Search Results (596)

In the face of increasingly severe cybersecurity threats, incomplete information and environmental dynamics have become central challenges in network attack–defense scenarios. In real-world network environments, defenders often find it difficult to fully perceive attack behaviors and network states, leading to a high degree of uncertainty in the system. Traditional approaches are inadequate in dealing with the diversification of attack strategies and the dynamic evolution of network structures, making it difficult to achieve highly adaptive defense strategies and efficient multi-agent coordination. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a multi-agent network defense approach based on joint game modeling, termed JG-Defense (Joint Game-based Defense), which aims to enhance the efficiency and robustness of defense decision-making in environments characterized by incomplete information. The method integrates Bayesian game theory, graph neural networks, and a proximal policy optimization framework, and it introduces two core mechanisms. First, a Dynamic Communication Graph Neural Network (DCGNN) is used to model the dynamic network structure, improving the perception of topological changes and attack evolution trends. A multi-agent communication mechanism is incorporated within the DCGNN to enable the sharing of local observations and strategy coordination, thereby enhancing global consistency. Second, a joint game loss function is constructed to embed the game equilibrium objective into the reinforcement learning process, optimizing both the rationality and long-term benefit of agent strategies. Experimental results demonstrate that JG-Defense outperforms the Cybermonic model by 15.83% in overall defense performance. Furthermore, under the traditional PPO loss function, the DCGNN model improves defense performance by 11.81% compared to the Cybermonic model. These results verify that the proposed integrated approach achieves superior global strategy coordination in dynamic attack–defense scenarios with incomplete information. Full article

As a crucial vehicle for advancing the transition to a green low-carbon economy, the green supply chain plays a pivotal role in alleviating pollution pressures and facilitating the green transformation of products. Existing studies mainly focus on static optimization and cost coordination in green supply chains, with limited attention to the dynamic impact of consumer behavior on green production and channel coordination. Based on consumer green preferences and the evolution of reference prices, we developed a differential game model for a two-tier green supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The model incorporates green goodwill and consumer memory variables to capture the dynamic interaction among product greenness, sales effort, and consumer perception. By comparing the dynamic optimal response paths under integrated and non-integrated strategies, the study analyzes how reference price effects and goodwill accumulation influence decision-making and system performance. The results show that the stable reference price of green products is significantly higher than the actual selling price. When consumer environmental awareness is strong, cooperative strategies can markedly improve both green performance and supply chain profits, offering potential for Pareto improvement. This research enhances behavior-oriented modeling in green supply chains and provides theoretical and empirical support for designing collaboration mechanisms in green product promotion. Full article

In the cybersecurity attack and defense space, the “attacker” and the “defender” form a dynamic and symmetrical adversarial pair. Their strategy iterations and capability evolutions have long been in a symmetrical game of mutual restraint. We will introduce modern Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) from the defender’s side to counter the techniques designed by the attacker (APT attack). One major challenge faced by IDS is to identify complex attack paths from a vast provenance graph. By constructing an attack behavior tracking graph, the interactions between system entities can be recorded, but the malicious activities of attackers are often hidden among a large number of normal system operations. Although traditional methods can identify attack behaviors, they only focus on the surface association relationships between entities and ignore the deep causal relationships, which limits the accuracy and interpretability of detection. Existing graph anomaly detection methods usually assign the same weight to all interactions, while we propose a Causal Autoencoder for Graph Explanation (CAGE) based on reinforcement learning. This method extracts feature representations from the traceability graph through a graph attention network(GAT), uses Q-learning to dynamically evaluate the causal importance of edges, and highlights key causal paths through a weight layering strategy. In the DARPA TC project, the experimental results conducted on the selected three datasets indicate that the precision of this method in the anomaly detection task remains above 97% on average, demonstrating excellent accuracy. Moreover, the recall values all exceed 99.5%, which fully proves its extremely low rate of missed detections. Full article

