Search Results (15)

Construction project management is critical to the success of construction projects, with the performance of project managers (PMRs) playing a central role. Despite its importance, previous studies have highlighted the poor performance of construction organizations in Nigeria, such as project delays and cost overruns and the need for proper project management practices. However, the specific performance of PMRs in the Nigerian construction industry (NCI) has not been extensively studied. To address this issue, this study aims to identify the causes of underperformance among PMRs in the NCI by examining the tasks where PMRs underperform and the extent of this underperformance and its effect on motivational support from organizations. Data were collected through 206 questionnaires and 36 semi-structured interviews with organizations and project managers. Descriptive analysis was conducted to evaluate project management (PM) practices as well as the level of motivational support provided to PMRs. The analysis revealed that PMRs underperform in more than 60% of tasks but outperform in 20%. Underperformance refers to the tasks in which PMRs performed less than the expected contributions set by the organization, while outperformance describes tasks where PMRs exceeded the organization’s expectations. The analysis also revealed low motivational support of PMR. Correlation analysis was conducted to investigate whether motivational support influences PMR performance, and the results indicated a two-way causal relationship between underperformance and low motivational support. This study integrated a game theory model with regression analysis to show that (stay, support) is the dominant solution for project managers and organizations, provided the net contribution of support is positive. In this context, “stay” refers to PMRs continuing working with their current organization, while “support” refers to the motivational support provided by the organization to enhance the commitment and performance of the PMRs. However, current support levels may not be enough to cause PMRs to begin to outperform. In addition, regression analysis was conducted between the degree of underperformance and motivational factors, and we conducted a preliminary simulation by increasing these values of regression coefficients. The results indicated that while motivational support from organizations can improve PMRs performance, its effectiveness is limited. Factors such as corruption, political pressures, and organizational culture have a greater impact on performance. Addressing these factors may be more crucial for enhancing performance and project outcomes than focusing only on motivational support. Therefore, the Nigerian construction industry needs to implement institutional changes alongside motivational strategies to improve PMRs performance and project success. Full article

Transnational cooperation in international corporations has become an important force in promoting the economic development of countries, and corruption in cross-cultural business has an important impact on the sustainable development of international cooperation. Based on the construction field, this study applies evolutionary game theory to the microlevel to investigate the corrupt behavior of international corporations from reputation perspectives, taking into account their reputation and cooperation behaviors. The findings indicate that the sensitivity of each party involved in the corruption behavior differs concerning international reputation, and a heightened reputation of the supervisory company can effectively curb the corrupt behavior of subcontracting. Additionally, the behavior of the general contracting company shows a sense of inertia, while the three main parties—general contracting company, supervisory company, and subcontracting company—exhibit multistage decision-making characteristics as their international reputation gradually improves. Through the lens of multinational enterprise cooperation and the development of the construction industry, this study aims to address the constraints faced by the construction industry in various countries and identify potential solutions. Furthermore, it provides insights into key issues related to international engineering corruption governance. Full article

The contemporary environment is interrelated, and interactions between markets, countries, and international actors at different levels exist in every corner of the globe. Amid this, the failures of the free-market system have paved the way for institutionalism, which proposes minimising transaction costs, substantial property rights, and enabling proper contract enforcement. Studies on institutions and insurance development spillover concerning growth relationships are rare and a critical area needing exploration. This study explores the behaviour of economic development in terms of potential spatial dependencies and spatial institutional and insurance development spillover on economic growth. To measure insurance development by the life insurance and non-life insurance penetration, economic growth by per capita gross domestic product (GDP), and indicators of good governance for institutions in the nations. The study explored the spatial impact between countries using panel data of 56 countries between 2002 and 2020 representing the Asian and European regions. We did this by using dynamic spatial econometric modelling (DSEM) on institutional and insurance development and seeing the spatial implications and the spatial institutional impact moderated by insurance development on growth. Results indicate that developing the life insurance and non-life insurance of surrounding countries creates a spillover impact on the local countries’ economies. In contrast, institutions have created a reverse spatial spillover impact on local countries. However, life insurance development, moderated through accountability and government effectiveness, has created a spatial spillover between countries. Both life and non-life penetration moderated by the control of corruption and overall institutions have shown a reverse spillover on countries’ economies. This suggests that global governance is a positive-sum game, and monitoring and governance structures have failed at the international level concerning separate countries. Therefore, it is seen that to prevent institutional failure at the state level, good governance and links with the global governance structure could disrupt or energise local institutions. Full article

In previous papers of the authors, a generalized evolutionary approach was developed for the analysis of popular inspection and corruption games. Namely, a two-level hierarchy was studied, where a local inspector I of a pool of agents (that may break the law) can be corrupted and is further controlled by the higher authority A. Here, we extend this two-level modeling by answering the following questions: (i) what levels of illegal profit r of violators and what level of bribes α (fraction of illegal profit asked as a bribe from a violator) of an inspector are feasible, that is, realizable in stable equilibria of generalized replicator dynamics; and (ii) what α can be optimal for a corrupted inspector that aims at maximizing the total profit. Concrete settings that we have in mind are illegal logging, the sales of products with substandard quality, and tax evasion. Full article

