Madhyamaka vs. Yogācāra: A Previously Unknown Dispute in Vimalamitra’s Commentary on the Heart Sūtra

Abstract

Vimalamitra’s (ca. the 8th–9th cent.) *Āryaprajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā (hereafter the PHT) sparks interest not only because of its detailed verbal commentary on the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya or the Heart Sūtra but also because it developed various philosophical arguments. However, these arguments have not always been clear due to the difficulty surrounding Tibetan translation and the complexity of the discussion. For instance, in 2021, Mathes, who examined some passages of the PHT, suggested that Vimalamitra endorsed the Yogācāra idea that the perfect nature exists ultimately as the dharmakāya—an idea that can be traced back to 1996, Lopez. However, a close reading of the relevant passages of the PHT through consultation with the commentary on the Saptaśatikā Prajñāpāramitā by Vimalamitra himself, a sub-commentary on the PHT by rNgog blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109), and a reading of the Tibetan translation (the only translation preserved) conjecturing the underlying original Sanskrit reveals that the opposite is true: there is a fierce and complex debate between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra on the passage, with Vimalamitra sharply criticizing the latter’s views as a Mādhyamika. Thus, this paper will reveal for the first time the previously unknown details of the dispute between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in the PHT. This will offer new evidence for the confrontation between the two around the eighth and ninth centuries.

1. Introduction

Vimalamitra’s (ca. the 8th–9th cent.) *Āryaprajñāpāramitāhṛdayaṭīkā (hereafter the PHT) is interesting not only for its detailed verbal critique of the Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya or the Heart Sūtra (hereafter the HS) but also for its development of different philosophical arguments. However, challenges surrounding the Tibetan translation and the complexity of the discussion have made these arguments relatively unclear.

Several studies have focused on the PHT. Lopez (1996), Tan and Liu (2005), and Ōyagi (2016) translated the entire PHT, identified most of its cited texts, and presented its contents. Although Lopez translated the PHT by collating its D[erge] and P[eking] editions, he did not prepare the critical edition; nevertheless, he seems to have recognized its importance.1 Subsequent research on the PHT has long neglected this point, but I began creating a critical edition of the PHT in my series of Japanese translations of the work that starts from Horiuchi (2019b-1). Still, my study has skipped the part that this paper highlights.

One interesting concern regarding the PHT is Vimalamitra’s ideological position. Ōyagi (2016, p. 73) correctly argued that no esoteric element exists in the PHT, although Vimalamitra cites a tantric text, Mahāvairocanābhisaṃbodhi. Furthermore, Mathes (2021) rightly asserted that “Vimalamitra leaves no doubt that he shares Nāgārjuna’s view of things” (p. 665) but also considered some passages in the PHT (D273a7–273b3) to demonstrate that “Vimalamitra also endorses the Yogācāra model of reality” (p. 665). Meanwhile, my analysis of the passage’s structure and reference to rNgog blo ldan shes rab’s (1059–1109) (hereafter the rNgog) sub-commentary on the PHT clarified that Vimalamitra first presented other schools’ opinions and then regarded the HS’s sūtra passage as criticisms of them, arguing that the passage showed the views of Yogācāra as the other school for Vimalamitra to criticize immediately afterward (Horiuchi 2022). Simply put, I argued that Vimalamitra composed the PHT solely from a Mādhyamika master’s standpoint.

In addition, a further discussion is conducted on one folio in the D edition (PHT, D273b3–274b2) that succeeds the above paragraph, which was not covered by Horiuchi (2022). Mathes (2021) evaluates that section as follows:

In some later Yogācāra currents the ontological distinction between the dependent and imagined is surpassed by restricting it to a description of the relative truth. This is what Vimalamitra does a bit further down in the Heart Sūtra commentary, where the perfect nature is described to exist ultimately as the dharmakāya, while the imagined and dependent natures are not established²². This accords with Vasubandhu’s (or Daṃṣṭrāsena’s)²³ Bṛhaṭṭīkā, in which the perfect is taken to be empty of the imagined and dependent.

(Mathes 2021, p. 666)

He does not specify the location of the text or present the text itself, but since the passage he presented before was D273a7–273b3, by saying “a bit further down”, he was surely referring to the passage D273b3ff, which I will discuss in this paper.

In short, Mathes opines that Vimalamitra asserts in the PHT that “the perfect nature” exists “ultimately as the dharmakāya”, endorsing later Yogācāra currents. However, in my understanding, the passage in question is Vimalamitra’s presentation of Yogācāra’s position, and Vimalamitra rejects the view. Ultimately, my view is the exact opposite of Mathes’. Furthermore, I believe that an even fiercer argument between Vimalamitra and Yogācāra takes place immediately after the passage. Moreover, this understanding is also supported by the rNgog’s synoptical commentary on the PHT.

In this paper, I aim to explain this through a reading of the passage, further clarify Vimalamitra’s views as a Mādhyamika, and offer new material on the previously unknown controversy between Yogācāra and Vimalamitra as a Mādhyamika, who advocates the ideas of the Madhyamaka School.

I will provide an overview of what is at stake here from a broader context, that is, what can be typified with great hesitancy2 as the controversy between existence and non-existence advocated by the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka schools, respectively. In this regard, one would recall that a Mādhyamika master, Bhāviveka (ca. 490–570), devoted Chapter 5 of his Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (hereafter the MHK), which consists of 104 verses, to an examination of the Yogācāra position. Yamaguchi Susumu carefully investigated this chapter as early as 1941, together with its (auto)commentary, the Tarkajvālā (hereafter the TJ), in his book titled The Controversy Between Existence and Non-existence in Buddhism. Moreover, Eckel (2008), who also provides detailed information about previous research, is noteworthy as a recent study on this chapter. Incidentally, Hoornaert (1994) aptly summarized the focus of the controversy between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra as depicted by Bhāviveka. In the following paragraphs, I will summarize the points of that controversy by citing his article.

The Yogācāra calls the ultimate truth (paramārtha[satya]) perfected nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva), thusness (tathatā), emptiness (śūnyatā), and others (Madhyāntavibhāga (hereafter the MAV), 1.14, 3.10d), and argues that emptiness is “the existence of non-existence” (abhāvasya bhāva, MAV, 1.13abc) (of the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) or the dichotomy of object and subject (grāhya-grāhaka)). They insist on such an existence because without it, the non-conceptual gnosis or knowledge (nirvikalpa-jñāna) that makes emptiness (śūnyatā) the object of cognition, which is the goal of the practitioner’s attainment, would be a false gnosis that makes nothingness the object of cognition. As a counterargument, Bhāviveka, in verses 95 and 106 of Chapter 5 of the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā and the Tarkajvālā, states,

TJ (introductory phrase to 5.95): Moreover, in your (i.e., in Yogācāra’s, the citator) doctrine,

MMK, 5.95: The inherent nature (svabhāva) that is both existence (bhāva) and the presence of nonexistence (abhāvasya bhāva) is the ultimate [nature of things]. If so, how can your doctrine be free from the extremes of affirming too much (samāropa) and negating too much (apavāda)?3

MMK, 5.106: The Buddhas, their minds similar to space, by means of non-dual (nirvikalpa) knowledge, see by way of non-seeing all the knowable things exactly as they are.

