Early Chinese Madhyamaka Ethics: Revisiting the Subtleties of Jizang’s Claim That “Grasses and Trees Possess Buddha-Nature”

Abstract

Taking Jiaxiang Jizang’s (嘉祥吉藏, 549–623) statement that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” (草木有佛性, cao mu you foxing) as an example of Early Chinese Madhyamaka ethics, I provide an analysis of the two main propositions of his claim and discuss the ethical significance thereof to highlight the characteristics of Early Chinese Madhyamaka ethics. Although the two propositions appear contradictory in a literal sense, differing criteria are employed in each to establish whether or not grasses and trees and sentient beings possess Buddha-nature—namely, dependent origination and emptiness in the first and non-attainment in the second. I also point out that the ethical significance of the first proposition exhibits a shift from ontology to moral awareness and then to moral disposition as the practitioner in moral accomplishment, while the approach of the second proposition is instead an ontological inquiry into the origins of morality, with an ethical outlook founded on the soteriological aspect of self-discipline. I conclude by showing that no single theory of Western ethics can be suitably applied to the Chinese Madhyamaka ethics of Jizang, as any such attempt would prove incompatible with his philosophical standpoint of non-attainment.

1. Introduction

Recent years have seen a proliferation of research into Buddhist ethics; however, international academic discourse focused on the Chinese Buddhist tradition is less plentiful.1 There are some studies on Chinese Buddhist ethics that have been published by Chinese academics; however, there is still much scope for delving into and elaborating on various standpoints.2 For example, there is hardly any discussion on the ethical perspectives of the Early Chinese Madhyamaka (Three Treatise School, 三論宗 san lun zong). In order to contribute to this topic, this article will present the views on Buddha-nature advanced by the founder of the Early Chinese Madhyamaka, Jiaxiang Jizang (嘉祥吉藏, 549–623), as a paradigm of Early Chinese Madhyamaka ethics.

At the heart of this study is Jizang’s provocative assertion that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” (草木有佛性, cao mu you fo xing). I contend that this is not merely a metaphysical hypothesis but rather a philosophically grounded claim rooted in his understanding of dependent origination, emptiness, and the doctrine of non-attainment. For Jizang, Buddha-nature is not an inherent essence universally possessed but a potentiality realized only through the correct insight into emptiness. This paper argues that this realization is a necessary condition for the attainment of Buddha-nature and gives rise to a distinctive ethical vision. This vision takes the form of a dynamic moral model—one that integrates non-attainment, moral discernment, and self-discipline to bridge ontology and ethical praxis.

During the Northern and Southern Dynasties period in China, the introduction of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra translation significantly accelerated the rise of Buddha-nature thought as a crucial theoretical concern within Chinese Buddhism. Jizang lived during a period when discussions on Buddha-nature were widely prevalent. Although his teachings followed the Madhyamaka tradition, he naturally addressed issues related to Buddha-nature and provided responses to them.

At the time, debates on Buddha-nature in Chinese Buddhism primarily revolved around two key questions: first, what is the meaning of Buddha-nature? Second, do all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature (Liu 1985b, p. 203; Yang 1989, p. 74)?

Regarding the first question, Jizang, in the third volume of his work, Discussion of the Profundity of Mahāyāna (大乘玄論, Dasheng Xuanlun),3 hereafter DSXL, outlines different theories of Buddha-nature proposed by eleven schools and subsequently critiques them. His criticism is based on the notion that these explanations of Buddha-nature fundamentally relied on the concept of “the principle [which ensures] the attainment of Buddhahood” (得佛之理, de fo zhi li) (Liu 1985a, p. 179).4 For Jizang, however, “the principle [which ensures] the attainment of Buddhahood” still implies a form of “attainment” (有得, you de), which contrasts with the notion of “non-attainment” (無得, wu de) that emerges from the premise of emptiness (Yang 1989, pp. 221–22). Following his refutation of the “Buddha-nature theories of the eleven schools”, Jizang proposes his own definition of Buddha-nature, which is encapsulated in his well-known statement: “neither the ultimate nor the conventional but the middle way is the proper cause of Buddha-nature” (非真非俗中道為正因佛性也, fei zhen fei su zhong dao wei zheng yin fo xing ye).5 This statement asserts that Buddha-nature is grounded in the Middle Way, transcending both ultimate and conventional truths.

Regarding the second question, Jizang essentially accepts the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra’s view that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature. However, in DSXL, Jizang proposes another significant view—that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature”. Jizang was the first figure in the history of Chinese Buddhist philosophy to suggest this, namely, that not only sentient beings but also insentient entities such as plants possess Buddha-nature. From this assertion follows an ethical outlook that emphasizes the equality of plants, animals, and humans.

