Search Results (19)

This paper explores the relationship between John Cage’s seminal work 4′33″ and the philosophies of Zen and Mahāyāna Buddhism, while reflecting on the limitations of Western philosophical frameworks in cross-cultural musical analysis. Existing scholarship has primarily focused on musical structure, performance practice, audience perception, and interpretations through Western theories such as those of Ludwig Wittgenstein and postmodernism, with limited attention to the influence of Eastern philosophy on Cage’s creative thought. Drawing on Mahāyāna concepts including emptiness, dependent origination, and the Two Truths, this study argues that the work’s use of silence encourages contemplation of the impermanence and relational nature of all phenomena. The paper further critiques the tendency to impose Western theoretical models upon Eastern thought, advocating instead for an experience-centred approach to cross-cultural analysis. It contends that 4′33″ is not merely an experimental musical work, but also a practical manifestation of Zen philosophy at the auditory and perceptual levels. Full article

Alphonse Mucha’s oeuvre is frequently categorized as a formalist paradigm of ornamentation within the Art Nouveau movement. This study, however, contends that Mucha’s signature Q Formula is far from a mere aesthetic redundancy or a utilitarian embellishment; rather, it manifests as Autonomous Ornament—an autonomous generative process and an inherent rhythm. Adopting a synchronic structural perspective that transcends linear historical causality, this research frames ornament as a dynamic relational medium connecting individual perception with collective evolution across geocultural boundaries. With Theosophy serving as a historical mediation and synthesizing Rudolf Arnheim’s psychology of visual perception with Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of the ornamental refrain (ritornello), this paper traces the cross-cultural construction of the Q Formula—from Mucha’s Moravian Catholic roots to the avant-garde Theosophical milieu of Paris. Through a horizontal comparative analysis with contemporary fin-de-siècle artists—specifically contrasting Gustav Klimt’s ornamental dissolution and Aubrey Beardsley’s ironic fragmentation—the study underscores Mucha’s distinct integrative strategy. Furthermore, it demonstrates a profound structural homology in topological energy between the Q Formula and the Eastern Kālacakra Mandala. Within this pure and vital ornamental logic, the circular main body acts as a centripetal anchor referencing Emptiness (Śūnyatā), while the boundary-crossing media serve as a metaphor for centrifugal Dependent Origination (Pratītyasamutpāda) and worldly manifestation through clothed repetition. Such ornamental rhythms collapse the classical hierarchy between structure and surface. Amidst the pervasive anxiety of fin-de-siècle industrialization, these forms exerted a visual soothing function, providing deep emotional and psychological efficacy. Mucha’s ornamental schemata reveal how repetitive and structural rhythms successfully transmuted traditional religious paradigms into channels for the internal integration of the modern subject. The paper thus reaffirms ornament as a form of critical imagination and an independent artistic force, which not only reshapes the psychological homeostasis of the modern subject but also constructs a profound resonance between form and life within a cross-cultural context. Full article

This article argues that lotus and dharma wheel motifs in the Dunhuang Mogao Caves function not merely as decorative symbols but as active visual apparatuses that generate embodied religious experience through a mechanism we term “totemic mediation.” Drawing on Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist reading of totemism, Descola’s ontological framework, Gell’s theory of art as agency, Meyer’s “sensational form,” and Varela’s neurophenomenology, we define totemic mediation as a triadic mechanism encompassing material–spatial arrangement, ontological transformation of experiential states, and value structure generation. We analyze motifs from Mogao Caves 285, 329, and 361 using a five-step analytic framework: formal–visual description, reconstructed embodied viewing, doctrinal identification, mediation mechanism analysis, and evaluative assessment. The analysis demonstrates that the lotus mediates ontologically along a spatial axis, building a vertical channel between the worldly and the divine through ceiling configurations and upward gazes, while the dharma wheel mediates teleologically across the temporal axis, neutralizing linear temporality through rotational dynamics. Together, these motifs constitute “visual prajñā”—a nonconceptual, embodied cognitive effect that bypasses discursive reasoning to enable direct apprehension of śūnyatā (emptiness). This article offers a replicable analytic framework for examining how religious images operate simultaneously as visual apparatuses and ontological mediators. Full article

