Search Results (19)

This study reconceptualizes self-understanding not as a reflective outcome but as a conditionally constituted process grounded in the Buddhist principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Adopting a comparative philosophical analysis, it examines how traditional meditation and AI-mediated meditation differently configure the conditions under which experience and self-understanding arise. Drawing on early Buddhist texts, Madhyamaka philosophy, and classical meditation theory, the study develops an analytical framework centered on conditions, interdependence, non-self, and the processes of arising, transformation, and cessation. The analysis shows that traditional meditation operates as a structure of conditional disclosure, in which practitioners observe the dynamic interplay of experiential conditions. By contrast, the AI-mediated systems examined in this study tend to pre-configure these conditions through algorithmic classification, procedural guidance, and interface design. In such contexts, self-understanding is increasingly shaped through technologically mediated interpretations. The findings suggest that the key distinction lies not in the presence of conditions themselves but in the visibility and configurational control of those conditions. This study contributes a theoretical framework for understanding how digital environments may reshape contemplative agency and the conditions under which self-understanding is formed. Full article

Mereological anti-realism denies the intrinsic reality of both composite wholes and their constituent parts. This paper analyzes the mereological anti-realist argumentation developed by the Sino-Parthian scholar-monk Jizang 吉藏 (549–623 CE) targeting the mereological realist doctrine of the Brāhmaṇical Vaiśeṣika tradition in his understudied Exegesis on the Middle Treatise (Zhongguan lun shu中觀論疏) and Exegesis on the Hundred Verse Treatise (Bailun shu百論疏). By counterbalancing Jizang’s critiques with the Vaiśeṣika mereological realist doctrine on its own terms, this paper critically assesses the viability and coherence of Jizang’s arguments that there are no entities that instantiate mereological relations or properties. An examination of Jizang’s critique of Vaiśeṣika mereological realism brings to light how the Madhyamaka Buddhist doctrine avoids metaphysical nihilism in accounting for how both wholes and parts can possess causal efficacy without being attributed intrinsic reality in and of themselves. Full article

In this contribution, I explore the idea that reality is best understood as fundamentally dynamic and interdependent, i.e., processual, bringing together resources from process thought, phenomenology and the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. I furthermore explore how this view shapes the ways we speak about, investigate, and understand the natural world. What is novel in my approach is that I bring a phenomenological reading of process in dialogue with Buddhist thought. My paper unfolds in two stages: first, I map key points of convergence between phenomenologically clarified process philosophy and Madhyamaka; second, I consider the broader epistemological and practical consequences of viewing reality as impermanent and dependently arising by looking at Whitehead’s and Nāgārjuna’s views in dialogue. Engaging with Buddhist philosophy alongside phenomenological process thought enables a deeper investigation into the ethical, and lived dimensions of metaphysical inquiry, which are dimensions often sidelined both in Western metaphysics and in some versions of phenomenology, because metaphysical and phenomenological analysis can remain stuck on the conceptual level, detached from both lived experience and practice. By contrast, Buddhist traditions explicitly link philosophical reflection with lived experience and embodied practice throughout. For this reason, sustained dialogue with Buddhist views and practices can expand Western methodology as such and can enrich process-based phenomenological approaches in particular by showing ways to reconnect speculative metaphysics, observation, and the concrete in practical ways. Full article

This paper explores philosophical issues of personal identity and its connection to forgetting through the famed Tibetan Buddhist thinker Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). Tsongkhapa, in turn, follows the Middle Way (madhyamaka) tradition of Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE) and Candrakīrti (c. 600–650 CE). Specifically, Tsongkhapa demonstrates that we can make sense of a consistent personal continuity despite the disruptions of forgetting and remembering. In so doing, he nuances the notion of personhood, revealing that it does not exist in the way we think. I rely on a thought experiment derived from the hit TV show Severance to demonstrate the ramifications of his theory. By way of conclusion, I explore how Tsongkhapa’s analysis constitutes a notion of “positive forgetting”. Full article

In discussions of whether Nāgārjuna was an ontological realist or a nihilist, one key concept is omitted from most discussion: the “that-ness” (tattva) of phenomenal reality that is revealed once our conceptual overlay is removed. Once his notion of tattva is understood as a central element in his ontology, the idea that he was a full-blown nihilist disappears. Full article

Taking Jiaxiang Jizang’s (嘉祥吉藏, 549–623) statement that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” (草木有佛性, cao mu you foxing) as an example of Early Chinese Madhyamaka ethics, I provide an analysis of the two main propositions of his claim and discuss the ethical significance thereof to highlight the characteristics of Early Chinese Madhyamaka ethics. Although the two propositions appear contradictory in a literal sense, differing criteria are employed in each to establish whether or not grasses and trees and sentient beings possess Buddha-nature—namely, dependent origination and emptiness in the first and non-attainment in the second. I also point out that the ethical significance of the first proposition exhibits a shift from ontology to moral awareness and then to moral disposition as the practitioner in moral accomplishment, while the approach of the second proposition is instead an ontological inquiry into the origins of morality, with an ethical outlook founded on the soteriological aspect of self-discipline. I conclude by showing that no single theory of Western ethics can be suitably applied to the Chinese Madhyamaka ethics of Jizang, as any such attempt would prove incompatible with his philosophical standpoint of non-attainment. Full article