Turning to Jizang’s response to the first question mentioned above, scholars have generally interpreted Jizang’s definition of Buddha-nature through his critique of the Buddha-nature theories prevalent during the Northern and Southern Dynasties. This interpretation is primarily understood within the framework of deconstructing the substantialist view of Buddha-nature, aligning it with the Middle Way Buddha-nature theory (Liu 1985b, pp. 203–67; 2008, pp. 79–106; Yang 1989, pp. 221–52). Recently, Jenny Hung successfully consolidated previous academic research on Jizang’s Buddha-nature theory, reconciling the tension between the non-empty Buddha-nature and the universal emptiness emphasized in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and Madhyamaka philosophy. Furthermore, Hung specifically illustrated that Jizang’s theory of eternal Buddha-nature is not merely an ontological assertion but also carries practical implications (Hung 2025). These developments indicate that Jizang’s Buddha-nature theory continues to attract scholarly attention within the evolving framework of academic research.

This paper focuses on Jizang’s response to the second question, particularly emphasizing his distinctive view that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature”. Over the years, numerous interpretations of Jizang’s argument have been proposed. For instance, Ming-Wood Liu interprets Jizang’s view through the sage’s perspective of the Middle Way, which seeks to dissolve the distinction between sentient and insentient beings (Liu 2008, pp. 104–5). Heng-Ching Shih, on the other hand, considers Jizang’s statement to be negative and static, suggesting that it can be understood in terms of the “Middle Way Buddha-nature” (Shih 1997, pp. 254–58). Chih-Mien A. Tseng examined Jizang’s argument from the dual perspectives of epistemology and ontology (Tseng 2014, pp. 130–82). Meanwhile, Schmithausen posits that Jizang believed grasses and trees to be “mere images in the mind and thus integrated into sentient beings, so that they must also participate in the Buddha-nature of the latter” (Schmithausen 2009, p. 137). Shuman Chen asserts that Jizang acknowledges the Buddha-nature of insentient beings such as grasses and trees through the concept of non-dual emptiness. However, Chen emphasizes that Jizang’s perspective should be regarded as theoretical and philosophical rather than practical or broadly applicable (Chen 2014, p. 208). Sharf highlights that, for Jizang, the concept of “Buddha-nature” is merely another way of affirming emptiness, dependent origination, and the Middle Way. From this perspective, the distinction between sentient and insentient beings disappears. Nevertheless, Jizang also asserts that a certain distinction between sentient and insentient beings can still be maintained in a particular sense. Consequently, while Jizang is recognized as the first figure in Chinese Buddhism to openly propose that insentient beings possess Buddha-nature, his position remains consistent with the doctrine of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, which asserts that only sentient beings can possess Buddha-nature (Sharf 2007, pp. 212–13).

Based on the above discussion, it can be observed that the discourse surrounding Jizang’s argument that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature”, along with current related research, has largely focused on exploring Jizang’s Middle Way Buddha-nature theory within the ontological framework of emptiness and non-emptiness, particularly in terms of its philosophical implications. Meanwhile, there have been relatively few detailed analyses of the complexity of Jizang’s reasoning itself. Although Hung has highlighted the practical implications of Jizang’s Buddha-nature theory, her analysis is primarily based on Jizang’s interpretation of the notion that “Buddha-nature is eternal” (Hung 2025).

I depart from these explanations to focus specifically on the reasoning behind Jizang’s argument that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature”, paying particular attention to its ethical implications.

To better contextualize the significance of Jizang’s argument, it is important to consider the broader landscape of contemporary Buddhist ethical studies. While recent scholarship has made progress in Buddhist ethics, particularly in relation to early Buddhism, discussions specifically addressing Chinese Madhyamaka ethics—and especially Jizang’s unique argument that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature”—remain limited.

Contemporary discourse on Buddhist ethical studies appears to be gradually reaching maturity; however, in comparison with the discourse on the ethics of early Buddhism (Harvey 2000; Keown 2001, 2005), the ethical framework of Mahāyāna Buddhism still appears to be relatively weak on the surface. Although there has been an attempt in recent years to reflect on Madhyamaka ethics in terms of different theories, such as consequentialism, ontology, and so on (Cowherds 2016), discussions specific to Chinese Madhyamaka ethics remain to be seen. As far as ethical matters related to plants and Buddha-nature are concerned, for example, only a handful of scholars have explored the issue of “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” (Schmithausen 2009, pp. 258–59; Harvey 2000, pp. 166–67) or reflected on Chinese Buddhist vegetarianism from the perspective of non-killing (Pu 2014). In the Chinese Buddhist landscape specifically, there are many aspects of Buddhist ethics that have yet to be uncovered.

If we delve a bit deeper into the research outcomes of contemporary Buddhist ethics on the question in Chinese Buddhism of whether grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature, we find that apart from the discussions by Schmithausen and Harvey, the majority are focused on environmental ethics based on the standpoint of Tiantai Zhanran’s (天台湛然) “non-sentient beings possess Buddha-nature” (無情有性, wuqing you xing). That said, Schmithausen and Harvey’s discussions of Jizang’s statement on Buddha-nature are limited, and I believe a more in-depth reflection and evaluation of the topic is warranted.

Building upon this background, a closer examination of Jizang’s argument is essential for understanding its deeper philosophical and ethical implications.