The Diamond Sutra and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, though grounded in distinct traditions, converge in their critique of the substantial “self,” revealing it as a fantasy produced by symbolic or conceptual structures. The Sutra dismantles attachment to “name-and-form,” asserting that realizing emptiness (śūnyatā) entails realizing non-self (anātman). Lacan, through the mirror stage, the Symbolic Order, and the Real, exposes the subject’s alienation within language, where desire continually circles around a constitutive lack. Both disclose that symbolic systems simultaneously generate and obscure reality. Practically, the Diamond Sutra prescribes the letting-go of all attachments—“letting the mind function without abiding anywhere”—while Lacan’s ethics of “traversing the fantasy” calls for confronting one’s fundamental lack and assuming responsibility for desire. By juxtaposing their approaches to the deconstruction of ego-fantasy, critique of symbolic mediation, and transcendence of illusion, this paper illuminates a shared insight into the interrelation of desire, language, and the real. Full article

International scholars have frequently interpreted Sengzhao’s 僧肇 Things Do Not Shift (wubuqianlun 物不遷論, hereafter TDNS) as reflecting the doctrinal positions of the Sarvāstivāda or Sautrāntika schools. This paper argues that the core issue lies in the relationship between Sengzhao’s concept of “not shifting” and Kṣaṇikavāda (the theory of momentary arising and ceasing). A genealogical examination reveals that this interpretive view originated during the Tang dynasty—particularly in Chengguan’s 澄觀 citation of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (hereafter AKBh), which includes a dual-layered implication: both “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda (cha’na shengmie buqian 剎那生滅不遷)” and “not shifting based on śūnyatā (xingkong buqian 性空不遷)”. However, Chengguan did not make a conclusive judgment. This dual implication was already clearly distinguished by Yanshou 延壽 in the late Tang period. Yanshou pointed out that “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda” presupposes the real existence of dharmic entities, whereas Sengzhao’s view belongs to the Mahāyāna orientation of “not shifting based on śūnyatā”—thus marking a fundamental doctrinal distinction. In contrast, by the late Ming period, Zhencheng 镇澄 misinterpreted Chengguan’s argument out of context and reduced it to a heterodox doctrine of “not shifting based on the abide of inherent nature (xingzhu buqian 性住不遷)”. Later Ming masters such as Deqing 德清, Zhenjie 真界, and Huanyou 幻有 also emphasized the dual aspects in Chengguan’s explanation and directly refuted Zhencheng’s misreading. Therefore, the issue in equating Sengzhao’s TDNS with “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda” does not lie in the difference between “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda” and “not shifting based on śūnyatā” as this distinction was acknowledged on both sides. Rather, the key lies in identifying the doctrinal basis of Sengzhao’s argument: to which category does it properly belong? To answer this, the paper analyzes the conceptual structure of TDNS in contrast to the idea of “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda”, and finds a fundamental divergence in their understanding of whether phenomena are subject to arising and ceasing. Sengzhao’s notion of TDNS is not the same as the concept of “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda”. It will then analyze the differences between the two in their understandings of substance and time, revealing a fundamental divergence in their perspectives on whether phenomena undergo arising and cessation. Sengzhao’s concept in TDNS is not equivalent to the notion of “not shifting based on Kṣaṇikavāda”, nor are they congruent in terms of the consequent conceptions of entities, time, and the view of temporal flow that emerge from these respective frameworks. Full article

Jñānakīrti (Tib. Ye shes grags pa), an eminent monk of the late Indian Buddhist period, composed the Tattvāvātara (De kho na nyid la ’jug pa, Realizing Reality), of which only a Tibetan translation exists in the Tibetan Tripiṭaka-Tanjur. The treatise is considered an exposition of the Mahāmudrā teachings, with the chapter entitled “Practices of the Secret Mantra Approach” (gSang sngags kyi sgo’i spyod pa) forms a large part. However, this part has been less frequently discussed. This chapter guides the practice of Mahāmudrā non-dual yoga, which is intended for practitioners with superior faculties. The core content of this chapter can be subsumed under the following two aspects: Mahāmudrā teachings involve practicing insight (prajñā), which represents the theory of meditation, i.e., the idea of emptiness (śūnyatā); it also involves practicing skillful means (upāya), which includes the methods of cultivation, such as tantric rituals such as Vajradhātu maṇḍala visualization. From the perspective of compositional length, the first half of the text contains numerous quotations of verses, with several being from Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, while the second half mainly draws references from the Tattvasaṃgrahatantra and the Guhyasamājatantra. More attention should be paid to the juxtaposition of the Mahāmudrā teachings with the Tattvasaṃgrahatantra and the Guhyasamājatantra, which reflect the early form of the Mahāmudrā teachings as they were introduced into Tibetan Buddhism. Full article

