues in the affirmative. As an atheistic ethicist, Sterba is motivated to maintain an objective morality that is not based in theism [...] Read more.
This essay explores the question: can we have an objective ethics without God? This question is raised by James Sterba, who argues in the affirmative. As an atheistic ethicist, Sterba is motivated to maintain an objective morality that is not based in theism and that can withstand the problems with Darwinism. Sterba examines what he sees as one of the most popular theistic attempts to ground human morality, viz., divine command theory. In rejecting both divine command theory and theism, Sterba offers what he believes can offer objective morality: a basic moral norm that all people should adhere to. This article examines Sterba’s criticism of divine command theory along with his own efforts at establishing an objective morality in what he considers a universal abstract principle. In the end, this article argues that Sterba’s axiomatic principle is unclear as to its ontological foundation as well as its causal efficacy in attempting to obligate objective human ethics. It will be argued that Sterba is correct about human nature being the locus of morality, but that atheism fails at providing human teleology to account for such morality. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
17 pages, 220 KiB  
Article
A Critique of the Neo-Platonist Theory of Moral Value
by Kai Michael Büttner and David Benjamin Dolby
Religions 2025, 16(8), 1054; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081054 - 15 Aug 2025
Viewed by 156
Abstract
Divine Command Theory holds that what is morally right is what is commanded by God. This view faces a form of the Euthyphro dilemma: either God commands actions because they are right, in which case moral standards are independent of God, or actions [...] Read more.
Divine Command Theory holds that what is morally right is what is commanded by God. This view faces a form of the Euthyphro dilemma: either God commands actions because they are right, in which case moral standards are independent of God, or actions are right because God commands them, in which case morality appears arbitrary. A currently influential response among theistic philosophers draws on a distinction between moral duties and moral values. On this view, duties arise from God’s commands, while values are understood—following a neo-Platonist approach—to be grounded in God’s nature. Proponents of this account appeal to an analogy with the role of the standard metre in the metric system: just as a metre is defined by reference to a paradigmatic length, so goodness is defined by reference to God’s character. On this basis, they argue that the existence of moral value depends on God’s existence, and that moral objectivity requires theism. We argue, however, that moral language cannot be understood as involving God in a structurally analogous way to the standard metre. Moreover, the neo-Platonist account does not provide a successful explanation of the normativity of moral language. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
10 pages, 196 KiB  
Article
Is Ethics Possible Without God?
by Whitley Kaufman
Religions 2025, 16(8), 1053; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16081053 - 14 Aug 2025
Viewed by 224
Abstract
This essay defends the position that ethics must be grounded in God, where the notion of ‘God’ is understood as a transcendental source of normativity, though not necessarily a personal being who ‘commands’ moral behavior. The essay argues that the true debate is [...] Read more.
This essay defends the position that ethics must be grounded in God, where the notion of ‘God’ is understood as a transcendental source of normativity, though not necessarily a personal being who ‘commands’ moral behavior. The essay argues that the true debate is between the naturalistic reduction of ethics and the idea of a transcendental ground for moral normativity. I claim that only the latter can provide a sufficient basis for morality. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
20 pages, 259 KiB  
Article
A View on the Possibility of an Ethics Without God
by Elliott R. Crozat
Religions 2025, 16(7), 813; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16070813 - 22 Jun 2025
Viewed by 436
Abstract
This article addresses the question, “Is an ethics without God possible?” This question is explored in a special issue, edited by Prof. Dr. James P. Sterba, which directly poses this very inquiry. I argue that an objective ethics without God is epistemically possible. [...] Read more.
This article addresses the question, “Is an ethics without God possible?” This question is explored in a special issue, edited by Prof. Dr. James P. Sterba, which directly poses this very inquiry. I argue that an objective ethics without God is epistemically possible. Having addressed this initial point, I then make the case that an objective ethics without God is metaphysically possible. In other words, there are plausible explanations to support the thesis that ethics exists without God. Lastly, I propose that although God is not required for ethics, it is reasonable to postulate God’s existence to realize aspects of justice. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
11 pages, 170 KiB  
Article
Prolegomena to the Concept of God When Dealing with the Question: Is Ethics Without God Possible?
by Daniel A. Dombrowski
Religions 2025, 16(5), 651; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050651 - 20 May 2025
Viewed by 474
Abstract
This article examines the assumption that, in order to respond adequately to the question in the title, one must have the classical concept of God in mind. Classical theism is criticized and neoclassical/process theism is briefly defended. Specifically, the classical theistic attribute of [...] Read more.
This article examines the assumption that, in order to respond adequately to the question in the title, one must have the classical concept of God in mind. Classical theism is criticized and neoclassical/process theism is briefly defended. Specifically, the classical theistic attribute of omnipotence receives four criticisms. The hope is that these criticisms prepare the way for a more fruitful response to the question in the title than is possible when the classical concept of God is assumed. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
18 pages, 214 KiB  
Article
Whether God Exists Is Irrelevant to Ethics
by David Kyle Johnson
Religions 2025, 16(5), 558; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16050558 - 27 Apr 2025
Viewed by 555
Abstract
The question of whether ethics is possible without God is a non-issue. While many believe that without God, morality collapses, I contend that the existence or non-existence of God has no bearing on whether ethics is possible, whether moral truths exist, or whether [...] Read more.
The question of whether ethics is possible without God is a non-issue. While many believe that without God, morality collapses, I contend that the existence or non-existence of God has no bearing on whether ethics is possible, whether moral truths exist, or whether ethical inquiry is viable. Ethics is no more secure within a theistic framework than an atheistic one. I establish this by critically examining Divine Command Theory (DCT) and its variants, including Divine Nature Theory, demonstrating that they fail to provide truthmakers for moral statements, explain moral truths, generate moral knowledge, or serve as a practical guide for ethical decision making. If one seeks a way to justify ethical principles or resolve moral dilemmas, appealing to God does not improve the situation; supernatural explanations, including those invoking divine commands or nature, fail to meet the criteria of explanatory adequacy. I conclude by suggesting a secular approach to ethics—drawing from Ted Schick’s inference to the best action—that does not depend on God’s existence. Ultimately, if moral nihilism is a concern, God’s existence offers no solution. If ethics is possible at all, it is possible regardless of whether God exists. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
17 pages, 198 KiB  
Article
Why Ethics Requires a God and Is Safer from Evolutionary Debunking Threats as a Result: A Reply to Sterba
by Gerald K. Harrison
Religions 2025, 16(3), 360; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel16030360 - 13 Mar 2025
Viewed by 1003
Abstract
Sterba has argued that ethics does not require God and that an atheistic objectivist ethics is compatible with an evolutionary account of our development. This paper argues that though ethics does not require God specifically, it does require a god of some sort, [...] Read more.
Sterba has argued that ethics does not require God and that an atheistic objectivist ethics is compatible with an evolutionary account of our development. This paper argues that though ethics does not require God specifically, it does require a god of some sort, for all normative reasons require a god and moral reasons are simply a subset of normative reasons. Sterba’s criticisms of more orthodox divine command theories of ethics are shown to raise no challenge to my view. Furthermore, even if Sterba’s alternative atheistic objectivist ethics is coherent, it would leave moral norms vulnerable to a particular kind of evolutionary debunking threat in a way that my theistic alternative does not. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Is an Ethics without God Possible?)
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