Jizang’s argument is, in fact, quite complicated. In his argument regarding the Buddha-nature of grasses and trees, he logically demonstrates the various aspects of “whether grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature or not” and “whether sentient beings possess Buddha-nature or not”. It is vital to note that Jizang’s concept regarding the Buddha-nature of grasses and trees is not restricted to literal interpretation but indeed carries rich philosophical significance.

In this article, I will, therefore, firstly analyze Jizang’s argument that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” and subsequently reflect on the meta-theory of his argument from which the moral thinking that insentient plants and sentient beings are equal can be deduced. I will discuss the practical model of this ethical outlook and finally elaborate on the theoretical relevance and value of Early Chinese Madhyamaka ethics.

2. The Two Main Propositions in Jizang’s DSXL for Discerning Whether or Not “Grasses and Trees Possess Buddha-Nature”

I would like to start by giving some historical context to Jizang’s claim. In the Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition, discussions on Buddha-nature are limited to sentient beings alone, and insentient beings are excluded from consideration. For example, the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra states that “non-Buddha-nature” refers to insentient things such as walls and fences, tiles, and stones. That which is other than such insentient things is what is called “Buddha-nature”.6 In the DXSL, Jizang puts forward the idea that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature”. According to the abovementioned quote in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, grasses and trees are insentient things. Therefore, in this statement, Jizang was the first in the history of Chinese Buddhism to propose that insentient beings possess Buddha-nature.

In the DSXL, Jizang provides an extensive exposition of the concept of Buddha-nature on the grounds of the “Ten Paths” (十門, shimen) and further develops his unique view of the Middle-Way Buddha-nature. More specifically, Jizang’s view regarding the Buddha-nature of grasses and trees is derived from the seventh path of the significance of Buddha-nature, recorded in the DSXL as follows: “Discern Buddha-nature by means of the significance of within or beyond the principle (理, li)”.7 Jizang himself considered this to be the most incomprehensible proposition. In an effort to resolve this, Jizang puts forward two contrasting formulations:

Proposition 1 (P1): 

“There is Buddha-nature within the principle (理內, linei) and none beyond the principle (理外, liwai)”.

Proposition 2 (P2): 

“There is Buddha-nature beyond the principle and none within the principle”.8

These two propositions—P1 and P2—at first glance appear logically contradictory. P1 posits that only beings “within the principle” possess Buddha-nature, while those “beyond the principle” do not. In contrast, P2 asserts the opposite: that beings “beyond the principle” possess Buddha-nature, and those “within the principle” do not. However, if we take a deeper look at Jizang’s nuanced definitions of “beyond the principle” and “within the principle” in each case, it becomes evident that he applies distinct interpretative frameworks in each proposition. As such, the apparent contradiction can be resolved through contextual analysis.

First, let us begin with the proposition of P1. In the DSXL, Jizang states that “If all dharmas are said to arise and cease, they are “beyond the principle” (理外, liwai) and belong to the external path. If all dharmas are without arising and cessation, they are “within the principle” (理內, linei) and belong to the internal path. Therefore, it is now clarified that to arouse the aspiration and awaken to the non-arising and non-ceasing—as discerned in the Prajñāpāramitā—is called the internal path”.9 In this context, Jizang defines “beyond the principle” as referring to the conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta), which are characterized by arising and extinction and thus manifest as impermanence. Conversely, “within the principle” refers to the emptiness of all phenomena and the unconditioned principle (asaṃskṛta), which are devoid of arising and extinction. Accordingly, Jizang identifies the “principle” in “beyond the principle” as the doctrine of dependent origination, which pertains to conditioned, impermanent phenomena. Meanwhile, the “principle” in “within the principle” is identified as emptiness, which denotes the ultimate nature of reality as free from inherent existence. In other words, the concepts of “beyond the principle” and “within the principle” signify departing from dependent origination and realizing emptiness, respectively. This refined understanding highlights that Jizang’s framework distinguishes between the conditioned realm of impermanence and the unconditioned realm of ultimate emptiness as the guiding principles for discerning the nature of Buddha-nature. In addition to this ontological explanation, Jizang’s discussion here also addresses whether the ability to comprehend the principle of dependent origination and emptiness serves as the basis for distinguishing between what is “beyond the principle” and what is “within the principle”. Once this key point is clarified, Jizang’s rationale for asserting that all beings—including insentient entities—possess Buddha-nature within the principle, and none beyond it, appears all the more coherent.

