Search Results (21)

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) are an integral part of modern society and are used in various industries, providing users with positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT). However, their effectiveness is vulnerable to signal interference, since GNSSs are based on received satellite signals from space, and that can severely impact applications that rely on continuous and accurate data. Interference can pose significant risks to sectors dependent on GNSSs, including transportation, telecommunications, finance, geodesy, and others. For this reason, in parallel with the development of GNSSs, various interference protection techniques are being developed to enable users to receive GNSS signals without the risk of interference, which can cause various effects, such as reducing the accuracy of positioning, as well as completely blocking signal reception and making it impossible to obtain positioning. There are various sources and methods of interfering with GNSS signals, and the greatest consequences are caused by intentional interference, which includes jamming, spoofing, and meaconing. This study investigates the effects of jamming devices on static GNSS observations using high-accuracy devices through multiple controlled experiments using both single-frequency (SF) and multi-frequency (MF) jammers. The aim was to identify the distances within which signal interference devices disrupt GNSS signal reception and position accuracy. The research conducted herein was divided into several phases where zones within which the jammer completely blocked the reception of the GNSS signal were determined (blackout zones), as were zones within which it was possible to obtain the position (but the influence of the jammer was present) and the influence of the jammer from different directions/azimuths in relation to the GNSS receiver. Various statistical indicators of the jammer’s influence, such as DOP (dilution of precision), SNR (signal-to-noise-ratio), RMS (root mean square), and others, were obtained through research. The results of this study indicate that commercially available, low-cost jamming devices, when operated within manufacturer-specified distances, completely disrupt the reception of GNSS signals. Their impact is also evident at greater distances, where they significantly reduce SNR values, increase DOP, and decrease the number of visible satellites, leading to reduced measurement reliability and integrity. These results underline the necessity of developing effective protection mechanisms against GNSS interference and strategies to ensure reliable signal reception in GNSS-dependent applications, particularly as the use of jamming devices becomes more prevalent. Full article

The jamming of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) is now a major threat for GNSS-based Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) users. A jammed receiver will lose its fix at a certain distance and will not be able to provide PNT information. At greater distances, there will be a fix, so this PNT information can be obtained; however, the information will be less accurate, as the carrier-to-noise ($C/N_0$) ratios of the received signals will be suppressed by the jammer. In this paper, the pseudo-range accuracy of a GNSS receiver under jamming conditions is investigated in order to provide more insight into the effects of a jammer on the accuracy of a GNSS receiver. The theory available in the literature will be reviewed, after which this theory will be evaluated by comparing the theoretical results with actual measurements using a high-end GNSS signal simulator and a software-defined GNSS receiver. Full article

NovAtel has recently leveraged its expertise in both receiver design and anti-jam technology to develop solutions for space- and weight-constrained applications in challenged GNSS environments. Robust Dual-Antenna Receiver (RoDAR), is based on a commercial dual-antenna receiver, originally designed for attitude determination, and employs special firmware to mitigate jammers and spoofers without an increase in size or power consumption. With RoDAR, the multi-frequency, multi-constellation dual-antenna receiver is capable of null-steering at two different frequency bands (e.g., L1 and L5). In September 2022, the Norwegian Public Roads Administration hosted JammerTest, a live, over-the-air broadcast jamming and spoofing test. This paper presents the jamming and spoofing detection and mitigation performance of RoDAR during this live broadcast test. The interference detection provides spectrum monitoring and jamming characterization on all GNSS bands. The mitigation is carried out by steering a null formed on-board the receiver towards a jamming/spoofing source at GPS L1 and L5 bands. The null steering performance is characterized as a function of signal and position availability compared to a non-protected NovAtel receiver. The effectiveness of the anti-jam and anti-spoofing technology is demonstrated using representative complex spoofing and jamming test cases during this event. Full article

Nowadays, commercial aeronautical Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) receivers are more and more exposed to Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) threats from GNSS jammers and spoofers. On commercial aircraft GNSS, receiver outputs, in general, are integrated or cross-monitored with other navigation sensors such as IRS and DME, etc., and, in many cases, the GNSS receiver outputs are used directly by on-board aircraft systems. The advent of modernized dual-frequency and multi-constellation signals will improve the availability and integrity of GNSS receivers in the presence of RFI. To be further resilient to the various types of RFI threats, the airborne GNSS receiver will need to perform additional receiver-based detection/mitigation techniques and should be able to determine position integrity in the presence of spoofers. This paper focuses specifically on two techniques under development that will be incorporated via a field loadable software update to the GLU-2100. The first method, Receiver Autonomous Signal Authentication (RASA), and a second type of technique, Staggered Examination of Non-Trusted Receiver Information (SENTRI). The paper will provide a brief description of the RASA and SENTRI algorithms, followed by results from both simulation and real-world tests. Finally, the limitations of the algorithms will also be provided. Full article