This work proposes a method for the intelligent deployment of distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. In recent years, in the field of moving target defense (MTD) strategies to detect coordinated cyber–physical attacks (CCPAs), establishing how to deploy D-FACTS devices has become an important research point. Although some research results have been proposed, the obtained deployment solutions are unintelligent due to not carefully considering smart attackers’ behaviors. A method for achieving the intelligent deployment of D-FACTS devices is proposed in this paper. First, the basic concept of corrupting CCPAs is summarized; second, based on considering practical constraints and the basic concept, a protected transmission line set is confirmed; and third, a zero-sum game model is formulated, and a robust Nash equilibrium solution is computed. Due to the game’s characteristics, this solution reflects the smart attackers’ sense of action. Relying on the solution, those lines that are most likely to be tripped form a new protected transmission line set. Finally, a comprehensive algorithm using a metric proposed in previous studies is proposed for finding an intelligent solution for the deployment of D-FACTS devices. We validated our results through extensive simulations using IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, and 118-bus power systems provided by MATPOWER and the real-world load profiles from New York State. Our work, in tracking the targets that attackers are most likely to attack, opens up new ideas for the intelligent deployment of D-FACTS devices. Full article

There is a great deal of literature devoted to mathematical models of corruption, including corruption in auctions. However, the relationship between the seller and the auctioneer is not studied sufficiently. The research aim is to analyze such relations in a game theoretic setup. We built a difference game theoretic model in normal form that describes possible collusion between an auctioneer and participants of an auction. The auctioneer acts on behalf of a seller. The seller can control possible collusions by administrative and economic mechanisms. The probability of detection depends on audit cost. We consider four cases of absence/presence of the collusion and those of the audit. The model is investigated numerically by simulation modeling using an original method of qualitatively representative scenarios. Several conclusions are made: factors of corruption are low probability of detection, small penalty, and big corruption gain of the auctioneer. Full article

For the science of autonomous human–machine systems, traditional causal-time interpretations of reality in known contexts are sufficient for rational decisions and actions to be taken, but not for uncertain or dynamic contexts, nor for building the best teams. First, unlike game theory where the contexts are constructed for players, or machine learning where contexts must be stable, when facing uncertainty or conflict, a rational process is insufficient for decisions or actions to be taken; second, as supported by the literature, rational explanations cannot disaggregate human–machine teams. In the first case, interdependent humans facing uncertainty spontaneously engage in debate over complementary tradeoffs in a search for the best path forward, characterized by maximum entropy production (MEP); however, in the second case, signified by a reduction in structural entropy production (SEP), interdependent team structures make it rationally impossible to discern what creates better teams. In our review of evidence for SEP–MEP complementarity for teams, we found that structural redundancy for top global oil producers, replicated for top global militaries, impedes interdependence and promotes corruption. Next, using UN data for Middle Eastern North African nations plus Israel, we found that a nation’s structure of education is significantly associated with MEP by the number of patents it produces; this conflicts with our earlier finding that a U.S. Air Force education in air combat maneuvering was not associated with the best performance in air combat, but air combat flight training was. These last two results exemplify that SEP–MEP interactions by the team’s best members are made by orthogonal contributions. We extend our theory to find that competition between teams hinges on vulnerability, a complementary excess of SEP and reduced MEP, which generalizes to autonomous human–machine systems. Full article

Using the ARIMA time-series analysis technique, this study measured the impact China’s anti-corruption campaign had on Macau’s casino gaming industry and forecasted future gaming revenue. This study also analyzed current trends and proposed future strategies for the Macau tourism and gaming industry. The results suggest China’s anti-corruption campaign did not significantly affect Macau’s non-VIP gaming revenue. Instead, the campaign has triggered positive changes for Macau’s tourism and gaming industry by transforming it from an unbalanced development model relying solely on VIP business to a diversified healthy development, which would potentially bring positive impact to Macau’s overall economy in the future. The findings of this study echo the revisions of gaming laws proposed by the Macau Special Administrative Region Government in September 2021 and provide new insights into the impact of the anti-corruption policy with focus on the outlook of Macau’s tourism and gaming industry. Full article