I will divide Jizang’s argument into two parts. The first relates to the metaphor of water in fire, and the second relates to inferring whether grasses and trees have Buddha-nature based on the theory of “non-self-character” (anātmākāra), as presented in the Diamond Sutra. Both are arguments by analogy. Regarding the first argument, Jizang provides the following statement in the DSXL:

Someone asked: Do sentient beings of “beyond the principle” possess Buddha-nature? Or do sentient beings of “within the principle” possess Buddha-nature? Reply: To ask whether sentient beings of “beyond the principle” possess Buddha-nature does not constitute a question. Why is it so? For if there are no sentient beings “beyond the principle”, then there is no reason for asking whether the sentient beings of “beyond the principle” possess Buddha-nature? This is therefore like asking about water within a fire: it fundamentally does not exist, so how can we ask about where the water of the fire came from? Thus, since there are no sentient beings “beyond the principle”, it follows that there is no Buddha-nature.10

In this argument, Jizang proposes that there are no sentient beings beyond the principle of dependent origination. Asking whether the sentient beings of beyond all phenomena possess Buddha-nature would be comparable to seeking water within fire. Thus, as far as Jizang is concerned, all phenomena arise through dependent origination, including sentient beings; therefore, there can be no sentient beings to contemplate outside of dependent origination. And without sentient beings, of course, there can be no Buddha-nature to speak of. This is the reason why Jizang states that “there is no Buddha-nature beyond the principle”.

Furthermore, Jizang draws on the principle of non-discrimination from the Diamond Sūtra’s exposition of non-form (無相wuxiang, asaṃjñā) to illustrate that if a person or a sage grasps at the form or appearance of me, people, and sentient beings, then neither the person nor the sage has Buddha-nature. From this, Jizang then deduces that all sentient phenomena, including grasses and trees, have no Buddha-nature. His argument is as follows:

The Sūtra states, “If a Bodhisattva apprehends a self, a person or a sentient being, then he or she is not a ‘Bodhisattva’”. Therefore, neither self nor person, nor even a contemporary person possesses Buddha-nature. It is not only ordinary persons who do not possess Buddha-nature, Arhats likewise do not possess Buddha-nature. By this significance, not only is there is no Buddha-nature in grasses and trees, but there is also no Buddha-nature in sentient beings. If you wish to be clear on which phenomena possess Buddha-nature, (then know that) not only sentient beings possess Buddha-nature, but grasses and trees also possess Buddha-nature. In this way those who possess Buddha-nature in “within the principle” can be distinguished from those who do not possess Buddha-nature in “beyond the principle”.11

By analyzing Jizang’s argument, we can see that he employs as the basis for determining “beyond the principle” and “within the principle” not only the ontological principle of dependent origination but also the additional criterion of whether or not someone can comprehend emptiness without clinging to any outward appearances—specifically, the conditioned appearances arising through dependent origination. The so-called “beyond the principle” refers to those who do not comprehend emptiness and cling to attachments, which is a condition Jizang refers to in his texts as “delusion regarding provisional designation” (假名惑, jiaminghuo), meaning being confused by and attached to a person in terms of conditioned arising (假人, jiaren).12 In contrast, “within the principle” refers to those who comprehend the emptiness of all phenomena. Based on this, Jizang states that “there is Buddha-nature within the principle”.

According to the two arguments contained in P1, two different interpretations of Jizang’s so-called “beyond the principle” are possible. The first interpretation outlines two categories of phenomena: that which is outside of dependent origination and those who do not fully comprehend dependent origination and emptiness. Whatever falls into these two categories does not possess Buddha-nature. The second interpretation, on the other hand, is that, based on the fact that all beings beyond the principle do not possess Buddha-nature, Jizang suggests that all beings within the principle do. In accordance with this “principle”, he then infers that all sentient beings, even insentient grasses and trees, possess Buddha-nature. As a matter of fact, this point of view is founded upon the premise of an understanding of dependent origination and the emptiness of all phenomena, by which all things are equal. And from this angle of equality, sentient beings and grasses are equal in possessing Buddha-nature.13

In accordance with the view that “sentient beings within the principle possess Buddha-nature, and so do the grasses and trees”, Jizang promulgates a view of equality that is founded on a theoretical understanding of dependent origination and emptiness, and then proceeds on a practical level to regard all phenomena from within world view constructed by this understanding.

My personal view is that Jizang deduces the proposition that all things are equal from the ontological principles of dependent origination and emptiness. Without practical implementation, this concept of equality would remain merely on the theoretical or ontological level and thus be devoid of ethical significance. Jizang’s view obviously does not stop at ontological equality but rather takes dependent origination and emptiness as the guiding principles for practitioners’ behavior, with the main aim being the realization of the great ideal of equality of all things on a practical level. In Jizang’s own words, “If you aware (悟, wu) that all phenomena are equal, you will not see the two characteristics of circumstantial and direct rewards (依正二相, yi zheng er xiang). In reality, there is no such thing as perfection and non-perfection; all things are perfection. If people become Buddhas, according to this significance, all grasses and trees also become Buddhas. If all sentient beings attain Buddhahood (成佛, cheng fo), all grasses and trees also attain Buddhahood”.14 Obviously, the “awareness” and “attainment of Buddhahood” that Jixiang refers to here contain an element of practical implementation. Jizang calls this ideal the “holistic perspectives of non-obstruction of the Mahāyāna” (大乘無礙, dasheng wuai), and establishes as the “universal path” (通門, tongmen) the equality of all sentient beings and grasses and trees possessing Buddha-nature based on dependent origination and emptiness.15