TJ (the last sentence of the commentary on the above verse): It is called ‘seeing’ for the purpose of designation (upacāra) [only], because [it sees] by way of non-seeing.4

Simply put, Bhāviveka’s claim can be distilled into two points. First, the idea of the existence of non-existence is wrong because it falls into the extremes of too much affirmation (samāropa) and too much negation (apavāda). Second, non-conceptual gnosis or right seeing means non-seeing.

Regarding this, it is worth noting that Hoornaert (2003, p. 149, footnote 35) states, “‘Seeing by way of non-seeing’ is the usual Madhyamaka way of characterizing the knowledge of reality as it is. This knowledge is ‘non-seeing’ because it is the absence of all the ordinary dual perceptions of things. Nevertheless, it is the only true ‘seeing’ of reality as it is”. Adopting terminologies in the PHT, while the Madhyamaka takes adarśana or “non-seeing” as its ultimate position, Yogācāra sets the goal of acquiring advayaṃ jñānam or “the non-dual gnosis” that exists ultimately. Soteriologically, therefore, the two schools disagree on the results of such a practice, although the PHT truly shares practice steps with Yogācāra in that it cites the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, which teaches the 11 stages (bhūmis) (PHT, D277aff.).

Let me go back to the PHT. My methodology in this paper was different from those of Lopez (1996) and Mathes (2021). First, alongside Tanjur’s representative D and P editions, I used the “T edition” (See T in PHT in Abbreviations and Horiuchi 2022, note 6) to create a critical version of the PHT. Second, I referred to the *Ārya-Saptaśatikāprajñāpāramitāṭīkā (D no. 3814, hereafter the SPT), another work by the same Vimalamitra (Lopez refers to the SPT for one passage in reading the PHT but not for the present passage5). Then, I consulted the rNgog, which is a sub-commentary to this PHT. Finally, I translated the Tibetan translation conjecturing the underlying Sanskrit original. These steps allow my understanding of the passage to be significantly different from those of previous translations.

2. Understanding of Previous Research

2.1. Background

Mathes seems to derive his interpretation above from Lopez (1996), which is the only PHT study he cites in his article. Lopez (1996) is a valuable contribution to the study of the PHT in that it translates the text that collates the D and P editions and surveys its cited sources, although not completely. Moreover, it provides paragraph divisions and clarifies controversies as far as the author understood them. Also worth noting is that Lopez’s translation is often a better resource than the subsequently published Japanese translation.6 However, as discussed in the Introduction, the lack of a methodology often leads to misunderstandings of the text’s meaning, which is especially true for this section.

Therefore, in Section 2.2, I will first present Lopez’s English translation for a comprehensive picture of the argument in that part as understood by the representative previous study. In doing so, I will make an appropriate segmentation of it for ease of reference in subsequent sections. First, since the passage in question consists of seven paragraphs in Lopez’s translation, I will identify them as [P1] (paragraph 1) and so on. In addition, I inserted [1], [2], and so on to indicate divisions within each paragraph (note that Lopez italicizes the title of the text and the phrase in the HS; notes 30–36 also exist in the said range, whose contents are referred to in the text below insofar as they are relevant to this paper). Moreover, [273b] and so on refer to the folio numbers of the D edition.

2.2. Lopez’s Translation of the PHT, D273a7–274b2

Lopez (1996, pp. 58.13–60.20):

[P1][1] Another enumeration is that imputed form, that is, the dependent nature, permanently and constantly lacks the imaginary nature, that is, the two natures of subject and object. [273b] [This lack or] emptiness is the form of reality, the consummate nature. [2] This³⁰ statement, emptiness is form, indicates that both the dependent and the consummate are identical because emptiness, the consummate nature, and form, the dependent nature, are determined to be identical. Therefore, it is just said that emptiness is form.

[P2][1] Having stated their identity from a positive standpoint, it is also stated from a negative standpoint. Emptiness is not other than form refutes their difference. [2] Because it is thoroughly established as unchanging and unmistaken, it is consummate. Because it is not made by potencies upon the conjunction of causes and conditions, it is unconditioned. Duality, which is other than that, is not established. [3] Because its continuum is not severed, it is permanent. It is the dharmakāya of the Mahāmuni [Buddha]; it exists ultimately.³¹ [4] It alone is the ultimate truth; thus it is said to be nirvāṇa, having the character of nonobscuration. [5] There is the famous statement that if this were not so,³² then all undertakings become meaningless.

[P3][1] How can those who assert that the nature of the dharmakāya as it was set forth³³ [above] understand it to exist ultimately,³⁴ when it is [in fact] dependent? [2] The self and so forth that are completely imagined [to exist] by the non-Buddhists (tīrthika) are either permanent or momentary. [3] If [one holds] the first position [i.e., that the self is permanent], how could there be particularities in the system of non-Buddhists such as the Vedāntins? [4] The Candrapradīpasamādhi (Moon Lamp Samādhi) says, “All phenomena are always empty of their own entity. Children of the Conqueror destroy true existence. All existence is empty in all ways. The trifling emptiness of the non-Buddhists. ...” [5] This is to be understood to ascribe faults to the non-Buddhists. [6] According to the second position [i.e., that the self is momentary], at a given time the prior moment is the cause of the subsequent moment. Because it has already been explained earlier that this has the fault of [the prior moment and later moment existing both at] the same time and at different times, it will not be discussed.

[P4][1] Such statements as “Whatever is one alone is the highest truth” [274a] is a case of indirect speech pertaining to entrance [into the teaching] (avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi)³⁵ for those who have a strong desire for nirvana. In that way, all of those are dispelled by the statement in the Akṣayamatinirdeśa: “But if conditioned phenomena do not exist, then, what is it that when refuted makes nirvana true?” It also says in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā (Perfection of Wisdom in 25,000 Stanzas) and so on, “I say that even the complete and perfect Buddha is like an illusion and a dream. Nirvāṇa is also like an illusion and a dream. But if there is some phenomenon that surpasses nirvana, it also is like an illusion and a dream.” [2] How undertakings become meaningful [although everything is empty] will be set forth below.

