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Intention-Based Sharing

Department of Economics and Finance, Luiss Guido Carli, Rome, 00198, Italy
Politecnico di Milano, Milan, 20133, Italy
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, 53133, Germany
Department of Economics and Finance, University of Rome Tor Vergata, Rome, 00133, Italy
Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
Games 2018, 9(2), 22;
Received: 21 March 2018 / Revised: 23 April 2018 / Accepted: 24 April 2018 / Published: 30 April 2018
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Economic Behavior and Game Theory)
How are allocation results affected by information that another anonymous participant intends to be more or less generous? We explore this experimentally via two participants facing the same allocation task with only one actually giving after possible adjustment of own generosity based on the other’s intended generosity. Participants successively face three game types, the ultimatum, yes-no and impunity game, or (between subjects) in the reverse order. Although only the impunity game appeals to intrinsic generosity, we confirm conditioning even when sanctioning is possible. Based on our data, we distinguish two major types of participants in all three games: one yielding to the weakest social influence and the other immune to it and offering much less. This is particularly interesting in the impunity game where other-regarding concerns are minimal. View Full-Text
Keywords: (conditional) generosity; ultimatum game; yes-no game; impunity game; experiments (conditional) generosity; ultimatum game; yes-no game; impunity game; experiments
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MDPI and ACS Style

Di Cagno, D.; Galliera, A.; Güth, W.; Panaccione, L. Intention-Based Sharing. Games 2018, 9, 22.

AMA Style

Di Cagno D, Galliera A, Güth W, Panaccione L. Intention-Based Sharing. Games. 2018; 9(2):22.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Di Cagno, Daniela, Arianna Galliera, Werner Güth, and Luca Panaccione. 2018. "Intention-Based Sharing" Games 9, no. 2: 22.

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