That being said, because the equality advocated by Jizang in the “universal path” is established from the ontological principles of dependent origination and emptiness, he employs a deductive method by taking the Buddha-nature of all sentient beings to arrive at the proposition that grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature. The conclusion is that the ideal is deduced from the principle, not from the fact that grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature. This can be seen based on the fact that Jizang first defines the “universal path” and then outlines his position on the “particular path” (別門, biemen) soon thereafter. Contrary to his proposition in the “universal path” that grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature, Jizang claims in the “particular path” that “all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature, while grasses and trees do not possess Buddha-nature”. Here, Jizang moves away from the criterion of comprehending dependent origination and emptiness as the deciding factor to determine whether sentient beings, plants, and trees possess Buddha-nature. Instead, he employs the concept of “mind” (心, xin) to adjudge whether or not there is Buddha-nature. Jizang holds that because sentient beings are subject to “mental delusion”, this very affliction renders them capable of awakening through the realization of emptiness—a transformative process that arises from the condition of delusion itself. Grasses and trees, however, lack both mind and the delusive afflictions that would necessitate liberation. Therefore, they are excluded not because they have no defilement to overcome but because they lack the very conditions—cognitive function and affliction—required for engaging in the soteriological process. To clarify the role of “mental delusion”, Jizang’s reasoning presupposes that the capacity for awakening (and thus for realizing Buddha-nature) hinges on the presence of both mind and affliction. It is precisely because sentient beings are entangled in delusions and misapprehensions about reality that they are also capable of undergoing the transformative process of awakening through insight into emptiness. In other words, delusion is not a disqualifier but a precondition for liberation, insofar as it creates the existential condition that necessitates and enables the realization of truth. By contrast, grasses and trees lack such delusion, not because they have transcended it but because they were never burdened with it to begin with. Thus, they also lack the condition from which the transformative realization of emptiness can arise. In Jizang’s framework, this absence of delusion corresponds not to an already awakened state but to a lack of the very potential that makes awakening meaningful. This distinction is essential to understanding why he denies Buddha-nature to grasses and trees in the “particular path” while affirming ethical equality through dependent origination in the “universal path”. Based on this, from the perspective of the “particular path”, Jizang advocates for the view that “since sentient beings possess Buddha-nature they can attain Buddhahood, but because grasses and trees are devoid of Buddha-nature, they cannot attain Buddhahood”.16

After establishing his first major proposition (P1), Jizang outlines his second (P2). His approach in P2 is different from that in P1. Here, Jizang distinguishes between “within the principle” and “beyond the principle” based on the criterion of whether or not someone can comprehend the “principle” of “non-attainment (無得, aprāptitva)”. Jizang defines “within the principle” as a sentient being capable of comprehending “non-attainment”. Such sentient beings do not need to possess Buddha-nature because they have achieved perfection and thus comprehend the true nature of reality. Beings who are “beyond the principle”, on the other hand, have not yet fully achieved “non-attainment”, and, hence, they still need to rely on Buddha-nature as a potentiality for approaching true reality. Jizang’s rationale can be seen from the following:

To clarify “there is Buddha-nature beyond the principle and none within the principle”; the following was stated in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra: “As far as any conceivable form of beings is conceived: all these must be led to extinction (Nirvāṇa), into that realm which leaves nothing behind. And yet, although innumerable beings have thus been led to extinction, no being at all has been led to extinction”. The Avataṃsaka Sūtra furthermore states that: “All sentient beings attained the equal and true realm of dharma, and yet in reality none at all have attained it”. With regard to the statement that ‘all beings attained the equal and true realm of dharma’, know that this refers to the sentient beings of beyond the principle. Similarly, ‘in reality none at all have attained it’ refers to the sentient beings of within the principle. Within the principle, in reality no sentient beings have attained extinction. You should know that since there are no sentient beings in the principle (who attained it), there is also no Buddha-nature. Beyond the principle there are sentient beings who can attain (extinction), thus it is said that beyond the principle there is Buddha-nature.17

According to Jizang’s explanation, the deciding factor for distinguishing “beyond the principle” and “within the principle” lies in whether or not one has comprehended the true nature of reality and reached non-attainment (入無所入, ru wusuoru). “Within the principle” thus signifies having comprehended the true nature of reality and having attained non-attainment. Such a person, therefore, manifests a state of “having reached attainment and yet not having reached attainment at all”. This refers to a saintly being who has cut their afflictions, who, by virtue of no longer being classified as a sentient being, does not possess Buddha-nature. Conversely, sentient beings “beyond the principle” are yet to cut their afflictions, and, therefore, still have the potential to realize the true nature of reality and reach non-attainment. Based on this reasoning, Jizang proposes that there is Buddha-nature within “beyond the principle” sentient beings, and, as such, they have the potential to attain Buddhahood. Having established his proposition for P2, Jizang then immediately moves on to negate the tetralemma or “four alternative assumptions” (四句 si ju, catuṣkoṭi)18 as a means to demonstrate that all phenomena, including grasses and trees, are equal and nondual. Through his double negation of the contradiction between “within the principle” and “beyond the principle” of both P1 and P2, Jizang is able to reveal “the proper cause of Buddha-nature”.19