As the global manufacturing industry’s transformation accelerates toward being intelligent, “unmanned”, and low-carbon, manufacturing workshops face conflicts between production schedules and transportation tasks, leading to low efficiency and resource waste. This paper presents a multi-agent collaborative scheduling optimization method based on a hybrid game–genetic framework to address issues like high AGV (Automated Guided Vehicle) idle rates, excessive energy consumption, and uncoordinated equipment scheduling. The method establishes a trinity system integrating distributed decision-making, dynamic coordination, and environment awareness. In this system, the multi-agent decision-making and collaboration process exhibits significant symmetry characteristics. All agents (machine agents, mobile agents, etc.) follow unified optimization criteria and interaction rules, forming a dynamically balanced symmetric scheduling framework in resource competition and collaboration, which ensures fairness and consistency among different agents in task allocation, path planning, and other links. An improved best-response dynamic algorithm is employed in the decision-making layer to solve the multi-agent Nash equilibrium, while the genetic optimization layer enhances the global search capability by encoding scheduling schemes and adjusting crossover/mutation probabilities using dynamic competition factors. The coordination pivot layer updates constraints in real time based on environmental sensing, forming a closed-loop optimization mechanism. Experimental results show that, compared with the traditional genetic algorithm (TGA) and particle swarm optimization (PSO), the proposed method reduces the maximum completion time by 54.5% and 44.4% in simple scenarios and 57.1% in complex scenarios, the AGV idling rate by 68.3% in simple scenarios and 67.5%/77.6% in complex scenarios, and total energy consumption by 15.7%/10.9% in simple scenarios and 25%/18.2% in complex scenarios. This validates the method’s effectiveness in improving resource utilization and energy efficiency, providing a new technical path for intelligent scheduling in manufacturing workshops. Meanwhile, its symmetric multi-agent collaborative framework also offers a reference for the application of symmetry in complex manufacturing system optimization. Full article

Wireless Sensor Networks are composed of a set of sensors distributed within an area that monitor physical variables of the environment and send back information to a central node. Nodes cannot always remain active since they would swiftly drain the system’s energy. As such, some works have proposed the use of different on/off schemes to monitor the phenomena of interest efficiently but also to conserve energy as much as possible. To this end, the use of on/off protocols has been used before, but has no relation to the characteristics of the monitored events. However, in scenarios where the phenomena to monitor occur in a certain pattern or specific region, the use of more suited techniques to activate the nodes can yield better results. In this sense, we propose the use of cellular automata (CA), based on the Game of Life (GoL), in order to turn the nodes on and off, according to the patterns described by the automata. Cellular automata are discrete models consisting of a lattice or grid of cells in a finite number of states that remain or change into another state following pre-established rules commonly associated with the states of their neighbors. As such, we propose to activate/deactivate the nodes following the natural behavior of the GoL scheme. Since the initial state of the cellular automata directly modifies the pattern evolution of the GoL, we consider several possible patterns that can occur in practical systems in order to prove the effectiveness of our proposal. We evaluate the system performance in terms of successful event report probability and energy consumption, comparing our results to the conventional on/off schemes with a certain probability of nodes being in the on state. With this premise, we think CA is a good alternative to determine the on/off process in WSNs. We compared the system performance of the GoL patterns compared to the classical approach and found the cases where the GoL scheme performs better. Full article

