Corporate Governance and Informational Risk

Dear Colleagues,

In today’s dynamic and increasingly complex business environment, the quality of information disclosed by firms is more crucial than ever. Informational risk—the uncertainty or unreliability surrounding the information that stakeholders rely upon to make decisions—has become a central concern in corporate finance, accounting, and strategy. This Special Issue brings together new insights and empirical evidence at the intersection of corporate governance and informational risk, exploring how governance structures, practices, and mechanisms influence firms’ transparency and the perceived credibility of their disclosures.

Corporate governance plays a pivotal role in mitigating informational risk. Effective governance not only aligns the interests of managers and shareholders but also improves the monitoring and oversight of financial and non financial reporting and disclosure practices. Conversely, weak governance frameworks can exacerbate information asymmetry, enable managerial opportunism, and erode investor confidence. In an era marked by heightened stakeholder scrutiny, regulatory evolution, and technological disruption, understanding the governance mechanisms that can reduce informational opacity is both theoretically relevant and practically urgent.

The themes explored in this Special Issue include, but are not limited to, the following:

• The role of board composition and independence in reducing informational risk;
• Ownership structure and transparency in financial and non-financial disclosures;
• Audit committee effectiveness and financial reporting quality;
• Executive compensation and risk-taking behavior in disclosure practices;
• Biodiversity disclosures;
• ESG disclosures and information asymmetry;
• Cross-country governance mechanisms and comparative informational risk;
• Technological innovation, governance, and data transparency.

The articles selected for this Special Issue address these themes from diverse perspectives, using a variety of methodological approaches and data sources. Together, they should contribute to a deeper understanding of how governance structures can serve as tools for reducing uncertainty, improving accountability, and fostering trust in the information disclosed by firms

Prof. Dr. Faten Lakhal
Guest Editor

Manuscript Submission Information

Manuscripts should be submitted online at www.mdpi.com by registering and logging in to this website. Once you are registered, click here to go to the submission form. Manuscripts can be submitted until the deadline. All submissions that pass pre-check are peer-reviewed. Accepted papers will be published continuously in the journal (as soon as accepted) and will be listed together on the special issue website. Research articles, review articles as well as short communications are invited. For planned papers, a title and short abstract (about 100 words) can be sent to the Editorial Office for announcement on this website.

Submitted manuscripts should not have been published previously, nor be under consideration for publication elsewhere (except conference proceedings papers). All manuscripts are thoroughly refereed through a single-blind peer-review process. A guide for authors and other relevant information for submission of manuscripts is available on the Instructions for Authors page. Journal of Risk and Financial Management is an international peer-reviewed open access monthly journal published by MDPI.

Please visit the Instructions for Authors page before submitting a manuscript. The Article Processing Charge (APC) for publication in this open access journal is 1400 CHF (Swiss Francs). Submitted papers should be well formatted and use good English. Authors may use MDPI's English editing service prior to publication or during author revisions.

• ownership
• corporate governance
• financial disclosure