From this analysis, Jizang’s rationale for claiming in P1 that grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature becomes more clear: he makes this statement on the grounds of the concept of “equality”, which is itself deduced from the theories of dependent origination and emptiness. As previously noted, Jizang’s orientation shifts from the ontological to the epistemological to develop the ethical ideal of how to observe and treat oneself as well as others and the environment based on a worldview that incorporates this thorough understanding of dependent origination and emptiness. As such, it is a theoretical ideal and, indeed, a theoretical “Ought”. As for the aspect of “Is”,20 Jizang was of the opinion that grasses and trees are not subject to “mental delusions”, and hence they have no afflictions to cut, and as a result there they do not possess Buddha-nature. Although Jizang does not directly deal with whether or not grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature here, once he establishes the concept of “non-attainment” in P2, he outlines on this basis the equality of sentient beings and grasses and trees through his elucidation of “the proper cause of Buddha-nature”.

We can now summarize Jizang’s two major propositions. Firstly, Jizang clearly differentiates P2 from P1 by establishing that the meaning of “the principle” in P2 refers to the realization of “non-attainment”, whereas the different “the principle” in P1 refers to dependent origination and emptiness. He also contrasts P2 with P1 by establishing that in P2, “beyond the principle” refers to “non-attainment”, whereas in P1, “beyond the principle” refers to that which is beyond dependent origination. Second, in P1 “within the principle” refers to sentient beings who have the capacity to comprehend dependent arising and emptiness and thus possess Buddha-nature, whereas in P2, “beyond the principle” refers to those who have cut their afflictions and attained Nirvāṇa, according to which they can no longer be classified as sentient beings, and as such they do not possess Buddha-nature. Third, I propose that Jizang’s discussion of Buddha-nature in P1 occurs in the context of an ontological framework, while in P2, the focus is on practical philosophy. The seemingly contradictory nature of P1 and P2 mainly stems from confusion about Jizang’s references to the “principle”. Based on the above analysis, however, this literal contradiction is not inherently problematic. Lastly, Jizang’s claim that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” derives from the concept of “equality”, which is deduced from the ontology of dependent origination and emptiness. Jizang concludes on these grounds that “equality” applies to sentient beings as well as insentient grasses and trees. The “equality” referred to here is a behavior or moral disposition cultivated by the practitioner through a thorough understanding of dependent arising and emptiness and then internalized as the practitioner’s behavior or moral disposition toward others and the environment. Therefore, the concept of “equality” employed in the proposition of P1 is a dynamic process of development which moves from ontology to epistemology, and finally on to the cultivation of virtue, while P2 serves to demonstrate the equality and non-duality of grasses and trees and sentient beings in relation to the ideal and ultimate result of Buddhist practical philosophy (i.e., non-attainment).

3. Two Possible Moral Grounds for Jizang’s Argument That “Grasses and Trees Possess Buddha-Nature”

Before unraveling the Buddhist ethics of Jizang’s statement that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature”, it would be helpful to first explore the significance of Buddha-nature in the context of ethical studies. According to Harvey, the concept of Buddha-nature in Mahāyāna Buddhism is “a basis for respecting all beings” (Harvey 2000, p. 35). This perspective establishes Buddha-nature as the root for ethical contemplation and very much provides an explanation for the origin of our moral ideals. Sevilla offers a similar line of reasoning (Sevilla 2010, pp. 212–52), despite employing the Dōgen view of Buddha-nature in Japanese Buddhism as his foundation for demonstrating human rights issues. While this line of enquiry provides an ontological foundation for moral practice, I would like to highlight another ethical dimension of Jizang’s concept of Buddha-nature.

Because Buddha-nature is the potential by which a person can purify defilements, and on that basis strive to attain Buddhahood, this is also what allows a person to engage in the dynamic process of purifying their own mental state and correcting wrong behaviors whilst gradually advancing on the path towards liberation in order to attain the final ideal of Nirvāṇa or Buddhahood. In saying that, we can establish that the ethical thinking pertaining to Buddha-nature is not merely an ontological exploration of the source of our moral foundations, but that the self-discipline that needs to be cultivated by a practitioner as they strive to purify their afflictions and progress along the path to liberation is indeed a fundamental aspect of ethics (Chinese Mahyamaka ethics or Jizang’s Chinese Madhyamaka ethics). In the same vein, Garfield highlights the example of Buddhaghosa to illustrate that moral theory is not merely an external moral principle but a path of self-purification in the form of “cultivation as a psychophysical process as the content of ethics”. He further concludes that “an ethical life is a life on this path” (Garfield 2022, pp. 93–7). Although Garfield does not explicitly deal with the ethical implications of Buddha-nature here, it echoes my thinking that the dynamic journey from self-purification to Nirvāṇa can be freed from ontological presupposition. Within this moral structure, Buddha-nature serves as a potentiality for the self-directed cultivation of virtue and ethical accomplishment, which allows for the continuous self-correction of behaviors and purification of one’s state of mind. The aim of this paper is to show that the theoretical validity of the concept of Buddha-nature presented above is equally applicable to Jizang’s proposition of P2 because it establishes “nonattainment” on the grounds of eliminating their afflictions. It is my view that avoiding evil and cultivating good in the process of eliminating defilements and moving towards liberation has an explicit ethical connotation. Chappell presents a similar view in the first two points of his threefold emphasis of Mahāyāna ethics (Chappell 1996, p. 351). Christopher Queen likewise echoes this sentiment by way of his discipline and virtue in the four styles of Buddhist ethics (Queen 2000, p. 11). When viewed in this sense, Jizang’s ethical hypothesis presented in P2 does not necessarily establish the ethical significance of Buddha-nature based on an ontological premise, instead reflecting on Buddha-nature as a type of self-cultivation, which forms a necessary part of the practical approach to liberation.