The early encounters between Buddhism and Christianity in China were primarily characterized by mutual exclusivity and competition. By the Republic of China era, both traditions faced mounting pressures—Buddhism under the impact of modernization, and Christianity in its efforts toward indigenization—which prompted a shift toward inclusive engagement and mutual learning. However, their interactions often remained limited to superficial formalities due to an instrumental approach that treated the other as a means to an end. During the early modern period, some pioneering thinkers began exploring core doctrines from a pluralistic perspective: Zhang Chunyi’s concept of “Buddhicized Christianity” sought to deconstruct essentialist views using the Buddhist wisdom of śūnyatā (emptiness), offering an Eastern philosophical pathway for religious dialogue. Xu Dishan, on the other hand, employed the literature as a medium to transcend doctrinal differences by emphasizing shared ethical practices, thereby constructing what can be termed “aestheticized pluralism”. In the contemporary context of globalization, scholars increasingly rely on comparative theology and comparative religious studies to enable deeper mutual interpretation of core doctrines, bringing more mature forms of interfaith dialogue. These dialogue practices demonstrate unique paradigm shifts and reflections on Western theories of religious dialogue, contributing Eastern-inspired insights for contemporary religious dialogue. Full article

In discussions of whether Nāgārjuna was an ontological realist or a nihilist, one key concept is omitted from most discussion: the “that-ness” (tattva) of phenomenal reality that is revealed once our conceptual overlay is removed. Once his notion of tattva is understood as a central element in his ontology, the idea that he was a full-blown nihilist disappears. Full article

This paper explores the role of forgetting in the thought of the Korean Sŏn (Chan in Chin.; Zen in Jpn. 禪) master Chinul (知訥, 1158–1210), situating it within broader East Asian philosophical and Buddhist discourses. While the concept of forgetting has often been treated negatively in Western philosophy—as a cognitive failure or loss—this study draws on recent comparative scholarship, including Youru Wang’s reading of Zhuangzi, to show how forgetting can be reframed as a conscious spiritual and philosophical practice. In particular, this paper examines how Chinul integrates the practice of forgetting into a systematic Buddhist framework grounded in no-self (anātman), emptiness (śūnyatā), and the unity of samādhi and prajñā. In Straight Talk on the True Mind (Chinsim chiksŏl 眞心直說), Chinul outlines ten distinct methods for cultivating no-mind by offering interpretations of teachings from various East Asian Chan masters. Through a detailed analysis of Chinul’s Chinsim chiksŏl, this paper argues that forgetting—when understood as the deliberate letting go of discursive thought, deluded conceptualizations, and habitual dualisms—becomes a powerful method for revealing the true mind. Ultimately, Chinul’s philosophy of forgetting offers a unique account of cognitive transformation—one that challenges conventional epistemologies and calls for a reorientation of perception itself. Therefore, Chinul’s teachings on no-mind and forgetting offer a profound understanding of how deconstructing ingrained cognitive habits can lead to the emergence of enlightened awareness, providing valuable insights into the transformative processes at the heart of East Asian Sŏn Buddhist practice. Full article

This paper aims to juxtapose bodhisattvas, awakened beings recognized in various Buddhist traditions and contemporary philosophies, as viewed through different lenses: as personified symbols, idealistic visions, mystical manifestations, naturalized sentient beings, and integral visions. Specific attention is given to the contrasting bodhisattva motivations and ideals articulated in Theravāda and Mahāyāna Buddhism as well as secularized psychospiritual–philosophical Western conceptions in neurophysicalism (naturalized bodhisattva) and participatory spirituality and theory (integral bodhisattva). The paradox of the traditional bodhisattva is to liberate oneself and all sentient beings by ending suffering and to act compassionately while realizing emptiness (Skt., śūnyatā), though with different conceptions undergirding ultimate realization. The paradoxical nature of bodhisattvas is discussed in regard to illusional ideation, moral agency, mystical nature, idealized devotion, and naturalized form. The ethical underpinnings of the traditional Buddhist bodhisattva notions and non-Buddhist ethics of Western bodhisattva conceptions are critically examined. Finally, the Buddhist and secular morals of bodhisattvas are discussed in the context of the moral relativism of the Post-Truth culture in the United States. Full article

With the introduction of the theory of śūnyatā (emptiness 空) in Madhyamaka philosophy from India to China, Indian Buddhism and Chinese culture have achieved a historic new convergence in their understanding of emptiness. After several evolutions of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy, some people agree with it, while some question it, and the discussion around it has been very complicated. Determining how to fully understand and scientifically conceive of the core idea of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy and its contemporary value have become important issues in related research. Most of the existing research focuses on the theoretical interpretation of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy, but understanding and research from the perspective of life practices are still quite scanty, hindering the attainment of a comprehensive understanding and objective cognition of this theory’s actual value. The purpose of this paper is to strengthen the practical research on the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy in order to fully understand and scientifically conceptualize its core ideas and contemporary value. From the two basic perspectives of past and present, in regard to both theory and practice, we will re-explore the core ideas of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy and investigate and analyze corresponding theoretical doubts. We further reveal that the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy is not only a metaphysical philosophical theory in which the nature of the world is regarded as empty and its logic as consistent but also a practical piece of wisdom that views the world as empty so as to eliminate all kinds of life troubles and help people attain a better life experience. The dialectical wisdom of both the theory and practice of the theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka philosophy gives it very broad theoretical potential and practical prospects, making it worthy of in-depth study by relevant researchers. Full article

