Continuity and Change according to Hindu and Buddhist Religious Philosophies

A special issue of Religions (ISSN 2077-1444).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (31 October 2022) | Viewed by 38322

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Department of Philosophy and Ethics, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, ND 58202, USA
Interests: Hindu and Buddhist religion and philosophy; nondual Śaivism and tantra; Sanskrit; intercultural philosophy and other theories of religions
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Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

In classic Hindu or Brahmanic and Buddhist (as well as Jain and other Asian) philosophies, a great weight is placed on the epistemology and ontology or metaphysics of whether there are continuities amidst change in our temporal situation. Such ostensible constancies may be a universal Self or different selves, God, reliable verbal testimony, recognition and other epistemic syntheses, physical objects, universals and other qualities, relations, actions, principles of action, and so on. In general, the great variety of Hindu philosophies have claimed that one or the other of these identify genuine epistemological and ontological continuities. In accordance with their teachings of impermanence (anitya) and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpada), Buddhist philosophies in diverse ways have endeavored to “analyze away” such continuities into transitory facts and/or logical problems, although Buddhists have their own ways of explaining the reliability of the teachings of the Buddha(s). These debates also have religious significance. Hindu traditions have endeavored to realize, or somehow know or utilize, one or more continuities in their quest for liberation or heaven. Buddhist philosophers, excluding representatives of Pure Land or other adherents of an enduring Self, have likewise endeavored ultimately to relinquish attachment to ostensible continuities in their pursuits of nirvāṇa or bodhi. In their understanding of their goal, Buddhists have often been hesitant to ascribe continuity even to the liberative realization. There is minimal or no comprehensible “referent” to their terms for liberation.

This journal Issue will present original, constructive research on Hindu and Buddhist arguments about various alleged continuit(y/ies), as well as the religious significance of these contentions for each tradition. The meaning of this research will be generalized in two ways. First, the position originally propounded will be presented as exemplifying a more common stance toward their respective Hindu or Buddhist opponents. For example, Dharmakīrti and allies continue the Abhidharma search for elemental dharmas in their theorization on svalakṣaṇas, whereas Hindu philosophers repudiate such analysis and argue for the self-evidence and/or supporting evidence of the existence of enduring objects, the Self, and so on. The Hindus and Buddhists view their arguments as variously facilitating their respective pursuits for liberation, while their opponents find them to be threatening to their own.

Second, the authors will also generalize the significance of Hindu and Buddhist positions in considering their value for contemporary global philosophy, and other relevant fields of knowledge. The authors will also suggest the significance of these positions for contemporary religious or “spiritual” pursuits. It is additionally reasonable to argue that the debate about continuity and change is not philosophically or religiously significant. Thus, we will endeavor to understand traditional philosophical wisdom in both its traditional and contemporary dialogical and agonistic contexts. The importance of this journal Issue will consist of bringing these arguments into focus as a traditional and contemporary theme.

Since the pioneering work of scholars such as Bimal Krishna Matilal in South Asia, the Kyoto school in Japan, and others, there have been serious philosophical dialogues between Asian cultures and the contemporary academy. That academy is likewise gradually becoming less and less dominated by the West. In much scholarship, there has further been increasing attention paid to the relation of philosophical arguments to religion. The invited scholars are leaders in the intercultural philosophical and religious interpretation of Asian philosophies. They promise to bring cutting-edge insights into one of the most fundamental issues of human life.

Prof. Dr. David Peter Lawrence
Guest Editor

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Keywords

  • Hindu philosophy
  • Buddhist philosophy
  • continuity
  • change
  • realism
  • relations
  • sambandha
  • universals
  • Sāmānya
  • Self
  • Ātman
  • ultimate reality
  • Brahman
  • God
  • objects
  • speech
  • Śabda
  • Vāk

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Published Papers (11 papers)

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Editorial

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5 pages, 193 KiB  
Editorial
Continuity and Change according to Hindu and Buddhist Religious Philosophies
by David Peter Lawrence
Religions 2024, 15(4), 508; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15040508 - 19 Apr 2024
Viewed by 1065
Abstract
I am happy to present to the scholarly audience this Special Issue of Religions on the theme of “Continuity and Change according to Hindu and Buddhist Religious Philosophies” [...] Full article