In addition, from our analysis of P1, two propositions can be obtained: First, from an ethical perspective fostered through observations of dependent origination and emptiness, grasses and trees should have Buddha-nature. Second, from the factual perspective that grasses and trees do not possess the same potentiality for eliminating their afflictions as sentient beings, grasses and trees do not have Buddha-nature. Irrespective of which of the two positions Jizang takes, the proposition that “grasses and trees have Buddha-nature” is only considered on the level of morality pertaining to “ought” and not on the level of “is”. Joyce defines moral anti-realism as “the denial of the thesis that moral properties—or facts, objects, relations, events, etc. (whatever categories one is willing to countenance)—exist objectively” (Joyce 2021). Jizang’s proposition in P1 can likewise be said to comprise a moral anti-realist stance because he does not regard “grasses and trees have Buddha-nature” as a moral fact from either the perspectives of “is” or “ought”. While this ethical interpretation is very convincing, I am of the opinion that any account of the ethical implications of “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” presented in P1 is best sought from Jizang’s own arguments.

Having outlined Jizang’s rationale for claiming that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” in both his propositions of P1 and P2—which, as mentioned, is entirely based on the premise of moral “ought” or the ideal of moral practice rather than moral fact—we are in a better position to consider the ethical significance of his claim from the perspective of “ought”. From both P1 and P2, we can derive the ethical perspective of regarding all phenomena with “equality”. This very much aligns with the approach Macrea employs in moral psychology on the basis of “equanimity” or the four immeasurable states of mind according to which the treatment of all sentient beings as equal is seen as a sort of “neutral” attitude (McRae 2018, p. 343). Jizang’s text prompts further investigation into the possible reasons for adopting such a moral stance. In P1, Jizang advocates for the cultivation of an ethical perspective through which a practitioner “ought” to treat all phenomena as equal based on a thorough understanding of dependent origination and emptiness; in P2, he proposes that based on “nonattainment”, grasses and trees and all sentient beings ought to be regarded as equal and nondual.

In this article, I aim to show that Jizang uses the proposition that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” to demonstrate such a moral imperative or moral “ought”. This type of “ought” is not merely a type of moral attitude, however; it also encompasses appropriate moral understanding on the part of the practitioner to initiate how moral judgements “ought” to be made or how moral behavior “ought” to be initiated from appropriate intention. Based on this, I propose that the ethical outlook promulgated by Jizang’s claim that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” is an account of a practitioner’s moral literacy or moral accomplishment. To quote Herman’s definition, moral literacy is a “basic learned capacity to acquire and use moral knowledge in judgement and action” (Herman 2008, p. 80). With this understanding, we can appreciate that Jizang’s claim that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” is not a proposition that remains stuck in moral dogma. Instead, it serves as a reminder that from the time of making moral judgments and inferences all the way to initiating our intentions and even acting on them, a practitioner should maintain a certain moral sensitivity from which to apply their rational moral understanding to make judgments and proceed with actions. The idea of equality concluded from the premise that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” represents a shift from a proper understanding of dependent origination and emptiness to the inner moral stance of the practitioner, from which judgements and behavior ultimately ensue.

Based on the above analysis, it is clear that Jizang’s argument concerning the claim that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” reflects two distinct yet complementary ethical perspectives. P1 emphasizes moral cognition and moral sensitivity, suggesting that practitioners should cultivate an ethical perspective of equality through an understanding of dependent origination and emptiness. In contrast, P2 centers on the concept of non-attainment, emphasizing self-cultivation and purification as the path to transcend distinctions between phenomena, ultimately realizing the equality between insentient beings such as plants and sentient beings.

While P1 focuses on the establishment of moral cognition, P2 highlights the deepening of moral practice. Together, these two propositions construct the comprehensive framework of Jizang’s ethical thought regarding the Buddha-nature of grasses and trees. This ethical framework, grounded in emptiness and non-attainment, underscores the distinctive nature of Jizang’s ethical view and reveals the unique characteristics of Chinese Madhyamaka ethics, which cannot be adequately explained by any single Western ethical theory, such as consequentialism, deontology, or virtue ethics. Garfield offers a similar observation in his study of Buddhist ethics. He notes that Buddhist ethical thought comprises diverse texts that address moral issues, virtue, and character. However, Buddhist ethics lacks an explicit articulation of universal and definitive moral principles. Buddhist moral philosophers deliberately avoided constructing a systematic metaethical framework. As such, understanding Buddhist ethics requires interpreting it within its own tradition rather than through the lens of Western ethical models (Garfield 2022, p. 18).