One recurrent criticism of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) is its equation with a potential axiological nihilism that undermines, inter alia, the telos of Buddhist practice. Here, I speculate that Madhyamaka non-foundationalism could be compatible with the naturalized teleology of C.S. Peirce. In brief, Peirce argues on pragmatic grounds that the ‘final cause’ of events does not refer to a predetermined finis ultimis or summum bonum with any ‘intrinsic nature’ (‘svabhāva’). Rather, a final cause is a general continuum of lawfulness (‘Third’/future) that mediates between indeterminate possibility (‘First’/present) and determinate actuality (‘Second’/past). Therefore, while a continuum of ‘purposiveness’ is a rational precondition for all temporal events, its futural significance means it can only ever be asymptotically realized; indeed, the constitutively general form of each ‘final’ cause is, practically speaking, fundamentally vague and open-ended to some degree. Finally, I show that the so-called strange attractors of dynamical systems theory provide an imperfect model for this naturalized ‘groundless teleology’. Full article

The concepts of emptiness and nothingness are extremely important in Eastern as well as Western spiritual traditions. In East Asia, they are relevant in Daoism, Confucianism (in the context of integrating Daoist ideas) and Buddhism (in Śūnyatā), while in the European Christian discourse they are significant in the context of creatio ex nihilo, kenotic theories, individual self-emptying out of humility and Nihilianism. These concepts have formed and continue to form the basis of important intercultural interactions, influencing philosophical and scholarly discourse in both the “East” and “West” to the present day. This article compares the perception of emptiness/nothingness from two representatives of Protestantism: the Korean Christian philosopher Ryu Yongmo (1890–1981, pen name Tasŏk) and the Moravian missionary Isaac Jacob Schmidt (1779–1847), who was a pioneer of Buddhist studies in Europe. A comparison between Schmidt and Tasŏk is important, because tracing the evolution of the worldview of both thinkers reveals a great similarity in how they reconciled the spiritual heritage of Asia with the principles of Western Protestant Christianity despite their different backgrounds. It also could shed new light on the possibility of dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism, especially in the context of two major philosophical systems of Mahāyāna Buddhism: Yogācāra and Mādhyamika, which were once so important in East Asia. In addition, it is exactly the interpretation of emptiness/nothingness that forms the cornerstone of the analogy of the religious–philosophical ideas of the two thinkers compared in the article. Full article

Historical transmission and other controversies related to Sengzhao’s Things Do Not Shift have long been a subject of scholarly attention. However, his essay Emptiness of the Nonabsolute has been insufficiently studied, despite being traditionally deemed emblematic of the Chinese understanding of Mādhyamaka philosophy. The present study shows that this essay has also historically generated divisions and debates in the Chinese context. It finds that Emptiness of the Nonabsolute expresses the Mādhyamaka philosophy of emptiness in a distinctly Chinese manner by grounding itself in the principle of dependent origination, and by transforming issues of being and nonbeing and the name and the “thing-in-itself” into conditional emergence. Nevertheless, Sengzhao’s essay evoked the two markedly distinct construals of Buzhengukong 不真故空 and Bushizhenkong 不是真空 as Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature philosophy within Chinese Buddhism. Bushizhenkong directly aligned Sengzhao’s ostensibly representative theory of Mādhyamaka emptiness in China with the doctrinal framework of Tathāgatagarbha and Buddha-nature, triggering almost a millennium-long period of discussions and controversies. Full article

Currently, artificial intelligence (AI) is gradually approaching or surpassing human level in terms of perceptual ability, computational ability, logical ability, and even language ability. However, the cognitive concepts proposed by Buddhism, such as “Twelve Factors”, “Eight Consciousness”, “Emptiness”, and “Middle Path”, do not seem to be able to be technically processed by artificial intelligence. The fundamental reason is that artificial intelligence, as an intelligence made by humans, can only intervene in the field of phenomena not the field of ontology. This is exactly the fundamental difference between humans and AI. Conversely, the fundamental difference between humans and AI provides a new perspective on “what is the noumenon”, which requires a re-cognition of ontology. Full article