[P5][1] But if it is not asserted that the wisdom of the nonduality of object and subject ultimately exists, why is it not nonexistent? [2] It is not, because it is asserted to be dependently arisen conventionally and because it has passed beyond being ultimately existent or nonexistent. [3] Existence is overcome. The conception of nonexistence, the view that nothing exists in that way, is the extreme of annihilation; father does not exist, mother does not exist, this world does not exist, the next world does not exist, the fructifying of auspicious and faulty actions does not exist. If such deprecating characterizations of the truths, the jewels, and so forth are sinful, what is the appropriate view in the system of the exceedingly pure Mādhyamikas? [4] The Ratnāvalī (Garland of Jewels) [1.55] says in response, “Having thought a mirage to be water and then having gone there, it would simply be stupid to hold that ’Water does not exist.’” And [1.60], “Those who rely on enlightenment have no nihilistic thought, assertion, or behavior. How can they be considered nihilists?”³⁶

[P6][1] Objection: Because existence is refuted, is nonexistence not entailed? [2] If nonexistence is refuted, why is existence not entailed? [3] If those who assert that the knowledge of nonduality ultimately exists apprehend with their consciousnesses the operation of different causes, [274b] how is this nondual? [4] Furthermore, if it is not held to be ultimately existent, how can it be omniscient? This fault of yours is similar [to the non-Buddhists’].

[P7][1] Answer: It is not the case. Not seeing ultimate existence is seeing reality; not seeing water in a mirage is not a case of being endowed with ignorance. As it is said, “Not seeing form is seeing form.” And the Samādhirāja (King of Samādhis) says, “Not seeing anything is seeing all phenomena. [2] …7

2.3. General Comments on Lopez’s Translation

Lopez’s translation uses the notations “Objection:” and “Answer:” when he considers that a counterargument exists, but in this long quote, he only makes it explicit in two places: in [P6] and [P7]. The other paragraph divisions indicate that Lopez observes a semantic break, but at least he does not seem to consider them as counterarguments; therefore, he must have understood that the rest of the passage except [P6] and [P7] are developments of Vimalamitra’s opinion. Since Lopez, the only preceding English translation, translated it in this way, it is no surprise that Mathes understood that Vimalamitra’s opinions were expressed in the relevant passages. The passage that Mathes (2021) highlights as Vimalamitra’s view is found in [P2][5]. However, according to my understanding, the above passage presents the view of Yogācāra, Vimalamitra’s opponent, which he criticizes in [P3][1] and below. To further strengthen the point, the above passages include a fierce debate between Yogācāra and Vimalamitra as a Mādhyamika, an advocate of the Madhyamaka doctrine, consisting of five parts.

Furthermore, I aim to examine the rNgog’s synoptical understanding of the PHT passage in question by contrasting it with that of Lopez (see Appendix A for the Tibetan text in contrast with the PHT text).

The rNgog includes [P2][5] in the opponents, namely, the Yogācāra view ((i) in

Table 1. The rNgog’s and Lopez’s understanding of the paragraph of the PHT (D273a7–274b2), which the rNgog calls “the denial of the other’s system, which is the second [explanation on the particularity of emptiness]”.

rNgog’s Synopsis	Lopez’s Paragraph
(i) the setting up of the qualities of the emptiness of/by others	[P1][1] to the end of [P2]
(ii) the refutation of it	[P3]–[P4][1] *
(iii) there is no fault of the nihilism for those who do not admit the non-dual gnosis	[P5]–[P6][2]
(iv) omniscience is illogical for those who admit it (i.e., the non-dual gnosis)	[P6][3] to the end of [P7]

* The rNgog is deficient in that it lacks the position for the last sentence of [P4][1] and [2]. I explain this in note 29.

above), which alone is sufficient as a counterargument to Mathes. However, since the rNgog requires further examination as well, we will analyze the PHT’s Tibetan texts in more detail below.

Notably, Horiuchi (2022) believed that [P1][1] presents the Yogācāra perspective and that [P1][2] and [P1][3] are Vimalamitra’s refutations of it. In this paper, we will position [P1][1] to [3] as a “prelude” and perform an analysis starting from [P1][4].

3. Analysis of the Dispute between Mādhyamika and Yogācāra

3.1. Structure

This section investigates the discussions in the PHT. First, I explain my understanding of the overall picture of these discussions in

Table 2. My understanding of the subject and speaker of the passage: in contrast to the rNgog and Lopez.

Topic	Speaker and the Location of D	The rNgog’s Synopsis	Lopez’s Paragraph
Prelude: On the perfected nature (PN)	[Y] (D273a7–)	(i) the setting up of the qualities of the emptiness by others	[P1][1]
	[V] (D273b1–)		[P1][2][3]
Dispute 1: Further debate on the PN	[Y] (D273b3–)		[P2][1]–[5]
	[V] (D273b4–)	(ii) the refutation of it	[P3]–[P4][2]
Dispute 2: On the non-dual gnosis	[Y] (D274a3–)	(iii) there is no fault of nihilism for those who do not admit the non-dual gnosis	[P5][1]
	[V] (D274a3–)		[P5][2]
Dispute 3: Is Madhyamaka nihilism? (1)	[Y] (D274a4–)		[P5][3]
	[V] (D274a5–)		[P5][4]
(2)	[Y] (D274a7–)		[P6][1]
	[V] (D274a7–)		[P6][2]
Dispute 4: Non-dual gnosis and omniscience	[V] (D274a7–)	(iv) omniscience is illogical for those who admit it (i.e., the non-dual gnosis)	[P6][3]
	[Y] (D274b1–)		[P6][4]
	[V] (D274b1–2)		[P7][1]

Y = Yogācāra; V = Vimalamitra.

; there are four debates between Vimalamitra and Yogācāra regarding the perfected nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva) or non-dual gnosis (*advayaṃ jñānam).

The following presents my English translations and interpretations of the relevant PHT passages in due order. I include the corresponding Tibetan text in Appendix A, where I discuss philological problems in the notes. As indicated in Section 2.2, I will mention Lopez’s translation in the form [P2][5], for instance. I occasionally cite the English translation in the analysis.

3.2. Dispute 1: Further Debate on the Perfected Nature

3.2.1. The Yogācāra View of the Perfected Nature

[Y]

[Y](1) Furthermore, it (de, i.e., pariniṣpannasvabhāva, or the perfected nature) is perfected (*pariniṣpanna) because of unchangeable and non-erroneous perfection (*avikārāviparītapariniṣpattyā). Simply put, it is unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta) because it is not created by being capable after the combination of the causes and conditions.8 The two (gnyis, i.e., parikalpita and paratantra), other than that (i.e., pariniṣpanna), are not perfected.9

The phrase de yang found at the beginning does not clearly indicate the start of the opponent’s argument. However, the first sentence here also seems to be based on Maitreya-Asaṅga’s Madhyāntavibhāga (MAV), Vasubandhu’s Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya (MAVBh), and Sthiramati’s Triṃśikābhāṣya (TrBh), suggesting that this is a Yogācāra statement. Based on this, I assumed the Sanskrit above.