Research

Jump to: Editorial

16 pages, 268 KiB  
Article
Time and Change in Advaita—Gauḍapāda in Dialogue with Vasiṣṭha and Nāgārjuna
by Sthaneshwar Timalsina
Religions 2024, 15(2), 167; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15020167 - 30 Jan 2024
Viewed by 2834
Abstract
In the classical philosophical landscape of India, the Advaita of Śaṅkara occupies central stage. Besides the Upaniṣadic literature, the Gauḍapāda-kārikā (GK) of Gauḍapāda is the primary text in this school. Relying primarily on the GK, this essay explores the ways the issue of [...] Read more.
In the classical philosophical landscape of India, the Advaita of Śaṅkara occupies central stage. Besides the Upaniṣadic literature, the Gauḍapāda-kārikā (GK) of Gauḍapāda is the primary text in this school. Relying primarily on the GK, this essay explores the ways the issue of change can be addressed within the Advaita paradigm. For Advaitins, there exists only the singular reality of Brahman, of the character of non-differentiated consciousness. In this paradigm, the attributes of both being and blissfulness never change. Furthermore, the central teaching of Gauḍapāda is the doctrine of ‘non-origination’ (ajāti), that nothing is ever originated. For Advaita, change or deviation is possible only under the spell of illusion, as the absolute is changeless. By comparing the position of Gauḍapāda with other classical, non-dual philosophies, this paper explores arguments for and against change in the classical philosophical school of Advaita. Full article
19 pages, 774 KiB  
Article
Sambandha as a ‘Śakti-of-Śaktis’: Bhartṛhari’s Influence on the Relational Realism of Pratyabhijñā
by Jesse Berger
Religions 2023, 14(7), 836; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14070836 - 26 Jun 2023
Cited by 1 | Viewed by 1318
Abstract
Contemporary scholarship has significantly advanced our understanding of the grammarian Bhartṛhari’s influence on the Pratyabhijñā Śaivism of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. One area that has been somewhat neglected, however, is the subject of relation (sambandha). Here, I examine the influence of Bhartṛhari’s [...] Read more.
Contemporary scholarship has significantly advanced our understanding of the grammarian Bhartṛhari’s influence on the Pratyabhijñā Śaivism of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta. One area that has been somewhat neglected, however, is the subject of relation (sambandha). Here, I examine the influence of Bhartṛhari’s sambandha-vāda on the Pratyabhijñā school. As I see it, Bhartṛhari’s understanding of the holistic movement of sphoṭa—the practical process of ‘encoding’ and ‘decoding’ linguistic information—leads to a necessary reevaluation of the general logical form of sambandha, i.e., ‘relationality-as-such.’ On this account, Bhartṛhari articulates a basically transcendental conception of sambandha as a ‘śakti-of-śaktis’ in his ‘Exposition of Relation’ (Sambandhasamuddeśa [SSam]). This effectively means that one cannot designate the general logical form of sambandha in linguistic terms without also thereby changing its essential nature as such (cf. Houben: 170–4). I maintain that Utpaladeva’s ‘Proof of Relation’ (Sambandhasiddhi [SS]) leverages this insight into a series of pragmatic arguments to demonstrate that vimarśa, or recognitive judgment, is the true locus of relational action—i.e., unity-in-diversity (bhedābheda). In doing so, he effectively salvages a coherent understanding of relation as necessarily real (satya) from the deconstructive agenda of the Buddhist eliminativist, even though the referent may indeed appear paradoxical from the perspective of theoretical reason alone. Full article
20 pages, 339 KiB  
Article
Being Is Relating: Continuity-in-Change in the Sambandhasiddhi of Utpaladeva
by Sean K. MacCracken
Religions 2023, 14(1), 57; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14010057 - 29 Dec 2022
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1968
Abstract
Relation-theories—theories on the metaphysical status of relations—have for some time stood at the center of disputes between realism and idealism. To such disputes, this paper contributes insights from an understudied premodern source, the Sambandhasiddhi (Proof of Relation). Its author Utpaladeva (c. 925–975 C.E.) [...] Read more.
