Search Results (110)

The increasing pressure on natural resources and the environment has intensified the need for sustainable cascade utilization in closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). This study develops a game-theoretic framework to examine cascade utilization under both constant and heterogeneous quality restoration costs across three collection structures: centralized, manufacturer-led, and third-party collection. The results show that the relative performance of different structures depends on key economic conditions, including material recycling revenue and the comparative advantage of remanufacturing. No single structure dominates across all dimensions: a manufacturer-led collection tends to promote new product sales, while a third-party collection enhances remanufacturing and recovery levels, particularly under cost heterogeneity. Environmental performance, evaluated through collection quantity, cascade utilization efficiency, and an environmental impact indicator, also varies across structures, with cost heterogeneity shifting advantages toward the third-party collection. Policy analysis further indicates that both collection and remanufacturing subsidies increase recovery volumes but operate through distinct mechanisms. The collection subsidy expands return flows but may reduce cascade utilization efficiency by directing more low-quality products to recycling, whereas remanufacturing subsidy promotes higher-value reuse pathways and improves environmental performance. These findings highlight the importance of aligning collection structures and policy instruments under different cost conditions to enhance resource efficiency and support the circular economy and sustainable consumption and production objectives. Full article

Background: Circular economy (CE) practices, such as glass bottle refilling, are critical to the beverage industry’s sustainability. However, coordinating manufacturer marketing efforts with collector reverse logistics investment remains a strategic challenge. Methods: This study develops a Stackelberg game-theoretic model featuring a manufacturer and a collector. The model incorporates communication effort as a demand driver and analyzes the role of bottle quality (damage rates) and the reusable bottle unit cost on the optimal decisions of the players and the collection rate. Results: Equilibrium analysis shows that the quality of the reusable bottle and the rate of bottle damage are crucial in reducing the operational costs of the refilling program. Additionally, these factors significantly influence the decisions made by manufacturers and collectors regarding their investments in communication and collection systems. Conclusions: The study demonstrates that successful refilling requires strategic coordination between manufacturers and collectors, particularly in terms of communication and investment in reverse logistics. Managerial insights indicate that investing in the quality of bottles is the key factor for achieving joint profitability. Full article

Within closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), limited attention has been given to firms’ production and abatement decisions involving carbon permit transfer between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR) under a cap-and-trade policy (CTP). Several questions remain unresolved: How does CTP reshape production and abatement decisions through carbon permit transfer under binding emission constraints? Can such regulation reallocate abatement responsibilities between firms and generate environmental and economic benefits? To address these questions, this paper develops a constrained Cournot game model capturing competitive interactions between an OEM and an IR under regulation. The results show that CTP reallocates abatement responsibilities toward the firm with a lower abatement difficulty, inducing full abatement as a corner solution. When remanufactured products exhibit a high low-carbon level, a moderate increase in cap stringency promotes remanufacturing output and market share. By contrast, once full abatement is reached, stricter regulation expands output. Moreover, when remanufacturing features substantial cost savings and a high low-carbon level, CTP consistently improves social welfare. This study provides insights into how cap-and-trade policies shape production and abatement decisions in CLSCs. Full article

Manufacturing industries are increasingly applying sustainable closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) to meet economic, environmental, and societal goals. The increasing complexity and interdependence associated with the sustainability CLSCs make them highly vulnerable to disruption risks that threaten continuity and sustainability. However, prior studies fall short of guiding how disruption risks in sustainable CLSCs can be systematically prioritized under uncertainty in a stable and decision-relevant manner. To fill this literature void, this study develops a hybrid of the Fuzzy Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (Fuzzy-TOPSIS) method and the genetic algorithm (GA) technique to prioritize disruption risks under uncertainty. Triangular fuzzy numbers are used to capture the imprecision of 13 experts from industry and academia, whereas the GA technique used aimed to improve stability and reduce the variability commonly observed in conventional fuzzy multi-criteria decision-making methods. The method is validated through a real-world case study, identifying supplier disruption risk, route disruption risk, and industrial accidents as the most critical risks. Moreover, sensitivity analysis is conducted to validate the robustness of GA-based Fuzzy-TOPSIS, demonstrating its superior stability and reliability compared to the classical Fuzzy-TOPSIS method in uncertain environments. The novelty of this study lies in embedding a GA-driven approach within the fuzzy-TOPSIS structure to explicitly address ranking instability under uncertainty in sustainable CLSCs. The study provides significant theoretical contributions by enhancing multi-attribute decision-making regarding disruption risk in sustainable CLSC literature, as well as practical insights for decision-makers to efficiently allocate resources by focusing mitigation investments on consistently high-priority risks instead of low-priority ones. Full article