TrBh, 124.8 ad., Triṃśikā (Tr), v. 21cd: It (sa, i.e., niṣpanna in the Tr, v. 21c or pariniṣpannasvabhāva, or the perfected nature) is perfected because of unchangeable perfection.

avikārapariniṣpattyā sa pariniṣpannaḥ |

MAV 3.11 and its commentary MAVBh (Nagao 1964, 41.22–42.1): Because of the perfection of being unchanging and without error, the perfected nature is twofold.

(3.11)

The perfected is unconditioned because its perfection is unchanging. Furthermore, [the perfected] is conditioned because of its perfection of being without error since it is non-erroneous regarding things to be known.

nirvikārāviparyāsapariniṣpattito dvayaṃ ||

(3.11)

asaṃskṛtam avikārapariniṣpattyā pariniṣpannaṃ|saṃskṛtaṃ mārgasatyasaṃgṛhītam aviparyāsapariniṣpattyā punar jñeyavastuny aviparyāsāt |

This is a general explanation of pariniṣpanna in the Yogācāra school, which is characterized further below:

[Y](2) [It is] eternal (*nitya) since it is not interrupted. It is the dharmakāya of the great Sage (*mahāmuni), that which exists ultimately (*paramārthasat).

[Y](3) Precisely that is only one (ekam eva) and supreme (para) truth (satya).10 Namely, it is called the nirvāṇa, which has a nature of non-confusion (*asaṃmoṣadharma-nirvāṇa).

[Y](4) If it is not the case, all efforts would be meaningless. Thus (from [Y](1) up to [Y](4)) they (i.e., Yogācāra) say.

Cf. Lopez ([P2][5] = above[Y](4)): There is the famous statement that if this were not so, then all undertakings become meaningless.

It must be clear that what Mathes (2021) refers to in his statements cited in the Introduction corresponds to [Y](1)(2). However, unlike Mathes, I consider all the above paragraphs as assertions of Yogācāra, the counterargument for Vimalamitra, for three reasons.

First, [Y](2) apparently echoes Vasubandhu’s Tr.

Tr v. 30 (TrBh, 138.8–9): Precisely that11 is dhātu (source/cause) that is without depravity, inconceivable, wholesome, eternal, and pleasant. This is the body of liberation; this is the dharma[kāya] of the great sage.

sa evānāsravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ |

sukho vimuktikāyo ’sau dharmākhyo ’yaṃ mahāmuneḥ ||

Second, a serious problem in the previous studies lies in [Y](4). Although Lopez translates zhes zer ba grag ste P or zhes zer ro zhes grags te D as “the famous statement”, no such notable reference exists to the best of my knowledge, and neither does Lopez indicate the source. In addition, Lopez seems to have understood the scope of “the famous statement” as only one line. However, the rNgog and Horiuchi (2022) had different interpretations. That is, the word grag apparently means the end of the passage of the opponent’s opinion12 instead of “the famous statement”. Furthermore, the next sentence starts with the phrase de la bshad pa, suggesting that it is a response by the author (see the next section).

Third, the following section shows that Vimalamitra replies to or refutes [Y](2) to [Y](4) one by one, although this is not mentioned by other studies.

3.2.2. Reply to [Y](1)(2) by Vimalamitra 1

The rNgog states that the following paragraph is classified as a refutation of the theories of the other school (see Table 2 above):

[V](1) [We will] reply to this (de la bshad pa, *tatrocyate/atrocyate). Let the characteristics of the dharmakāya that is explained before [by you Yogācāra] be so (*kāmam), [but] what on earth is it to say “ultimately existent”?13

For, (a) it (i.e., ultimately existent thing) is either eternal (*nitya) like the self (*ātman) and so on that non-Buddhist imagine (b) or momentary (*kṣaṇika). [However, neither is the case.]

Despite Lopez’s ([P3][1]) failure to translate it, de la bshad pa apparently suggests that the author’s reply begins here, which is why the rNgog divided the paragraph here.14 Moreover, Lopez’s fatal mistake is that he understood the subject of the last line as “the self and so forth”, which is impossible because de (that) is clearly the subject of the sentence here, and bdag la sogs pa bzhin du (like the self and so on) cannot be understood as the subject. Moreover, from the context, it is clear that the de pertains to something that exists ultimately. Incidentally, another problem with Lopez is that non-Buddhists who say that the self or ātman exists never claim it to be momentary.

Meanwhile, based on my understanding, the larger context here and thereafter is that Vimalamitra presents two alternatives, (a) and (b), to the Yogācāra claim of “what ultimately exists” and shows that neither is tenable. Thus, the scope of the Yogācāra theory criticized here is directly below [Y](2). However, the preceding sentence, [Y](1), may also be regarded as being criticized hereafter as a general statement of Yogācāra according to the understanding of the rNgog. In any case, the SPT, another work by Vimalamitra, validates my interpretation, which will be discussed in Section 3.2.4.

3.2.3. Reply to [Y](1)(2) by Vimalamitra 2

(a’) In the case of the first position (i.e., that the dharmakāya that ultimately exists is eternal (*nitya)), (i) what difference does this (’di, i.e., the Yogācāra doctrine or what ultimately exists) have from the established doctrine (*siddhānta) of such as Vedāntavādins? (ii) Also, how can one understand what is said in the *Candrapradīpasamādhi (=Samādhirāja):

“The sons of the Victorious ones (i.e., bodhisattvas) observe thing[s] clearly: all elements are always empty of own nature. All existence is empty in all manners. [On the other hand,] the emptiness of non-Buddhists is partial?”

(iii) Moreover, how can one impute faults to non-Buddhists?

Cf. Lopez ([P3][3]): If [one holds] the first position [i.e., that the self is permanent], how could there be particularities in the system of non-Buddhists such as the Vedāntins? …

Examining the subject of this sentence, I observe that Lopez is wrong because he understood it as the self or the position that the self is permanent, succeeding in his previous misunderstanding. Lopez also fails to translate the word “this” (’di), which I believe refers to the Yogācāra theory since it is contrasted with the established doctrine of Vedāntavādin, among others. Alternatively, from a context perspective, it can also be something that exists ultimately. In any case, my understanding is that Vimalamitra is arguing here that the Yogācāra theory would be indistinguishable from that of non-Buddhists.