Smartphones now dominate the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) devices capable of collecting raw data. However, they also offer valuable research opportunities in intentional jamming, which has become a serious threat to the GNSS. Smartphones have the potential to locate jammers, but their robustness and sensitivity range need to be investigated first. In this study, the response of smartphones with dual-frequency, multi-constellation reception capability, namely, a Xiaomi Mi8, a Xiaomi 11T, a Samsung Galaxy S20, and a Huawei P40, to various single- and multi-frequency jammers is investigated. The two-day jamming experiments were conducted in a remote area with minimal impact on users, using these smartphones and two Leica GS18 and two Leica GS15 geodetic receivers, which were placed statically at the side of a road and in a line, approximately 10 m apart. A vehicle with jammers installed passed them several times at a constant speed. In one scenario, a person carrying the jammer was constantly tracked using a tacheometer to determine the exact distance to the receivers for each time stamp. The aim was, first, to determine the effects of the various jammers on the smartphones’ positioning capabilities and to compare their response in terms of the speed and quality of repositioning with professional geodetic receivers. Second, a method was developed to determine the position of the interference source by varying the signal loss threshold and the recovery time on the smartphone and the decaying carrier-to-noise ratio (CNR). The results indicate that GNSS observations from smartphones have an advantage over geodetic receivers in terms of localizing jammers because they do not lose the signal near the source of the jamming, but they are characterized by sudden drops in the CNR. Full article

Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) array antenna receivers are effective for suppressing wideband jamming. However, its anti-jamming performance decreases sharply when the number of wideband interference surpasses the number of array elements. Since a large number of jammers are often used in navigation countermeasures, it is crucial to keep array antenna receivers available in such conditions. Aiming at this issue, two main tasks were performed in this research and are presented in this paper: Firstly, the direction sensitivity of the sup-freedom anti-jamming performance is revealed and an anti-jamming method for array antenna receivers based on antenna rotation is proposed. Secondly, in order to determine the optimal rotation angle rapidly, a variable-step iteration algorithm based on gradient descent is proposed. Theoretical analysis and simulation show the effectiveness of the proposed anti-jamming method and the efficiency of the implementation algorithm. In a typical airborne scenario with a maximum azimuth difference of 90°, the anti-jamming ability of the proposed method improved by 21~26 dB and 5~10 dB for arrays adopting the PI (power inversion) and MVDR (minimum variance distortionless response) algorithms, respectively. The iterative efficiency improved by 78.35–99.63% in comparison with a traversal of 0.1° search resolution. The proposed method and algorithm are not limited to airborne scenarios and they might be influential to anti-jamming algorithms in the data domain. Full article

When satellite navigation terminal sensors encounter malicious signal spoofing or interference, if attention is not paid to improving their anti-spoofing ability, the performance of the sensors will be seriously affected. The global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing has gradually become a research hotspot of the jammer because of its great harm and high concealment. In the face of more and more sensors coupling GNSS and inertial measurement unit (IMU) to varying degrees and configuring a variety of anti-spoofing techniques to effectively detect spoofing, even if the spoofer intends to gradually pull the positioning results, if the spoofing strategy is unreasonable, the parameters of the coupled filter output and spoofing observation measurement will lose their rationality, which will lead to the spoofing being detected. To solve the above problems, in order to effectively counter the non-cooperative target sensors of assembling loosely coupled GNSS/IMU using GNSS spoofing, based on the analysis of the influence mechanism of spoofing on the positioning of loosely coupled GNSS/IMU, a slowly varying spoofing algorithm to avoid loosely coupled GNSS/IMU with multiple anti-spoofing techniques is proposed in this paper, and a measurement deviation determination method to avoid multiple anti-spoofing techniques is proposed, which can gradually pull the positioning results of the coupled system and successfully avoid the detection of anti-spoofing techniques of innovation sequence monitoring and a rationality check on parameters. Simulation experimental results show that the proposed algorithm gradually changes the positioning of loosely coupled GNSS/IMU, the north and east displacements achieve the purpose of spoofing, and error with expected offset is −0.2 m and 2.3 m, respectively. Down displacement also basically achieves the purpose of spoofing, and error with the expected offset is 13.2 m. At the same time, the spoofer avoids the detection of multiple anti-spoofing techniques, does not trigger the system alarm, and realizes the purpose of spoofing; thus, the effectiveness and high concealment of the spoofing algorithm are verified. Full article