Big data service providers (BDSPs) play a critical role in supporting the digital transformation of closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs). However, as the number of CLSC members increases, traditional coordination contracts become complex in the big data era, which challenges effective collaboration and contract implementation. To address this issue, this paper investigates the profit coordination problem in a CLSC with a BDSP, with the aim of lowering the contract implementation threshold and facilitating flexible adjustment of contract terms. This study applies the variational inequality method to derive the necessary conditions under which a CLSC with the participation of a BDSP achieves maximum system profit. The results indicate that these necessary conditions are as follows. First, the wholesale price is equal to the unit cost of new products. Second, the optimal payment level is positively correlated with production volume, unit cost savings, the BDSP marketing effort sensitivity coefficient, and the BDSP recycling effort sensitivity coefficient, while it is negatively correlated with the retail price sensitivity coefficient, the recycling price sensitivity coefficient, and the big data service cost coefficient. Full article

The increasing popularity of electric vehicles (EVs) as green alternatives to traditional internal combustion engine cars has highlighted the need for sustainable and environmentally friendly supply chain models. In particular, the handling of EV batteries, which are environmentally unfriendly and logistically critical due to their hazardous nature and short life cycle, requires a well-designed closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). This study proposes a new multi-objective optimization model of the CLSC, explicitly tailored to EV batteries under demand and return rate uncertainty. The proposed model incorporates three primary objectives that are typically in conflict with one another: minimizing the total cost, reducing carbon emissions throughout the entire supply chain network, and maximizing the recycling and reuse of batteries. The model employs a neutrosophic goal programming (NGP) methodology to address the uncertainties associated with demand and battery return quantities. The NGP model translates multiple objectives into non-monolithic goals with crisp aspiration levels (i.e., prescribed ideal levels for achieving the best of each goal) and thresholds that capture tolerances, thereby accounting for uncertainty. The efficiency of the proposed method is illustrated by a numerical example, solved using a IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio 22.1.2 solver. The findings demonstrate that the NGP can offer cost-effective, low-impact, and environmentally friendly solutions, thereby enhancing system robustness and flexibility to adapt to uncertainties. This study contributes to the emerging literature on sustainable operations research by developing a decision-making tool for EV-HV battery supply chain management. It also offers relevant suggestions for policymakers and industrialists who seek to co-optimize economic benefits, ecological sustainability, and logical feasibility in the emerging green society. Full article

The retrieval of end-of-life products is a critical component of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) remanufacturing, yet achieving efficient recycling remains challenging due to coordination barriers between supply chain members. To address this issue, this study investigates the collaboration problem in end-of-life product collection within a CLSC consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. The retailer is responsible for collecting end-of-life products, while the manufacturer may provide support through two alternative cooperation modes: fund cooperative and labor cooperative. Using the differential game approach, we develop equilibrium strategies under three scenarios—non-cooperation, fund-assistance cooperation, and labor-assistance cooperation. The analytical results show that cooperative collection strategies not only increase the recycling rate but also yield Pareto improvements, benefiting both the manufacturer and the retailer. Among the two cooperation modes, the labor cooperative achieves higher collection rates and greater joint profits than the fund cooperative. When considering heterogeneous collection costs between the manufacturer and retailer, the fund-assistance mode becomes more favorable for the manufacturer only when its collection cost substantially exceeds that of the retailer. Furthermore, we explore the combined implementation of fund and labor cooperative programs, revealing their potential to further enhance collection efficiency and overall profitability. This study contributes to the CLSC literature by introducing a dynamic differential game framework to model cooperative collection behaviors and provides actionable managerial implications for promoting manufacturer participation in used-product retrieval and fostering coordinated development across CLSC enterprises. Full article

Copper is a critically important metal for economic security, and its supply chain is influenced by various factors, particularly market prices. This paper aims to uncover the impact of high uncertainty in copper prices on the copper supply chain (CSC) configuration and propose strategies for CSC construction. To achieve this goal, this study presents a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) network, simulates copper market volatility using the geometric Brownian motion (GBM) model, and establishes a two-stage stochastic programming (TSSP) model. An empirical study was conducted using geographical and economic data of the CSC in the Chinese province of Hunan. The research results indicate that there is a threshold in copper prices that can lead to the construction of a reverse supply chain (RSC). However, significant fluctuations in copper prices introduce uncertainty into the supply chain network configuration. Therefore, policy measures to encourage copper scrap recycling should be implemented to maintain the safety of the CLSC during market instability. The proposed modelling framework for addressing fluctuation factors in supply chain design has been validated and can be promoted to other similar industries affected by markets. Full article