Furthermore, although Lopez has an opposite understanding of (iii), it is clear that the Tibetan (iii) mu stegs can rnams la yang ji ltar skyon gdags/ is a rhetorical question. That is, Vimalamitra asserts that if the dharmakāya is approved to exist ultimately, then letting non-Buddhists know of their faults or attributing faults to them would no longer be possible. Note that although (i) and (iii) appear similar, they are different: the former means that the theory would be the same as that of non-Buddhists, while the latter means that it would be impossible to inform non-Buddhists of their faults or impute such faults to them.

Worth noting here is that Vimalamitra criticizes Yogācāra, treating them equally to non-Buddhists.

3.2.4. Vimalamitra’s Refutation of Yogācāra in the SPT and Its Ideological Background

Furthermore, although not previously pointed out, Vimalamitra’s SPT argues the following as a criticism of the theory that non-dual gnosis (gnyis su med pa’i ye shes, *advayaṃ jñānam or advayajñānam) ultimately exists:

SPT, D ma 60b2–4, P72a8–73b3:

There are many faults in approving (/for those who approve) that non-dual gnosis ultimately exists. Namely,

(1) To be an advocator of partial emptiness like non-Buddhists;

(2) If many Tathāgatas know those non-dual gnoses, [they] will possess grasped (*grāhya, object) and grasper (*grāhaka, subject); and

(3) There will be no gnosis [for Tathāgatas] if [they] do not know15 what ultimately exists.

Meanwhile (ni, *tu), there is no fault on the part of the one who does not cognize what does not ultimately exist. That is, one is not ignorant because of the non-seeing of a horse and so on in a dream when they have woken up [from the dream].16

Point (1) is precisely the argument that the PHT was making in quoting the Candrapradīpa. Point (2) asserts that since the gnosis that knows the non-dual gnosis is subjective and the non-dual gnosis is objective, it would no longer be called the non-dual gnosis. For the last point, its main argument is as follows: If a person wakes up, they do not see the horse they encountered in their dream. In that case, their inability to see the horse does not mean that they are ignorant. Likewise, one’s failure to recognize something that is not ultimately existent is not an indication of their ignorance.

Since it is the dharmakāya that was mentioned in the PHT, we must discuss its relation with the non-dual gnosis. First, Dignāga’s Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārtha 1ab states as follows:

The perfection of wisdom is the non-dual gnosis. It (the perfection of wisdom) is the tathāgata.

prajñāpāramitā jñānam advayaṃ sā tathāgataḥ |

Second, according to Haribhadra’s (9C) Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā (AAA), the former is said to be of the essence of the latter,17 suggesting an inseparable link between the two. Second, while the dharmakāya as a concept is mentioned at the early stage of the Mahāyāna, the non-dual gnosis is particularly discussed around the time of Vimalamitra. From a broader history of thought, whether or not this non-dual gnosis is regarded as ultimately existent is a key element of the conflict between Yogācāra, especially its Alīkākāravāda (the theory that images are false) school, and Madhyamaka. This is most evident in the writings of Kamalaśīla, a senior contemporary of Vimalamitra.

Kajiyama (1978, pp. 136–38) explains that in the BhK (pp. 210–11), Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of the three verses of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (LAS, 10.256–258) makes a stepwise positioning of Buddhist schools. These verses are discussed in Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti and Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā and are the subject of debate by various researchers (see Ichigō 2011, p. 35, fn. 168; and Keira 2019, etc.). Here, I will cite a brief overview by Keira (2004):

As evidenced by his quotation of LAS X 256–257, Kamalaśīla seems to see meditation as involving the following stages: (1) In reliance upon the Yogācāra position (i.e., Satyākāravāda), yogins transcend the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika positions that external objects are really existent; (2) Taking the Alīkākāravāda, yogins abide in the non-dual cognition and transcend the Satyākāravāda, i.e., the position that the aspects of cognition are really existent; (3) Eliminating the attachment to the real existence of the non-dual cognition, yogins abide in the Madhyamika meditation and “see the Mahāyāna”.

(Keira 2004, p. 76)

Furthermore, by extracting passages in the BhK I, we confirm that such non-dual gnosis is the point that separates (2) and (3):

A passage relating to (2): BhK I, 211.9–10: One should overcome the appearance that is the grasper (i.e., subject). This means one should abide by the non-dual gnosis that is precisely the non-appearance of the two (subject and object).

grāhakam ākāram arikramet | dvayanirābhāsa evādvayajñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ |

A passage relating (3): BhK I, 211.14–16: With regard to the nondual gnosis as well, one should abandon the clinging of its being an entity. This means one should abide by the gnosis that is precisely the non-appearance of the non-dual gnosis.

tatrāpy advayajñāne vastutvābhiniveśaṃ tyajet, advayajñāna-nirābhāsa eva jñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ|

In (2), there is a statement that one should abide by the non-dual gnosis, but this is tentative, and as Keira notes, Kamalaśīla’s ultimate position is to get over it.

However, Kamalaśīla’s adopting the Alīkākāravāda does not mean that the Mādhyamikas would accept something like nondual cognition (advayajñāna) as being really existent, as would a bona fide Yogācāra of the Alīkākāra school. For Kamalaśīla all mental states would remain conventional entities.

(Keira 2004, p. 46)

The above discussion can be summarized in terms of Vimalamitra’s position in the history of thought as follows. Vimalamitra, like Kamalaśīla, was critical of the theory that dharmakāya and non-dual gnosis ultimately exist, which implies Vimalamitra’s espousal of a Madhyamaka position, and since Kamalaśīla positively positioned Yogācāra as a stage of practice, while Vimalamitra made no such argument, one can evaluate Vimalamitra as a purer Mādhyamika than Kamalaśīla.

3.2.5. Reply to [Y](1)(2) by Vimalamitra 3

(b’) Or, if it is like the second position [i.e., that the dharmakāya that ultimately exists is momentary (*kṣaṇika)], then the previous moment is the cause of the later moment. With regard to this, I have previously (sngar) explained the fault of a simultaneous and different time. Therefore, I will not state [it] furthermore.

Lopez ([P3][6]) translates the first part as “According to the second position [i.e., that the self is momentary] ...”, which is incorrect. Moreover, “previously (sngar)” refers to the discussion in the PHT (D272b6–273a1), which precedes this part (D273b7). I will cite Horiuchi’s (2022) translation:

When a thing (i.e., an effect) arises, it can either (i) arise at the same time as the cause or (ii) arise at a different time.

(i’) In the case of the first position (simultaneous arising), [there are three absurdities:] (a) cause and effect, i.e., all of the preceding and following positions, would be perceived simultaneously, (b) cause and effect would be indistinguishable, and (c) an eon (*kalpa) would be a moment.