Relation-theories—theories on the metaphysical status of relations—have for some time stood at the center of disputes between realism and idealism. To such disputes, this paper contributes insights from an understudied premodern source, the Sambandhasiddhi (Proof of Relation). Its author Utpaladeva (c. 925–975 C.E.) is the Śaiva philosopher of India best known as an innovator in the Pratyabhijñā (Doctrine of Recognition) school of Kashmiri Śaivism. This lesser-known late text shows Utpaladeva deploying an even more explicitly Bhartṛharian grammatical view of reality than he had previously. He argues against his chief rival and predecessor, the Buddhist epistemologist, Dharmakīrti (c. 6th or 7th C.E.), while modifying the latter’s epistemic idealism to an objective idealism. This text differs from Utpaladeva’s prior works in its sustained attack on Dharmakīrti’s nominalism and citation of the Buddhist’s own writings. The Sambandhasiddhi accordingly offers an interesting glimpse at a sustained treatment on relations, a topic that is important to Utpaladeva’s prior arguments, but that he considered perhaps not sufficiently developed, so as to warrant a separate treatment. A few brief comments are also offered on how Utpaladeva’s relation-theory might fit alongside Russell’s disputes with Bradley over relations, and Utpaladeva’s affinity with Peircean semiosis. Full article
22 pages, 925 KiB  
Article
Disputed Emptiness: Vimalamitra’s Mādhyamika Interpretation of the Heart Sutra in the Light of His Criticism on Other Schools
by Toshio Horiuchi
Religions 2022, 13(11), 1067; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111067 - 4 Nov 2022
Cited by 2 | Viewed by 1969
Abstract
The *Āryaprajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā (hereafter PHT), Vimalamitra’s (ca. the 8th- to 9th cent.) commentary on the long Heart Sutra (hereafter HS), is not merely a commentary on words and phrases of the HS, but it also refers to and criticizes non-Buddhist schools and other [...] Read more.
The *Āryaprajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā (hereafter PHT), Vimalamitra’s (ca. the 8th- to 9th cent.) commentary on the long Heart Sutra (hereafter HS), is not merely a commentary on words and phrases of the HS, but it also refers to and criticizes non-Buddhist schools and other schools within Buddhism. However, due to its textual situation, namely, the original Sanskrit being lost and it remains only as the Tibetan translation, the discussion there has not always been well understood. In particular, it has been suggested in recent years that Vimalamitra endorsed the Yogācāra perspective in the PHT. In this paper, I will primarily examine Vimalamitra’s interpretation of the famous four sets of phrases, such as “rūpa (form) is emptiness/empty” in the PHT, and clarify Vimalamitra’s understanding of key Buddhist concepts such as “emptiness” or “dependent origination”. In doing so, I argue that the PHT is written sorely from the Madhyamaka perspective, and Vimalamitra criticizes other schools, including the Yogācāra. Furthermore, by comparison with the writings of Kamalaśīla, an older contemporary of Vimalamitra, I further clarify his position as a Mādhyamika adherent. Finally, I will discuss the significance of those philosophical arguments in the PHT to the modern readers of the HS. Full article
15 pages, 282 KiB  
Article
Change: Thinking through Sāṅkhya
by Sthaneshwar Timalsina
Religions 2022, 13(6), 549; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13060549 - 15 Jun 2022
Viewed by 1879
Abstract
This paper explores the ways change is addressed in Sāṅkhya, one of the major Hindu schools of philosophy, specifically in light of the classical debate between Hindu and the Buddhist philosophers regarding intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and the concept of transformation ( [...] Read more.
This paper explores the ways change is addressed in Sāṅkhya, one of the major Hindu schools of philosophy, specifically in light of the classical debate between Hindu and the Buddhist philosophers regarding intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and the concept of transformation (pariṇāma). When we closely analyze Sāṅkhya categories, the issue of temporality stands out, because for Sāṅkhya philosophers time is not a distinct category and is infrequently addressed in classical Sāṅkhya. Nonetheless, we can still extract two different notions related to time, dynamism intrinsic to rajas, and temporality that is enclosed within the notion of space and spatial objects. What this implies is that the temporality implicit within the concept of change is only applicable to the last of the evolutes, according to Sāṅkhya cosmology. However, the Sāṅkhyan idea of 16 transformations (pariṇāma) applies to all categories, except puruṣa. By exploiting the parameters of these arguments, this paper makes the case for a closer analysis of the category of transformation in classical Sāṅkhya. Reading about change in the light of svabhāva, the intrinsic nature of an entity, versus the idea of its termination, allows us to have a wider conversation on what it means for something to change from within the Sāṅkhya paradigm. Full article
12 pages, 203 KiB  
Article
The Introductory Part of Udayana’s Critique of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness
by Kisor Chakrabarti
Religions 2022, 13(3), 241; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13030241 - 11 Mar 2022
Viewed by 2949
Abstract