The performance of global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers is significantly affected by interference signals. For this reason, several research groups have proposed methods to mitigate the effect of different kinds of jammers. One effective method for wide-band interference mitigation (IM) is the high-rate DFT-based data manipulator (HDDM) pulse blanker (PB). It provides good performance to pulsed and frequency sparse interference. However, it and many other methods have poor performance against wide-band noise signals, which are not frequency-sparse. This article proposes to include automatic gain control (AGC) in the HDDM structure to attenuate the signal instead of removing it: the HDDM-AGC. It overcomes the wide-band noise limitation for IM at the cost of limiting mitigation capability to other signals. Previous studies with this approach were limited to only measuring the carrier-to-noise density ratio ($C/N_0$) performance of tracking, but this article extends the analysis to include the impact of the HDDM-AGC algorithm on the position, velocity, and time (PVT) solution. It allows an end-to-end evaluation and impact assessment of mitigation to a GNSS receiver. This study compares two commercial receivers: one high-end and one low-cost, with and without HDDM IM against laboratory-generated interference signals. The results show that the HDDM-AGC provides a PVT availability and precision comparable to high-end commercial receivers with integrated mitigation for most interference types. For pulse interferences, its performance is superior. Further, it is shown that degradation is minimized against wide-band noise interferences. Regarding low-cost receivers, the PVT availability can be increased up to 40% by applying an external HDDM-AGC. Full article

Interference multipath is an important factor to affect the anti-jamming performance for the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) antenna array receiver. However, interference multipath must be considered in practical application. In this paper, the antenna array model for interference multipath is analyzed, and an equivalent model for interference multipath is proposed. According to the equivalent interference multipath model, the influence of interference multipath on anti-jamming performance is analyzed from the space only processing (SOP) and space-time adaptive processing (STAP). Interference multipath can cause loss of the degree of freedom (DoF) of SOP. Through analysis of the equivalent model and STAP mechanism, it further reveals how the STAP can solve the interference multipath. The simulation experiments prove that the equivalent model is effective, and the analysis conclusion is correct. This paper also points out that the interference bandwidth is wider and more taps in STAP are required, under the same experiment conditions. Full article

Robust autonomous driving, as long as it relies on satellite-based positioning, requires carrier-phase-based algorithms, among other types of data sources, to obtain precise and true positions, which is also primarily true for the use of GNSS geodetic receivers, but also increasingly true for mass-market devices. The experiment was conducted under line-of-sight conditions on a straight road during a period of no traffic. The receivers were positioned on the roof of a car travelling at low speed in the presence of a static jammer, while kinematic relative positioning was performed with the static reference base receiver. Interference mitigation techniques in the GNSS receivers used, which were unknown to the authors, were compared using (a) the observed carrier-to-noise power spectral density ratio as an indication of the receivers’ ability to improve signal quality, and (b) the post-processed position solutions based on RINEX-formatted data. The observed carrier-to-noise density generally exerts the expected dependencies and leaves space for comparisons of applied processing abilities in the receivers, while conclusions on the output data results comparison are limited due to the non-synchronized clocks of the receivers. According to our current and previous results, none of the GNSS receivers used in the experiments employs an effective type of complete mitigation technique adapted to the chirp jammer. Full article

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) jamming is an acute problem in the world of modern navigation. As more and more applications rely on GNSS for both position and timing, jamming ramifications are becoming more severe. In this paper we suggest a novel framework to cope with these threats. First, a Bayesian jamming detection algorithm is introduced. The algorithm can both detect and track several jammers in a pre-defined region of interest. Then, a jamming coverage map algorithm is offered. Similar to cellular $3G/4G$ coverage maps, such a map can detect “weak” GNSS reception spots and handle them. Since jamming interference can be a dynamic phenomenon (e.g., a vehicle equipped with a jammer), the coverage map changes with time. Thus, interference patterns can be detected more easily. Utilizing the offered algorithm, both on simulation and field experiments, we have succeeded to localize an arbitrary jammer(s) within the region of interest. Thus, the results validate the viability of the proposed method. Full article