(ii’) As for the second position (arising at different times), since the two, namely, causes and effects do not unite simultaneously, there is no capacity (nus pa med) [for the cause]. Therefore, it follows that there are no causes. If there are no causes, it follows that [things] always exist or [always] do not exist. For there is no other thing on which [they] rely. If they rely on [something], then things would be temporary.

[However,] there can be no third position. The two [positions] of simultaneity and at different times abide, mutually excluding each other.

Therefore, Vimalamitra is arguing here that a similar fault occurs when claiming that the dharmakāya that ultimately exists is momentary.

To summarize the argument from Section 3.2.1, Vimalamitra asserts that it is irrational whether the dharmakāya that ultimately exists is eternal or momentary. Thus, he is denying the ultimate existence of dharmakāya, which is a Yogācāra theory. Therefore, I conclude that Vimalamitra is doing the exact opposite of Mathes’s (2021) assessment in the Introduction.

3.2.6. Reply to [Y](3) by Vimalamitra

[V](2) (Reply to [Y](3)) What [you (i.e., Yogācāra) have] said (in [Y](3)): “[it is] the only one supreme truth (*ekam eva paraṃ satyam)” is also an intentional speech for the sake of entrance [into the teaching] (*avatāraṇa-abhisaṃdhi) for those who wish nirvāṇa. Namely, all of them are denied by the statement in the Akṣayamati[nirdeśa]:

“Or, since there is no conditioned, what is to be destroyed to make nirvāṇa true?”

In the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (PSP) too, it is said,

“The supreme right awakening is also like a dream and illusion. Nirvāṇa is also like dream and illusion. Even if there is something other than the dharma that is nirvāṇa, I say that that is also like dream and illusion.”

The reference here is to the avatāraṇābhisaṃdhi, one of the four abhisaṃdhis preached in Yogācāra texts such as the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (MSA), as Lopez ([P4][1]) correctly assumes (for details, see Lopez 1996, p. 59, fn. 35). According to its commentary, the MSABh, this is expedient teaching that pertains to the hearers (śrāvakas) or hearer [vehicle, yāna] for whom the existence of rūpa (form, or form and color), among others, is taught so that they enter the teaching without fear.18

Here, Lopez overlooks the reference in the previous passage ([Y](3)) and therefore mistakes the subject here as “whatever is one alone”. However, according to my understanding, this is a criticism of Yogācāra theory stated in the [Y](3): de nyid gcig kho na dam (dam] PT; don dam D) pa bden pa ste.19 Hence, I understand the subject of this sentence as “that which exists ultimately” or “the dharmakāya”.

A further examination of the contents of this passage shows that the quote in the Akṣayamatinirdeśa is challenging. The na in med na can certainly be read as a subjunctive (if) but can also be read as a reason (since).20 Furthermore, given that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, immediately following, states that everything is like a dream, the Akṣayamatinirdeśa can be read as “since the conditioned is not existent”, that is, because they are like an illusion or dream. In addition, it seems that in quoting the sūtra, Vimalamitra intended to say that no nirvāṇa exists ultimately. In conjunction, the point of Vimalamitra’s statement must be as follows: the claim that nirvāṇa or dharmakāya is “the only one supreme truth” found in Yogācāra is expedient teaching to lead Yogācāra, namely, those who cling to nirvāṇa or dharmakāya as real, into the teachings.

More to the point, Vimalamitra criticizes the opponent (Yogācāra) here by using the opponent’s technical term. Furthermore, Yogācāra uses this term to claim that the Hearer Vehicle or Śrāvakayāna is expedient teaching for Yogācāra. If this is the case, then Vimalamitra is essentially arguing that Yogācāra is expedient for Madhyamaka. Hence, we can read into Vimalamitra’s aforementioned harsh criticism toward Yogācāra.

3.2.7. Reply to [Y](4) by Vimalamitra

[V](3) (Reply to [Y](4)) How the effort [for nirvāṇa] becomes meaningful [although nirvāṇa is like a dream, i.e., does not exist ultimately] will be set forth later (’og nas).

This sentence is clearly a response to [Y](4) despite not being clearly mentioned in the previous translation (cf. Lopez, [P4][1]). Furthermore, although absent in the previous translation, as a detailed reading of this PHT will show, and as the rNgog points out elsewhere, ’og nas (later) is supposed to refer to PHT, D276b6ff, which is later compared to here (D274a3). The associated discussion in the PHT is lengthy, so I will instead draw on the rNgog’s explanation of which Horiuchi (2019a, p. 134) provided an edition and a Japanese translation.

The rNgog: The “if” etc. [in the PHT, D276b3] is a question that states, “If there are no elements in the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramitā), on which one relies (the object of relying on), and in the supreme right awakening (anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi), for which one relies upon (the purpose for relying on), then the effort will be meaningless.

The reply [by Vimalamitra] is that “it is taught [in the HS] that ’since there are no obstacles in the mind (cittāvaraṇanāstitvāt),’” and so on [in PHT, D276b6ff.]. This means that it is not the case that the fruit of one’s effort is to attain the perfection of wisdom or the supreme right awakening as those which are truly existent. Rather, the result is only the abandonment of error (*viparyāsa). Simply put, this means the abandonment of the attachment as truth regarding the element that is not perfected.21

Here, bden par mngon par zhen pa, or attachment as truth, must be equivalent to the famous phrase bden ’dzin or bden par ’dzin pa (grasping as real [of what in fact is not]) (cf. Zanghan Dacidian, p. 1372). In short, Vimalamitra argues that it is not the case that something real is obtained as a fruit of practice, but only errors are abandoned. This is another point of decisive conflict between Vimalamitra as a Mādhyamika and Yogācāra, which insists that the dharmakāya and nirvāṇa exist ultimately. However, this raises the question of whether such a position is considered nihilism. Below is a Yogācāra rebuttal to such a point of view.

3.3. Dispute 2: On the Non-Dual Gnosis

According to the rNgog, this paragraph pertains to “(iii) there is no fault of the nihilism for those who do not admit the non-dual gnosis”.

[Y] If you do not admit that the non-dual gnosis (*advayaṃ jñānam) which is free from [the dichotomy of] object and subject (*grāhyagrāhakavinirmukta) ultimately (*paramārthatas) exists, will it not be non-existent?

[V] No, it will not. (i) Since we admit the existence of dependent origination conventionally (*saṃvṛtitas). (ii) And since it (i.e., non-dual gnosis) is beyond existence and non-existence ultimately ([based on T]) (/there also exists (yang yod pa) something that is beyond existence and non-existence ultimately [based on DP]).

[V] mi ’gyur te/ (i) kun rdzob tu rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba khas len pa’i phyir dang/ (ii) don dam par yang yod pa dang med pa las ’das pa’i (pa’i] T; pa yang yod pa’i DP) phyir ro//

Cf. Lopez’s translation of [V]: It is not, because it is asserted to be dependently arisen conventionally and because it has passed beyond being ultimately existent or nonexistent.