In this article, we investigate the previously unstudied life and works of the late-12th/early-13th century Tibetan polymath Jamyang Sarma Sherab Özer (‘Jam dbyang gsar ma shes rab ‘od zer), an important Buddhist master in the Dro lineage of the Kālacakra Tantra. We will focus on his unique syncretic work, Illuminating the Path to Freedom (Thar lam sgron me), and provide an overview of his surviving literary output. Jamyang Sarma predates Dölpopa Sherab Gyeltsen (Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan, 1292–1361) in the use of the term ‘other-emptiness’, or ‘extrinsic emptiness’ (gzhan stong), in his writings, as opposed to the well-known view of Madhyamaka on ‘self-emptiness’ (rang stong). While conventional historiography has predominantly attributed the earliest systematic deployment of the technical term gzhan stong to Dölpopa, whose writings indeed represent the most comprehensive theoretical exposition within the Jonang tradition, current philological evidence suggests more complex lines of transmission through earlier Tibetan masters. This essay will shed new light on this issue by looking into Jamyang Sarma’s Illuminating the Path to Freedom. Full article

With the introduction of the theory of śūnyatā (emptiness 空) in Madhyamaka philosophy from India to China, Indian Buddhism and Chinese culture have achieved a historic new convergence in their understanding of emptiness. After several evolutions of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy, some people agree with it, while some question it, and the discussion around it has been very complicated. Determining how to fully understand and scientifically conceive of the core idea of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy and its contemporary value have become important issues in related research. Most of the existing research focuses on the theoretical interpretation of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy, but understanding and research from the perspective of life practices are still quite scanty, hindering the attainment of a comprehensive understanding and objective cognition of this theory’s actual value. The purpose of this paper is to strengthen the practical research on the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy in order to fully understand and scientifically conceptualize its core ideas and contemporary value. From the two basic perspectives of past and present, in regard to both theory and practice, we will re-explore the core ideas of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy and investigate and analyze corresponding theoretical doubts. We further reveal that the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy is not only a metaphysical philosophical theory in which the nature of the world is regarded as empty and its logic as consistent but also a practical piece of wisdom that views the world as empty so as to eliminate all kinds of life troubles and help people attain a better life experience. The dialectical wisdom of both the theory and practice of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy gives it very broad theoretical potential and practical prospects, making it worthy of in-depth study by relevant researchers. Full article

One recurrent criticism of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) is its equation with a potential axiological nihilism that undermines, inter alia, the telos of Buddhist practice. Here, I speculate that Madhyamaka non-foundationalism could be compatible with the naturalized teleology of C.S. Peirce. In brief, Peirce argues on pragmatic grounds that the ‘final cause’ of events does not refer to a predetermined finis ultimis or summum bonum with any ‘intrinsic nature’ (‘svabhāva’). Rather, a final cause is a general continuum of lawfulness (‘Third’/future) that mediates between indeterminate possibility (‘First’/present) and determinate actuality (‘Second’/past). Therefore, while a continuum of ‘purposiveness’ is a rational precondition for all temporal events, its futural significance means it can only ever be asymptotically realized; indeed, the constitutively general form of each ‘final’ cause is, practically speaking, fundamentally vague and open-ended to some degree. Finally, I show that the so-called strange attractors of dynamical systems theory provide an imperfect model for this naturalized ‘groundless teleology’. Full article

The Zhao Lun, authored by Seng Zhao, elaborates on the Madhyamaka thought. This work has had a significant impact on Chinese Buddhist philosophy, as well as on Confucianism and Taoism. During the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), the esteemed monk Wencai from the Huayan school of Buddhism composed a book titled A New Commentary on the Zhao Lun (hereafter New Commentary), which offers annotations and explanations for the text of the Zhao Lun and employs the “One Mind” theory to interpret the Zhao Lun. Text analysis methods are utilized in this article to conduct an in-depth study of the “One Mind” theoretical system constructed by Wencai within the New Commentary. It explores the essential content, integrative characteristics, and theoretical origins of the “One Mind” theory, thereby revealing the theoretical style of the Huayan school during the Yuan dynasty from a novel and unique perspective. Additionally, we analyze how Wencai integrates Tathāgatagarbha thought and Madhyamaka thought into his theory of “One Mind”. This analysis constitutes, to a certain extent, an indirect refutation of the harsh criticisms of Tathāgatagarbha thought of “Critical Buddhism” in Japan and provides new perspectives and reflections for a deeper understanding of Tathāgatagarbha thought. Full article