In the Buddhist view, all real things are subject to constant change, and nothing real endures for more than one moment. The Buddhist holds that only causally productive things are real and offers arguments to prove that anything that produces an effect must [...] Read more.
In the Buddhist view, all real things are subject to constant change, and nothing real endures for more than one moment. The Buddhist holds that only causally productive things are real and offers arguments to prove that anything that produces an effect must undergo immediate change and cannot be permanent. In his Ātmatattvaviveka (ATV), Udayana (a Nyaya philosopher of the 11th century) raises objections to Buddhist arguments and tries to show that a causal condition can endure through time. Moreover, although a causal condition may have the ability to produce an effect, the production of an effect may be delayed until all other causal conditions are available; during this time, a causal condition may continue to exist and remain unchanged. I explain Udayana’s critique of the Buddhist position with the help of selections from the Sanskrit text. I translate the selected texts into English with notes and provide expository comments. (Diacritical marks are omitted from names). Full article
14 pages, 1357 KiB  
Article
Paramārtha’s Ultimate Truth and the Development of Chinese Buddhism’s Ultimate Truth
by Sijia Wang and Huanhuan He
Religions 2022, 13(1), 17; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13010017 - 24 Dec 2021
Viewed by 2860
Abstract
This paper discusses the development of ideas of the ultimate in the thought of Chinese Buddhism in the Northern and Southern Dynasties. The concept of ultimate truth is, along with that of conventional truth, a core concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism. During the Sui [...] Read more.
This paper discusses the development of ideas of the ultimate in the thought of Chinese Buddhism in the Northern and Southern Dynasties. The concept of ultimate truth is, along with that of conventional truth, a core concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism. During the Sui Dynasty, Chinese Buddhism developed the unique perspective of the Three Truths, the foundation for which was formed during the Southern and Northern Dynasties. This begins with Jie jie Jing 解節經 (in full, Foshuo Jiejie Jing 佛說解節經) by Paramārtha (499–569), which is a partial translation of Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and presents the theory of ultimate truth (paramārtha) to Chinese Buddhists. Through a comparison of Jiejie Jing with other Chinese and Tibetan translations of Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, we establish Paramārtha’s thoughts on the ultimate. The relationship between Paramārtha’s thought on the ultimate and the development of the Three Truths is evaluated in a comparison of Paramārtha’s thoughts on ultimate truth with the thinking of nearly contemporary Chinese monks. Full article
13 pages, 259 KiB  
Article
Past Continuous or Present Perfect? Continuity and Change in Contemporary Indian Philosophy
by Daniel Raveh
Religions 2021, 12(12), 1087; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121087 - 9 Dec 2021
Viewed by 2629
Abstract
Contemporary Indian philosophy is a distinct genre of philosophy that draws both on classical Indian philosophical sources and on Western materials, old and new. It is comparative philosophy without borders. In this paper, I attempt to show how contemporary Indian philosophy works through [...] Read more.
Contemporary Indian philosophy is a distinct genre of philosophy that draws both on classical Indian philosophical sources and on Western materials, old and new. It is comparative philosophy without borders. In this paper, I attempt to show how contemporary Indian philosophy works through five instances from five of its protagonists: Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya (his new interpretation of the old rope-snake parable in his essay “Śaṅkara’s Doctrine of Maya”, 1925); Daya Krishna (I focus on the “moral monadism” that the theory of karma in his reading leads to, drawing on his book Discussion and Debate in Indian Philosophy, 2004); Ramchandra Gandhi (his commentary on the concept of Brahmacharya in correspondence with his grandfather, the Mahatma, in his essay “Brahmacharya”, 1981); Mukund Lath (on identity through—not despite—change, with classical Indian music, Rāga music, as his case-study, in his essay “Identity through Necessary Change”, 2003); and Rajendra Swaroop Bhatnagar (on suffering, in his paper “No Suffering if Human Beings Were Not Sensitive”, 2021). My aim is twofold. First, to introduce five contemporary Indian philosophers; and second, to raise the question of newness and philosophy. Is there anything new in philosophy, or is contemporary philosophy just a footnote—à la Whitehead—to the writings of great thinkers of the past? Is contemporary Indian philosophy, my protagonists included, just a