Natural disasters in agriculture considerably threaten food security and the implementation of the rural revitalization strategy. With the rapid development of new approaches in organizing agricultural production, traditional disaster relief mechanisms are encountering new adaptive dilemmas. Particularly, the active participation of farmers in disaster relief is remarkably insufficient in the context of the reduction in the proportion of agricultural production income. Thus, it is urgent to establish a modernized agricultural disaster relief synergy mechanism. In this study, an agricultural disaster relief synergistic model was constructed with the participation of the government, agricultural service enterprises, and farmers based on the evolutionary game theory, and the strategy interaction law of each subject and its evolution path was systematically analyzed. The following results were revealed: First, the government, agricultural service enterprises, and farmers tended toward an equilibrium state under three different modes. Second, the cost of farmers’ concern and complaint behavior was the crucial driving factor of the three-party synergy. Third, the increasing cost of agricultural service enterprises’ participation in disaster relief significantly affected the evolution path of the system. Additionally, a three-dimensional synergistic optimization path of “incentive-constraint-information” was proposed, laying a quantitative foundation for improving the agricultural disaster relief mechanism and promoting the transition from “passive emergency response” to “active synergy”. This research is of great practical significance to improve the resilience of agricultural disaster response and resource allocation efficiency. Full article

The green renovation of existing residential buildings is a key way for the construction industry to achieve sustainable development and the dual carbon goals of China, which makes it urgent to make collaborative decisions among multiple stakeholders. However, because of divergent interests and risk perceptions among governments, energy service companies (ESCOs), and owners, the implementation of green renovation is hindered by numerous obstacles. In this study, we integrated prospect theory and evolutionary game theory by incorporating core prospect-theory parameters such as loss aversion and perceived value sensitivity, and developed a psychologically informed tripartite evolutionary game model. The objective was to provide a theoretical foundation and analytical framework for collaborative governance among stakeholders. Numerical simulations were conducted to validate the model’s effectiveness and explore how government regulation intensity, subsidy policies, market competition, and individual psychological factors influence the system’s evolutionary dynamics. The findings indicate that (1) government regulation and subsidy policies play central guiding roles in the early stages of green renovation, but the effectiveness has clear limitations; (2) ESCOs are most sensitive to policy incentives and market competition, and moderately increasing their risk costs can effectively deter opportunistic behavior associated with low-quality renovation; (3) owners’ willingness to participate is primarily influenced by expected returns and perceived renovation risks, while economic incentives alone have limited impact; and (4) the evolutionary outcomes are highly sensitive to parameters from prospect theory, The system’s evolutionary outcomes are highly sensitive to prospect theory parameters. High levels of loss aversion (λ) and loss sensitivity (β) tend to drive the system into a suboptimal equilibrium characterized by insufficient demand, while high gain sensitivity (α) serves as a key driving force for the system’s evolution toward the ideal equilibrium. This study offers theoretical support for optimizing green renovation policies for existing residential buildings in China and provides practical recommendations for improving market competition mechanisms, thereby promoting the healthy development of the green renovation market. Full article

Achieving the construction sector’s dual carbon objectives necessitates scaling green energy adoption in new residential buildings. The current literature critically overlooks four unresolved problems: oversimplified penalty mechanisms, ignoring escalating regulatory costs; static subsidies misaligned with market maturity evolution; systematic exclusion of innovation feedback from energy suppliers; and underexplored behavioral evolution of building owners. This study establishes a government–suppliers–owners evolutionary game framework with dynamically calibrated policies, simulated using MATLAB multi-scenario analysis. Novel findings demonstrate: (1) A dual-threshold penalty effect where excessive fines diminish policy returns due to regulatory costs, requiring dynamic calibration distinct from fixed-penalty approaches; (2) Market-maturity-phased subsidies increasing owner adoption probability by 30% through staged progression; (3) Energy suppliers’ cost-reducing innovations as pivotal feedback drivers resolving coordination failures, overlooked in prior tripartite models; (4) Owners’ adoption motivation shifts from short-term economic incentives to environmentally driven decisions under policy guidance. The framework resolves these gaps through integrated dynamic mechanisms, providing policymakers with evidence-based regulatory thresholds, energy suppliers with cost-reduction targets, and academia with replicable modeling tools. Full article