Despite this similarity, there are notable differences between Jizang’s ethical thought and Garfield’s interpretation. Garfield contends that Buddhist ethics cannot be confined to any single Western ethical theory due to several key factors: its emphasis on the complex roots of suffering, the cultivation of virtues, the regulation of actions, and the transformation of intentions as a means to achieve liberation. Additionally, Buddhist ethics interprets human actions through the concept of dependent origination and evaluates pleasure and pain in ways that differ from Western ethical traditions (Garfield 2022, pp. 18–21). In contrast, Jizang’s ethical thought places greater emphasis on the role of correct understanding as the foundation for moral cultivation within a practical context. This “correct understanding” refers to the appropriate realization of emptiness. Although Jizang similarly emphasizes the elimination of afflictions and liberation as core aspects of Buddhist ethics, he distinctly underscores the concept of non-attainment. Through this notion, Jizang asserts that one can recognize the non-differentiation between plants and sentient beings, thereby deriving an ethical view of equality. Moreover, Jizang’s emphasis on non-attainment implies that all ethical perspectives must account for varying contexts and cannot be confined to any single theoretical framework. This critical distinction highlights the fundamental difference between Jizang’s ethical thought and Garfield’s interpretation.

In light of the distinctive features of Jizang’s ethical thought discussed above, it is evident that the version of Chinese Madhyamaka ethics represented by Jizang cannot be adequately interpreted through any Western ethical construct. Rather than attempting to frame Jizang’s ethics within a fixed Western model, I propose possible interpretations of the ethical implications based on Jizang’s original writings. Furthermore, owing to Jizang’s emphasis on the concept of non-attainment, no fixed-type ethical theory would be compatible with Jizang’s refutation of the tetralemma or the theoretical and practical accounts of non-attainment.

By grounding my analysis in Jizang’s original texts, I aim to demonstrate that Jizang’s ethical framework presents a distinctive model of Chinese Madhyamaka ethics—one that integrates moral cognition, self-cultivation, and the wisdom of non-attainment to shape a dynamic and context-sensitive ethical perspective.

4. Conclusions

This article has analyzed the two primary propositions in Jizang’s discourse on the notion that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature”, with the aim of illustrating that, although these two propositions may appear contradictory on the surface, Jizang employs distinct interpretative frameworks in each to establish the decisive criterion for determining whether sentient beings and plants possess Buddha-nature. In P1, Jizang adopts the concepts of “dependent origination” and “emptiness” as the foundation for his argument on Buddha-nature, whereas in P2, he employs the concept of “non-attainment” as the key criterion.

In P1, Jizang asserts that the claim that grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature exists only on the normative level of “ought” rather than the factual level of “is”. This perspective emphasizes the cultivation of moral cognition and moral sensitivity, encouraging practitioners to develop an ethical outlook of equality through a proper understanding of dependent origination and emptiness. Accordingly, Jizang asserts that all entities—including both sentient and insentient beings—should be regarded as equal in moral considerations. While this ethical outlook is grounded in theoretical understanding, it also carries profound practical significance.

In contrast, P2 emphasizes the deepening of moral cultivation and practice. Through the concept of “non-attainment”, Jizang highlights the process of self-cultivation and the purification of afflictions as the central pathway to achieving the ideal of equality. P2 not only transcends ontological discourse but also presents an ethical model rooted in practical philosophy. This model underscores the dynamic process through which practitioners continuously purify their mental states and adjust their behavior to ultimately achieve liberation. As a result, P2 reveals the practical and transformative dimensions of Jizang’s ethical thought, with “non-attainment” serving as the key concept for transcending distinctions within the phenomenal realm and achieving the vision of equality.

From this analysis, it becomes evident that Jizang’s ethical thought represents a unique moral model that integrates theoretical understanding with practical application. His framework emphasizes both moral cognition and self-cultivation, and through the wisdom of “non-attainment”, Jizang presents a dynamic and context-sensitive ethical outlook.

Based on the above analysis, it is clear that the Chinese Madhyamaka ethics represented by Jizang cannot be fully interpreted through any single Western ethical theory, such as consequentialism, deontology, or virtue ethics. Rather than attempting to frame Jizang’s ethical thought within Western ethical models, a more appropriate method is to analyze Jizang’s original texts and interpret his thought within the context of the Buddhist tradition itself. This approach offers a more precise and comprehensive understanding of the depth and complexity of Jizang’s ethical thinking.

In conclusion, this article argues that Jizang’s view that “grasses and trees possess Buddha-nature” reveals a distinctive model of Chinese Madhyamaka ethics—a dynamic and contextually adaptive ethical framework that integrates moral cognition, self-cultivation, and the wisdom of “non-attainment”.