In the above dispute, the subject is non-dual gnosis. Hence, like Lopez, it should also be adopted as the underlying subject in [V]. While (i) can only be translated as above, like Lopez, I understand it to mean that non-dual gnosis exists conventionally as something that has dependently emerged. We recall Keira’s passage that I cited before: “For Kamalaśīla all mental states would remain conventional entities” (Keira 2004, p. 46).

Meanwhile, (ii) differs between DP and T. If one adopts the DP reading, does this not mean that the Mādhyamika is acknowledging something that exists ultimately? Although this point seems ambiguous in Madhyamaka thought, it does not contradict Vimalamitra’s basic tenet even in that case, as we will see in Section 3.5. This is because he states that the non-seeing (*adarśana) of something that exists ultimately is the seeing of reality. Moreover, what DP says is that something that ultimately exists is beyond existence and non-existence. Therefore, even if one adopts DP, Vimalamitra remains opposed to the Yogācāra idea that the non-dual gnosis ultimately exists. In contrast, T states that from the ultimate perspective, non-dual gnosis is beyond existence and non-existence. Lopez seems to have understood it latterly. Here I read it according to T.

3.4. Dispute 3: Is Madhyamaka Nihilism? (1)

3.4.1. Objection by Yogācāra

[Y] The grasping of non-existence, after having denied existence, is the view of nihilism (*nāsti-dṛṣṭi), namely, the extreme (*anta) of the cutting off (*uccheda) in the following manner: “Father does not exist. Mother does not exist. This world does not exist. The next world does not exist. The maturation of the fruit of the well-conducted and badly conducted actions do not exist.” Moreover, it is that kind of wicked [view of nihilism] (*pāpakā [nāsti-dṛṣṭi]), characterized by the denial of the [four] truths (*satya) and [three] treasures (*ratna), etc. Therefore, how could [“the grasping of non-existence, after having denied the existence” or “the view of nihilism”] be the very pure system of the Mādhyamikas [as you claim yourself to be]?

While Lopez ([P5][3]) does not so translate it, lta skabs ga la yod is understood as a rhetorical question.22 The point of my reading here is that Yogācāra criticizes its opponent, a Mādhyamika or Vimalamitra, as a nihilist who denies the very foundations of Buddhism and is scathing in its assertion that the Madhyamaka doctrine is hardly a pure view. Not only Vimalamitra but also the Yogācāra side has been waging even more caustic commentary against their opponents in the PHT.

3.4.2. Vimalamitra’s Response

[V] [It (i.e., Yogācāra objection)] is answered in the Ratnāvalī (RV), which says,

“If somebody, after having thought of the mirage as ‘this is water,’ went there (i.e., to the mirage), and would think that ‘that water does not exist,’ he is precisely a fool (1.55).”

And,

“If they are advocators of nothingness [who say that] ‘because of the dependence of awakening, there is no statement, doing, and mind in reality,’ how can they be regarded as nihilists? (1.60).”

As Lopez has identified, the above are citations from Nāgārjuna’s RV, 1.55 and 60. Let us now analyze the dispute here. Yogācāra states that “the grasping of non-existence, after having denied the existence,23 is the view of nihilism (*nāsti-dṛṣṭi)”. If this were the view of the Madhyamaka school, then it would be considered nihilism. The intention of Vimalamitra’s response to Yogācāra with this scripture quote may be to argue that Madhyamaka would not do such a foolish thing. With regard to the second passage, I quote Tucci’s (1936) appropriate commentary on the English translation of the RV verse:

Of course, all this* from the standpoint of absolute truth, not from that of conventional truth. Nihilism is in fact, affirmation of a negation, but for Nāgārjuna truth is beyond either negation or affirmation.

(Tucci 1936, p. 321)

*: sic. add “is”

3.4.3. Dispute 3: Is Madhyamaka Nihilism? (2)

[Y] Since you [Mādhyamika] deny the existence, it would be non-existence.

[V] Since [you, Yogācāra] deny non-existence, why wouldn’t it be precisely existence? [It would be existent.]

[Y] ji ste yod pa nyid bkag pa’i phyir med pa nyid du ’gyur ro zhe na/

[V] med pa nyid du (du] DP; φ T) bkag pa’i phyir yod pa nyid du yang ci’i phyir mi ’gyur/

Lopez headlines the beginning of the above as “Objection” and considers the following four sentences as statements by the opponent ([P6][1]–[4]), followed by “Answer” in [P7][1]. However, my understanding is that the first two sentences above consist of a question by the opponent ([P6][1]=[Y[ogācāra]]) and a reply by Vimalamitra ([P6][2]=[V[imalamitra]]).

I will present a finding that supports my interpretation. The above is in prose, but a verse that contains the same content is found in the RV, I.59, which is a previous verse quoted immediately above.

syād astidūṣaṇād asya nāstitākṣipyate ’rthataḥ |

nāstitādūṣanād evaṃ kasmān nākṣipyate ’stitā || RV, 1.59||

gal te yod pa sun phyung bas// don gyis ’di ni med par bslan//

de bzhin med pa sun phyung bas// yod par ci yi phyir mi bslan//

Tucci’s (1936, p. 321) translation: If you object that by the refutation of existence its non-existence is logically implicit, why then refutation of non-existence would not imply existence?

Because words such as arthataḥ and evam are not translated, they cannot be directly quoted from the RV. The fact that v. 59 is quoted after v. 60 is also puzzling since the quotation of the RV, 1.60, is immediately followed by a clause that concludes it in the previous paragraph. Incidentally, the PHT’s colophon identifies Vimalamitra as one of the translators of the text into Tibetan (Lopez 1996, p. 70); a mistranslation or confusion here is unlikely. If this is the case, one can reasonably assume that Vimalamitra formed a dispute inspired by v. 59, although its content is linked to the earlier dispute 3. Since Tucci’s footnote on v. 59 properly summarizes this passage’s contents, I will quote it:

That is, it is impossible to affirm existence or non-existence, because this affirmation implies logically its contrary.

(Tucci 1936, p. 321, fn. 1)

Since some doubt has been cast on Nāgārjuna’s authorship regarding the RV, and since it is widely known that the Madhyamaka school did not clearly form before Bhāviveka, the RV’s opponent is likely one of the proponents of emptiness or a nihilist rather than Yogācāra as opposed to Madhyamaka. Meanwhile, the PHT situates this content in the context of the counterargument between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, so I added the above supplement to clarify who the speaker is. In any case, this is a typical response to the charge of nihilism made against proponents of emptiness, which stems around Nāgārjuna’s time.