Radio frequency fingerprinting (RFF) methods are becoming more and more popular in the context of identifying genuine transmitters and distinguishing them from malicious or non-authorized transmitters, such as spoofers and jammers. RFF approaches have been studied to a moderate-to-great extent in the context of non-GNSS transmitters, such as WiFi, IoT, or cellular transmitters, but they have not yet been addressed much in the context of GNSS transmitters. In addition, the few RFF-related works in GNSS context are based on post-correlation or navigation data and no author has yet addressed the RFF problem in GNSS with pre-correlation data. Moreover, RFF methods in any of the three domains (pre-correlation, post-correlation, or navigation) are still hard to be found in the context of GNSS. The goal of this paper was two-fold: first, to provide a comprehensive survey of the RFF methods applicable in the GNSS context; and secondly, to propose a novel RFF methodology for spoofing detection, with a focus on GNSS pre-correlation data, but also applicable in a wider context. In order to support our proposed methodology, we qualitatively investigated the capability of different methods to be used in the context of pre-correlation sampled GNSS data, and we present a simulation-based example, under ideal noise conditions, of how the feature down selection can be done. We are also pointing out which of the transmitter features are likely to play the biggest roles in the RFF in GNSS, and which features are likely to fail in helping RFF-based spoofing detection. Full article

Since radio frequency interference (RFI) seriously degrades the performance of a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver, interference detection becomes very important for GNSS receivers. In this paper, a novel rearranged wavelet–Hough transform (RWHT) method is proposed in GNSS interference detection, which is obtained by the combination of rearranged wavelet transform and Hough transform (HT). The proposed RWHT method is tested for detecting sweep interference and continuous wave (CW) interference, the major types of GNSS interfering signals generated by a GNSS jammer in a controlled test bench experiment. The performance of the proposed RWHT method is compared with the conventional techniques such as Wigner–Ville distribution (WVD) and Wigner–Hough transform (WHT). The analysis results show that the proposed RWHT method reduces the influence of cross-item problem and improves the energy aggregation property in GNSS interference detection. When compared with the WHT approach, this proposed RWHT method presents about 90.3% and 30.8% performance improvement in the initial frequency and chirp rate estimation of the GNSS sweep interfering signal, respectively. These results can be further considered to be the proof of the validity and effectiveness of the developed GNSS interference detection method using RWHT. Full article

Jamming is becoming a serious threat to various users of global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). Therefore, live monitoring tests are required to estimate the sensitivity range of GNSS receivers under jamming. This study analyses the response of some mass-market and professional-grade receivers to intentional interferences based on different 3D jammer positions. First, the vertical jamming was investigated, followed by a horizontal experiment where the receivers were placed at three locations while the jammer was moving within a triangular area. The aim was to determine a fingerprint of the influence of the L1/E1 chirp jammer on receivers used in the research. The results show that low-cost receivers are much more susceptible to interference, while the latest generation of GNSS geodetic receivers are much more resilient. It is encouraging that positioning in the presence of jamming could be achieved on a larger scale, especially by using professional receivers. An attempt to position the jammer will be left for trials when a more frequency stable device is applied. Full article

Many tasks performed by swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles require localization. In many cases, the sensors that take part in the localization process suffer from inherent measurement errors. This problem is amplified when disruptions are added, either endogenously through Byzantine failures of agents within the swarm, or exogenously by some external source, such as a GNSS jammer. In this paper, we first introduce an improved localization method based on distance observation. Then, we devise schemes for detecting Byzantine agents, in scenarios of endogenous disruptions, and for detecting a disrupted area, in case the source of the problem is exogenous. Finally, we apply pool testing techniques to reduce the communication traffic and the computation time of our schemes. The optimal pool size should be chosen carefully, as very small or very large pools may impair the ability to identify the source/s of disruption. A set of simulated experiments demonstrates the effectiveness of our proposed methods, which enable reliable error estimation even amid disruptions. This work is the first, to the best of our knowledge, that embeds identification of endogenous and exogenous disruptions into the localization process. Full article