This study introduces a novel tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic interactions among electric vehicle (EV) aggregators, local governments, and EV users in vehicle–grid interaction (VGI) markets. The core novelty lies in capturing bounded rationality and dynamic decision-making across the three stakeholders, revealing how policy incentives and market mechanisms drive the transition from disordered charging to bidirectional VGI. Key findings include the following: (1) The system exhibits five stable equilibrium points, corresponding to three distinct developmental phases of the VGI market: disordered charging (V0G), unidirectional VGI (V1G), and bidirectional VGI (V2G). (2) Peak–valley price differences are the primary driver for transitioning from V0G to V1G. (3) EV aggregators’ willingness to adopt V2G is influenced by upgrade costs, while local governments’ subsidy strategies depend on peak-shaving benefits and regulatory costs. (4) Increasing the subsidy differential between V1G and V2G accelerates market evolution toward V2G. The framework offers actionable policy insights for sustainable VGI development, while advancing evolutionary game theory applications in energy systems. Full article

AI-powered health assistants offer promising opportunities to enhance health management among older adults. However, real-world uptake remains limited, not only due to individual hesitation, but also because of complex interactions among users, platforms, and public policies. This study investigates the dynamic behavioral mechanisms behind adoption in aging populations using a tripartite evolutionary game model. Based on replicator dynamics, the model simulates the strategic behaviors of older adults, platforms, and government. It identifies evolutionarily stable strategies, examines convergence patterns, and evaluates parameter sensitivity through a Jacobian matrix analysis. Results show that when adoption costs are high, platform trust is low, and government support is limited, the system tends to converge to a low-adoption equilibrium with poor service quality. In contrast, sufficient policy incentives, platform investment, and user trust can shift the system toward a high-adoption state. Trust coefficients and incentive intensity are especially influential in shaping system dynamics. This study proposes a novel framework for understanding the co-evolution of trust, service optimization, and institutional support. It emphasizes the importance of coordinated trust-building strategies and layered policy incentives to promote sustainable engagement with AI health technologies in aging societies. Full article

The digital economy presents multiple challenges to the promotion of green technologies, including behavioral uncertainty among firms, heterogeneous technological choices, and disparities in policy incentive strength. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model encompassing government, production enterprises, and technology suppliers to systematically explore the strategic evolution mechanisms underlying green technology adoption. A three-dimensional nonlinear dynamic system is constructed using replicator dynamics, and the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) algorithm is applied to identify key cost and benefit parameters for firms. Simulation results exhibit a strong match between the estimated parameters and simulated data, highlighting the model’s identifiability and explanatory capacity. In addition, the stability of eight pure strategy equilibrium points is examined through Jacobian analysis, revealing the evolutionary trajectories and local stability features across various strategic configurations. These findings offer theoretical guidance for optimizing green policy design and identifying behavioral pathways, while establishing a foundation for data-driven modeling of dynamic evolutionary processes. Full article

In the low-carbon era, there is a serious challenge of climate change, which urgently needs to promote low-carbon consumption behavior in order to build sustainable low-carbon consumption patterns. The establishment of this model not only requires in-depth theoretical research as support, but also requires tripartite cooperation between the government, enterprises and the public to jointly promote the popularization and practice of the low-carbon consumption concept. Therefore, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model and simulation analysis, this study deeply discusses the mechanism of government policy on the strategy choice of logistics enterprises. The stability strategy and satisfying conditions are deeply analyzed by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of the logistics industry, government, and consumers. With the help of MATLAB R2023b simulation analysis, the following key conclusions are drawn: (1) The strategic choice of logistics enterprises is affected by various government policies, including research and development intensity, construction intensity, and punishment intensity. These government policies and measures guide logistics enterprises toward low-carbon development. (2) The government’s research, development, and punishment intensity are vital in determining whether logistics enterprises adopt low-carbon strategies. R&D efforts incentivize logistics companies to adopt low-carbon technologies by driving technological innovation and reducing costs. The penalties include economic sanctions to restrain companies that do not comply with low-carbon standards. In contrast, construction intensity mainly affects the consumption behavior of consumers and then indirectly affects the strategic choice of logistics enterprises through market demand. (3) Although the government’s active supervision is a necessary guarantee for logistics enterprises to implement low-carbon strategies, more is needed. This means that in addition to the government’s policy support, it also needs the active efforts of the logistics enterprises themselves and the improvement of the market mechanism to promote the low-carbon development of the logistics industry jointly. This study quantifies the impact of different factors on the system’s evolution, providing a precise decision-making basis for policymakers and helping promote the logistics industry’s and consumers’ low-carbon transition. It also provides theoretical support for the logistics industry’s low-carbon development and green low-carbon consumption and essential guidance for sustainable development. Full article