A Buddhist system of two truths provides a descriptive framework with criteria for what counts as real in contrast to what does not. This paper looks at the relationship between these two truths in the works of two seventh-century Indian philosophers, Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti, and draws implications for comparison and contrast with modern scientific understandings of the world. It highlights important features of Dharmakīrti’s epistemology that aim to circumvent cultural conventions in a way that resonates with scientific representations of knowledge. It also contrasts this approach with one inspired by Candrakīrti in order to argue for the place of ethics and persons in a hybrid Buddhist–scientific picture of the world. Full article

In Yogācāra epistemology, the term prapañca refers to various dimensions of the cognitive process in aspects ranging from consciousness, language formation, the conceptualization of subject–object duality, mental defilements, and ignorance. Given that the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra conveys the richness of early tenets for both the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka traditions, an investigation of the meaning and discourse context of prapañca is a necessity. This paper conducts a contextual examination of the word prapañca, primarily addressing (1) a range of meanings, (2) possible characteristics, (3) conditions and consequences, especially the associations with the conceptualization (vikalpa) process, and (4) the significance of the elimination of prapañca that the corresponding dialogue implies. This paper finds that prapañca is associated with dualistic conceptualization and the evolution of consciousness within saṃsāra. It shows some qualities of the beginningless conceptual structure of saṃsāric conditioned negativity and is related to language formation. As the discourse in Laṅka adduces it as the root of suffering, liberation from it is a prerequisite for reaching enlightenment and achieving the state of Buddhahood. Full article

Vimalamitra’s (ca. the 8th–9th cent.) *Āryaprajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā (hereafter the PHT) sparks interest not only because of its detailed verbal commentary on the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya or the Heart Sūtra but also because it developed various philosophical arguments. However, these arguments have not always been clear due to the difficulty surrounding Tibetan translation and the complexity of the discussion. For instance, in 2021, Mathes, who examined some passages of the PHT, suggested that Vimalamitra endorsed the Yogācāra idea that the perfect nature exists ultimately as the dharmakāya—an idea that can be traced back to 1996, Lopez. However, a close reading of the relevant passages of the PHT through consultation with the commentary on the Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā by Vimalamitra himself, a sub-commentary on the PHT by rNgog blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), and a reading of the Tibetan translation (the only translation preserved) conjecturing the underlying original Sanskrit reveals that the opposite is true: there is a fierce and complex debate between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra on the passage, with Vimalamitra sharply criticizing the latter’s views as a Mādhyamika. Thus, this paper will reveal for the first time the previously unknown details of the dispute between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in the PHT. This will offer new evidence for the confrontation between the two around the eighth and ninth centuries. Full article

The *Āryaprajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā (hereafter PHT), Vimalamitra’s (ca. the 8th- to 9th cent.) commentary on the long Heart Sutra (hereafter HS), is not merely a commentary on words and phrases of the HS, but it also refers to and criticizes non-Buddhist schools and other schools within Buddhism. However, due to its textual situation, namely, the original Sanskrit being lost and it remains only as the Tibetan translation, the discussion there has not always been well understood. In particular, it has been suggested in recent years that Vimalamitra endorsed the Yogācāra perspective in the PHT. In this paper, I will primarily examine Vimalamitra’s interpretation of the famous four sets of phrases, such as “rūpa (form) is emptiness/empty” in the PHT, and clarify Vimalamitra’s understanding of key Buddhist concepts such as “emptiness” or “dependent origination”. In doing so, I argue that the PHT is written sorely from the Madhyamaka perspective, and Vimalamitra criticizes other schools, including the Yogācāra. Furthermore, by comparison with the writings of Kamalaśīla, an older contemporary of Vimalamitra, I further clarify his position as a Mādhyamika adherent. Finally, I will discuss the significance of those philosophical arguments in the PHT to the modern readers of the HS. Full article

By the twelfth century, a broad consensus had developed among Tibetan Buddhists: The Middle Way School (Madhyamaka) of Nāgārjuna (c. 2nd century), as interpreted by Candrakīrti (c. 600–650), would be normative in Tibet. However, Tibetans had inherited various trajectories of commentary on Madhyamaka, and schools of thought developed, each with a particular reading. This article will examine some of the major competing philosophical stances, focusing on three figures who represent particularly compelling interpretations, but whose understandings of Madhyamaka are profoundly divergent: Daktsang Sherap Rinchen (1405–1477), Wangchuk Dorjé, the 9th Karmapa (1556–1603), and Purchok Ngawang Jampa (1682–1762). The former two contend that Nāgārjuna’s statement “I have no thesis” (nāsti ca mama pratijñā) means exactly what it says, while the latter advocates what could be termed an “anthropological” approach: Mādhyamikas, when speaking as Mādhyamikas, only report what “the world” says, without taking any stance of their own; but their understanding of Buddhism is based on insight gained through intensive meditation training. This article will focus on how these three philosophers figure in the history of Tibetan Madhyamaka exegesis and how their respective readings of Indic texts incorporate elements of previous work while moving interpretation in new directions. Full article