series of footnotes to classical thinkers both in India and Europe? Footnotes to the Upaniṣads, Nāgārjuna, Dharmakīrti and Śaṅkara, as much as (let us not forget colonialism and Macaulay) to Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? Footnotes can be creative and work almost as a parallel text, interpretive, critical, even subversive. However, my contention is that contemporary Indian philosophy (I leave it to others to plea for contemporary Western philosophy) is not a footnote, it is a text with agency of its own, validity of its own, power of its own. It is wholly and thoroughly a text worth reading. In this paper, I make an attempt to substantiate this claim through the philosophical mosaic I offer, in each instance highlighting both the continuity with classical sources and my protagonists’ courageous transgressions and innovations. Full article
15 pages, 290 KiB  
Article
Buddhist Approaches to Impermanence: Phenomenal and Naumenal
by Pradeep P. Gokhale
Religions 2021, 12(12), 1081; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12121081 - 8 Dec 2021
Cited by 7 | Viewed by 12181
Abstract
The doctrine of impermanence can be called the most salient feature of the Buddha’s teaching. The early Buddhist doctrine of impermanence can be understood in four different but interrelated contexts: Buddha’s empiricism, the notion of conditioned/constituted objects, the idea of dependent arising, and [...] Read more.
The doctrine of impermanence can be called the most salient feature of the Buddha’s teaching. The early Buddhist doctrine of impermanence can be understood in four different but interrelated contexts: Buddha’s empiricism, the notion of conditioned/constituted objects, the idea of dependent arising, and the practical context of suffering and emancipation. While asserting the impermanence of all phenomena, the Buddha was silent on the questions of the so-called transcendent entities and truths. Moreover, though the Buddha described Nibbāṇa/Nirvāṇa as a ‘deathless state’ (‘amataṃ padam’), it does not imply eternality in a metaphysical sense. Whereas the early Buddhist approach to impermanence can be called ‘phenomenal’, the post-Buddhist approach was concerned with naumena (things in themselves). Hence, Sarvāstivāda (along with Pudgalavāda) is marked by absolutism in the form of the doctrines of substantial continuity, atomism, momentariness, and personalism. The paper also deals with the approaches to impermanence of Dharmakīrti and Nāgārjuna, which can be called naumenal rather than strictly phenomenal. For Dharmakīrti, non-eternality was in fact momentariness and it was not a matter of experience but derivable conceptually or analytically from the concept of real. Nāgārjuna stood not for impermanence, but emptiness (śūnyatā), the concept which transcended both impermanence and permanence, substantiality and non-substantiality. Full article
14 pages, 312 KiB  
Article
The Disputed Middle Ground: Tibetan Mādhyamikas on How to Interpret Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti
by John Powers
Religions 2021, 12(11), 991; https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12110991 - 11 Nov 2021
Viewed by 2441
Abstract
By the twelfth century, a broad consensus had developed among Tibetan Buddhists: The Middle Way School (Madhyamaka) of Nāgārjuna (c. 2nd century), as interpreted by Candrakīrti (c. 600–650), would be normative in Tibet. However, Tibetans had inherited various trajectories of commentary on Madhyamaka, [...] Read more.
By the twelfth century, a broad consensus had developed among Tibetan Buddhists: The Middle Way School (Madhyamaka) of Nāgārjuna (c. 2nd century), as interpreted by Candrakīrti (c. 600–650), would be normative in Tibet. However, Tibetans had inherited various trajectories of commentary on Madhyamaka, and schools of thought developed, each with a particular reading. This article will examine some of the major competing philosophical stances, focusing on three figures who represent particularly compelling interpretations, but whose understandings of Madhyamaka are profoundly divergent: Daktsang Sherap Rinchen (1405–1477), Wangchuk Dorjé, the 9th Karmapa (1556–1603), and Purchok Ngawang Jampa (1682–1762). The former two contend that Nāgārjuna’s statement “I have no thesis” (nāsti ca mama pratijñā) means exactly what it says, while the latter advocates what could be termed an “anthropological” approach: Mādhyamikas, when speaking as Mādhyamikas, only report what “the world” says, without taking any stance of their own; but their understanding of Buddhism is based on insight gained through intensive meditation training. This article will focus on how these three philosophers figure in the history of Tibetan Madhyamaka exegesis and how their respective readings of Indic texts incorporate elements of previous work while moving interpretation in new directions. Full article
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