Games of inspection and corruption are well developed in the game-theoretic literature. However, there are only a few publications that approach these problems from the evolutionary point of view. In previous papers of this author, a generalization of the replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game theory was suggested for inspection modeling, namely the pressure and resistance framework, where a large pool of small players plays against a distinguished major player and evolves according to certain myopic rules. In this paper, we develop this approach further in a setting of the two-level hierarchy, where a local inspector can be corrupted and is further controlled by the higher authority (thus combining the modeling of inspection and corruption in a unifying setting). Mathematical novelty arising in this investigation involves the analysis of the generalized replicator dynamics (or kinetic equation) with switching, which occurs on the “efficient frontier of corruption”. We try to avoid parameters that are difficult to observe or measure, leading to some clear practical consequences. We prove a result that can be called the “principle of quadratic fines”: We show that if the fine for violations (both for criminal businesses and corrupted inspectors) is proportional to the level of violations, the stable rest points of the dynamics support the maximal possible level of both corruption and violation. The situation changes if a convex fine is introduced. In particular, starting from the quadratic growth of the fine function, one can effectively control the level of violations. Concrete settings that we have in mind are illegal logging, the sales of products with substandard quality, and tax evasion. Full article

We use an original variant of the standard trust game to study the effects of corruption on trust and trustworthiness. In this game, both the trustor and the trustee know that part of the surplus they can generate may be captured by a third “corrupted” player under different expected costs of audit and prosecution. We find a slightly higher trustor’s giving in the presence of corruption, matched by a significant excess of reciprocity from the trustee. Both the trustor and the trustee expect, on average, corruption to act as a tax, inelastic to changes in the probability of corruption prosecution. Expectations are correct for the inelasticity assumption and for the actual value of the “corruption tax”. Our experimental findings lead to the rejection of four standard hypotheses based on purely self-regarding preferences. We discuss how the apparently paradoxical excess reciprocity effect is consistent with the cultural role of heroes in history, where examples of commendable giving have been used to stimulate emulation of ordinary people. Our results suggest that the excess reciprocity component of the trustee makes the trustor’s excess giving a rational and effective strategy. Full article

The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government’s supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different supervision modes in the vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that: (1) Severe punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2) In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the government’s efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-disciplined; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government’s supervision departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3) The success rate of government regulatory departments and the probability of a third-party reporting to play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of enterprises. (4) The power of government and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but corruption of government and awareness of people are different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises’ non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers. Full article

This paper explores the role of cultural transmission in extortion. Extortion is modeled as an asymmetric contest where individuals from one group attempt to take from individuals in another group. Using a model of cultural transmission, this paper finds the existence of a unique asymptotically stable equilibrium where there are a fraction of people who defend against extortion and a fraction of people who take from others. The degree of extortion is decreased when: (1) extortion is less effective; (2) socialization efforts of parents who resist are more effective; and (3) socialization efforts of parents who abstain from extortion are more effective. A key finding is the existence of a complementarity between the effectiveness of socialization. When socialization is more effective for resisting extortion and choosing not to extort, there is a much larger reduction of extortion than either increase could achieve alone. This provides a potential explanation for why some countries like Singapore and Hong Kong were able to greatly reduce corruption and suggests potential policy applications. Full article

We extend a standard two-person, non-cooperative, non-zero sum, imperfect inspection game, considering a large population of interacting inspectees and a single inspector. Each inspectee adopts one strategy, within a finite/infinite bounded set of strategies returning increasingly illegal profits, including compliance. The inspectees may periodically update their strategies after randomly inter-comparing the obtained payoffs, setting their collective behaviour subject to evolutionary pressure. The inspector decides, at each update period, the optimum fraction of his/her renewable budget to invest on his/her interference with the inspectees’ collective effect. To deter the inspectees from violating, he/she assigns a fine to each illegal strategy. We formulate the game mathematically, study its dynamics and predict its evolution subject to two key controls, the inspection budget and the punishment fine. Introducing a simple linguistic twist, we also capture the corresponding version of a corruption game. Full article

We investigate the role of framing, inequity in initial endowments and history in shaping behavior in a corrupt transaction by extending the one-shot bribery game introduced by Cameron et al. (2009) to a repeated game setting. We find that the use of loaded language significantly reduces the incidence of bribery and increases the level of punishment. Punishment of bribery leads to reduced bribery in future. The evidence suggests that this game captures essential features of a corrupt transaction, over and above any sentiments of inequity aversion or negative reciprocity However, showing subjects the history of past play has little effect on the level of corruption. Full article

Informal recycling of electronics in the developing world has emerged as a new global environmental concern. The primary approach to address this problem has been command-and-control policies that ban informal recycling and international trade in electronic scrap. These bans are difficult to enforce and also have negative effects by reducing reuse of electronics, and employment for people in poverty. An alternate approach is to link informal and formal sectors so as to maintain economic activity while mitigating environmental damages. This article explores the idea of an interface organization that purchases components and waste from informal dismantlers and passes them on to formal processors. Environmental, economic and social implications of interface organizations are discussed. The main environmental questions to resolve are what e-scrap components should be targeted by the interface organization, i.e., circuit boards, wires, and/or plastic parts. Economically, when formal recycling is more profitable (e.g., for circuit boards), the interface organization is revenue positive. However, price subsidies are needed for copper wires and residual waste to incentivize informal dismantlers to turn in for formal processing. Socially, the potential for corruption and gaming of the system is critical and needs to be addressed. Full article