Special Issue "Economic Behavior and Game Theory"

A special issue of Games (ISSN 2073-4336).

Deadline for manuscript submissions: closed (15 July 2018).

Special Issue Editor

Dr. Maria Bigoni
E-Mail Website
Guest Editor
Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Bologna 40126, Italy
Interests: experimental economics; game theory; bounded rationality; industrial organization

Special Issue Information

Dear Colleagues,

During the last three decades, the dialogue between game theory and experimental economics has produced a positive feedback loop, promoting the advancement of both fields. This Special Issue of Games is meant to encourage this prolific exchange, including papers that can contribute both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view. We welcome submission of game-theoretic models aiming at capturing regularities that emerge from laboratory experiments, as well as experiments designed to test theoretical predictions, or to explore issues on which the theory is silent or ambiguous. The list of keywords included below identifies some of the suitable topics, but it is not exhaustive. To promote the verifiability and replicability of empirical results, experimental papers should include a power analysis, and all data should be made available upon publication.

 

Dr. Maria Bigoni

Guest Editors

Keywords

  • bounded rationality
  • conflict
  • cooperation
  • coordination
  • equilibrium selection
  • focal points
  • information
  • learning
  • repeated games
  • social dilemmas

Published Papers (7 papers)

Order results
Result details
Select all
Export citation of selected articles as:

Research

Open AccessArticle
The Effect of Competition on Risk Taking in Contests
Games 2018, 9(3), 72; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030072 - 19 Sep 2018
Abstract
We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the effect of competition on risk taking in a contest in which players only decide on the level of risk they wish to take. Taking more risk implies a chance of a higher performance, but also implies a [...] Read more.
We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, the effect of competition on risk taking in a contest in which players only decide on the level of risk they wish to take. Taking more risk implies a chance of a higher performance, but also implies a higher chance of failure. We vary the level of competition in two ways: by varying the number of players (2 players versus 8 players), and by varying the sensitivity of the contest to differences in performance (lottery contest versus all-pay auction). Our results show that there is a significant interaction effect between the two treatments, suggesting that players are particularly prone to take more risks if both the number of players and the sensitivity to performance are higher. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Open AccessArticle
Instrumental Reciprocity as an Error
Games 2018, 9(3), 66; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030066 - 06 Sep 2018
Cited by 1
Abstract
We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is [...] Read more.
We study the strategies used by experimental subjects in repeated sequential prisoners’ dilemma games to identify the underlying motivations behind instrumental reciprocity, that is, reciprocation of cooperation only if there is future interaction. Importantly, we designed the games so that instrumental reciprocity is a mistake for payoff-maximizing individuals irrespective of their beliefs. We find that, despite the fact that instrumental reciprocity is suboptimal, it is one of the most frequently used cooperative strategies. Moreover, although the use of instrumental reciprocity is sensitive to the costs of deviating from the payoff-maximizing strategy, these costs alone cannot explain the high frequency with which subjects choose to reciprocate instrumentally. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Open AccessArticle
The Circulation of Worthless Tokens Aids Cooperation: An Experiment Inspired by the Kula
Games 2018, 9(3), 63; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030063 - 02 Sep 2018
Abstract
Many anthropological records exist of seemingly worthless tokens exchanged in traditional societies. The most famous instances of such tokens are probably the Kula necklaces and armbands first described by B. Malinowski. In our experiment, each participant can send a token to another participant [...] Read more.
Many anthropological records exist of seemingly worthless tokens exchanged in traditional societies. The most famous instances of such tokens are probably the Kula necklaces and armbands first described by B. Malinowski. In our experiment, each participant can send a token to another participant before each round of a repeated public good game. We use as examples of tokens a bracelet built by the participants in the lab, a simple piece of cardboard provided by the experimenter, and an object brought from home by the participants. Notwithstanding the cheap-talk nature of the decision to send the token, both sending and receiving the token are associated with a significant increase in contributions to the public good. Regression analysis shows that contributions to the public good in the treatments featuring a bracelet and a cardboard piece are higher than in a control study. The home object appears not to have been equally useful in increasing contributions. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Open AccessFeature PaperArticle
Preference Based Subjective Beliefs
Games 2018, 9(3), 50; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030050 - 16 Jul 2018
Abstract
We test the empirical content of the assumption of preference dependent beliefs using a behavioral model of strategic decision making in which the rankings of individuals over final outcomes in simple games influence their beliefs over the opponent’s behavior. This approach— by analogy [...] Read more.
We test the empirical content of the assumption of preference dependent beliefs using a behavioral model of strategic decision making in which the rankings of individuals over final outcomes in simple games influence their beliefs over the opponent’s behavior. This approach— by analogy with Psychological Game Theory—allows for interdependence between preferences and beliefs but reverses the order of causality. We use existing evidence from a multi-stage experiment in which we first elicit distributional preferences in a Random Dictator Game, then estimate beliefs in a related 2×2 effort game conditional on these preferences. Our structural estimations confirm our working hypothesis on how social preferences shape beliefs: subjects with higher guilt (envy) expect others to put less (more) effort, which reduces the expected difference in payoffs. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Open AccessArticle
The Patron Game: the Individual Provision of a Public Good
Games 2018, 9(2), 35; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020035 - 09 Jun 2018
Cited by 2
Abstract
The Patron Game studies the individual provision of a public good, i.e., a situation in which the cost of contributing exceeds by construction its private return (e.g., volunteering, Open Collaboration projects). We test the Patron Game in the lab finding that contributions are [...] Read more.
The Patron Game studies the individual provision of a public good, i.e., a situation in which the cost of contributing exceeds by construction its private return (e.g., volunteering, Open Collaboration projects). We test the Patron Game in the lab finding that contributions are high, though significantly lower than in a classic Public Good Game. Results show that demand effects and the warm glow of giving account almost entirely for the contributions, with the former playing the most prominent role. The social nature of the individual provision of a public good is confirmed by the fact that, even when the efficiency multiplier is removed, contributions are higher than in comparable Dictator Games. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Open AccessArticle
Intention-Based Sharing
Games 2018, 9(2), 22; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9020022 - 30 Apr 2018
Cited by 1
Abstract
How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on [...] Read more.
How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other’s intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Open AccessArticle
Examining Spillovers between Long and Short Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games Played in the Laboratory
Games 2018, 9(1), 5; https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010005 - 31 Jan 2018
Cited by 3
Abstract
We had participants play two sets of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD) games, one with a large continuation probability and the other with a small continuation probability, as well as Dictator Games (DGs) before and after the RPDs. We find that, regardless of which [...] Read more.
We had participants play two sets of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (RPD) games, one with a large continuation probability and the other with a small continuation probability, as well as Dictator Games (DGs) before and after the RPDs. We find that, regardless of which is RPD set is played first, participants typically cooperate when the continuation probability is large and defect when the continuation probability is small. However, there is an asymmetry in behavior when transitioning from one continuation probability to the other. When switching from large to small, transient higher levels of cooperation are observed in the early games of the small continuation set. Conversely, when switching from small to large, cooperation is immediately high in the first game of the large continuation set. We also observe that response times increase when transitioning between sets of RPDs, except for altruistic participants transitioning into the set of RPDs with long continuation probabilities. These asymmetries suggest a bias in favor of cooperation. Finally, we examine the link between altruism and RPD play. We find that small continuation probability RPD play is correlated with giving in DGs played before and after the RPDs, whereas high continuation probability RPD play is not. Full article
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
Show Figures

Figure 1

Back to TopTop