Sales competition and recycling rivalry are critical factors affecting the operation of closed-loop supply (CLSC). The existing research on competitive CLSCs primarily analyzes the impact of competition between two sales entities and/or two recycling entities on management decisions. To make the study more realistic, this study constructs a Stackelberg game model with the manufacturer as a leader, and analyzes the impacts of competition among $n$ retailers ($\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e} n\ge 2$) and rivalry among $m$ third-party recyclers $(\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e} m\ge 2)$ on the decision-making and profits of both node enterprises and the supply chain system, and proposes a linear transfer-payment contract to coordinate the CLSC from an economic perspective. Numerical analyses are conducted to visualize the effects of competition on the decisions and profits. The key findings are as follows: (1) In the centralized system, inter-retailer competition reduces optimal order quantities but does not affect optimal retail prices. In the decentralized system, however, it decreases both optimal order quantities and retail prices. (2) Rivalry among recyclers reduces their optimal recycling volumes but does not affect their optimal recycling prices in the centralized system. In the decentralized system, however, such rivalry not only decreases recycling volumes but also increases optimal recycling prices. (3) The manufacturer’s product wholesale price and used product recycling price remain independent of competitive interactions among retailers and recyclers in the decentralized system. (4) Competition among retailers and recyclers positively affects the profits of the CLSC and the manufacturer, but negatively impacts those of retailers and recyclers. (5) When the reward–penalty factors for product order and used product recycling fall within a specific range, the linear transfer-payment contract can coordinate the CLSC in the presence of competition in both retail and recycling. (6) All enterprises’ profits are sensitive to the penalty–reward factor, but this sensitivities also gradually decrease as the number of retailers and (or) recyclers increases. Full article

This research analyzes optimal information-sharing (IS) mechanisms in online closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) systems. In contrast to offline supply chains, online retailers hold a significant informational edge over their upstream counterparts due to their access to both demand and return information. Given that information asymmetry severely diminishes the efficiency of online CLSCs, it is imperative to optimize IS mechanisms to enhance operational performance. We emphasize the impact of product return and replacement information in e-businesses on inventory costs and bullwhip effects. The present study systematically characterizes four distinct IS mechanisms to assess their efficacy in mitigating information variability and inventory costs. The results underscore the vital importance of return information for supply chain management practices. A distributor who fails to account for return dynamics in their e-business may experience a detrimental operational performance. Particularly, online supply chains exhibit distinctive anomalies: sharing demand information may unexpectedly amplify bullwhip effects if the return period surpasses an online retailer’s lead time. This study offers valuable perspectives to assist managers in identifying the most effective IS strategies based on particular supply chain contexts, thereby facilitating robust supply chain partnerships. Full article

With the large-scale power batteries approaching their retirement phase, efforts are being made to advance the recycling and cascade utilization of power batteries for electric vehicles (EVs). This paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of power batteries led by the battery manufacturer (BM) and composed of the electric vehicle manufacturer (EVM) and third-party recycler (TPR). The study investigates the optimal pricing strategies of this CLSC with the consideration of recycling competition under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. This paper establishes five recycling modes, namely independent recycling and cooperative recycling, under dual-channel recycling, and further discusses the effects of the government reward–penalty mechanism and recycling competition on the recycling rate, profits, and recycling pricing of the CLSC in each recycling mode. The following conclusions are found: (1) An increase in the reward–penalty intensity will increase the recycling rate, sales price of EVs, wholesale price, transfer price, recycling price, and the profit of each recycler in the CLSC. (2) An increase in the recycling competition will result in the reduction of the profit of each enterprise, and will also lead to the reduction of the recycling rate. (3) Cooperation between enterprises can inhibit the recycling volume of other enterprises to a certain extent. The cooperation between the EVM and BM can increase the recycling volume and the sales volume of EVs. (4) The leadership of the BM in the supply chain is embodied in the recycling and profit. For other members of the supply chain, it is very important to strive for cooperation with the leaders in the supply chain. These research conclusions can provide theoretical support for optimizing the power battery recycling system, formulating relevant policies, and improving the efficiency of resource recycling, thereby promoting the sustainable development of the new energy industry. Full article