3.5. Dispute 4: Non-Dual Gnosis and Omniscience

The rNgog identifies the subject here as “(iv) omniscience is illogical for those who admit it (i.e., the non-dual gnosis)”.

[V] With regard to [your (Yogācāra’s)] claim that the non-dual gnosis exists ultimately too, when the gnosis grasps those that are caused to exist by different causes, how can there be non-duality? Or you might argue (’on te):

[Y] If one does not grasp something that ultimately exists, how will there be omniscience (*sarvajñatā)? [Thus] for you (Vimalamitra as a Mādhyamika) too, this fault will be the same.

[V] [No,] it will not. (i) [For us,] non-seeing (*adarśana) of something that exists ultimately is the seeing of reality (*tattva). (ii) It is not the case that the non-seeing of water in a mirage is together with ignorance. (iii) As it taught:

“Precisely the non-seeing of rūpa is the seeing of rūpa”

and so on. Moreover, in the Samādhirāja too, it is taught:

“Nonseeing of whatsoever is the seeing of all elements (dharmas).”

Cf. Lopez’s translation of the last sentence of [Y]: This fault of yours is similar [to the non-Buddhists’].

The first sentence would indicate that if one sees different things, then that gnosis cannot be considered non-dual. Next, there is a discussion of omniscience (*sarvajñatā), which Yogācāra understands as grasping something that ultimately exists. Meanwhile, [V](i) presents Vimalamitra’s standpoint, which I will discuss later.

[V](ii) may directly follow the RV, 1.55, cited in Section 3.4.2, but it also echoes the SPT cited in Section 3.2.4: “Namely, one is not ignorant due to the non-seeing of a horse and so on in a dream when he has woken up [from the dream]”. This is also notable as a different position of Vimalamitra as a Mādhyamika as opposed to Yogācāra.

Now, Horiuchi (2022) focuses on the description in [V](iii). Studies reveal that the same idea can be found in many works. First, Mimaki (1982, p. 246) notes that the sūtra cited in the BhK I (below) is similar to the Dharmasaṃgītisūtra. Ichigō (2011, p. 36, fn. 171; 2015, pp. 68–70) pointed out that the sūtra is also cited in Śikṣāsamuccaya, Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti, and Madhyamakāloka.

Ārya-dharmasaṃgīti-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra (P no. 904, 74b): bcom ldan ’das chos thams cad ma mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba’o//

Śāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya (Bendall ed., 264): adarśanaṃ bhagavan sarvadharmāṇāṃ {darśanaṃ} samyagdarśanam. (D no. 3940, 146b: bcom ldan ’das chos thams cad ma mthong ba ni yang dag pa (read par?) mthong ba’o//)

Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti (Ichigō 1985, p. 286): bcom ldan ’das chos thams cad mi mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba’o//

Translation of the above three sentences: O Bhagavat, non-seeing of all dharmas is the right seeing.

Kamalaśīla’s BhK I, 212: tathā coktaṃ sūtre. katamaṃ paramārthadarśanam? sarvadharmāṇām adarśanam iti.

Likewise, the sūtra also states, “What is the seeing of the ultimate? It is non-seeing of all dharmas”.

Based on this, I argued that the ultimate position of Vimalamitra (which Ichigō did not address) is consistent with theirs. Such an assessment would be appropriate with regard to [V](iii). However, although it was not pointed out therein (in Horiuchi 2022), Ichigō (2015, p. 70) identifies the originality of Haribhadra (9C) in that he replaces the object of non-seeing from “all dharmas” to an “ultimately existent thing”.

AAA, 640.23–24: Therefore, in this way, it is intended that precisely the nonseeing of an ultimately existent thing whatever is the seeing of reality.

tad evaṃ kasyacit pāramārthikasya bhāvasya prajñācakṣuṣā ’darśanam eva paramaṃ tattvadarśanam abhipretaṃ.

This is precisely the point that Vimalamitra presents in [V](i):

nonseeing (*adarśana) of something that exists ultimately is the seeing of the reality (*tattva).

don dam par yod pa mi mthong ba nyid de kho na (na] DP; na nyid T) mthong ba yin

The word abhipreta (intended) in the AAA is a term for when an author tries to deduce the hidden intention of a scripture or text; even in the PHT, [V](i) is Vimalamitra’s own interpretation, which is not found in or developed from the sūtra cited in [V](iii). In addition, as this paper has clarified, and especially as evident in [Y] above, Yogācāra believes that seeing an ultimately existing thing is the omniscience or right view. If this is the case, one may evaluate that while the Dharmasaṃgītisūtra and [V](iii) are general Madhyamaka descriptions of non-seeing, Vimalamitra’s intention or viewpoint revealed in [V](i) pinpointedly criticizes Yogācāra ideas; for all intents and purposes, Vimalamitra is a pure Mādhyamika thinker.

4. Conclusions

By thoroughly rereading passages in Vimalamitra’s PHT (D273b3–274b2), this paper has successfully deciphered the fierce debate between Yogācāra and Vimalamitra as a Mādhyamika, which can be divided into four deliberations. These are briefly stated as follows. In dispute 1, Yogācāra presents four opinions, with Vimalamitra adding criticisms in turn. The point is that he does not admit that the dharmakāya exists ultimately and that the results of practice do not become meaningless despite the lack of admission of the existence of such a thing. In dispute 2, Vimalamitra argues that even if one does not admit that non-dual gnosis (advayaṃ jñānam) ultimately exists, one does not fall into nihilism. In dispute 3, it is asserted that denying existence does not make one a nihilist. In dispute 4, Vimalamitra argues his standpoint that the “non-seeing (*adarśana) of something that exists ultimately is the seeing of reality (*tattva)”, whereas omniscience is illogical for those who admit the non-dual gnosis.

In each of these cases, what was seen was a scathing criticism of Yogācāra by Vimalamitra. Mathes (2021) asserts that Vimalamitra endorses Yogācāra’s views; however, this paper reveals the opposite—that is, Vimalamitra regards himself as a Mādhyamika and his opponent, Yogācāra, as irreconcilably at odds with him.

Although one of the disputes can be interpreted as a direct adaptation of Nāgārjuna’s Ratnāvalī, it is now clear that a more pointed debate over non-dual gnosis and non-seeing, terms that were being discussed at the time, also took place during Vimalamitra’s era.

My translation of the PHT presented here differed substantially from Lopez’s, but my understanding itself is also a result of going back and forth, which may recur in future. Moreover, a critical edition presented in Appendix A is only a hypothesis, and its creation does not indicate the establishment of a solid foundation. However, I have tried to present my arguments together with the source texts and other materials so that future studies can judge them. I believe that this paper certainly provides material for future Vimalamitra studies and on the Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka and Yogācāra debate.