Next Article in Journal
Evaluation of Three Different Vaccination Protocols against EHV1/EHV4 Infection in Mares: Double Blind, Randomized Clinical Trial
Next Article in Special Issue
Socioeconomic Determinants in Vaccine Hesitancy and Vaccine Refusal in Italy
Previous Article in Journal
Current Status of Zika Virus Vaccines: Successes and Challenges
Previous Article in Special Issue
Seasonal Influenza Vaccination and Recommendation: The Difference between General Practitioners and Public Health Workers in China
Open AccessArticle

Game Analysis on the Evolution of Decision-Making of Vaccine Manufacturing Enterprises under the Government Regulation Model

1
School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China
2
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
3
Institute of Artificial Intelligence, De Montfort University, Leicester LE1 9BH, UK
4
Business School, Zhengzhou University of Aeronautics, Zhengzhou 450046, China
5
College of Animal Science and Technology, Shihezi University, Shihezi 832000, China
*
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Vaccines 2020, 8(2), 267; https://doi.org/10.3390/vaccines8020267
Received: 31 March 2020 / Revised: 15 May 2020 / Accepted: 27 May 2020 / Published: 31 May 2020
The harm caused by defective vaccines to human health and social stability is immeasurable. Aiming at the government’s supervision of the vaccine market, an evolutionary game model is constructed to analyze the quality of supervision and the key factors in the dynamic interaction between government departments and vaccine manufacturers under different supervision modes in the vaccine manufacturing process. The results show that: (1) Severe punishment by government regulatory authorities, and increased costs of rectification after investigation and handling of involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises can effectively prevent involuntary behaviors of vaccine enterprises. (2) In the early stage of the game, the success rate of the government’s efficient supervision will make the vaccine enterprises continuously self-disciplined; when the vaccine market is relatively stable, the government’s supervision departments tend to be more conducive to passive supervision. (3) The success rate of government regulatory departments and the probability of a third-party reporting to play a great role in promoting the self-discipline of enterprises. (4) The power of government and regulation are conducive to promoting the active supervision of the government regulatory authorities but corruption of government and awareness of people are different. Once the phenomenon of vaccine enterprises’ non-discipline increases, the government regulation must change from passive regulation to active regulation. Therefore, the government should implement different measures according to the characteristics of each period in the manufacturing process to effectively prevent problematic vaccines. The conclusions and policy recommendations are significant for addressing the issue of insufficient self-discipline of vaccine manufacturers. View Full-Text
Keywords: government regulation; defective vaccines; severe punishment; evolutionary game government regulation; defective vaccines; severe punishment; evolutionary game
Show Figures

Figure 1

MDPI and ACS Style

Zhang, N.; Yang, Y.; Wang, X.; Wang, X. Game Analysis on the Evolution of Decision-Making of Vaccine Manufacturing Enterprises under the Government Regulation Model. Vaccines 2020, 8, 267.

Show more citation formats Show less citations formats
Note that from the first issue of 2016, MDPI journals use article numbers instead of page numbers. See further details here.

Article Access Map by Country/Region

1
Search more from Scilit
 
Search
Back to TopTop