Trade-in programs have become a vital mechanism for promoting sustainable consumption and reducing negative impacts on the environment, gaining substantial support from branders, e-platforms, and consumers in recent years. Concurrently, the emergence of professional recyclers has provided firms with viable alternatives for the outsourcing of recycling processes. To investigate the optimal leadership and recycling model with respect to trade-in operations, this study examines the strategy selection in a platform-based supply chain under a resale model. A two-period game-theoretic framework is developed, encompassing four models: self-recycling and outsourcing models under the leadership of the brander or platform. The main findings are as follows: (1) In markets characterized by a low consumer price sensitivity, both branders and platforms tend to choose the self-recycling model to capture the closed-loop value. In contrast, in highly price-sensitive markets, both parties exhibit a preference for “free-riding” strategies. (2) Once the recycling leader is determined, adopting a self-recycling model can lead to a relative win–win outcome in high price sensitivity contexts. (3) With a short product iteration cycle, both the brander and platform should strategically lower their prices in the first period, sacrificing short-term profits to enhance trade-in incentives and maximize long-term gains. (4) When the brander leads the recycling process, they should consider reusing the resources derived from old products; however, in platform-led models, the brander can only consider reusing the recycled resources in a low price sensitivity market. This study provides strategic insights for the sustainable development of the supply chain through the analysis of a game between a brander and an e-commerce platform, enriching the literature on CLSCs through integrating trade-in leadership selection and the choice to outsource, offering theoretical support for dynamic pricing strategies over multi-period product lifecycles. Full article

In reality, there is often information asymmetry between upstream and downstream enterprises in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, which can have a profound impact on the decisions of member enterprises and the operation of the system. Under asymmetric market demand information, this study examines CSR input and recycling decision making in CLSC. Four decision-making models were developed for CLSC, and the effects of consumer sensitivity to CSR input and demand information asymmetry on CLSC optimization were studied. The results indicate that higher consumer sensitivity to CSR input enhances both CSR levels and recycling rates, benefiting both manufacturer and retailer by increasing profits. In terms of increasing CSR levels, the manufacturer achieves the best results when independently managing CSR input and recycling. However, for improving recycling rates and market demand, the retailer is more effective when responsible for CSR input, with the manufacturer handling recycling. Additionally, demand information asymmetry reduces the manufacturer’s profit but may not affect the retailer’s profit. The retailer–manufacturer cooperation model proves more beneficial for overall CLSC system performance compared to information symmetry. Full article

The sales of New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) have experienced substantial growth, resulting in a significant increase in the number of used NEV batteries. Improper disposal of these used batteries can lead to pollution and resource wastage. In line with the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) principles, this research designs a three-level hybrid recycling closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, retailer, and third-party recycler. Furthermore, Stackelberg game theory is applied to develop distinct game models for analyzing the interactions among the supply chain participants. To research the interaction among multiple policies on the hybrid recycling system, it explores the optimal pricing and the CLSC’s recycling performance under the policy mix. In addition, a coordination mechanism is devised and validated to solve the decline in members’ individual profits caused by the policy mix. The findings indicate that battery tax policy may reduce total profits, and subsidy policies could result in enterprise dependency, but the policy mix can lead to increase in both recycling price and amount. This research demonstrates the policy mix can overcome the limitations of single policy, implement a long-term and dynamically adjustable incentive mechanism and provide a crucial reference for the government’s role as the “visible hand” in recycling. Full article

In the context of green economy, Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) competition is intensifying. This study aims to help companies operating in green supply chains determine optimal remanufacturing strategies when competing with other firms. We examine the decision-making problem of CLSCs in competitive environments facing multiple remanufacturing mode options. The research constructs a Prisoner’s dilemma model for dual CLSCs, where each chain has three strategic choices: independent remanufacturing, outsourced remanufacturing, and authorized remanufacturing. Employing Stackelberg game models, Nash equilibrium analysis, and numerical simulations, this study explores how remanufactured product unit saving costs affect remanufacturing mode decisions concerning competitive intensity and discount policies. The study then draws the following conclusions: (1) CLSCs prefer outsourced and authorized remanufacturing in competitive scenarios; (2) Remanufactured product discounting significantly influences CLSC remanufacturing decisions; (3) Competitors typically adopt conservative strategies by aligning decisions with rivals. These results provide practical guidance for CLSCs selecting remanufacturing approaches when facing substitute competition, contributing to more sustainable and competitive supply chain operations. Full article