Credit supervision of practitioners in the water conservancy construction market, a vital pillar of national infrastructure development, significantly impacts project safety and the maintenance of order in the industry. From the perspective of indirect supervision, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving government departments, enterprises, and practitioners to analyze the dynamic evolution mechanism of credit supervision. By examining the strategic interactions among the three parties under different regulatory scenarios, we identify key factors influencing the stable equilibrium of evolution and verify the theoretical conclusions through numerical simulations. The study yields several key insights. First, while government regulation and social supervision can substantially increase the likelihood of practitioners’ integrity, relying solely on administrative regulation has an efficiency limit. Second, the effectiveness of the reward and punishment mechanism of the direct manager plays a crucial leveraging role in credit evolution. Lastly, under differentiated regulatory strategies, high-credit practitioners respond more strongly to long-term cost optimization, while low-credit practitioners are more effectively deterred by short-term, high-intensity disciplinary actions. Based on these findings, this study proposes a systematic governance framework of “regulatory model innovation–corporate responsibility enhancement–social supervision deepening.” Unlike previous studies, this framework adopts a comprehensive approach from three dimensions: regulatory model innovation, corporate responsibility enhancement, and social supervision deepening. It offers a more holistic and systematic solution for refining the credit system in the water conservancy construction market, providing both theoretical support and practical approaches. Full article

In the digital economy, sustainable development is based on digital technologies. However, information security issues arising from its use pose significant challenges to sustainable development. Assessing information security risks in the digital economy is crucial for sustainable development. This paper constructs an information security risk assessment indicator system for the digital economy based on information ecology theory. Using game theory to combine CRITIC weights and entropy weights, the information security risk values for the digital economy in 29 provinces of China from 2019 to 2021 are calculated. Quantitative analysis is conducted using Ward’s method and the obstacle degree model. The combined weighting results indicate that the information security risks of the digital economy are mostly influenced by information infrastructure. Additionally, the spatio–temporal evolution pattern shows that the risk values of provinces vary to different degrees over time, with a distribution pattern of southern regions > northern regions > northwestern regions. Furthermore, the clustering results indicate that information technology is the primary cause of risk gaps. Finally, the obstacle degree model indicates that digital criminal behavior is the greatest obstacle to information security in the digital economy. The research findings hold significant implications for addressing information security challenges in the global digital economy’s sustainable development process, particularly in terms of the replicability of the research methodology and the valuable case study of China. Full article

With the rapid development of new energy vehicles, the echelon utilization of power batteries has become a key pathway to promoting efficient resource recycling and environmental sustainability. To address the limitation of the existing studies that overlook the dynamic strategic interactions among multiple stakeholders, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, battery recycling enterprises, and consumers. By incorporating consumers’ battery usage levels into the strategy space, the model captures the behavioral evolution of all these parties under bounded rationality. Numerical simulations are conducted to analyze the impact of government incentives and penalties, consumer usage behaviors, and enterprise recycling modes on system stability. The results show that a “low-subsidy, high-penalty” mechanism can more effectively guide enterprises to prioritize echelon utilization and that moderate consumer usage significantly improves battery reuse efficiency. This study enriches the application of the evolutionary game theory in the field of battery recycling and provides quantitative evidence and practical insights for policy formulation. Full article